




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THE LIFE

OF

FREDERICK WILLIAM VON STEUBEN.

MAJOR GENERAL IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

BY

FRIEDRICH KAPP.

"Omnia reliquit servare rempublicam."—*Motto of the Cincinnati.*

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

GEORGE BANCROFT.

SECOND EDITION.

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TO

The Memory

OF

FRIEDRICH ENGELS,

LATE MAJOR GENERAL IN THE PRUSSIAN ARMY, AND COMMANDANT OF
COLOGNE ON THE RHINE,

AN HONEST MAN, A BRAVE SOLDIER AND A TRUE FRIEND,

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED

BY HIS GRATEFUL SON-IN-LAW,

THE AUTHOR.



INTRODUCTION.

THE memory of Steuben has many claims upon the present generation. To the cause of our country in the times of its distress, he, at the sacrifice of a secure career, devoted the experience and skill, which had been the fruit of long years of service under the greatest master of the art of war of that day. He rendered the inestimable benefit of introducing a better rule into the discipline of the American army, and stricter accountability in the distribution of military stores. He served under our flag with implicit fidelity, with indefatigable industry, and a courage that shrunk from no danger. His presence was important both in the camp and on the field of battle; from the huts of Valley Forge to Yorktown; and he remained with us till his death.

Happily, a biographer has at last risen up, worthy and able to do justice to Steuben by a full sketch of the eventful story of his life. The interesting and well-written work of Friedrich Kapp, which is now laid before the public, has been prepared with a care-

ful and conscientious study of the best materials. The author has brought to his undertaking the scholarly habits and criticism of the learned men of Germany, and has left nothing within his reach unconsidered. We have in his production the most complete and trusty account of Steuben's career, drawn directly from contemporary sources, authenticated by the use of the original papers of Steuben himself. Neither has the zeal of the biographer led him to exaggerate the hero's merit; he is painted to the life with his defects and his great qualities. Full justice is also rendered to Washington; but of the character and career of Lafayette, I have formed an estimate widely different from that of the author of this biography.

It is not merely as the memorial of an eminent general of the Revolution, and a valuable contribution to the history of American independence, that this work has claims to consideration. It deserves special attention as a just tribute by one of our German fellow-citizens to the greatest military commander of German origin who took part in the vindication of our liberties. The Americans of that day, who were of German birth or descent, formed a large part of the population of the United States; they can not well be reckoned at less than a twelfth of the whole, and perhaps formed even a larger proportion

of the insurgent people. At the commencement of the Revolution, we hear little of them, not from their want of zeal in the good cause, but from their modesty. They kept themselves purposely in the background, leaving it to those of English origin to discuss the violation of English liberties and to decide whether the time for giving battle had come. But when the resolution was taken, no part of the country was more determined in its patriotism than the German counties of Pennsylvania and Virginia. Neither they nor their descendants have laid claim to all the praise that was their due. So that the effort to exhibit the achievements of one of their race in a clearer light deserves a willing recognition.

Another consideration enhances the interest of the subject. The number of those who have emigrated from Germany has increased, till the intelligence, the culture, as well as the people and the aspirations of Germany find here their representatives. It requires no prophetic eye to discern that the German mind, as represented by our German fellow-citizens, blending with the other elements which go to constitute the American people, is destined to exert a marked influence on America. The American Revolution,—having been wantonly opposed by a few of the minor princes, and loudly supported by the sympathies of Lessing, Klopstock, Schiller, Frederick the Great,

and so many more of that day,—is indissolubly connected with the traditions of central Europe. This circumstance, aided by a natural pride and interest in the large body of men of German descent in the United States, has exercised, and is destined yet more to exercise, a moulding influence on the thought, the political theories and institutions of Germany. The career of Steuben, who was born in Prussia, and took part in the great Seven Years' War for German liberty, before he became the fellow-laborer of Washington, is a ground on which these sympathies may come together; as he did not live to that period when our country heaped just rewards upon the surviving soldiers of the Revolution, our debt of gratitude is best acknowledged by a monument to his fame; and men of German origin on the Rhine or the Oder, on the James river or the Ohio, on the Mohawk or the Missouri, may join with the rest of us in approving an honest and hearty record of the worth and services of Steuben.

GEORGE BANCROFT.

NEW YORK, February 14, 1859.

P R E F A C E.

THE following pages constitute the first attempt that has ever been made at a complete biography of General Von Steuben. In submitting them to the American public, I flatter myself that my work will not be considered superfluous, and that it will be found to contain a considerable store of valuable and hitherto unpublished matter connected with the internal history of the American Revolution.

It is manifest that the obstacles in the way of publishing an historical work, were much more serious for a foreigner, to whom to think and write in a language not his own is difficult enough, than for a native of America. Nevertheless, from the moment I commenced the work, I have not allowed any sacrifice of time to deter me from reviving, by a description of his life, the memory of one whose participation in the achievement of the independence and freedom of this country has been so distinguished and meritorious as that of Steuben.

I am too well aware of the imperfections and advantages of this book, to allow a false modesty to prevent my alluding to them. To appreciate adequately Steuben's merit requires a profound military education. An officer of experience and talent is alone capable of treating the subject of this work in a perfect manner; and it was only because no one possessing this qualification seemed willing to perform the task, that I was induced to overcome my reluctance to undertake it. To supply my deficiency in this respect as much as possible, I have copied a number of important letters and other documents, which, I trust, will render it easy for every one versed in military matters to form a correct opinion, and make up for the many imperfections of my narrative. The arrangement

of my book may not be exactly in conformity with the artistic requirements of biographical writing ; but the fact that the greater part of my material is new, and hitherto unpublished, and that in order to attain my chief object, to portray Steuben in the light of his time and the judgment of his contemporaries, I was obliged to copy the greater number of the documents without abridgment, will, I hope, in some degree plead my excuse.

I conceive that one of the chief recommendations of this book will be found to be that it allows facts to speak for themselves, and limits the author's opinions to those statements which obviously need explanation. Had the material not been so very incomplete, that is, so full of gaps, I should have followed my first inclination, and have only given a carefully selected collection of the Steuben papers, critically and chronologically arranged ; for a good biography is only a single plank in the building which the historian puts together. The greater the amount of material it contains the better it is ; and the more reasoning it contains the worse it is. A great German philosopher, Ludwig Feuerbach, has written the life of his father, the great jurist, in this way, and has published a classical work which does not contain a single superfluous word, and teaches other authors a lesson of modesty and self-control. "Historians," says Feuerbach, "may be as proud as they please of their objectivity (Objectivität), but this, in reality, only consists in abstaining from speaking themselves, and in allowing the subject to speak directly for itself. Every one represents himself best."

For the same reason I have allowed, as much as possible, evidence and persons to speak for themselves, and certainly nobody can reproach me with having even partially adopted the "Fourth of July oration style." I believe that the biographical works relating to the period of the Revolution which are extant here, are not sufficiently comprehensive. The Americans regard with justifiable pride the battle for independence which their fathers fought, and it must be admitted that the heroes who achieved that independence were giants compared with the men of the present day. But in their peculiar evangelical way of contemplating men and things, they fancy they

are paying their heroes a great tribute of respect, by divesting them of all human attributes, and either forgetting altogether, measuring by the standard of the present time, or blindly condemning those men who do not exactly suit their tastes and ideas. Thus has erroneous idealism of the time of the Revolution by the present generation seriously impeded the progress of a comprehensive and critical investigation of the history of that period. The more the commercial and business pursuits of the day are opposed to an intimate understanding of the character of the Revolution, the more is the past transcendentalized. Unqualified worship is always accompanied by equally unqualified depreciation or condemnation, and the rarely commended Greene, and the unappreciated Steuben correspond with the deified Washington and Lafayette. Jefferson fitly criticises their mode of judging, in his remarks on a life of Patrick Henry, which was written in this objectionable style. "It is a bad book," says he, "written in bad style, and gives so imperfect an idea of Patrick Henry that it seems intended to show off the writer more than the subject of the work."

I hope that I have not exposed myself to this reproach, since it has been my most earnest endeavor to adhere strictly to impartial truth and justice, and avoid all illusions and erroneous conclusions. And if my opinions of events and men differ from those of others, and even appear to be less favorable than those contained in the traditionary accounts of the times, I hope that instead of blaming me, my readers will give me credit for having examined the sources of information within my reach independently and conscientiously.

Steuben's life could only be written in New York. The New York Historical Society contains in its collection of manuscripts sixteen volumes of original Steuben Papers, which were presented to the society about twenty years ago by the heirs and executors of Colonel Benjamin Walker. They extend over the entire of Steuben's life, and although here and there important gaps occur in them, it would nevertheless be impossible without them to write any thing approaching to a perfect biography of Steuben.

The most valuable portions of the collection are the letters

of the year 1778, and the documents relating to the Virginia campaign. Besides these, the Gates Papers, also in the possession of the Historical Society, contain a large part of Steuben's correspondence with Lafayette in 1781, and some valuable letters from Gates, Armstrong and others.

My use of this precious treasure was greatly facilitated by the extreme kindness of the librarian, George H. Moore, Esq. Mr. Moore is a model librarian; he gives every assistance in his power, and often meets the searcher more than half way. It is not only most fortunate for the Historical Society to have such a librarian, but it is fortunate for the entire country, and for science, since both profit by his good qualities. I trust that Mr. Moore may long be spared to the Historical Society.

In a like degree am I indebted to Mr. George Washington Greene for the readiness with which he placed his written treasures at my disposal. Mr. Greene is a grandson of the famous General Nathanael Greene, and has, with the piety of a son, and the judgment and industry of a historian, collected all his grandfather's letters and despatches. In this invaluable collection I found sixty-two letters which had been exchanged between Greene and Steuben, and which often cast a new light on the war in the South, and on the relations of the two generals. When Greene's letters and dispatches are published, a new, and, after Washington's writings, the most authentic source of information, with regard to the history of that eventful period will be accessible to the public.

I gratefully acknowledge the important services rendered to me by John W. Mulligan, Esq., with whom I have had the advantage of becoming intimately acquainted during the progress of this work. This venerable gentleman, now eighty-six years of age, who became acquainted with Steuben when the latter lived in New York at Walker's, afterwards with Charles Adams lived in his family, and continued to act as his secretary until his death, related to me with quite remarkable vigor and freshness a number of characteristic traits and stories of Steuben's life. I would that every biographer may find so reliable an authority, and so amiable and instructive a narrator as Mr. Mulligan.

In my journeys, which I was obliged to make in search of

new sources of information, I was always most fortunate in meeting with kindness and assistance when I addressed myself to private individuals. Through the favor of Mr. Jared Sparks, and the friendly intervention of Dr. Langdon Elwyn of Philadelphia, I was permitted to examine and make use of the collection of the Duponceau papers, which remain unprinted in the possession of Mr. G. Garesché of Philadelphia. I am also indebted to Dr. W. B. Sprague of Albany for some of the most valuable documents that I have found for my purpose. Mr. Sprague was good enough to allow me to select them from his famous collection of autographs, and to entrust them to my care. Had he not been so obliging there would have been many perceptible gaps in my narrative.

The richest store, however, I found in Utica, in the possession of Mr. Charles A. Mann, to whom the New York Historical Society is indebted for its present manuscript collection of Steuben papers. I discovered here, for the first time, among a heap of bills and business papers of the late Colonel Walker, an absolute treasure of interesting and instructive manuscripts, viz. : opinions on military matters, muster-rolls, army lists, complete returns, order-books, letters, etc., etc., which form a necessary supplement to the Steuben papers of the Historical Society, and which were given to me by Mr. Mann for presentation to that institution. He who has undertaken an historical work in which he is deeply interested, and in his search for information has found an unexpected treasure, can alone conceive the joy which I felt when I saw all these priceless documents spread out before me at Mr. Mann's, and knew that I might rummage among them as I pleased.

Judge M. M. Jones, the historian of Oneida county, who once thought of writing Steuben's life himself, offered me, in the kindest manner, permission to examine the materials which he had collected, and I am also under obligations to him for a copy of the interesting and rare biographical sketch of Steuben by William North. Finally, I acknowledge the kindness of Frederick Fairlie, Esq., of Elizabeth City, New Jersey, in communicating to me some interesting details of the life of his father, Major James Fairlie, one of Steuben's former aides-de-camp.

I am the more thankful to those of the above-named gentlemen who do not inhabit New York, because, although I was a perfect stranger to them, and without any personal introduction, they received me with so much kindness and flattering confidence.

Lastly, I desire to express the obligations I am under to my friend, William Montague Browne, Esq., one of the editors of the New York Journal of Commerce, whose willing services in correcting my MSS. have been invaluable to me.

The only place where I was ignominiously repulsed was Washington, where I wished to examine, among the State Archives, the perfectly arranged collection of papers relating to the Revolution which is kept there. I arrived there on the 19th of June, 1856, provided with the best letters of introduction to ministers, secretaries and members of Congress. I was not received by the then Secretary of State, and was put off from Friday to the following Tuesday, because the Secretary was too much occupied with a note on the Central American question to receive anybody before the departure of the next European steamer. I was then referred to an assistant Secretary of State, who, in his first conversation, declared his perfect willingness to grant my request. He, however, went immediately into another room, as it seemed, to take advice, and came back to inform me that I could not be allowed access to the archives without the express permission of Congress. This decree was quite new and strange to me, because it was in complete contradiction to what my New York friends had led me to believe; because acquaintances of mine had only a short time before found no difficulty whatever; and because a New York gentleman was at that very time working every day among the archives without, as far as I knew, any special permission from Congress. In order to get an explanation of this contradiction I went to the librarian and to a member of Congress, to whom I had been personally introduced. They both assured me that I must have made a mistake, and that there was no need of any special permission from Congress. I made a second attempt with the under Secretary of State, who, it appeared, was also a general in time of peace; but I was most positively refused. My New York

acquaintance then took me, without any further parley, straight to the archive chamber, and I was permitted by the superintendent, an agreeable, obliging man, to look over and copy the papers I wanted, on condition that I should get the permission of the Secretary of State, of which he had no doubt. On the next day, a Saturday, I began to copy, and made arrangements to continue my task during the following week. On Monday, however, after having made a third attempt to get the desired information, and not having been allowed admittance to the Secretary of State, the superintendent took away my copies, and locked up the documents. I have no fault to find with the latter gentleman. He had already done more than perhaps he ought to have done. I was unwilling, with a temperature of about one hundred degrees, to spend several days begging as a special grace for that to which I conceived I had a perfect right. I left Washington that same evening for New York, and had scarcely arrived when I received the copied papers which had been taken from me by the superintendent, in a cover, unaccompanied by a line of explanation, bearing the seal of the State Department. If any thing can speak in favor of my opinions and against the under Secretary of State, it is this unsolicited remittance of the papers.

I can not deny myself the satisfaction, small though it be, to denounce to the public the insult which I received. I was treated in Washington as if I were a spy, and that for no other reason than because I was a foreigner. American historians are justly proud of the complaisance and attention with which they have been received in European libraries, and allowed access to European archives. The narrow-mindedness of applying to scientific researches the miserable standard of nationality does not exist in any European capital. Throughout Europe, from St. Petersburg to Madrid, the librarians, ministers and subordinate officials, are too enlightened to be guilty of any such offense against civilization. They do not regard the permission to use the treasures confided to their care as a favor, but as the vested right of every educated man who is properly recommended. I must here relate a little anecdote, which, although belonging to low

comedy, is perfectly characteristic of these Washington gentlemen.

"I presume you are going to prove," said one of these classic under Secretaries to me, on that day, "that the success of our Revolution is due to the Germans; that they contributed chiefly to our national independence. There was once an Irishman who wrote a life of General Montgomery, and applied to the Department for admission to the archives. He afterwards proved that we should not have succeeded without General Montgomery, and that he was even equal to Washington." In short, among the generals, commodores and colonels of the ministry of State, I was submitted to a close cross-examination, and though of course denying the propriety of their inquisitiveness, I gave repeated assurances that I intended to write history and not fancy tales. They, however, did not seem to place much confidence in what I said.

It is very possible that in the rich collection of papers in the archives of Washington, many valuable documents exist, which I might have used. I wish that those who may attempt to get access to them after me, may have better success, and, above all, receive more becoming treatment. The chances, however, of any such change are very small, so long as the control of the great original treasures of the Revolution is left to the subordinate tools of the dominant party.

It was my intention at one time, after completing this work, to write the lives of Von Kalb, Kosciusko, Pulasky, and other foreign officers and generals of the Revolution; but as I should be obliged to consult the Washington archives in the greater portion of my researches, I have abandoned the idea, not being willing to purchase a very doubtful success by personal humiliation.

FRIEDRICH KAPP.

NEW YORK, February, 1859.

CHAPTER I.

PROMINENT PART TAKEN BY STEUBEN IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.—SYNOPSIS OF HIS CAREER.—GENEALOGY OF THE STEUBEN FAMILY.—FIRST MENTIONED IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.—EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THE REFORMATION UPON THE GERMAN NOBLES, TO WHICH THE STEUBENS BELONGED.—SEPARATION OF THE BRANCH FROM WHICH THE GENERAL IS DESCENDED FROM THE PARENT STOCK DURING THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.—NICHOLAS VON STEUBEN CAPTAIN IN THE ARMY OF THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY, FOUNDER OF THIS BRANCH.—MENTION OF ITS MEMBERS DOWN TO WILHELM AUGUSTINE, THE FATHER OF THE GENERAL.—SKETCH OF HIS LIFE.—NAMES AND NUMBER OF HIS CHILDREN.—BIRTH OF GENERAL VON STEUBEN.—HIS YOUTH AND EDUCATION.—HIS ENTRANCE INTO THE PRUSSIAN ARMY UNDER FREDERICK THE GREAT.—POSITION OF PRUSSIA AT THIS TIME.—THE INFLUENCE OF THE KING IN EUROPE.—GERMAN PATRIOTISM AROUSED BY HIS EXPLOITS.—PRUSSIA AT THE ZENITH OF HER FAME AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF STEUBEN'S CAREER.—STEUBEN ENSIGN AND LIEUTENANT.—HIS DUTIES IN SCHWEIDNITZ DESCRIBED IN AN INTERESTING LETTER.—HIS AMBITION AND DEVOTION TO HIS PROFESSION.—PROSPECTS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.—STEUBEN FIRST LIEUTENANT.

AMONG the officers who assisted the United States of America in achieving their independence, General Von Steuben, or, as he is more generally called in this country, Baron Steuben,* holds one of the most prominent positions. This position, however, is not accorded to him in the pages of American history.

The evident reason for this neglect is, that Steuben's activity, although essentially useful and indispensable, was not as conspicuous as that of others; that on account of the peculiar nature of his position as inspector and disciplinarian of the troops, he was almost exclusively engaged behind the scenes of the theater of war, and assisted materially in paving the way for the successes of which others reaped the greatest portion of the glory. Thus, few or no exterior marks of Steuben's exertions are left, and the same prominence is not given to his name, in connection with the glorious exploits of the war, as

* Pronounced as if spelled Stoyben.

is bestowed upon others whose merits were not greater, if so great, and whose deeds would not have been so brilliant, were it not for the effective assistance which Steuben's talent and thorough acquaintance with military details and the management of troops afforded in the entire conduct of the War of Independence.

The life of Steuben is one of the most interesting and eventful of the many brilliant and stirring scenes of the eighteenth century.

Sprung from an old noble and military family of Prussia, as a child he accompanied his father in his campaign in the Crimea and during his sojourn in Russia. As a boy, he was present at the siege of Prague, and, as a youth, he entered the service of Frederick the Great, the greatest commander of the age, and fought with distinction in the bloodiest engagements of the Seven Years' War. Taken prisoner by the Russians, he spent some time at the court of St. Petersburg, and, when set at liberty by Peter III., he remained, until the end of the war, attached to the personal staff of the great king. The calm which succeeded the stormy events of his youth was not destined to be everlasting. As soon as prospects of fame and active exertions were opened to him at Versailles, he threw up his agreeable but inactive appointment at home, and hastened to America, to devote his military knowledge and experience to the conquest of American liberty, and to fight under George Washington for the independence of the United States. His efforts were crowned with success; and, after the termination of the war, Steuben finally retired into private life, to end a career devoted to the public good, in honorable but unassuming poverty, in a rough log-house in the backwoods.

Prague and Kunersdorf, Petersburg and Berlin, Versailles and Philadelphia, Yorktown and New York, are the landmarks of this existence, which, however checkered and beset with difficulties, has left brilliant traces behind it, and justly deserves to be added to the records of American history, so

that, from a solitary example, the student may learn what efforts and sacrifices were necessary to found and protect the state of things, in the enjoyment of which the American nation lives happy and undisturbed.

The family from which General Von Steuben is descended, still exists in some parts of Germany, namely, in eastern Prussia, Weimar, and Westphalia, and is mentioned for the first time in the thirteenth century, when they left Franconia, and came into the district named Mansfeld, now a part of the Prussian province of Saxony.* The name, which is first written Steube, Stoebe, Stoyben, and, finally Von Steuben, is found in the list of vassals of Mansfeld and Magdeburg, which was a roll of all the noblemen who were invested with feudal manors and estates. Among others, there is a record of a conveyance, executed in the year 1398, by Archbishop Albrecht of Magdeburg, to one Bernard Von Steuben, concerning the manor of Hohenthurm;† besides which, the Steubens are found, in the course of the following centuries, in the possession of the estates of Gerbstaedt, Friedeburg, and Treschwitz. In 1457 and 1466, we find a Wenzel Von Steube, who was town counselor in Halle, on the Saale, and the owner of some shares in the salt mines of that city. In 1478, Archbishop Ernest of Magdeburg conferred on Philip and Hans Von Stoyben two shares of the above mines, and some other estates in the neighborhood.

Afterwards, the Steubens joined the Reformation under Luther, and became Protestants, like all the noblemen of that part of Germany.

It was one of the consequences of the Reformation, that the little German princes increased their power by confiscating the Church property, and thus became enabled to subdue the

* Spangenberg Adelshistorie II., 1106-1117, and Collectio Genealogica Koenigiana, vol. xciii.

† I. Ch. Von Dreyhaupt Ausführliche diplomatisch historische Beschreibung des Saalkreises und aller darin befindlichen Staedte. Halle, 1755, fol, p. 901.

influence of the smaller vassals, who were in this way compelled to enter into the service of their former rivals. At the same time the new method of warfare, the new inventions in the military service, the general application of gunpowder, guns and cannons, and finally the new system of mercenary troops, made the services and the importance of the knights superfluous, whose former individual influence and power were extinguished by the centralized dominion of the prince. By the continued wars they lost their property, also, and incurred considerable debts. Especially in those countries which, like the north and middle of Germany, were the perpetual theater of strife, the nobility became from day to day poorer and more dependent upon the territorial prince. This is the reason why, in the old provinces of Prussia, there are scarcely any wealthy noblemen to be found, and why the electors of Brandenburg, afterwards kings of Prussia, succeeded with comparative ease in forcing the formerly independent knights to subserve their private interests. This change, with the exception of local differences, was general over the whole continent of civilized Europe. Commencing with the Reformation, it reached its culminating point in the court nobility of Louis XIV. and Louis XV., whose example was eagerly imitated by the mushroom princes of Germany. The highest ambition of the former equals of kings and princes was now to obtain some civil or military office, and the only privilege left to them was their exclusive nomination to the highest places in the army and civil service.

The Steuben family belongs to this category. They must have lost their independence very early, for some of their numbers held ecclesiastical offices even at the time of the Reformation. Although they only lost the remnants of their landed estates in the course of the eighteenth century,* in the

* I. Ch. Von Dreyhaupt: General-Tabelle oder Geschlechtsregister der vornehmsten in Saalkreise mit Rittergütern angesessenen Familien. Halle, 1750, fol., p. 169.

early records of the Protestant church mention is made of a Mr. Von Steuben as one of its first preachers, and even before Luther's declaration of independence from the Pope, another Mr. Von Steuben, in 1512, is an officiating clergyman in Frotha, near Halle.*

It would be tedious and uninteresting to the American reader to trace the history of the Steuben family through all its details. It will, therefore, be sufficient for our purpose to state briefly that the branch to which the General belongs was separated from the parent stock during the Thirty Years' War, though retaining the same arms and name. The former are an impailed shield, azure (blue) and argent (silver), with a bend over all gules (red); the crest, surmounting a military casque, is two elephant-trunks, the one on the dexter (right-hand) argent and gules, the sinister (left hand) gules and azure, the whole surmounted by a coronet of nobility. This line is connected by marriage with some of the most prominent Prussian families of the last century. The Luederitz, Saldern, Mœllendorf and Knesebeck, who, for more than a hundred years, excelled as generals and commanders, are, on the mother's part, among the ancestors of Steuben, and the counts of Effern and the reigning princes of Waldeck and Nassau-Siegen were among the founders of this line. It goes back to Ernest Nicholas Von Steuben,† who entered the German emperor's service during the Thirty Years' War, and obtained a commission as captain. In consequence of the severe wounds he had received in various battles, he was compelled in early life to withdraw from service. He married a Lady Henriette Von Francken, and retired to his estate. He left but one son, Ludwig, born in 1642, who was knight of the order of Malta, and the great-grandfather of the General. Ludwig's only son,

* Hering's *Beitraege zur reformirten Kirche*, ii. 312.

† *Historisches Portefeuille*, Berlin, 1785, iv. Stück, p. 447, article of J. F. Seyfart of Halle, to whom the history of the Steuben family was communicated by the General's father.

Augustine Von Steuben, born in 1661, devoted himself to the study of theology, married Countess Charlotte Dorothea Von Effern, and died in 1737, as rector of the Protestant church of Brandenburg. He was a very learned divine, and won much distinction as the author of an able commentary on the New Testament and the Apocalypse. He had ten children, of whom seven were sons; three died in early youth, and the remaining four all adopted the military profession.* The oldest, Christian Ludwig, who died in 1765, at Glückstadt, commenced his career as an officer in the Prussian, and afterward became colonel in the Danish army, was an excellent mathematician, a prominent author on military science, and the inventor of a new system of fortification. A younger son, August Gottlieb, lieutenant in the Prussian regiment Kalekstein, was killed at the battle of Mollwitz, on the 10th of April, 1741. The younger son, Gottfried Gerhard, like his oldest brother, was first an officer in the Prussian service, but subsequently entered that of Holland, where he died, having attained the rank of a captain.

We have now particularly to notice the fourth son, Wilhelm Augustine, the father of the General. He was born on the 23d of April, 1699, received a first rate education;† studied with his two elder brothers at Halle, and at sixteen years of age entered the Prussian military service (1715) as cadet in the regiment Von Gersdorf. In 1724 he became ensign in the newly raised regiment Von Bardeleben; 1727, lieutenant in the engineer corps; and in 1729, captain, when he married Mary Dorothea Von Jagow, born on the 14th of August, 1706, and who died on the 19th of January, 1780. The captain was known as an able and scientific officer. In 1731 he was pre-

* Historisches Portefeuille, Berlin, 1785.

† Besides the work quoted, all the particulars about Steuben's father may be found in Carl Renatus von Hausen Staatsmaterialien, I Band, 6, Heft p. 636. Dessau, 1784. The author states that he derived his information from the General's sister.

sented with the order "*de la générosité*," and two years later, 1733, on the outbreak of the war of the Polish succession, he entered the service of Russia by order of King Frederick William I., to whom the Empress Anne of Russia had applied for some good Prussian engineer officers, and distinguished himself, in 1734, at the siege and capture of Dantzic. Shortly after, when war was declared between Russia and Turkey, Captain Von Steuben continued to serve in the Russian army under Field Marshal Count Münnich, and took part in the campaign in the Crimea. After the restoration of peace he went to Petersburg and Cronstadt as military instructor to the Russian officers, and did not return to Prussia until Frederick II. had ascended the throne. He reëntered the Prussian army as major unattached, and for his eminent services at the capture of Neisse in 1741, received the decoration of the order "*pour le mérite*," in the distribution of which Frederic was not at all liberal. At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War the king transferred Steuben from the position of engineer of the fort of Cosel to the more important and responsible post at Cüstrin, where he was appointed joint commander. He continued to live here after his discharge from service, and here he died at the advanced age of eighty-four, on the 26th of April, 1783. The major is described by his cotemporaries as an honest, straightforward and worthy officer. They mention it as something remarkable, that although engaged in a great many dangerous actions and sanguinary battles, as, for instance, the well-known storming of the Hagelsberg, near Dantzic, he never was wounded; and, up to his death, preserved the unimpaired use of his physical and mental energies. The only thing in which he lacked, was money.* During his entire life his circumstances were straitened. His salary was scarcely sufficient to enable him to live according to his rank, and to meet the expenses which a Prussian officer of those

* Politisches Journal von und für Deutschland, ii. vol., p. 84-95, 1784.

times was compelled to incur. Though poor in a pecuniary sense, he was rich in the number of his children. It was, perhaps, fortunate for him that many of them died in early youth, since to have given them a liberal education, would have required a larger fortune than he possessed. In all, he had ten children, of whom only three arrived at years of maturity. Two of his daughters are buried in Cronstadt, another in Petersburg, and a fourth in Riga; one of his sons also died in Riga, and two others in Breslau. Of his surviving children, the General, the subject of this memoir, is the oldest. The only surviving daughter, Dorothea Mary Justine, was born in 1733, in Cronstadt; and after having become a "chanoinesse" in a noble Protestant ecclesiastical foundation at Heiligen Grabe, gave up this position to marry, in 1762, a Prussian captain, Baron Carl Constantine Von Canitz, who died in 1766, leaving two sons. The last brother of the General, Hans Alexander Siegfried, was born on March 16th, 1743, at Breslau, in 1757 became a page in the household of the Queen of Prussia, and afterward, in 1761, entered the Prussian army, joining one of the most famous regiments of the Seven Years' War, Belling's hussars, to which the celebrated Field Marshal Blücher also belonged at that time; he retired in 1769, and died as tax collector at Baerwalde in Pomerania.

Frederick William Augustus Henry Ferdinand Von Steuben, the subject of this memoir, was born on the 15th of November, 1730, at Magdeburg, a large Prussian fortress on the Elbe.* At that time his father was captain in the Prussian engineers, and when called on service to the Crimea and Cronstadt, took his son with him. In 1740 he returned with him to Prussia. Young Steuben received and finished his education in the Jesuits' Colleges at Neisse and Breslau, whose

* As all our authorities differed in regard to the birthday of Steuben, we made it our special object to ascertain its exact date. This we owe to the kindness of the General's great-grand nephew, Lieutenant Von Steuben, in Gumbinnen (Eastern Prussia).

schools at that time were the best in the newly conquered Prussian province of Silesia, and on that account frequented equally by Protestants and Catholics. He distinguished himself especially in mathematics. The schools of those days did not consider it as their task to give a thorough education to their pupils; they only imparted the first rudiments of learning, and left to accident or self-education, the acquirement of that knowledge which enlarges the ideas and prepares the student for a better understanding of the world. Steuben's instruction, however, must have been far superior to that given to the sons of poorer noblemen and of the middle classes at that time. Although he may afterward have increased his store of knowledge by experience and the intercourse with men of an elevated standing in society; yet we find that the basis of his learning was a very solid one; that besides the information requisite for his rank, he knew what few officers of the first half of the eighteenth century understood, viz., to write and speak correctly German and French, and that he was intimately acquainted with ancient and modern history.

"The troubles of a military life, the narrow circumstances of my parents and their frequent changes of residence," says Steuben, in a memorial written toward the end of his life,* "did not permit them to give me any better education than that which a poor young nobleman in Prussia always receives. But while other young officers led a dissolute and extravagant life, I applied myself closely to study, and exerted myself not only to learn my profession, but to enlarge my knowledge of belles-lettres and the practical sciences. Nevertheless, from want of time and the necessary means, I made only slow progress."

While a boy of scarcely fourteen years of age, he served under his father as a volunteer in the campaign of 1744, during the war of the Austrian Succession, and was present at the protracted and sanguinary siege of Prague.†

* Steuben MS. Papers (Sprague).

† Historisches Portefeuille, l. c.

It is but natural that the first notions and impressions of the boy should exercise an important influence on the whole after life and destiny of the man. Steuben, from his earliest infancy, saw nothing but soldiers and things pertaining to war. The principal topics of conversation at home were the martial traditions of his family, and the exploits of his immediate relatives. The glory of heroic deeds and brilliant victories flew through the country, and the spirit of the people, martial since the days of the great elector, Frederick William, was now exultant at the triumph of Frederick II., and roused to enthusiasm.

As a son of a poor officer, Steuben's only prospect was to gain for himself an honorable position and distinction on the field of battle. The constitution of the State and of the army having given to the impoverished nobility fresh importance by attaching them to the service and interest of the sovereign, the entrance of young Steuben into the army was a necessary consequence of the father's position. It was, therefore, a matter of course, that when he arrived at the required time of life, he should obtain a commission.

At the age of seventeen, Steuben entered as a cadet (1747) the famous infantry regiment Von Lestwitz, afterwards Von Tauenzien.

At this period Prussia had just appeared like a meteor on the political horizon, and began to attract the attention of the world at large, as well by the rapid development of her strength, as by the imposing position which she had suddenly acquired after the fortunate termination of the wars of the Austrian Succession. That which was conceived a farce played by Frederick I. (1701-1713) in declaring himself king of a then powerless State, soon proved a plan not devoid of strong political signification. His successor, Frederick William I. (1713-1740) gave to his youthful kingdom that which no other monarchy of the time possessed, a well disciplined army unacquainted with defeat, an abundant treasury, and an energetic and autocratic form and system of government which

was based, in the words of that absolute monarch, on a "rock of bronze."

The sober prudence, the practical views, the sound judgment of the father, had smoothed the way for the son. However small his means compared with those of other powers, they proved amply sufficient, in the hands of a genius, to inflame the entire world, and to enable him to dictate his will as law. The accession of Frederick the Great to the throne (1740) opens the most glorious period in the history of Prussia, extending to the peace of Hubertsburg (1763) which terminated the Seven Years' War, and raised Frederick, notwithstanding the small extent of his dominions, to a place amongst the arbiters of the destinies of Europe. During the twenty-three years comprised in the above-mentioned period, for the greater part of which Steuben was in the service and under the very eyes of the great king, Frederick developed all the resources of his mighty talent, and gained, by his brilliant exploits and unexampled successes, both in the field and in the cabinet, for himself and his subjects, the admiration and respect of the world. This is not the place to analyze the political bearings of the king's position; but in tracing the biography of a man who took an active part in the events of that time, it is not inappropriate to describe the great influence and charm exercised by Frederick over his subjects and cotemporaries.

Germany, which ever since the Reformation had been the constant theater of wars, and had supplied the world with armies and commanders, gradually declined and became enfeebled and denationalized. It was on the eve of falling in pieces and being divided into innumerable little principalities, which, although nominally independent, were continually drained by petty despots, who depended for existence upon the subsidy of foreign powers. Emperor and empire who formerly represented a fictitious union, were never so weak as under the inglorious sway of Charles VI. Just before his

death the great Frederick appeared upon the stage, revived the fallen hopes of the people, condemned by misrule and tyranny to inaction, and inspired them with confidence in themselves. The glory of his arms evoked the enthusiasm of old and young, even amongst his enemies.

Every German felt that the brilliancy of this man was reflected upon his people, and the joy was universal that his victories finally tended, if not to the direct benefit of the German people, at least to the defeat of French prestige, of Russian barbarism, and to the reconquest of the former glory of German arms. National feelings were aroused, and the Germans regarded the future with proud and well-grounded hopes.

Although Frederick did not speak his native language correctly, and preferred French literature to that of all other nations, there never was a more national hero, or a more thoroughly German king. Prussia, under him, was the first exponent of these national feelings. On the battle field she had shown the way, which the rest of Germany successfully followed in literature and art, reaching their climax under Lessing, Kant, Schiller and Goethe about the end of the eighteenth century. As the glory of Prussia was, in the first instance, founded by her army, it was a source of pride and distinction for a young man to enter its ranks, the fame of which was increasing from year to year under the command of its illustrious leader. When Steuben received his first commission, the Prussian army was approaching the zenith of its fame, and was calculated to inspire a young and ardent spirit with a strong desire to devote his best energies to a service in which he could acquire distinction, and gratify the honorable ambition which his early training had implanted in his breast.

Two years after his entering the army, Steuben was promoted from the rank of cadet to that of ensign, in 1749, and made lieutenant in 1753. Of this time we have found but scanty memorials. Among a mass of papers, we discovered

one letter, written in bad French, dated Schweidnitz, June 4, 1754, and addressed to a friend, Count Henkel Von Donnersmark, who had just been appointed by the king Counselor of the Supreme Court in Silesia, in which he congratulates him on his appointment, and describing his own situation, manifests that devotion to his profession, and ardor for distinction, which his after life so abundantly proved.

"While you, my dear count," says he,* "are figuring in the temple of Themis, I am condemned to a most revolting occupation. A work that Mr. De Balby has traced across a cemetery, requires the cutting of a deep ditch, in the course of which half decomposed dead bodies are continually disinterred. I fear for my poor soldiers. The noisome exhalations will become more insupportable as the season advances. I order vinegar, brandy, tobacco, in short, every thing that I can think of for their protection, to be served up to them. As yet I have no sick, but I fear the month of July. In order not to alarm them, I am continually at work, notwithstanding my disgust for this abominable occupation, and my subordinates are obliged to follow my example—*ora pro nobis!* The fortifications are extensive, and appear to me to be well planned. I should like them to be more solid, and then this place would be well adapted for the king's purposes, to serve him as a great depot in case we go to war with *la grande dame*. I am occupied in taking a plan of the entire fortress, which we shall discuss when we meet. Unfortunately that will not be before the end of September. . . . What do your Berlin correspondents say? Are Mesdames Elizabeth and Mary Therese vexed with our great king? I should be happy if they were, although I am more gallant with the ladies than my master. I am extremely anxious to have an encounter, even as an apprentice, with these two Amazons. Yes, my dear Henry, if there is a war, I promise you, at the end of a

* Steuben's MS. Papers (Sprague).

second campaign, that your friend will be either in Hades, or at the head of a regiment."

We found another letter of about the same time, in which Steuben gives an account of his visit to General De la Motte Fouqué, at Glatz, another very important fortress in Silesia, and gives a detailed description of the fortifications, showing that even at that early period of his career he had a very advanced knowledge of the most scientific branches of his profession. He also pays an elaborate compliment to the Baron De la Motte Fouqué, whom the king admitted to his intimacy, and represents him as a man possessed not only of the highest military attainments, but also well versed in history, politics and philosophy.

Steuben was appointed first lieutenant in 1755,* in which capacity we find him at the beginning of the Seven Years' War.

* Historisches Portefeuille, l. c.

CHAPTER II.

STEUEN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.—WOUNDED AT THE BATTLE OF PRAGUE.—ENGAGED IN THE BATTLE OF ROSSBACH.—JOINING THE FREE CORPS UNDER GENERAL VON MAYR.—SKETCH OF MAYR'S LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS.—STEUEN'S RETURN TO THE REGULAR ARMY AS AID-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL VON HULSEN.—WOUNDED AT THE BATTLE OF KUNERSDORF, WHERE THE PRUSSIANS WERE DEFEATED.—PRESENT AT THE BATTLE OF LUBNITZ.—WITH THE KING'S ARMY IN THE FORTIFIED CAMP AT BUNZELWITZ.—ADJUTANT OF GENERAL VON KNORRLOCH, ON PLATEN'S EXPEDITION INTO POLAND IN 1761.—CROSSING THE WARTHA AT LANDSBURG, WHERE STEUBEN WAS ENGAGED AT THE SAME TIME WITH HIS FATHER.—MARCH TO THE RELIEF OF COLBERG.—CAPITULATION AT TREPTOW.—STEUEN NEGOTIATES THE TERMS.—TAKEN PRISONER BY THE RUSSIANS, AND BROUGHT TO PETERSBURG.—FAVORITE OF PETER III.—RELEASED BY HIM IN THE FOLLOWING YEAR.—ATTACHED TO THE KING'S PERSONAL STAFF, AND EMPLOYED IN THE QUARTER-MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.—PRESENT AT THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF SCHWEDNITZ.—NORTH'S STATEMENT.—STEUEN COMMANDER, AD INTERIM, OF THE REGIMENT VON SALMUTH.—ONE OF THE FAVORITE SIX PUPILS OF THE KING.—PRESENTED BY HIM WITH A LAY BENEFICE IN THE CHAPTER OF HAVELSBURG.—AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR STEUBEN LEAVES THE PRUSSIAN SERVICE.—DIFFERENT REASONS GIVEN FOR THIS STEP.—HIS JOURNEY TO HAMBURG.—PETITIONS FOR HIS DISCHARGE.—DELAY IN OBTAINING IT.—VISIT TO THE SPRINGS OF WILDBRAD IN SCABIA.—MAKES THE ACQUAINTANCE OF THE PRINCE OF HOHENZOLLEHN-HECHINGEN, WHO APPOINTS HIM GRAND MARSHAL OF HIS COURT.—DUTIES OF THIS OFFICE.—STEUEN'S REPUTATION AT THIS COURT.—TRAVELS WITH THE PRINCE.—OFFERS TO ENTER FOREIGN SERVICE.—HIS REFUSAL.—JEALOUSY OF ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS.—THEIR INTRIGUES AGAINST STEUBEN.—HE WITHDRAWS TO CARLSRUHE.—RECEIVES THE ORDER "DE LA FIDELITE" CHARLES FREDERICK, BY THE MARGRAVE OF BADEN.—VISITS THE CAPITALS OF GERMANY AND FRANCE.—STAY AT MONTPELLIER.—MAKES THE ACQUAINTANCE OF THE EARLS OF WARWICK AND SPENCER.—IS INVITED TO VISIT THEM IN ENGLAND.—NEGOTIATIONS TO ENTER THE SERVICE OF THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY.—UNPUBLISHED LETTER OF THE PRINCE DE LIGNE.—STEUEN ABANDONS THE IDEA OF RE-ENTERING ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE.

AFTER a peace of comparatively long duration, the Seven Years' War afforded an opportunity for military distinction, and consequently opened a field to Steuben of which he availed himself in a remarkable degree. At the beginning of the war he was in too subordinate a position to find his name prominently noticed; he is, however, often mentioned in the military records of those memorable events, and wherever he is alluded to, it is as a brave and talented officer, to whom the execution of arduous and responsible tasks was intrusted.

His regiment, which during the war was known as the 31st, belonged to the army of Field Marshal Count Schwerin, and distinguished itself on all occasions where it was engaged. Steuben fought and was wounded in its ranks* in the bloody battle of Prague, on the 6th of May, 1757, when it suffered heavily, losing a colonel and two officers. In the battle of Rossbach, on the 5th of November, 1757, the regiment Lestwitz was in the van of the Prussian army, and shared in the glory of that splendid victory. Even in the later years of his life Steuben told his American friends, with pride and satisfaction, that he too had been engaged in the battle of Rossbach, and that he had assisted in making the Frenchmen run away.

In the following year Steuben† entered, without prejudice to his claims to promotion in his regiment, the free corps of General Von Mayr, who appointed him his adjutant general. The volunteer corps of those times resembled very much what privateers are in naval warfare. Without forming part of the general military organization, they were employed to make inroads and excursions on their own account, and do the enemy all the injury in their power. This was the reason why young and brave spirits, fond of adventure, joined these corps, anxious to free themselves from the severe and monotonous discipline of the regular army. Here they found a field for the display of their energy and recklessness.

John Von Mayr‡ is the prototype of the military adventurer of his time, and was looked upon by the enemy with almost supernatural fear. He was the illegitimate son of Count Stella, born in 1716, and received little or no education. His boyhood was passed amid scenes of debauchery and profligacy. At the age of eighteen he was expelled from Vienna,

* Historisches Portefeuille, Berlin, 1785, iv., p. 447, ff.

† Schloezer's Staatsanzeigen, v., p. 59, 1783.

‡ Pauli: Leben grosser Helden, Biographie Johann Von Mayr's, 1759, iii., 143-183, und K. W. Schoening: "Die Generale der Kurbrandenburgischen und Koeniglich Preussischen Armee von 1640-1840." Berlin, 1840 p. 93.

and being quite destitute of all means, he embraced the soldier's career, as that was most suited to his riotous and daring disposition. He entered the Duke of Lorraine's regiment, in Hungary, as band-boy, and ultimately became sergeant in the same corps. His personal courage was indomitable, and in various skirmishes and battles during the Turkish war, the prowess and cool intrepidity of the youthful adventurer won the approval of his commander and the acclamation of his comrades. He was soon promoted to the rank of officer, and during ten years, from 1744-1754, he followed all the vicissitudes attendant on the career of a soldier of fortune, under Count Seckendorf, in Bavarian service, then in the army of the Elector of Saxony, and during the war in the Netherlands, under Count Bathyani; wherever danger was to be met, or difficulty to be encountered, Mayr was always the foremost. An unlucky duel with a brother officer, which terminated fatally for his adversary, obliged him to quit the service of Saxony. Frederick the Great, who was well aware of the courage and enterprising spirit which Mayr possessed, soon engaged his services, and gave him an appointment as aid-de-camp on the general staff of his army, from which he was subsequently transferred to the command of the light infantry corps, raised by the king at the commencement of the Seven Years' War to compete with the Croats and Pandours, in the service of Austria. Mayr's success proved the wisdom of the king's selection. His razzias in Franconia,* his descent on the rich towns of Nuremberg, Bamberg and Hof, his pursuit of the French troops to Erfurt, routed at the battle of Rossbach, his capture of Hof and seizure of two thousand two hundred guns manufactured at Suhl in Thuringia, his gallant resistance with inferior forces against the attacks of Marshal Daun's army on the lines of the Elbe, on account of which Frederick nominated him major general, his active participation in the defense of Dresden, to whose salvation his corps mainly con-

* Von Tempelhoff: Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges, ii., 95-93.

tributed,* and finally his hunting the Austrians to the Bohemian mountains, are the principal exploits of this remarkable soldier, who died in the beginning of January, 1759, at Plauen,† and whose career is here more specially noticed, as Steuben was attached to his corps during the year 1758, and as it was here he learned by practice and experience the use and management of light infantry, and skirmishes in actual warfare.

The constitution of these corps and their independence from the general army were such, that the officers were compelled to make their own dispositions, to form their own plans and calculations, to be possessed of both inventive and executive genius. It was, therefore, an excellent school for a young officer to learn that self-reliance and promptness of decision in the face of danger and difficulty, which are such essential attributes of a good general, and which formed such distinctive characteristics of Steuben's subsequent career.

The first particular mention made of Steuben in the annals of that war, is to be found in Pauli's biography of John Von Mayr, who, enumerating all the officers under his command, characterizes the lieutenant, Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben of the regiment Von Lestwitz, the General's adjutant general in 1758, as a highly gifted and distinguished officer.‡

After Mayr's death, Steuben reëntered the regular army, and was appointed adjutant general of General Von Hülsen,§ one of Frederick's best captains. Hülsen belonged to the army of Prince Henry, then in Saxony, to which Mayr's corps had been attached. On the 5th of June, 1759, he left Dresden with ten battalions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry (about nine or ten thousand men in all), and joined General Von Dohna on the 19th, near Frankfort on the Oder. In consequence of this march, Steuben was brought in immediate connection with his old regiment Von Lestwitz. During the battle of

* Von Tempelhoff: Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges, ii., 358.

† Pauli's Leben grosser Helden, iv., 355.

‡ The same; iii. 184.

§ Schloezer, l. c.

Kay, on the 23d of July, 1759, in which the Russian commander, Soltikow defeated Wedell, the Prussian general and successor of Dohna, it was among the troops first engaged, forming a part of the brigade Grabow, and of the division Manteuffel. On account of this defeat of the Prussians they were unable to prevent the junction of the Russian and Austrian armies, which, eighty thousand strong, advanced toward Frankfort and fortified themselves on the banks of the Oder. Here, between Frankfort and Kunersdorf, they were attacked by the king, on the 12th of August, 1759, who had hastened from Silesia to assist Wedell in his operations against the enemy under Soltikow and Loudon, who threatened Brandenburg and the interior of the king's old provinces with an invasion and occupation. This battle, which proved so fatal to the Prussian arms, cost the king eight thousand killed, fifteen thousand wounded, and three thousand taken prisoners, while the united enemy lost twenty-four thousand men in all. It was already won, the Russians were totally defeated, and the dispatches of victory forwarded to Berlin, when the king, not satisfied with having repulsed the Russians, but desirous to annihilate them, altered his dispositions, and notwithstanding the advice of his tried generals, such as Seidlitz, ordered a new attack against the last of the Russian batteries and defenses, which his exhausted and tired troops could stand the less, as they were vigorously attacked and driven back by the Austrian cavalry and Loudon's best troops, who had hitherto not taken part in the battle. Now a general flight began. Almost all the Prussian generals and the king himself were wounded, and a great many killed. Among the wounded was General Von Hülsen.*

It is not certain whether Steuben was engaged in this murderous battle as Hülsen's adjutant, or in the ranks of the regiment Von Lestwitz; his name, however, is found in the

* Von Archenholtz; Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges, fünfte. Auflage, Berlin, 1840, vol. i., p. 253.

list of the wounded of that memorable action.* The regiment Von Lestwitz, distinguished itself by its wonted bravery on this occasion, and after the loss of the battle, covered the Prussian retreat, displaying as well here as in the most difficult attacks such a degree of valor and intrepidity, that the king retired in its ranks from the battle-field, and paid to each private an extra remuneration amounting to a week's pay.†

From the date of the battle of Kunersdorf to the summer of 1761, there is no positive mention of Steuben. It is exceedingly probable, however, that he passed the entire years 1759 and 1760, with the army of Prince Henry, and acting as aide-camp to General Von Hülsen, was present at the battle of Liegnitz. We find his name first mentioned again in September, 1761, when the king, from his intrenched camp at Bunzelwitz, where he was besieged by the united armies of Austria and Russia, sent General Platen with seven thousand men to Poland, to attack the Russian rear. At that time Steuben was on the staff, and adjutant of General Knobloch, whose brigade was attached to Platen's corps, which marched, on September 11th, from the camp, stormed and burned, on the 15th, the Russian provision and ammunition train at the Golkowka convent, near Gostyn in Poland, routed four thousand men, and marched with nineteen hundred prisoners to Landsberg on the Wartha. Steuben's father, then major of engineers in Cüstrin, built a bridge across this river, by which Platen was enabled to cross. It is a curious coincidence, that Steuben and his father should both, the one as engineer officer, the other as adjutant general, have assisted in different ways in facilitating the passage of Platen's army over the Wartha.‡

Platen, after this brilliant expedition, marched into Pom-

* Historisches Portefeuille, I. c., Pauli v., p. 245 (misprinted 445), 1760.

† Kriele: Die Schlacht bei Kunersdorf, pp. 35 and 103.

‡ Beiträge zur Kriegskunst und Geschichte des Krieges von 1756-1763, mit Plan und Charten, v. Stück, von I. G. Tielke, Churfürstlich Sächsischer Artillerie Hauptmann, Freiberg, 1784, p. 95.

erania, where the Russians had, in the meantime, made their appearance in large numbers, and, upon the orders of the king, hurried to the relief of Colberg, which was threatened by the enemy. He effected a junction, on October 4th, with the general commanding in the vicinity of Colberg, Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg. Steuben's brigade, at that time two thousand strong, was dispatched to Treptow, on the Rega, to protect the arrival of supplies at Colberg. General Knobloch had been, since the 21st of October, 1761, blocked up in this exposed town by eight thousand men, so that he could neither advance towards Colberg nor reach Platen's corps. The town was set on fire in different places. As long as he had supplies of provisions and ammunition he defended himself most valiantly, but when he ran short of both, he was compelled to capitulate, and sent his adjutant, Steuben, to negotiate the terms, which were agreed to by the enemy.

The Prussians, accordingly, marched out, with drums beating and colors flying, and laid down their arms on the 23d of October, 1761, the officers and soldiers retaining their baggage. The prisoners were, Major General Von Knobloch, three colonels, four majors, thirteen captains, the adjutant Von Steuben, in all fifty-nine officers, two thousand and six rank and file, with four six pounders and two three-pounders.* In consequence of this capitulation, Steuben was, with his brother officers, sent as prisoner of war to St. Petersburg. But, as the Empress Elizabeth died on the 8th of January, 1762, and Peter III., immediately after her death, concluded an armistice with Frederick, Steuben's term of imprisonment was of brief duration. This imprisonment of Steuben and the other officers was of considerable value and importance for the king, as they were fortunate enough to obtain favor with the then Grand Duke Peter, the inordinate worshiper of Frederick, and were wise enough to turn his predilection for the king to such good account, that immediately after his accession to the throne he offered a most

* Tielke, l. c.

favorable alliance to the King of Prussia, and even ordered his troops to coöperate with the Prussian army. Special mention is made of the extreme popularity of Steuben, and of the anxiety evinced by Peter to induce him to enter the Russian service. But Steuben infinitely preferred his position in the Prussian army to every other, and—probably in April, 1762—returned home with General Knobloch. The king appreciated most highly the service which these officers had done him, and, it is very likely, rewarded them with promotion. It is to this, probably, that Steuben owed his advancement to the rank of captain, and his appointment as aid-de-camp on the personal staff of the king, in whose suite, in 1762, he took part in the celebrated siege of Schweidnitz, the surrender of which was the brilliant conclusion of the military operations of the Seven Years' War.

William North, Steuben's aid de-camp and intimate friend, gives another reason for this remarkable advancement of Steuben. However valuable North's information will be in other respects, we are inclined to doubt the correctness of his statement in this instance, because he was not thoroughly acquainted with the details of the Seven Years' War, and Steuben's position in the Prussian army; and, confounding truth and misconceptions, often did not comprehend the exact bearing of Steuben's narrative of that eventful period. We, therefore, give his statement with this preface.

"The Baron," relates North, "had been for some time in the family and friendship of Prince Henry,* the king's brother, of whom he never spoke but with the greatest tenderness and affection. In an unfortunate campaign of the Seven Years' War, the prince incurred the displeasure of his harsh brother, who directed him to retire from the army, and ordered his aides-de-camp to their different corps, or put them on such unpleasant duty as might make them feel the misfortune

* Not Prince Henry, as is erroneously stated by North, but Prince William, incurred the displeasure of his brother.

of belonging to a man who had dared to displease, perhaps to disobey him.

"Steuben was sent into Silesia to recruit, equip, and discipline, within a certain period, a corps broken down by long and hard service. The pecuniary allowance for this object was entirely inadequate, but who in the Prussian service dared to murmur or remonstrate! By the assistance of friends, funds were found, and the regiment, complete, was marched to head-quarters within the time. Pleased with the prompt performance of a duty, of the arduousness of which the king was well apprised, the Baron received his compliments, and, in a little time after, the appointment of aid-de-camp to the monarch, with the charge of superintending the department of the quarter-master general."

Steuben himself, in one of his memoirs addressed to Congress, says, that in the last campaigns of the Seven Years' War, he was "*maréchal general de logis*," that is to say, quarter-master general, and adjutant general to the king; and that in the winter 1762-1763, he had the command of the regiment Von Salmuth, afterwards Hesse-Cassel.* This statement of Steuben is originally written in French: "*Il eut le commandement du régiment Salmuth, aujourd'hui Hesse-Cassel.*" The English translator said he was colonel of the regiment, etc., but Steuben corrected this mistake as above, in order to show that he was not the colonel of that regiment, but only commanded it *ad interim*. Schloezer† says, that at the close of the war Steuben was major and temporary commander of the fortress of Torgau; but Steuben himself does not mention his having occupied this post, which omission warrants the supposition that he never held it, for he speaks repeatedly of his employment in the king's service towards the end of the Seven Years' War.

However this may be, it is certain that Steuben gained the affection and esteem of the king. He brought him into a

* Steuben's MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

† Schloezer, l. c.

chosen number of talented young officers, whom Frederick personally instructed and initiated into the most abstruse branches of military art, and prepared for the responsible duties of the staff. This academy consisted, besides six officers who died young, of the following: quarter-master general, lieutenant colonel and aid-de-camp in chief, Count Anhalt, and quarter-master lieutenants, Major Count Pinto, Captain Von Steuben, Captain Von Ruits, Von Gensau, Von Pfau and Von Diebitsch.* The selection of an officer to form one of so small a number as the immediate pupils of the great captain, is a convincing proof of the merit and promise of the recipient of this envied distinction. No family influence, high birth or other fortuitous circumstances had any weight with Frederick the Great in the selection of his military favorites: talent and fitness were the only recommendation to his favor. At the end of the war (1762), the king, in consideration of Steuben's services, presented him with a lay benefice, attached to the religious chapter of Havelberg, producing annually an income of four hundred thalers.† The king, in his parsimony, which approached very nearly to avarice, very seldom gave pecuniary remunerations to his officers, and it is a proof of high satisfaction that he made an exception to this rule in the case of Steuben.

Soon after the conclusion of the peace of Hubertsburg, Steuben quitted the Prussian service. Various reasons are given for this step. Some accounts say that he felt slighted and injured in his claims to promotion, because the king, notwithstanding his seniority and higher rank, intended to remove him as captain of a company to the same regiment Von Salmuth, at Wesel on the Rhine,‡ which he had commanded *ad interim*; others say, that he had quarreled and had a duel with the above-mentioned Count Anhalt, in consequence of

* *Lebensgeschichte Friedrichs des Grossen* von J. D. E. Preuss, Berlin, 1833
Dritter Band, pp. 149 and 150.

† Steuben's MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

‡ Schloezer, l. c.

which he had been obliged to give in his resignation,* and a third report says, that he felt uneasy and unhappy in the quiet and monotonous life of the garrison. He himself says, in a letter written toward the close of his life, that immediately after the war, an inconsiderate step and an implacable personal enemy had led to his leaving the Prussian service. He, however, gives no details. The first of the foregoing reasons seems the most probable, because it is asserted by highly trustworthy authorities, and because it is in accordance with the king's rough mode of dealing with his officers, whose number was quite out of proportion to that of the army, which had been considerably reduced. Whenever an officer of that time felt offended at the king's treatment, Frederick's stereotyped answer was, "He may go to the devil!" ("Kann sich zum Teufel scheeren!") With these words he dismissed the afterwards celebrated Field Marshals Blücher† and York,‡ who could only reënter the Prussian service after the great king's death. Steuben, while residing a short time in Halle and Dessau, feigned sickness and petitioned for his discharge, which, however, was not immediately granted. He first took a journey to Hamburg, where he got acquainted with the Count St. Germain,§ then in the service of Denmark, and visited, in May, 1764, the springs of Wildbad, in Suabia, in company with the Prussian general, Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg, at which time he was introduced to the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, who, on the warm recommendation of the Princess of Wurtemberg and Prince Henry of Prussia, offered Steuben the office of grand marshal of his court, which he accepted, having finally received his discharge from the service of Prussia.||

* Politisches Journal, l. c.

† Varnhagen Von Ense: Das Leben des Fürsten Blücher Von Wahlstadt, Berlin, 1827.

‡ Johann Gustav Droysen: Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen York Von Wartenberg. Berlin, 1854, i, 21.

§ Steuben's MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

|| Politisches Journal, l. c.

This office is one of the highest and most distinguished posts which it was possible to hold, particularly at the minor German courts, where the same system of etiquette prevailed, on a smaller scale, as at the larger and more influential courts of Vienna and Berlin. The duties of the office consisted in the supreme direction of the reigning Prince's household, and in the arrangement of all court presentations and ceremonies. The personage holding this office was always in the closest relations with, and in the most intimate confidence of, the prince, and the appointment was invariably conferred on persons who had made themselves remarkable in either a civil or military capacity. Steuben held the office of grand marshal of the court at Hechingen, as it appears, about ten years, and gained the affection and the esteem of every one with whom he had any connection. A cotemporary, who made his acquaintance at this time, writes as follows :*

"Steuben filled his post with all that dignity, method, and knowledge of his duty which it eminently required, gained the perfect confidence of the prince, and was looked upon in the most friendly manner by the neighboring courts, as well as by his own. He was affable and condescending to his inferiors, and severe and exact with those placed under his orders; without that tyranny by which, at many courts, the life of the subordinate was rendered miserable, he always succeeded in getting the duty punctually performed. He was obliging, humane, and anxious to promote the happiness of all with whom he had to deal; he always endeavored amicably to settle disputes amongst the officers of the court, by which he acquired for himself the esteem and respect of all who had the good fortune to know and appreciate him."

It formed a part of Steuben's duty to accompany the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen on his travels, which extended, during the period of his service, to various courts of Germany, and, in 1771, to that of France, on which occasions

* Politisches Journal, l. c.

he had opportunities of becoming acquainted with the prominent statesmen and the higher nobility of that time. The ease and comfort of his present office, compared with the bustle, hardship and privation of his former life, pleased him so much, that he seemed to have abandoned all ideas of returning to the profession in which he had acquired so large a share of renown. Although liberal offers had been made to him in 1764 on the part of the King of Sardinia,* and repeatedly in 1766 and 1769 by the German emperor through his minister and General Von Ried,† to enter military service, he declined these flattering proposals, being contented with the *otium cum dignitate* which he at present enjoyed; the more so as he had purchased a small country-seat near Hechingen, called Weilheim.

It is most probable that Steuben would have passed the rest of his life in this unprofitable retirement had he not happened to excite against him the animosity of certain Popish priests who—the religion of the court being also Catholic—were constantly plotting and intriguing against him after his return from France. As Steuben was a firm adherent to the tenets of the Protestant church, he was, of course, obnoxious to the priesthood, who were jealous of his growing influence over the prince and the other members of the court. Steuben seeing that this state of things, if prolonged, could only lead to disagreeable results for him, and perhaps cause dissension between the prince and himself, decided to retire. That this dissension did not arise from any serious cause, is proved by the fact that Steuben continued to be a great favorite of the prince, and kept up friendly intercourse with him even after his arrival in America.‡ He went to the court of the Margrave of Baden, at Carlsruhe, who, on the 28th of May, 1769, had distinguished him with the cross of the order “*De la Fidélité*.”§

* Steuben's MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

† Ibidem.

‡ Politisches Journal, l. c.

§ This was the only order which Steuben ever had, and it is a mistake

Steuben says, in one of his memorials, that this prince afterwards conferred on him the rank of general, but this statement does not appear correct according to the court calendars of that time, which we have carefully perused. It is the less likely as the rank of general did not exist in the small army of the Margrave of Baden, and as the highest military dignity was that of a colonel of the guards. We shall at another place refer to the reasons which probably produced the above assertion. It is, however, a fact established beyond any doubt, that Steuben held a military appointment of an honorary character in the militia of the empire, having been chosen general of the Circle of Suabia, a species of national guard, and scarcely ever called out for active service. This office was merely an honorary post, and did not entail any duty upon its holder.

His life in Carlsruhe and Durlach was as inactive and void of excitement as that during his stay in Hechingen. Having no duties to perform, and having sufficient, though not affluent, means, he diversified the monotony of an existence at a small German court, by occasional trips to the capitals of Germany and to France. It was during this time that he visited Baron Von Waldener at his country residence in Alsace, where he renewed his acquaintance with Count St. Germain,* and during his stay in Montpellier, in the south of France, in the winter of 1776, he met and became acquainted with the English Earls of Warwick and Spencer, and with the French Prince De Montbarey, subsequently minister of war

when some American writers (for instance Benson J. Lossing, "Pictorial Field Book," i., 333) say that the King of Prussia had given it to him. There never was a Prussian order of this name. It was founded on June 17, 1715, by Charles, Margrave of Baden, and consisted of only thirty members. According to § 5 of its by-laws only such persons were able to become members of the order who were of noble extraction, unsullied lineage, and irreproachable conduct. From 1715 to 1769, when Steuben was made one of its knights, there were one hundred and sixty-seven members in all.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

under the French government. His relations with those English noblemen were of the most intimate and friendly character, and he received from them pressing invitations to spend the ensuing summer with them in England, which he accepted.*

Steuben was ill adapted, either by disposition or early habits and training, to find enjoyment and satisfaction in a life of idleness, for any length of time, although the dignified tranquillity of his life at a little court promised agreeable repose to one tired of the bivouac and the camp. It was not calculated to satisfy his ardent and impetuous temperament, or induce him forever to renounce the busy scene from which he had withdrawn for a season, and soon after his return to Carlsruhe he appears to have sought a fitting opportunity to reënter active service. Just at that time all Europe was anxiously expecting the war, which some years after broke out, in regard to the succession of the Elector of Bavaria, and which promised honorable employment and glory to every officer. Steuben resolved to avail himself of these cheering prospects, and for this purpose opened negotiations, which, however, were not successful. The Prussian officers of that time were so fully convinced of their importance and superiority over all other troops, that they always expected to receive higher rank than that which they had under the king, and therefore very often rejected propositions made to them by foreign powers, who were anxious to profit by their knowledge and experience, but were unwilling to excite jealousy amongst their own officers by placing foreigners over their heads. To this cause is to be attributed, as it appears, the failure of Steuben's projects. The difficulties of entering the German emperor's service, even for an officer so distinguished and sought after as Steuben was, may be seen from the following letter addressed to him on the 4th of April, by the famous Prince De Ligne, one of the highest dignitaries of the imperial court.† It reads as follows:—

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

† I found this interesting letter, originally written in French, in vol.

"I thought of getting you, my dear baron, to enter our service even before the idea occurred to you, when I heard you speak of matters connected with war with that talent which distinguishes the pupil of the hero from whom you have learned so much. Independent of any personal gratification I should derive, I believed that it would be very fortunate for the service to have you amongst us.

"I should like you to see the emperor when he passes through your province, for I am sure that you would produce the same favorable impression upon him that you made upon me. Without this, it will be impossible to enter the service.

"I have just received a letter from Field Marshal Lasey, of whom I asked, as a particular favor, to get a commission in my own regiment for a colonel of the very highest distinction, but he informed me that it is utterly impossible, and not to be thought of. You see with what regret I acquaint you with this, my dear baron. If there were a war, I should exert myself to get you, for our own sake more than for yours, so that your talents should not be left unemployed."

In the beginning of the year 1777, when the Emperor Joseph II. went to France, General Ried, a personal friend of Steuben, urged him to pay his respects to the emperor at Stuttgart, assuring him that it was very probable that his Majesty would invite him to enter his service.* It does not appear, however, that Steuben complied with Ried's recommendation; on the contrary, it would appear that he declined doing so, and that he had definitively abandoned the idea of reëntering active military service.

xiii. of the Steuben Papers. Although bearing only the date of the month, it must have been written in 1777, because it refers to the emperor's intended journey through Western Germany, which Joseph II. never visited before 1777, on his way to Paris.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

CHAPTER III.*

STEBEN VISITS PARIS ON HIS WAY TO ENGLAND.—COUNT DE ST. GERMAIN'S MYSTERIOUS MESSAGE.—HIS INTERVIEW WITH STEBEN.—PROPOSITION TO ENTER THE SERVICE OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS.—STEBEN'S OBJECTIONS.—REMARKABLE ANSWER OF COUNT DE ST. GERMAIN.—STEBEN INTRODUCED TO BEAUMARCHAIS, FRANKLIN, AND DEANE.—INTERVIEW WITH THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS.—BEAUMARCHAIS' OFFER.—STEBEN ABANDONS THE IDEA OF GOING TO AMERICA.—TAKES LEAVE OF ST. GERMAIN PRIOR TO HIS RETURN TO GERMANY.—INTRODUCTION TO COUNT ARANDA, THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR.—VISIT TO PRINCE DE MONTEBARRY.—RETURN TO CARLSRUHE.—ADVICE OF PRINCE LOUIS WILLIAM OF BADEN.—LETTERS FROM ST. GERMAIN AND BEAUMARCHAIS, PERSUADING STEBEN TO ENTER THE SERVICE OF AMERICA.—HE CONSENTS, AND SETS OUT FOR PARIS.—ARRIVAL THERE.—RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE WITH THE FRENCH MINISTERS.—INTERVIEW WITH COUNT DE VERGENNES.—STEBEN'S DUTIES DEFINED BY ST. GERMAIN.—THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS FURNISH HIM WITH LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION.—SETS SAIL FROM MARSEILLES ON BOARD THE FLAMAND, WHICH CONVEYS ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO AMERICA.—THE HAZARDOUS CHARACTER OF THE ENTERPRISE.

THE negotiations alluded to in the foregoing chapter having failed, Steben determined to fulfill a promise made some time before to visit his friends in England, and set out, toward the end of April, 1777, on his journey thither, by way of France. He arrived in Paris on the 2d day of May, intending to spend a few days in that capital previous to his departure for Calais, in order to visit his old acquaintances, particularly the Count De St. Germain, whom the King of France had recently appointed minister of war. Shortly after reaching Paris he notified the count of his arrival and of his anxiety to see him, to which he received in reply, that the count would rather not see him at Versailles, but that he would be glad to meet him in three days at the Paris arsenal, where he intended to have a particular conversation with him, and that he would send an officer to conduct him to the place of rendezvous.

* Almost the entire narrative in this chapter is taken from vol. xiii. of the Steben Papers, at some places very often word for word.

Steuben could not conceive the meaning of this extraordinary message. "I had formed," says he, in one of his memorials, "no ambitious schemes, and was perfectly satisfied with my situation. I could not define the meaning of this enigma. I can certify, upon my honor, that among all the conjectures I made, the truth never occurred to me."

A few days afterward the Count St. Germain arrived in Paris, and sent the Baron De Pagenstecher, colonel of the Legion Condé, for Steuben, who waited upon the count, and was received by him in his cabinet. After observing to the baron that he had arrived very *à propos*, the count mentioned that he had intended to write to him to submit a project which he thought would prove very advantageous, and for the execution of which he thought the baron the most proper person. Then opening a map and pointing to America, "Here," said he, "is your field of battle. Here is a republic which you must serve. You are the very man she needs at this moment. If you succeed, your fortune is made, and you will acquire more glory than you could hope for in Europe in a great many years to come!" He then entered into a minute detail of the political situation of the United States, which, after having once declared themselves independent, would undoubtedly sustain this declaration; adding that it would be a meritorious office to assist in building up the grand edifice of that rising republic.

He demonstrated to Steuben the resources which the insurgents had, and the support which they could indirectly expect from France and Spain. He intimated to him the possibility of an open alliance between the different branches of the house of Bourbon and the Americans. He then turned to the other side of the picture, and with equal discernment detailed to Steuben the many disadvantages the United States then labored under; that their army had no regular or permanent formation; that their enlistments, being for very short periods, their army had no order, or method of keeping the

corps together ; that the loss of the men not only continually destroyed the formation of the corps, but caused the most terrible destruction of horses, arms, clothing, and every species of camp equipage ; that the consumption of these articles was enormous ; that they were in want of some officer of experience to be charged with the details, who was not only acquainted with the regular formation of an army, but who could trace out for them a system of economy for the disbursements of the army, and, by a rigid inspection, prevent those abuses which might otherwise tend to the destruction of the country. To this he added, that if some such order were not established, the resources of the United States must very soon be exhausted, nor would it be in the power of their friends in Europe to supply so enormous an expense ; that, among all the foreign officers who had gone to America, there was not one who possessed sufficient information on these points, and that the commander-in-chief and Congress would be extremely happy to meet with an officer of experience to assist in establishing order, which was so indispensably necessary.

"You perceive now," added the count, "why I wished you not to appear at Versailles ; I would not even wish you to be seen much in Paris ; you must, however, see the Count De Aranda and the Prince De Montbarey, who are acquainted with this project ; and in order that you may have every possible information with respect to the United States, I will send Mr. Deane to you."

St. Germain was well aware that Steuben was perfectly competent to perform the task. Being himself an ardent admirer of the Prussian school of military discipline and tactics, which in former years he had in vain tried to introduce into the Danish army, and which he now equally in vain tried to introduce into the French army, he had made the acquaintance of Steuben, when the latter, after the termination of the Seven Years' War, had just returned from the field, and formed a favorable opinion of the sound judgment and mili-

tary ability of King Frederick's aid-de-camp. Success demonstrated that his choice was a good one: a proof that St. Germain had a much deeper knowledge of men and things than his adversaries ordinarily attribute to him.

Steuben replied to St. Germain's overtures, that although his present situation was not an elevated one, it was, nevertheless, agreeable, while the enterprise proposed by the count was hazardous for a man no longer young, and ignorant, as he was, of the English language. He finally asked the count, not in his character of minister, but as a friend, if he would advise him to accept such an adventurous undertaking, to which St. Germain answered: "Sir, as a minister I have no advice to give you on these subjects; but as your friend I would never advise you to do any thing which I would not do myself, were I not employed in the king's service."

No determination was arrived at in their first interview. The first consequence, however, resulting from this conversation, was the suspension of Steuben's proposed visit to England. On the following day, when he saw the count again, the latter recurred to the subject, and as he still preferred that Steuben should not visit him at Versailles, he gave him a letter to Mr. De Beaumarchais, the author of *Figaro*, who took such a deep interest in the American Revolution, warning him at the same time to be extremely circumspect. The proposition now appeared to Steuben less extravagant than at first, and as he began to feel an interest in the matter, he did not need St. Germain's recommendation to be discreet. Mr. De Beaumarchais introduced Mr. Deane to Steuben, and a few days after Mr. Deane took him to Dr. Franklin at Passy.

Both the American commissioners appeared very desirous that Steuben should enter the service of Congress. They confirmed to him the statement, made by St. Germain, and expressed their hopes that he would be able to establish the order and discipline in the American army, which were so much wished by the commander-in-chief, and for which he had not

yet found an able assistant amongst the throng of foreign officers who had gone over to America. But when Steuben mentioned a disbursement for the expenses of his journey they expressed some doubt as to their power to grant it. Mr. Deane made no difficulties; Franklin, however, made several. He spoke a great deal about presenting him with a couple of thousand acres of land, to which Steuben did not attach much value, and which in any case could not furnish him with the means of crossing the Atlantic. As to advances, Franklin positively declared that it was out of the question; that he was not empowered to make any, and that he could not enter into any engagement with any officer whatever. He told him this with an air and manner to which Steuben, as he remarks in a letter written at the time, "was then little accustomed," whereupon Steuben immediately took leave without any further explanation.

He went thence to Mr. De Beaumarchais. He told him that he intended to set out immediately for Germany, and that he did not wish to hear any more of America. As soon as Beaumarchais was informed of the cause of Steuben's resolution, he informed him that "if he wanted nothing but money, a thousand Louis-d'ors and more were at his service." Steuben thanked him for his generous offer, but told him, at the same time, that he was fixed in his determination to pay his last visit to the Count St. Germain, and to leave the following day for Rastadt.

On July 24th, Steuben accordingly paid a farewell visit to Count St. Germain at Versailles, and informed the minister of his determination. He represented to him that he could not embark on so hazardous an enterprise, and that even if he would, he had not the money necessary for his own equipments and that of his suite. He cited the instance of Mr. Du Coudrai, whose services, notwithstanding a previous engagement with the American commissioners in France, had not been accepted by Congress, and alluded to the danger of

being taken prisoner by the English, without having made a definite engagement. Although the count appeared somewhat hurt by Steuben's determination, he invited him to spend two days at Versailles, and renew his acquaintance with the Prince De Montbary. After dinner the Spanish ambassador, Count De Aranda, came in, to whom St. Germain introduced Steuben with the following words: "Here is a man who will risk nothing, consequently he will gain nothing." On the same day Steuben waited upon Prince De Montbary, who appeared as full of the American scheme as the Count De St. Germain. Notwithstanding the arguments and importunities of the French ministers, Steuben declared that he could not determine on any thing until he had first visited Germany, whither he intended to set out the following day.

When he arrived at Rastadt he met there Prince Louis William of Baden, a lieutenant general in the Dutch army, and governor of Arnheim. He also found a very persuasive letter from M. De Beaumarchais, who wrote him that Count St. Germain expected his prompt return to Versailles; that a vessel was ready in the port of Marseilles for his embarkation, and that as for any disbursements he might need to make, he could dispose of his funds. This letter was accompanied by one from the Count St. Germain, who pressed Steuben to return immediately. The confidence he had in Prince Louis William made Steuben consult him about the affair. Being himself engaged in the service of a republic and probably more dazzled by the prospect of glory than Steuben was himself, he was of opinion that there was no room for hesitation; that he should certainly run the risk, and that he could never find a finer opportunity of distinguishing himself than that which was offered to him. The prince's advice was successful, and it was not long before Steuben carried his plan into execution. Having obtained the consent of the King of Prussia, he conferred his canonry at Havelberg, which then brought him a yearly revenue of four thousand six hundred livres, on

his nephew, the Baron Von Canitz, and started again for Paris, where he arrived on the 17th of August, 1777.

On the day after his arrival Steuben went to Versailles, where he had a conference with St. Germain and Montbarey, and where it was resolved that he should not enter into any arrangement with the American agents, either for money or the expenses of his journey, but that he should merely wait upon them, to inform them of his approaching departure for the United States, and ask them for letters of introduction to the leading members of Congress, telling them, at the same time, that it was his intention to make one or two campaigns with their army in the simple capacity of a volunteer.

"From the information," says Steuben afterwards,* in a letter addressed on the 27th of January, 1790, to Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, "I received from the ministers of France, that the preferment of foreigners to military employments had been a cause of discontent in the American army, I foresaw the necessity of pursuing a different course from that which had been adopted by my predecessors, in order to gain admission into your army. Being sure of success in my enterprise, as soon as the commander-in-chief and the army should be aware of the advantages of my military arrangements, there was but one difficulty to surmount, and from the complexion of the times, that difficulty was of the greatest magnitude. It depended upon obtaining such a post in the army as would enable me to make use of the knowledge of my profession, and to render it beneficial to the interest of the United States, without exciting the dissatisfaction and jealousy of the officers of your army. Any conditions proposed by me, under these circumstances, tending to insure me a recompense proportioned to my sacrifices and my services, would have rendered all my negotiations abortive. But proposals to serve the United States as a volunteer, with-

* American State Papers. Volume entitled "Claims." Washington, 1834; No. 5, fol. p. 11-16.

out rank or pay, could give no umbrage. No person, sir, is better informed than yourself, how difficult it was, at that time, to introduce a foreigner into your army, even without any condition whatever. If, however, I should be charged with having made use of illicit stratagems to gain admission into the service of the United States, I am sure the army will acquit me, and, I flatter myself, so also will the citizens of this republic in general."

Steuben does not say, either on this or on any other occasion, what was the illicit stratagem of which he had made use. Nevertheless, it is evident that it was his assertion that he had been general in the service of the Margrave of Baden. It appears that this pretense formed one of the subjects of the conversation with the French ministers, and that it had been suggested by them. Politically they were right, as Steuben, had he been introduced only as a major or colonel to Congress, would never have been able to gain that important and influential position in America, which he wanted for the introduction of his inspection and discipline. There was probably not a member of Congress that had ever heard of a Margraviate of Baden. The more imposing title of lieutenant general secured to Steuben the right place in the American army. Even Franklin, who lived then in Paris, confounded Steuben's being aid-de-camp to Frederick II. with the fictitious rank given to him by the French diplomacy. And in the United States, from his arrival to the present day, he is usually called a Prussian lieutenant general. So much is certain, that if Steuben had been a general in Europe, his position would have been so elevated, that he would never have crossed the Atlantic.

The Prince De Montbary introduced Steuben to the Count De Vergennes, the French minister of foreign affairs, who, on the 19th of August, granted him a particular audience.

"You are determined then to go to America," said the count, upon which Steuben asked if he considered the idea extravagant.

“On the contrary,” he replied, “it is the road to fame and distinction; but I strongly recommend you to make an agreement beforehand, and not rely too implicitly on republican generosity.” Whereupon Steuben remarked that he had no conditions to make with the American agents, adding, that if the republic he was going to serve was ungrateful, he expected that the King of France would not be so, and that Count Vergennes and Prince Montbarey would not allow his services to remain unrewarded.

“You know very well,” said Count Vergennes, “that it is impossible for us to make conditions with you. I can only say to you, Go, succeed, and you will never regret the step you have taken.”

The Count De St. Germain then conversed with Steuben relative to the defects of and the reforms to be introduced into the American army. Of these, the principal were strict order and economy in the different corps, and in the administration of the different departments having the regulation of the supplies for the army. The other points were, the establishment of a rigid inspection and regular and permanent formation of the different corps, a simplicity in the maneuvers, the abolition of all exercise of parade, and the easiest and most expeditious mode of encamping in order of battle.

Having obtained from Franklin letters of introduction to General Washington, Samuel Adams, President Laurens, Robert Morris, and other men of distinction in America, Steuben commenced arrangements for his departure. Mr. De Monthieu, one of the royal commissioners, gave him the choice of two vessels, one sailing from l'Orient, the other from Marseilles. By the advice of the Spanish minister, Count Aranda, Steuben selected the latter, and set out for Marseilles, whence, on the 26th day of September, 1777, he set sail on board of the twenty-four gun ship “l'Heureux,” the name of which, for this voyage, was altered to that of “le Flamand.” Steuben's name was entered on the ship's books as Frank, and under

this name the French ministers gave him dispatches to the Marquis De Bouilly, Governor of Martinique, in order to guard against the evil consequences of capture by the British cruisers. His suite consisted of Peter S. Duponceau, whom Steuben had engaged as secretary and interpreter; of his aids, De l'Enfant, De Romanai, Des Epinières and De Pontiere, who afterward, as a captain of horse, entered the corps of Pulasky. They were joined by Beaumarchais' nephew and agent, M. De Francy, who was sent over by his uncle to settle the accounts and business relations of the latter with Congress. It is worthy of remark, that this same vessel in which Steuben embarked also conveyed to the American government large supplies of war material, purchased and shipped by M. De Beaumarchais under the assumed name of the mercantile firm of Roderique Hortalez & Co. These supplies consisted of seventeen hundred weight of powder, twenty-two tons of sulphur, fifty-two brass cannon, nineteen mortars, besides a great number of smaller field-pieces, muskets and pistols,* and formed a part of the advances which Beaumarchais made to Congress as well from his own as from the governmental means, and the value of which his heirs only partly recovered after about sixty years' litigation. Beaumarchais at the same time advanced to Steuben his traveling expenses, which were considered by the latter as a personal loan.

"Recall me often," writes Beaumarchais, on the 6th of December, 1778, to De Francy,† "to the memory and good wishes Baron De Steuben. I congratulate myself, from what he tells me, of having given so great an officer to my friends, the free-men, and having in a certain way forced him to follow this noble career. I am in no way uneasy about the money I lent him to start with. Never did I make so agreeable a use of

* *Politisches Journal von und für Deutschland*, 1784. Vol. ii., p. 94. The Remembrancer, London, 1778, p. 98.

† Beaumarchais et son Temps, par Louis de Loménie. 4 vols.; iii., p. 175 (English translation. London edition, by Henry S. Edward).

capital, for I have put a man of honor in his true place. I hear that he is inspector general of all the American troops. Bravo! tell him that his glory is the interest of my money, and that I do not doubt that on these terms he will pay me with usury."

For a man of Steuben's age and habits to abandon home, kindred and powerful connections for a life of danger, privation and uncertainty in a strange land, with whose language he was unacquainted, and whose manners and habits were different from those in which he had lived, was a bold and hazardous enterprise in which one of less energetic and determined character than Steuben would scarcely have embarked with so little hesitation. He left Europe, where he had won hard-earned distinction and fame—where, if he was not opulent, he had at least a sufficient competence—to serve a country engaged in an obstinate, exhausting and hitherto unsuccessful war, where his prospects of professional advancement were by no means assured, and which offered him no inducements of a pecuniary or material nature. Confident in himself, urged by high and generous motives, he determined to offer his sword to a nation struggling for her rights and liberties. He made no conditions. He bargained for no reward. Military distinction and active employment were the chief objects of his ambition, the immediate motives of his conduct.

CHAPTER IV.

STEUBEN ON HIS WAY TO AMERICA.—REASONS WHY FRANCE ENGAGED HIM, AND AFTERWARDS CONCLUDED AN ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES.—THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND POSITION OF FRANCE.—ARBITER OF EUROPE TILL 1763.—IGNOMINIOUS PEACE.—ENGLAND'S SUPREMACY AS A MARITIME POWER.—FRANCE DEGRADED TO A SECOND-RATE POWER.—THE DISSOLUTE GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XV.—LOUIS XVI. ASCENDS THE THRONE.—WARLIKE SPIRIT AT THE COURT.—THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION HAILED WITH ENTHUSIASM ALL OVER FRANCE.—DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF SOCIETY.—THE KING JEALOUS OF ENGLAND.—THE COURT WANTS TO REVENGE ITSELF FOR THE DEFEATS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.—THE ARISTOCRATIC AND MIDDLE CLASSES IMBUED WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE TIME.—THEY ARE IN FAVOR OF THE REPUBLICAN CAUSE.—ROUSSEAU'S INFLUENCE ON THE COURT CIRCLES.—THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF HIS "CONTRAT SOCIAL" IN EUROPE.—ALLIANCE OF EUROPEAN IDEALISM WITH AMERICAN REALISM.—THE FRENCH NOBLEMEN PERCEIVE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION THE REALIZATION OF THEIR OWN DREAMS AND IDEAS.—SEGUR AND LAFAYETTE.—DUPORETAIL'S LETTER.—FRANKLIN'S INFLUENCE IN THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ENGLAND.—HIS CHARACTER BY SCHLOSSER.—VIEWS AND DESIGNS OF THE FRENCH CABINET AT THE TIME OF STEUBEN'S ARRIVAL IN PARIS.—FRANCE MAKES AN ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES AFTER BURGOYNE'S CAPITULATION.—NO DIRECT ADVANTAGES FROM THIS ALLIANCE.—BUT FRANCE THEREBY REGAINS HER POSITION AS ARBITER OF EUROPEAN POLITICS.—IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMERICAN WAR FOR EUROPE.

WHILE Steuben is hastening to his journey's end, and trying to relieve the monotony of life on ship-board by mathematical calculations, exercising his companions in shooting at a mark, or reading books like the writings of the Abbé Raynal on America, we propose to consider briefly the reasons which impelled the French minister to engage Steuben's services for Congress, and immediately afterwards to conclude an alliance with the United States.

There is perhaps scarcely an event in modern history which has been so partially judged by the American people, and therefore so distorted from its true historical connection. We shall, therefore, endeavor to analyze the motives of this act, and to place it in its true political light.

Frederick the Great used to say: "If I were King of France, not a single cannon could be fired in Europe without my consent," and thus demonstrated in the most convincing manner how the resources, importance and the position of France in the family of European States gave her this position of arbiter.

This supremacy was maintained from the beginning of the seventeenth century down to the Seven Years' War. The peace of Paris (1763) which deprived France of all her North American possessions—Canada in particular—put a sudden end to it. The terms of that peace were an unquestionable proof of the internal decay of the country, the impotence of the government, and the unsettled condition of the entire nation. From this time dates the decided superiority of England over France as a maritime power. That nation, which by its interpretation of the terms of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), had extended its dominion from the Canadas to the Ohio, and along the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico; that nation which had confined the English colonies within the comparatively narrow space between the Atlantic and the Alleghany mountains; that nation, which in the East Indies, also, had for a long time successfully struggled for the mastery, was broken in pieces by the mistresses and favorites of Louis XV. The apathy of the government, incapable of supporting or maintaining a single element of national greatness, now, by the peace of Paris, received the public testimony of its disgrace. France was thus reduced to the position of a second-class power. Her domestic and foreign relations reduced her influence in European politics to nothing, and even the Bourbon family compact, which was a sort of triumph in the politics of the house and family, at last became nothing but a vain attempt to regain the lost position. In 1772, when the first partition of Poland took place, France submitted without a protest, without uttering a syllable of war, to an act, which, consistently with her traditionary policy, and the preservation of the

balance of power in Europe, she ought to have opposed with all her might. Thus at the death of Louis XV. her political influence was everywhere destroyed, and new powers, which had acquired strength and size during the century—Prussia and Russia—threatened to deprive her of the last remnant of her attributes as leader of political and social *ton*. On the accession of Louis XVI. to the throne, a warlike spirit began to appear at court and in the most prominent circles of society. The humiliations of the last war excited feelings of shame, and efforts were made to collect strength and means to be employed at the first opportunity to recover the lost political influence. The national feeling which, under Louis XV., had sunk low, rose again to its proper height, and the court favored every bold and noble enterprise that flattered the popular pride.

Such was the state of feeling in France, when the American Revolution broke out. France, from one end to the other, hailed the event with the utmost joy, although for various reasons. The court rejoiced at the embarrassment of England, and regarded it as a good opportunity to avenge all the annoyances and losses which it had been compelled to endure from England for the last eighty years. A war with the latter power, detested by all Frenchmen of every degree, might recover the lost glory of their army and navy, snatch the mastery of the seas from England, and revive the commerce of France. The king, timid and hesitating as he was, could not come to any conclusion, and in this way lost all the probable advantages which would have resulted from a sudden declaration of war. Instead of commencing hostilities in the usual manner by capturing the enemy's trading vessels even before the formal declaration of war; or instead of sending a fleet to America, and there, in presence of the enemy, declaring war, Louis XVI. wavered up to the last moment. In secret he sent arms and money to America, while he publicly forbade the Revolution to be discussed in the cafés. He listened to his ministers and counselors with-

out giving an opinion or a decided answer, and "deceived himself so far as to believe that his secret intrigues could not be detected, and that he could ruin his rival without running the risk of a conflict with her. Such a deception could not long continue, and the English cabinet had too much penetration to allow the French government thus to reap all the advantages of war without incurring its dangers."*

A breach took place thus with England, and war was declared. Prejudiced as Louis XVI. was in the beginning against the Americans, in his character of legitimate sovereign, jealousy of England finally overcame the principles of monarchical policy. The "Most Christian King" allied himself with the rebels who were contending against his authority as well as that of his colleague in England, with the heretics, for whose destruction France had formerly made such great sacrifices of blood and treasure.

Simple times, when absolutism was still unaware of the solidarity of its interests, and had no combined system of action! Even Joseph II., whose strength did not consist in clear political conceptions, gave as his opinion concerning the alliance, that his "business was to be royalist."

It was, in general, the want of experience in all colonial matters that led almost all the European governments which had transatlantic possessions into the greatest practical mistakes. As the English, by acquiring Canada, destroyed the balance of power in North America, and cleared the way for the independence of their own colonies, so Charles III. of Spain, in drawing his sword in favor of the despised heretics of America, promoted the claims of his American colonies for emancipation. In this way, the very hot-houses of European absolutism, France and Spain, stirred up the fire of revolution in America, which, not long afterwards, reacted on their own countries with the most terrible effect. The consequences of

* *Memoirs of Count Ségur*, vol. i., p. 100.

the American war, however, very soon proved to them their short-sighted rashness, and made them more prudent in the future. When, in 1790, Louis XVI. was advised to assist Tippe Sabib against England, he most positively declined adopting the suicidal policy of encouraging rebels—a policy which Count Aranda, one of the most far-seeing statesmen of the last century, understood, even during the American war.* He had scarcely signed the peace of Paris, which declared the United States independent, when, convinced that the mutual advantages between Spain and her colonies did not depend upon their political relations, he advised the king, in a very remarkable memorial,† to give up all his American possessions, except the islands, and to erect three independent kingdoms of Mexico, Peru, and Costa Firma, for the princes of his house. In this memorial, the wise Aranda foresaw and predicted that the United States must grow to gigantic proportions, and that, in a very short time, they would threaten the Spanish colonies, first in Florida, and that the example given by the northern republic would produce the most disastrous results.

To return, however, to France; all the political reasons would have failed to induce Louis XVI. and the French court to declare war with England, were it not for another power, which, availing itself of the occasion of the American Revolution, for the first time, with youthful impetuosity, took part in European politics. This power was the PHILOSOPHY of that time, which, in contradiction to the corruption of the monarchy and the anomalies of the existing relations of Church and State, made *Nature* the standard by which it judged the laws, manners, and condition of things. It was based upon the philosophical doctrines and principles of Rousseau, as developed in his "*Contrat Social*." This important work presupposes a natural, primitive state of society, and certain inalienable rights by means of which an agreement was made between men for

* Gervinus, Geschichte des XIX. Jahrhunderts, iii. 35 and 36.

† Mora, Mejico y sus Revoluciones. Paris, 1836; iii., 275.

their mutual enjoyment, happiness, and defense against the encroachments of tyranny, which, however, finally succeeded in subjugating the majority. Rousseau proclaims it to be the object of all political organization to vindicate those rights, and to return to the original condition of things, a principle than which none at that time could be considered more revolutionary, as it, of course, implied the ruin of the *status quo*. This philosophy prevailed at that time, and carried with it not only France, but all civilized Europe. The ideal pretensions springing from this way of thinking, were already predominant towards the end of Louis XV.'s reign; but, at the commencement of the American Revolution, they had penetrated the minds of the educated middle classes. Independently of the court circle, this public opinion gained daily a more absolute intellectual dominion, and speedily spread beyond the limits of the more aristocratic literary circles, and entered that of the people. In this way, these ideal pretensions, which, in the beginning, had only made a tame and isolated opposition to the ruling powers, assumed the proportions of a militant democracy, bitterly attacking all temporal and spiritual power. The upper classes, even, weary of the old system, and attracted by the charm of novelty, began to flirt with the democratic opinions of the day, and introduce them at court, where it soon became fashionable to use the cant of this philosophy.

If, with regard to England, the nobility and educated classes, who constituted public opinion, shared the sentiments of the court in a greater or less degree, in their anxiety for war, they, nevertheless, gave prominence to their ideal demands, which appeared to them the principal consideration, and in this way introduced an ally into politics, which, finally, by its supremacy, overcame the reluctance of the king, and, at last, brought to pass the alliance with the United States. The court expected to turn public opinion to its own profit; but public opinion, on the contrary, made use of the court, and it was the only winning party. Philosophy never exerted so

direct and decisive an influence in politics at any previous or subsequent period, and on no previous or subsequent occasion did politicians commit so great a practical fault.

Thus the *idealism* of Europe, confounding form and substance, became a real, positive power, by its alliance with politics, and it contributed, in no inconsiderable degree, to the victory of American *realism*. All Europe accepted as a truth that the contest between England and her colonies was a contest between despotism and liberty, as these were understood under the influence of the new philosophy of enlightenment. It was thought that, in the transatlantic republic, the long looked-for *ideal* had been discovered. The mere word "republic," recalling the classic associations of antiquity, called forth an enthusiasm amounting to fanaticism, and incomprehensible at the present day.

It would be inappropriate in this place to detail at length the grounds of this state of things. It is sufficient for our purpose to give prominence to the fact, that, at the outbreak of the American war, the civilized world in Europe, and especially in France, longed for the realization of their ideas of equality.

Being unable to realize them at home, where the historical tradition and the existing political powers were in their way, they turned their eyes toward America, in which they believed they had discovered the land where their dreams, hopes and ideals would be fulfilled. So the struggling colonies became the favorites of European aristocratic society as far as it was governed by the revolutionary French philosophy of that period. In their blind enthusiasm they overrated the American Revolution and its immediate results for Europe as much as they underrated the influence and strength of the ruling powers at home. In their comprehension of things, that had really long come to pass in America which only existed in Europe in the vague form of a desire. In America there were no old distinctions of classes, and the germ of the new were

too little developed to be visible. American society was supposed to be a union of all the free and equal inhabitants of the country; the toleration of all religions, and the non-existence of the kingly dignity was a proof of superior human sagacity and popular virtue. Thus was the conclusion come to in Europe, and particularly in France, that their long cherished ideas of government and society were not mere empty visions, as the Americans showed that they were practical and realizable, and that, therefore, it was a duty to bring them into effect. In reasoning thus it was overlooked, that what was laid down as a postulate for Europe, was the result of a distinctly defined historical development in America; that there being no king in the United States did not arise from any abstract detestation of a monarchy, but from the absence of relations with the other dynasties of Europe; that the political recognition of all religions as equal, one of the principal causes of the national greatness of the United States, was here as much a matter of course as it was the reverse in Europe from precisely opposite reasons; in short, that what was natural health, perceptible, tangible, and hard reality in America, was nothing but a conditional conclusion from false premises and the sickly influences of a politically corrupt time in Europe.

The French nobility which, so to speak, gave the first legitimate importance to the movement, and introduced it to court, went so far as representatives of *la grande nation*, that they only found in America the execution of the programme which had been designed in Europe. In their vanity they only saw their own reflection in the Americans; they condescended graciously to applaud, and imagined that the Americans had shaped their Revolution exactly according to the Paris pattern, and celebrated their own apotheosis in the events of the time. Their sympathies with the American Revolution sprang more from a sentimental feeling than from a political understanding of the necessity and merits of the case. The demo-

cratic ideas they confessed were adopted more as a matter of fancy for the sake of philosophical amusement than as a practical principle involving their own welfare. That it was nothing but vanity, fashion, and ambition for military distinction which induced the French nobility to take part in the battle for American liberty is abundantly proved by the fact that, ten years after, when menaced in their own interests by the French Revolution, they were the most decided enemies of the republic, and the persecutors of every liberal opinion, because they did not find their own utopian schemes realized. Count Ségur, in his *Memoirs*, gives with great candor the reasons which induced him and his companions to come here; they are a most convincing proof of the perfect justice of our opinion given in the preceding paragraph.

"It would be difficult," says he, "to describe the eagerness and delight with which these men, the agents of a people in a state of insurrection against their monarch, were received in France, in the bosom of an ancient monarchy. Nothing could be more striking than the contrast between the luxury of our capital, the elegance of our fashions, the magnificence of Versailles, the still brilliant remains of the monarchical pride of Louis XIV., and the polished and superb dignity of our nobility, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the almost rustic apparel, the plain but firm demeanor, the free and direct language of the envoys, whose antique simplicity of dress and appearance seemed to have introduced within our walls, in the midst of the effeminate and servile refinement of the eighteenth century, some sages cotemporary with Plato, or republicans of the age of Cato and of Fabius. (!!)

"The delegates from Congress had not yet been officially recognized as diplomatic agents; an audience had not been granted by the sovereign; and the minister conducted his negotiations with them through intermediate channels. But the most distinguished individuals of the capital and the

court, the most celebrated philosophers, scholars, and men of letters, daily frequented their habitations.

"To their own writings and influence they ascribed the successful progress of liberal opinions in the New World, and their secret aspirations were to see themselves, at a future day, the legislators of Europe, as their rivals already were of America.

"Influenced by a different motive, the young officers of the French army, who breathed only war, were constant in their attendance on the American envoys, and urged their inquiries on the situation of affairs, the forces of Congress, the means of defense, and the various intelligence regularly received from the great theater on which Liberty was maintaining so valorous a combat against the tyranny of Great Britain."

Lafayette, too, the most important champion of the young noblemen, makes no exception to the general rule. His enthusiasm, however, is purer and more disinterested than that of others; it even approaches *naïveté*. "I will now tell you," writes he from Charleston, on the 19th of June, 1777, to his wife,* "about the country and its inhabitants. They are as agreeable as my enthusiasm had painted them. Simplicity of manners, kindness, love of country and of liberty, and a delightful equality everywhere prevail. The wealthiest men and the poorest are on a level; and although there are some large fortunes, I challenge any one to discover the slightest difference between the manners of these two classes respectively toward each other. . . . What most charms me is, that all the citizens are brethren. In America there are no poor, nor even what we call peasantry. Each individual has his own honest property, and the same rights as the most wealthy proprietor."

The Americans contributed, partly from intention and

* Washington's Writings, by Jared Sparks, v., 452.

partly without design, to foster this belief of the French by their public documents, however temperate and business-like their acts may have been in reality. The Declaration of Independence, for example, is couched in terms exactly corresponding with the spirit of European liberalism of that time, and on this account produced such immense effects in Europe. Other public proclamations of that time are evidently designed to make foreigners believe that the development of their own ideas in America was the great question at issue, and there was really no better way to make the Revolution popular and England detested in Europe, than this adaptation of the liberal vocabulary which was then in vogue. In opposition to this, Duportail says :*

“Such are these people that they move without spring or energy, without vigor, and without passion, for a cause in which they are engaged, and which they follow only as the impulse of the hand that first put them in motion directs. There is a hundred times more enthusiasm for this revolution in any one coffee-house at Paris, than in all the thirteen provinces united. It is necessary, then, that France, to accomplish this revolution, should furnish these people with every requisite to lessen the hardships of war. True, it will cost some millions, but they will be well laid out in annihilating the power of England, which, when bereft of her colonies, without a navy and without commerce, will lose her consequence in the world, and leave France without a rival.”

The people proper were too little considered in France at that time to be able directly to contribute to a declaration of war against England. But they constituted that popular undercurrent upon which public opinion manifested itself with a hitherto unknown certainty of victory. It was the first and last time that the upper classes went hand in hand with the entire nation, and strove for a common purpose, although acting from different impulses and intentions.

* C. Stedman's History of the American War, vol. i., 8vo, p. 437.

All these opinions, vacillations, good intentions, and enthusiasm, would very probably have led to no result, or been only partially realized, had not a man arrived at Paris just at this juncture, who was more sharp-sighted, astute, and possessed of more diplomatic ability than all the statesmen of his time; who felt the pulse of the French nation, and knew how, in a masterly manner, to influence and direct public opinion to the profit of his own country. That man was BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. Were it not for him, the alliance between France and the United States would not have been concluded so soon.

A German historian, Schlosser of Heidelberg, has the merit of having more truly estimated, and more faithfully described the historical and personal importance of Franklin, than any American, English, or French writer. There is little of interest to remark that he has not noticed, and we conceive that we can not do better than introduce here what Schlosser says of Franklin.*

“Franklin’s appearance in the Paris *salons*, even before he was presented at court or began to negotiate, otherwise than through third parties, with the minister, was an event of great importance to the entire of Europe. Paris, at that time, set the fashion for the entire civilized world in Europe, and the admiration of Franklin, carried to a degree approaching folly, produced a remarkable effect on the fashionable circles of Paris. His dress, the simplicity of his external appearance, the friendly meekness of the old man, and the apparent humility of the Quaker, procured for Freedom a mass of votaries among the court circles who used to be alarmed at its coarseness and unsophisticated truths. To what extent this was the case, and how great a stir was made by republican ideas, particularly the expressions of the republican, we have seen from the foregoing extract from the writings of Ségur, who, in all

* Geschichte des XVIII. Jahrhunderts, vol. iii., p. 535, ff., 552, ff.

things that related to his own line or circle, is unquestionably the best authority.

"Franklin neither mistook himself nor the people with whom he had to deal. He knew mankind thoroughly, and was well aware how to use the Paris admiration of himself, and how to deal with the *salons*. In his private correspondence he describes the life in Paris and the intense worship which he received on all hands, in a comical, though masterly style. But as an American merchant, he took every advantage that a skillful dealer would derive from the fascination of his customers. If we compare the description given by Lacratelle, Lafayette, Ségur and others, of the noise made by Franklin, with the private letters which he wrote himself from Passy to America, we shall see what miserable bunglers in diplomacy the most adroit of the Parisians were, when compared with the old printer. They were led by long practice, an art or science; he followed nature and his own instincts, which were never wrong and were never exaggerated. Nevertheless, so long as the war in America was not successful, he found that his negotiations made but slow and halting progress."

Steuben reached Paris about this time. The French cabinet was already inclined to favor the colonies in their policy. The engagement of Steuben shows sufficiently the political state of things, and proves that in May, 1777, the ministry regarded the alliance with America as good as concluded.

Steuben was a foreigner, and not even the subject of a powerful prince. Even if a Frenchman with Steuben's acquirements was to be found, he would not have been engaged in his place in the then existing condition of affairs, because he could not be abandoned or disavowed in case of failure. However personally flattering the propositions made to him, they were made in the exclusive interest of the cabinet, and did not give Steuben the most remote guarantee for the future. Should he fall into the hands of the English he would

have been ruthlessly sacrificed without a pang or an effort to rescue him. Should Congress refuse to accept his services, having lost his former appointments, he would have been thrown on the charity of the court of St. Germain. It will be shown hereafter that notwithstanding the success of the cause, no further notice of Steuben was taken by the French court, and that his memorials were left unanswered because he was no longer wanted. He was even compelled to lower himself by making a defense against the scornful reproach in this country that he was a French pensioner. He did not even get from the French government his traveling expenses to America.

When the news reached Paris, towards the end of the year 1777, of the capitulation of Burgoyne, France hesitated no longer to recognize the young republic, and on the 6th of February, 1778, concluded an alliance, on the condition that the United States should not give up their independence and become again subjects of England.

"More important for France," continues Schlosser, "and for all Europe (which was then the blind satellite of Versailles fashion), than this alliance which caused a sanguinary war, was the impression which Franklin's first appearance at the French court and his subsequent relations at Versailles, made upon all the intelligent men of the upper classes. This impression was not confined to France. It was also perceptible in Germany, where it was exactly coincident with the reform of Basedow and others relative to the old school and educational system.

"The scene which took place on the 20th of March, 1778, when the American plenipotentiaries were presented to the king and introduced at court, belongs to the history of the Revolution, since not only those who were entitled to appear at the palace were present in large numbers, but the entire court-yard was filled with crowds of the populace. The people exulted about Franklin solely as the representative of patriarchal republics and pastoral simplicity. Of the three plenipotentiaries, Franklin alone remained as ambassador.

Silas Deane was soon recalled by Congress, and Lee had made himself suspected and disliked. Every thing devolved on Franklin. He was the exact picture of that ideal democracy which Rousseau had so beautifully described. Franklin was accompanied by an immense number of Americans, and when he entered the reception rooms of the palace, was received with clapping of hands and loud cheers, notwithstanding that strict etiquette forbade any such demonstration. When the audience of the king was over, and the embassy proceeded with its brilliant train across the courts of the palace to visit the minister of foreign affairs, it was greeted by the people with similar cheers and applause. Wherever Franklin was seen in Paris he was the great attraction of the day, and was always cheered by the crowd. Even the young courtiers, with all their sentimentality and frivolity, found the contrast quite charming between the lace-covered, embroidered coats of the court attendants, their curled, powdered, and pomade-besmeared hair, and the lank, unpowdered hair, round hat, and simple brown cloth of the republican's coat. In the month of May, of the following year (1779), Franklin was formally accredited as sole representative of the United States at the French court.

"The old man was specially constituted to lend himself, playfully, to all the follies of the day without being spoiled in the least by the charming politeness of a people whose politeness and gallantry were, at that time, their principal merit; to turn his intercourse with the ladies to account; to show the utmost gratitude for all the attentions that were shown him, and yet, like a sensible merchant, not to depart, by a single hair's breadth, from the track of solid and profitable business. As a practical citizen, looking only to positive profit, Franklin regarded all fashionable excitements as occurrences favorable to business, from which the greatest advantage might be derived. He informs us himself that he dined out six times a week, and that he made use of the inconstant admiration and

worship of the ladies, just as all diplomatists are wont to do."

So far Schlosser.

One thing is certain, that of the two contracting parties, the United States alone derived any advantage from the war, since France asked no reward for her exertions. Whether it was short-sightedness or generosity that prevented it, there can be no doubt that had the French cabinet wished, they might easily have profited by the necessities and embarrassments in which the United States were placed towards the end of the war, and have secured for themselves a large share of the spoil. Even the advantages which were reckoned upon for the commerce of France were not realized, since, immediately after peace was concluded, the Americans returned to the English manufactures, to which they were naturally inclined by community of race and requirements. The war cost France fifteen hundred million francs, and increased considerably her financial difficulties. The only real gain—and that was only ideal—for France consisted in the rehabilitation of the glory of her arms, and the reconquest of her position as arbiter of the destinies of Europe.

The most important and enduring consequence of the war, however, was that what, till then, only existed in the feeling and conviction of the people, was now introduced into the circle of the actual public interests of the old State, and that the realization of all that was considered most excellent and perfect in social and political life—the successful example of which was to be found in America—was tried in France eleven years later, by which legitimate monarchy was overthrown. The war in America was a pastoral sport in comparison with the tragedy which set all Europe in a blaze at the time of the French Revolution, the last act of which is still far from being represented.

CHAPTER V.

TEMPESTUOUS PASSAGE OF THE FLAMAND.—ARRIVAL AT PORTSMOUTH ON THE 1ST OF DECEMBER, 1777.—STEBEN TAKEN FOR AN ENEMY.—HIS FLATTERING RECEPTION BY GOVERNOR LANGDON.—NEWS OF THE CAPTURE OF BURGOYNE.—STEBEN'S LETTERS TO CONGRESS AND WASHINGTON.—STEBEN PROCEEDS TO BOSTON.—ANSWER OF WASHINGTON, ORDERING HIM TO GO TO YORK.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE JOURNEY.—DINNER AT HANCOCK'S.—ANECDOTE OF SAMUEL ADAMS.—DUPONCEAU'S NARRATIVE OF THE JOURNEY.—THE TORY LANDLORD AT WORCESTER.—SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS OF THE CONNECTICUT PEOPLE.—POPULARITY OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—STATE OF THINGS IN CONGRESS.—PARTY ANIMOSITIES.—THE CONWAY CABAL.—KING "CONG." BUNCH OF KINGS.—STEBEN WELL RECEIVED BY THE PROMINENT MEN OF CONGRESS.—LETTER TO JOHN HANCOCK.—HIS ARRANGEMENT WITH CONGRESS.—ITS RESOLUTIONS.—STEBEN SETS OUT FOR VALLEY FORGE.—BALL AT LANCASTER GIVEN IN HIS HONOR.—FIRST ACQUAINTANCE WITH WILLIAM NORTH.—STEBEN RECEIVED IN CAMP BY WASHINGTON WITH MARKS OF GREAT DISTINCTION.—CONDITION OF THE ARMY IN VALLEY FORGE.—REASONS WHY THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION WAS SUCCESSFUL.—WASHINGTON'S CHARACTER.—HIS MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE.

THE "Flamand" had a very dangerous and tempestuous passage of sixty-six days. She not only encountered two violent gales, each of three days' duration—one in the Mediterranean, off the African coast, and the other off the coast of Nova Scotia—but she also had her fore-castle three times on fire, and that, too, with seventeen hundred weight of gun-powder on board. A mutiny of the crew made it necessary for the passengers to fight, fourteen against eighty-four, in order to secure the chiefs of the rebels. She arrived, however, safely, on the 1st day of December, 1777, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

"It was a fine, clear bright day. Nature had put on her gaudiest attire, no doubt to receive us," says Duponceau. Steuben had been told, while in France, that the colors of the British uniform had been adopted by the American army, so that, when he and his secretary Duponceau, arrived in scarlet regimentals, turned up with blue, they were at first

taken for enemies, but they soon showed that they were friends.

"The more disastrous," writes Steuben to his friend Frank, in Hechingen,* "the passage, the more flattering was my arrival in America. Before entering the port of Portsmouth, I ordered my secretary to go ashore in a boat, and to inform General Langdon, the commander of the place, of my arrival, who came on board himself to take me and my officers ashore in his boat. While we were landing, we were saluted by the guns from the fortress and from the ships in the port. Several thousand of inhabitants welcomed me in the most flattering way. Mr. Langdon took us to his house to dine. In the meantime, all the inhabitants of the place crowded together 'to see the elephant.' Although exhausted by the hardships of the voyage, I went the next day to examine the fortifications; on the following day I reviewed the troops of the garrison."

It was at the above-mentioned dinner at Governor Langdon's, that Steuben and his suite heard, for the first time, of the capture of General Burgoyne and his whole army. They naturally hailed it as an omen of good portent.

While in Portsmouth, Steuben wrote to Congress and to the general-in-chief, and inclosing a copy of his letters of introduction from Franklin, Deane, and Beaumarchais, offered his services as a volunteer in the American cause. We subjoin these two letters in full, as the best and most authentic proofs of the spirit which animated Steuben in crossing the Atlantic.

To Congress he wrote on the 6th of December, 1777, as follows,† viz.:

"HONORABLE GENTLEMEN:—The honor of serving a nation, engaged in the noble enterprise of defending its rights and liberties, was the motive that brought me to this conti-

* Schloezer's Briefwechsel, xlii., Heft, 1780, p. 327, ff.

† Journals of Congress, vol. xiii., p. 114.

nent. I ask neither riches nor titles. I am come here from the remotest end of Germany, at my own expense, and have given up an honorable and lucrative rank. I have made no condition with your deputies in France, nor shall I make any with you. My only ambition is to serve you as a volunteer, to deserve the confidence of your general-in-chief, and to follow him in all his operations, as I have done during seven campaigns with the King of Prussia. Two-and-twenty years spent in such a school seem to give me a right of thinking myself among the number of experienced officers; and if I am possessed of the acquirements in the art of war, they will be much more prized by me if I can employ them in the service of a republic such as I hope soon to see America. I should willingly purchase, at the expense of my blood, the honor of having my name enrolled among those of the defenders of your liberty. Your gracious acceptance will be sufficient for me, and I ask no other favor than to be received among your officers. I venture to hope that you will grant this my request, and that you will be so good as to send me your orders to Boston, where I shall await them, and take suitable measures in accordance."

The letter to Washington reads as follows,* viz.:

"SIR:—The inclosed copy of a letter, the original of which I shall have the honor to present to your Excellency, will inform you of the motives that brought me over to this land. I shall only add to it, that the object of my greatest ambition is to render your country all the service in my power, and to deserve the title of a citizen of America, by fighting for the cause of your liberty. If the distinguished ranks in which I have served in Europe should be an obstacle, I had rather serve under your Excellency as a volunteer, than to be an object of discontent to such deserving officers as have already distinguished themselves among you. Such being the sentiments I have always professed, I dare hope that the respectable Con-

* Washington's Writings, by Sparks, v., 528.

gress of the United States of America will accept my services. I could say, moreover, were it not for the fear of offending your modesty, that your Excellency is the only person under whom, after having served the King of Prussia, I could wish to follow a profession, to the study of which I have wholly devoted myself. I intend to go to Boston in a few days, where I shall present my letters to Mr. Hancock, member of Congress, and there I shall await your Excellency's orders."

Steuben left Portsmouth on the 12th of December, 1777, and set out for Boston by land, where he arrived on the 14th, and was received as cordially as at the former place. He met there the illustrious John Hancock, who had just retired from the presidency of Congress, and received Washington's reply to his letter, by which he was informed that he must repair, without delay, to York, Pennsylvania, where Congress was then sitting, since it belonged exclusively to that body to enter into negotiations with him. At the same time Hancock communicated to Steuben an order of Congress, that every preparation should be made to make him and his suite comfortable on their journey to York, and Mr. Hancock himself with great care made all the necessary arrangements. Carriages, sleighs, and saddle horses were provided, five negroes were assigned to them as grooms and drivers, and an agent to prepare quarters and procure provisions.

Washington's answer, which was delayed in consequence of the difficulty of communication and the arrangement of his equipage, detained Steuben about five weeks in Boston. Hancock introduced him to Samuel and John Adams, and the other worthies of the Revolution. Duponceau, who accompanied Steuben everywhere, as he could not speak English, gives in his manuscript letters some very amusing anecdotes, which characterize as well the time as its prominent persons, and one of which, therefore, may find a place here. "Once," says he, "at a dinner given by Governor Hancock to General Steuben, I sat next to Samuel Adams, and happened by mis-

take to call him Mr. John Adams. 'Sir,' said he, looking sternly at me, 'I would have you know that there is a great difference between Mr. Samuel Adams (striking his breast and laying a strong emphasis on the word Samuel), and Mr. John Adams.' This remark," continues Duponceau, "let me into the little jealousies that then existed between some of the great men of the day, and I was afterward on my guard against addressing people by their Christian names."

Steuben, however, left Boston on the 14th of January, 1778. The journey to York is described in the following entertaining narrative, by Duponceau, the young Frenchman.

"Our party," says he, "consisted of Baron Steuben and his servant, Carl Vogel, a young lad whom he had brought from Germany, Mr. De Franey, an agent of Beaumarchais, and myself. We traveled on horseback. Notwithstanding the recent capture of General Burgoyne, the situation of the United States at that time was extremely critical. The enemy was in possession of Rhode Island, New York, and Philadelphia, with well-organized and disciplined troops, far superior in number to our own. Our army (if army it might be called) were encamped at Valley Forge, in the depth of a severe winter, without provisions, without clothes, without regular discipline, destitute, in short, of every thing but courage and patriotism; and what was worse than all, disaffection was spreading through the land. In this dismal state of things the baron was advised to keep as far from the coast as possible, lest he should be surprised by parties of the enemy or by the Tories, who made frequent incursions into the country between New York and Philadelphia. We, therefore, shaped our course westward, and crossing the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania, we employed about three weeks in a journey of four hundred and ten miles in all, which at present (1836) would hardly require as many days."

They stopped, on their way, on Sunday the 18th of January, at Springfield, on the 20th at Hartford, on the 28th at

Fishkill, on Thursday, the 30th, at Bethlehem, on the 2d of February at Reading, on the 4th at Manheim, and arrived on Thursday, the 5th, at York.

"In the course of that journey," remarks Duponceau, "we met with few adventures. I shall relate one or two to show the spirit of the times.

"We had been cautioned against putting up at a certain tavern in Worcester county, Massachusetts, not far from the frontier of Connecticut. We were told that the landlord was a bitter Tory, and that he would refuse to receive us, or, at least, treat us very ill. We determined to avoid that place if it were possible. Unfortunately, when we were at some distance from it, we were surprised by a violent snow storm; it was in the evening, and we were compelled to take shelter in the very house we wished to avoid. We had not been misinformed. The landlord at once said that he could not accommodate us. He had no beds, no bread, no meat, no drink, no milk, no eggs; all that he could offer us was the bare walls. In vain we remonstrated and prayed, he remained inflexible. At last Baron Steuben grew impatient and flew into a violent passion. After exhausting all his store of German oaths, he called in that language to his servant to bring his pistols, which he did. Then the baron, presenting the deadly weapons at the frightened landlord, repeated the questions that he had in vain asked before: 'Have you any bread, meat, drink, beds, etc.?' The answers were now such as we desired; we were accommodated with good beds and a good supper, and our horses were properly taken care of. In the morning after our breakfast, we politely took leave of our host, who, though a Tory, did not refuse the continental money in which we liberally paid him.

"Another anecdote which I now recollect, is strictly characteristic of the patriarchal manner of those times. As we passed through the State of Connecticut, we put up one night at a house where, for some reason that I do not remember, we

were all obliged to sleep on the floor in the same room with the family, some on feather beds, and some on blankets ; men, women and children, had all to bundle together, as it was called. The bedding was spread all around the room, and every one took his place and went very composedly to sleep. The utmost decency was observed though no fuss was made about it. There was so much innocence and simplicity in the manner in which these arrangements were prepared and made, that the idea of indelicacy did not even occur to us, and if in the morning we indulged in a smile at manners to which we were so little accustomed, nothing was said or thought to the prejudice of the morality of the good people who had entertained us in the best manner that they were able.

“A great number of inns, in towns and country, bore the sign of the King of Prussia, who was still very popular, particularly among the Germans. I remember that at Manheim the baron, with a significant look, pointed out to me, at the tavern where we dined, a paltry engraving hung up on the wall on which was represented a Prussian knocking down a Frenchman in great style. Underneath was the following appropriate motto :

“‘Ein Franzmann zum Preuszen wie eine Mücke.’

“‘A Frenchman to a Prussian is no more than a musquito.’

“The good baron appeared to enjoy that picture exceedingly, and so no doubt did the German landlord to whom it belonged.”

Steuben staid at York until the 19th of February, 1778. “The Congress of the United States,” continues Duponceau, “were not at that time the illustrious body whose eloquence and wisdom, whose stern virtues and unflinching patriotism had astonished the world. Their number was reduced to about one half of what it was when independence was declared ; all but a few of the men of superior minds had disappeared from it. Their measures were feeble and vacillating,

and their party feuds seemed to forebode some impending calamity. The enemy were in possession of our capital city; the army we had to oppose to them were hungry, naked and destitute of every thing. No foreign government had yet acknowledged our independence—every thing around us was dark and gloomy. The only ray of light which appeared amidst the darkness was the capture of Burgoyne, which cheered the spirits of those who might otherwise have despaired of the commonwealth. But that brilliant victory had nearly produced most fatal consequences. General Gates became the hero of the day. Saratoga was then what New Orleans has been since—the watchword of the discontented. A party was formed even in Congress to raise the conqueror of Burgoyne to the supreme command of our armies. But the great figure of Washington stood calm and serene at his camp at Valley Forge, and struck the conspirators with awe. With the exception of a few factious chiefs, he was idolized by the army and by the nation at large. The plot was discovered, and the plan frustrated without a struggle. Without any effort or management on his part, and by the mere force of his character, Washington stood firm and undaunted in the midst of his enemies, and I might almost say, looked them into silence.

“Such was the state of things when we arrived at York. Parties were then at their height; but as Congress sat with closed doors, the country at large was not agitated as it would otherwise have been. There were not wanting out of doors disaffected persons, who railed at King “Cong” and the bunch of “kings” (such was the slang of the day among the Tories), but the great mass of the people was still in favor of the Revolution, and the press did not dare to utter a sentiment inimical to it.

“The fame of Baron Steuben had preceded him to York. He was welcomed and courted by all, and I well remember that General Gates in particular paid him the most assiduous

court, and even invited him to make his house his home, which he prudently declined."

"Please to accept my grateful thanks"—such are Steuben's words, in a letter to John Hancock, written a day after his arrival at York*—"for all the kindness you have shown me during my stay at Boston. In this very moment I enjoy the good effects of it, having taken the liberty of quartering myself in an apartment of your house in this town. My journey has been extremely painful; but the kind reception I have met with from Congress and General Gates on my arrival here, have made me soon forget those past inconveniences. Now, sir, I am an American, and an American for life; your nation has become as dear to me as your cause already was. You know that my pretensions are very moderate; I have submitted them to a committee sent to me by Congress. They seem to be satisfied, and so am I, and shall be the more so when I find the opportunity to render all the services in my power to the United States of America. Three members of Congress have been appointed for concluding an arrangement with me to-morrow; that will not take long, my only claims being the confidence of your general-in-chief."

The committee of Congress just mentioned by Steuben, which consisted of Doctor Witherspoon, the chairman, and only person who spoke French, Messrs. Henry, of Maryland, and Thomas McKean, waited upon Steuben the day after his arrival, and demanded of him the conditions on which he was inclined to serve the United States, and if he had made any stipulations with their commissioners in France? He replied that he had made no agreement with them, nor was it his intention to accept of any rank or pay; that he wished to join the army as volunteer, and to render such services as the commander-in-chief should think him capable of, adding, that he had no other fortune than a revenue of about six hundred guineas per annum, arising from places and posts of honor in

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

Germany, which he had relinquished to come to this country ; that in consideration of this, he expected the United States would defray his necessary expenses while in their service ; that if, unhappily, this country should not succeed in establishing their independence, or if he should not succeed in his endeavors in their service, in either of these cases he should consider the United States as free from any obligations towards him ; but if, on the other hand, the United States should be fortunate enough to establish their freedom, and that if his efforts should be successful, in that case he should expect a full indemnification for the sacrifice he had made in coming over, and such marks of their liberality as the justice of the United States should dictate ; that he only required commissions for the officers attached to his person, namely, that of major and aid-de camp for Mr. De Romanai, that of captain of engineers for Mr. De l'Enfant, that of captain of cavalry for Mr. De Depontière, and the rank of captain for his secretary, Mr. Duponceau ; that if these terms were agreeable to Congress he waited for their orders to join the army without delay.”*

The committee applauded the generosity of Steuben's propositions in thus risking his fortune on that of the United States, and made their report. The next day Congress gave him an entertainment, after which the president, Mr. Laurens, told him it was the desire of Congress that he should join the army immediately, in conformity with the following resolution :

“ *Whereas*, Baron Steuben, a lieutenant general in foreign service, has in a most disinterested and heroic manner offered his services to these States as a volunteer,

“ *Resolved*, That the president present the thanks of Congress, in behalf of these United States, to Baron Steuben, for the zeal he has shown for the cause of America, and the disin-

* American State Papers, vol. “Claims.” Washington, 1834, p. 11-16.

terested tender he has been pleased to make of his military talents, and inform him that Congress cheerfully accept of his services as a volunteer in the army of these States, and wish him to repair to General Washington's quarters as soon as convenient."

"Congress received Steuben with every mark of distinction," says Richard Peters, in a letter dated Belmont, October 30, 1785, "and paid more particular attention to him than I had known given to any foreigner. Much pleasure was expressed at the arrival of a person of his military knowledge and experience, at a time when the want of discipline in our army, and the economy it produced, were severely felt and regretted."*

Steuben set out for Valley Forge on the 19th of February, 1778, and arrived there on the 23d. "On our journey," says Duponceau, "we passed through Lancaster, then considered the largest inland town in the United States. Having arrived there early in the afternoon, the baron was waited upon by Colonel Gibson and other gentlemen, who invited him and his family to a subscription ball to take place that evening, in honor of his arrival. The baron accepted, and we accordingly went. There we saw assembled all the fashion and beauty of Lancaster and its vicinity. The baron was delighted to converse with the German girls in his native tongue. There was a handsome supper, and the company did not separate until two o'clock the next morning."

It was on this occasion that William North, who afterwards was his aid-de-camp and adopted son, saw him for the first time. "His reputation had preceded him," says North, "and those who yet remember his graceful entry and manner in a ball-room, the novel splendor of his star and its accompanying ornaments, can easily conceive the feelings of his countrymen and of their assembled wives and daughters; they might

* American State Papers, vol. "Claims." Washington, 1834, p. 13.

indeed, with honest feeling, have thanked God that they had no reason to be ashamed of him."

"Upon my arrival in camp," writes Steuben, "I was again the object of more honors than I was entitled to. General Washington came several miles to meet me on the road, and accompanied me to my quarters, where I found an officer with twenty-five men as a guard of honor. When I declined this, saying that I wished to be considered merely as a volunteer, the General answered me in the politest words, that the whole army would be gratified to stand sentinel for such volunteers. He introduced me to Major General Lord Stirling and several other generals. On the same day my name was given as watchword. The following day the army was mustered, and General Washington accompanied me to review it. To be brief, if Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, or the greatest field marshal of Europe, had been in my place, he could not have been received with greater marks of honor than I was."

Washington himself informed Congress, on the 27th of February, 1778, of Steuben's arrival, in the following words:*

"Baron Steuben has arrived at camp. He appears to be much of a gentleman, and as far as I have had an opportunity of judging, a man of military knowledge, and acquainted with the world."

The encampment at Valley Forge lasted till the 18th of June, 1778, and the period of its existence marks one of the most trying periods of the revolutionary war. All the abuses and defects that had been dominant in the American army, reached their culmination during this time, and showed the pressing need of radical reforms. In consequence of the bad management in the commissary general's office, a famine broke out in camp, although the country was abounding with provisions. "Unless," writes Washington to Congress, "some great

* Washington's Writings, by Sparks. Vol. v., p. 244.

and capital change suddenly takes place, the army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things—to starve, dissolve, or disperse in order to obtain subsistence.” On the other hand, the quarter-master’s department was of as little use, as it had been long without a head, and was dependent, not on the commander-in-chief, but on Congress. On the 1st day of February, 1778, there were three thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine men in camp unfit for duty for want of clothing. The natural consequences of these evils were mutinies, frequent desertions, and the prevalence of fever and sickness, which swept hundreds of soldiers away. Of the original force of about seventeen thousand men, only five thousand and twelve were at this time (February, 1778) fit for duty.

Congress at last gave way to the remonstrances of the commander-in-chief, and appointed a committee to reside in camp during the winter, for the purpose of inquiring into the state of the army, and of proposing such reforms as seemed to it necessary. Upon its arrival, Washington laid a memorial before it concerning the state of the army, the remedies for the abuses in its departments, and the steps to be taken for its future safety. Little or nothing, however, was done in answer to Washington’s proposals. Congress seemed only desirous of showing its good will; the reforms proposed were but partially carried out, after their necessity had been demonstrated for months, and even years. Nothing, therefore, was consummated in the commissary’s and quarter-master general’s department, and while an inspector general was appointed, it was for the purpose of gratifying Conway’s ambition. The regulation of this important office was, therefore, postponed to better times; the officers were not provided for, and the comfort and exigencies of the privates were neglected.

At this critical period of the war it was not Congress that kept the army together; it was not the people at large that supported and sustained their soldiers; it was not the enthusiasm of the masses that saved the country; other and more

powerful elements were working toward the establishment of American independence.

To the most prominent only of these elements we mean to refer at this time.

The lack of proportion between the basis of operations and the numerical strength of the British forces is the characteristic type of the whole war, and in this essential difference may be found the chief reason for the final victory of the Americans over the English. Ten thousand square miles of an insurgent country can no more be occupied, watched over and kept by half a dozen weak divisions, than a few thousand regular troops can maintain themselves as masters of a large city like Paris or Berlin against a sudden revolutionary outbreak, however badly the rebels may be equipped and disciplined. If the English from the beginning had duly appreciated their situation, they would have confined themselves to the occupation of strong places, single posts and fortified ports. Whenever they made large expeditions into and through the country, or whenever they tried to conquer whole provinces, they always failed, as might have been anticipated. It was the war of Cyrus against the Scythians, of the Romans against the Germans. The sudden retreat of these undisciplined masses into the barren and distant interior, was their most terrible weapon, both of offense and defense. Moreover, the Americans were separated from their aggressor by a great ocean, and had no neighbor able to harm them seriously.

Thus it was that the American Revolution, which suffered from all the defects of the European revolutions, finally came out triumphant. On account of these reasons it had just time enough to organize itself. In all instances when a people has risen against its oppressors, it has to oppose loose, undisciplined, unorganized masses to a ruling power, which has at its disposal the chief support of an effective resistance, a disciplined and obedient army.

It is, therefore, at the beginning of the revolution that the

greatest difficulties of the uprising masses exist. The throwing off the yoke is comparatively an easy affair, but the struggle begins with the first battle. Even where insurgents have an army from the outset, it is difficult to keep it together and to employ it, because every revolution supposes a certain dissolution of the established order of things, which reacts with the most pernicious effect upon its creators. A revolution is doomed when it has not time and ground enough to collect itself and settle. It will at once be suppressed by the united military movements of its organized enemies.

Thus, at the beginning of the French Revolution, the French troops almost everywhere suffered defeat. Badly armed, badly provided for, badly drilled, all their personal heroism and the terror of the Convention were not sufficient to compensate for these defects. The Hungarian honveds (militia) were driven into a precipitate flight at Schwechat, and the whole army forced back into the interior of Hungary, until, provided from the resources of the country, and supplied with new arms and new ammunition, it could take its ground again and advance victoriously.

The people of these countries were as self-sacrificing, if not more so, than the Americans. Nevertheless, the latter alone, of all modern nations, succeeded in their struggle. If the circumstances we have mentioned were the natural basis of their final triumph, they had, on the other hand, the great good luck to have a general at their head who, by his indefatigable exertions and his noble conduct was immeasurably the superior of all the military leaders, and who knew how to choose the proper persons for the proper places. Thus, for instance, he at once perceived Steuben's talent for organization.

The independence of the United States would not have been realized so speedily, or with such brilliant effect, if the chief part of its achievement had not been conferred upon Washington. He appears a greater commander in his letters to Congress than in his military operations, in which, weak as he

was in his means, he had to combat with enormous difficulties. Why did he not incessantly alarm the English camp ; why did he not fly to inaccessible posts when the enemy was preparing to attack him ; why did he not suddenly outflank the British ; why did he not appear in their rear, cut off their provisions, and intercept their supplies ; why did he not use his entire force with more energy and activity ?

The answer to all these questions is easily given and understood when it is seen that his soldiers were barefooted, and would almost all have run away if Washington had made fatiguing marches ; that the government for which they fought did not provide them with the necessary provisions and clothing ; that often their own countrymen refused to them a mere shelter against cold and storm ; that there existed no hospitals to receive the wounded, who thus saw certain death staring them in the face ; and were thus discouraged from engaging in an enterprise in which they had to suffer much—without deriving any corresponding profit ; that these soldiers only wanted to go over to the English in order to put a stop to their miseries ; that the troops were enlisted for too short a time to be entirely trustworthy ; that in consequence of all these defects a rigid discipline could not be enforced, and that, therefore, General Washington was bound to save as much fatigue as possible to his troops, which were almost overwhelmed with hardships and privations, in order to keep at least as many of them together as would lead the enemy to suppose that a real and effective army existed. It is, therefore, apparent that Washington's inactivity was the result of the unfavorable circumstances in which he found himself ; but whenever it was prudent he took the offensive, and displayed great vigor, as in the affairs of Trenton, Princeton, and Germantown. This self-control and Fabian-like prudence is one of the most striking traits of Washington's character. He possessed all the qualities necessary for command. A hundred other commanders put in the same position, and sur-

rounded by the same difficulties, would have lost patience and courage ; but he was a master, not in guiding the general feeling of the people, but to discern, follow and make the best of them. On account of this talent, Washington is justly the most popular hero of the American people. He is flesh of their flesh and blood of their blood, but of a higher order.

All that has been said and written about Washington by his admirers, falls short, in our opinion, of a perfect appreciation of the man. It is certainly a high position to occupy the first place among men like Franklin, Jefferson, Greene, Hamilton, Jay, and several others ; it is an historical glory—and can there be any greater?—to be the soul and the expression of a great historical event ; it is an enviable destiny enjoyed by few, to be the first in war, the first in peace, the first in the hearts of his countrymen, and to shine to succeeding generations for centuries as *the man of his country*. Washington is more than all this—he is not only the hero of his people and of the new world, he is at the same time the hero of the whole world, of the entire Teutonic race, the classic expression of its will and power, of its perseverance and energy, of its contentedness and grandeur, of its disinterestedness and self-denial.

It is a great mistake to compare Washington with a great conqueror, like Napoleon, or any other military commander of modern times, because no point of comparison really exists between them. It is a contradiction in itself to place him on the same level with the monarchical statesmen and soldiers of the last century, as his views, motives and objects had nothing in common with theirs. To appreciate the greatness of a man like Washington, according to the number of his victories, the extent of his conquests, and the apparent brilliancy of his exploits is a proof how deeply, though unconsciously, the Latin dogma of authority and centralization has penetrated the life and notions of modern nations. Washington was great just because he did *not*

possess the qualities which constitute the greatness of other historical characters. His true position in history is on the threshold of the Present and the close of the era of the Reformation. That grand thesis of ninety-five paragraphs, which, on the 31st day of October, 1517, Luther nailed on the chapel-door of Wittenberg, finally found, after more than two centuries and a half, its synthesis when, on the 4th day of July, 1776, at the State House of Philadelphia, the young, rising republic of the West made its declaration of independence, and established liberty of conscience in politics, of which the chosen champion was Washington. Thus Wittenberg and Philadelphia, Luther and Washington, are the beginning and end of the era of the Reformation.

Open the book of modern history and you will find many heroes in the life of the Teutonic race who are not only akin to Washington, but complete his character, and who, either previous to his time or contemporaneously with him, assisted in forcing the world into the same phase of development. In the first place, we meet Luther, the great German reformer, who overthrew the despotism of Rome; there, also, we are reminded of the taciturn and majestic forms of the two Williams of Orange, who, in giving the death-blow to the gloomy rule of Spain, won undying fame for themselves. There, also, we meet the great dramatist, William Shakespeare, who illustrated poetically the new Protestant ideas; there, also, we meet the valiant King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, who secured religious liberty on the battle fields of Germany; there the sturdy Lord Protector, Oliver Cromwell, gives the first blow to the crumbling edifice of the effete social system of England, by bringing the middle classes into political existence, and thus laying the foundation of her present greatness; there, that sober Scotchman, Adam Smith, the Luther of political economy, breaks down the old feudal system, and initiates a new era in the commercial and industrial world; there, finally, Emanuel Kant, by his "categorical imperative," arouses

the world from mental slumber to intellectual activity, and closes, in this point of view, the age of the Reformation, as Washington did in a political sense. All these men, although in other spheres, his predecessors and cotemporaries, are sprung from the same race, and elevated by the same idea—the autonomy of the individual, which they made to prevail by prudence, moderation and concentration of their power on this single point.

Is there any more Teutonic nature than that of Washington, or any character that has exercised more perfect self-discipline, or anybody who, by each act of his life, elevated and purified himself to a higher degree; who performed his task with greater self-satisfaction, or regarded the fulfillment of his duty as a matter of course; or who adhered more rigidly to self-imposed limits; or who, after many and great personal sacrifices, having reached the goal of his noble ambition, retired into private life with more modesty and grace?

Thus we think Washington may be considered one of the most notable and important exemplars of Teutonic genius, which is not confined to any particular land, which to-day is exploring the deserts of Africa, and to-morrow lays the telegraphic cable between Europe and America, and which carries civilization into the wilderness, not with sound of trumpet and drum, but with the ax and the plow to last forever.

CHAPTER VI.

SAD CONDITION OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY.—STEUZEN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF THINGS IN VALLEY FORGE.—HARD TASK FOR A REFORMER.—THE ENGLISH SYSTEM PREVALENT.—ENORMOUS EXPENSES.—PERCENTAGE PAID TO THE COMMISSIONERS; THEIR PECULATION.—STEUZEN PROPOSES THE CONTRACT SYSTEM, WHICH, HOWEVER, IS NOT ACCEPTED.—CONDITION OF THE TROOPS.—EBB AND FLOW OF MEN.—INCOMPLETENESS OF THE COMPANIES, REGIMENTS, AND BRIGADES.—A REGIMENT CONSISTING OF THIRTY MEN, AND A COMPANY OF ONE CORPORAL.—DUTY OF THE MUSTER MASTER, AND THE WAY IN WHICH IT WAS PERFORMED.—INCORRECTNESS OF SUCH RETURNS.—THE ARMY A NURSERY FOR SERVANTS.—MORE COMMISSARIES AND QUARTERMASTERS THAN IN ALL THE ARMIES OF EUROPE TOGETHER.—NO ACCOUNTS KEPT.—FIVE TO EIGHT THOUSAND MUSKETS LOST IN ONE CAMPAIGN.—THE LOSS OF THE BAYONETS STILL GREATER.—STEUZEN'S ARRANGEMENTS SAVED THE UNITED STATES AT LEAST \$100,000 A YEAR.—THE ARMS IN A HORRIBLE CONDITION.—THE MEN ALMOST LITERALLY NAKED.—OFFICERS AT A GREAT PARADE IN A DRESSING-GOWN.—NO DISCIPLINE, NO REGULAR FORMATION.—EACH COLONEL HAS A SYSTEM OF HIS OWN.—NO ROLLS KEPT OF THE COMPANIES.—GREAT ABUSES IN GRANTING FURLONGS.—OFFICERS HAD NO IDEA OF THEIR DUTIES.—INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF A REGIMENT UNKNOWN.—INFINITY OF GUARDS.—DUPONCEAU'S SKETCH.—ARMY IN WANT OF PROVISIONS, CLOTHES, FODDER, AND EVERY THING.—LIFE AT HEAD-QUARTERS; MRS. WASHINGTON AND MRS. GREENE.—DINNER GIVEN BY STEUZEN, WHERE TORN CLOTHES WERE AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.—SALAMANDERS AND SANS-CULOTTES.—OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.—RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 13, 1777.—CONWAY.—"IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO."—STEUZEN TEMPORARY INSPECTOR.—DIRECTS HIS ATTENTION TO THE ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY.—WHERE TO COMMENCE, THE QUESTION.—DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AN ARRANGEMENT, SO AS NOT TO DISGUST THE OFFICERS AND MEN, AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE.—GREENE, LAURENS, AND HAMILTON ASSIST HIM.—STEUZEN'S PROPOSITION FOR A TEMPORARY INSPECTORSHIP APPROVED BY WASHINGTON.—STEUZEN'S SUB-INSPECTORS.—MODEL COMPANY FORMED AND DRILLED BY STEUZEN HIMSELF.—REASONS WHY HE DEPARTED FROM THE GENERAL EUROPEAN RULE IN DRILLING AND EXERCISING THE TROOPS.—COLONELS AND OFFICERS BEGIN TO DRILL THEIR MEN.—STEUZEN GAINS CONFIDENCE AND EXTENDS HIS OPERATIONS ON A LARGER SCALE.—HIS INSPECTORS TEACH THE DIFFERENT CORPS.—FLEURY DESCRIBES THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES IN WILMINGTON.—A. SCAMMEL ACKNOWLEDGES THE GOOD EFFECT OF STEUZEN'S INDEFATIGABLE EFFORTS.—WILLIAM NORTH'S NARRATIVE OF THE PROGRESS OF THE TROOPS IN CONSEQUENCE OF STEUZEN'S SYSTEM OF DRILL.—BENJAMIN WALKER FIRST INTRODUCED.—COMPLETE SUCCESS OF STEUZEN.

ALTHOUGH the sad condition of the Continental army during that horrible winter in Valley Forge is sufficiently known, it will be interesting to give here the testimony of an eye witness, who shared the privations of the troops, and

used his best exertions to mitigate the hardships to which they were exposed.

"The situation of affairs in general," writes Steuben, at the time of his arrival in camp,* "and of our own army at Valley Forge in particular, is too well known to need a description. My determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied, but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first place, I informed myself relative to the military administration. I found that the different branches were divided into departments. There were those of the quartermaster general, war commissary, provisions commissary, commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc. But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to say, they had imitated the English administration, which is certainly the most imperfect in Europe.

"The general asked me to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the departments, and their various branches in the European armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon the functions of the quartermasters (*maréchaux généraux de logis*) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system, bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and quartermaster had a commission of so much per cent. on all the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many millions.

"I pointed out to General Washington and several members of Congress, the advantages of the contract system. I even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi., and Sprague.

Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies. But whether it was that they thought such a system impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were.

“I directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were supreme. As this became my principal object, I must enter into some particular details.

“The effective strength of the army was divided into divisions, commanded by major generals; into brigades, commanded by brigadier generals; and into regiments, commanded by colonels. The number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number, that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers. Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of *thirty men*, and a company of *one corporal*! Nothing was so difficult, and often so impossible, as to get a correct list of the state or a return of any company, regiment, or corps. As in the English service, there was a muster-master general, with a number of assistants. It was the duty of this officer to ascertain and report every month the effective state of the army, for the payment of the men and officers. This operation took place as follows: each captain made a roll of his company, whether absent or present, after which he made oath before a superior officer that this return was correct, ‘to the best of his knowledge and belief.’ The muster-master counted the men present,

and the absent were marked by him for their pay upon the oath of the captain. I am very far from supposing that an officer would voluntarily commit a fraud, but let us examine the state of the companies, and we shall see the correctness of such returns.

“The company had twelve men present; absent, one man as valet to the commissary, two hundred miles distant from the army, for eighteen months; one man valet to a quartermaster attached to the army of the north, for twelve months; four in the different hospitals for so many months; two as drivers of carriages; and so many more as bakers, blacksmiths, carpenters, even as coal-porters, for years together, although the greater number were only engaged for nine months at the outset. But a man once on the roll of a company, remained there everlastingly, as forming part of the effective strength, except in case of death or desertion, under the very eyes of the captain.

“According to these rolls, the strength of the army for pay and provisions was calculated. The regimental returns furnished to the adjutant general every week, for the information of the general-in-chief, as to the strength of the army, were not much more exact. I am sure that, at that time, a general would have thought himself lucky to find a third of the men ready for action whom he found on paper.

“The soldiers were scattered about in every direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants, and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more commissaries and quartermasters at that time than all the armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one servant, but others had two and even three. If the captains and colonels could give no account of their men, they could give still less an account of their arms, accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all the articles. A company,

which consisted, in May, of fifty men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits, who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had completed their time of service.

General Knox assured me that, previous to the establishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish from five thousand to eight thousand muskets* to replace those which were lost in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his beef-steak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months. Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his successor received another from the public store. No captain kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture to say that during an entire campaign there have not been twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. It was the same with the pouches and other accouterments, and I do not believe that I exaggerate when I state that my arrangements have saved the United States at least eight hundred thousand French livres a year.

“The arms at Valley Forge were in a horrible condition, covered with rust, half of them without bayonets, many from which a single shot could not be fired. The pouches were quite as bad as the arms. A great many of the men had tin boxes instead of pouches, others had cow-horns; and muskets, carbines, fowling-pieces, and rifles were to be seen in the same company.

“The description of the dress is most easily given. The

* The price of a musket was fixed, in the regulations of 1779, at sixteen dollars without bayonet, and eighteen dollars with bayonet.

men were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. The officers who had coats, had them of every color and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. In the first place there was no regular formation. A so-called regiment was formed of three platoons, another of five, eight, nine, and the Canadian regiment of twenty-one. The formation of the regiments was as varied as their mode of drill, which only consisted of the manual exercise. Each colonel had a system of his own, the one according to the English, the other according to the Prussian or French style. There was only one thing in which they were uniform, and that was, the way of marching in the maneuvers and on the line of march. They all adopted the mode of marching in files used by the Indians. Mr. De Conway had introduced platoons and many other things; but as he was not liked, they had allowed all his instructions to fall into disuse, so that I scarcely found a trace of them. It is also necessary to remark, that the changing the men, the reductions and continual incorporations deprived the corps and regiments of all consistence. There was another evil still more subversive of order in an army: the captains and colonels did not consider their companies and regiments as corps confided to them by the United States for the care of the men as well as the preservation of order and discipline. The greater part of the captains had no roll of their companies, and had no idea how many men they had under their orders. When I asked a colonel the strength of his regiment, the usual reply was, 'something between two and three hundred men.' The colonels, and often the captains, granted leave of absence as they thought proper, and not only that, but permissions to retire from the service. The officers were not accustomed to remain with the troops when the army was in camp; they lived in houses, often several miles

distant. In winter quarters they nearly all went home, and there were often not more than four officers with a regiment. In the campaign of 1779, I found a Massachusetts regiment commanded by a lieutenant. The idea they had of their duty was, that the officers had only to mount guard and put themselves at the head of their regiment or company when they were going into action.

"The internal administration of a regiment and a company was a thing completely unknown. The quarter-master received arms, ammunition and camp equipage, for an entire brigade. The clothing and provisions were distributed in the same way by brigades. A captain who did not know the number of men in his company, could not know the number of the rations and other articles necessary for it. There were absolutely no regulations for the service of the camp and of the guards. Each colonel encamped his regiment according to his fancy. There were guards and pickets, and sometimes too many; but the officers did not know their duty, and in many instances did not understand the object of the guard. An infinity of internal guards for the commissaries of forage and provisions, and for the quarter-master, weakened the strength of the army, the more so, because these guards were never relieved, and remained from one year to another. Their arms were lost, and they were all the servants of the commissary, who often granted them leave not only for six months, but without limitation. It would be an endless task to enumerate the abuses which nearly ruined the army. The above is a general view of the situation of the American army as I found it at Valley Forge in the month of February, 1778."

Duponceau's sketch of the state of affairs at Valley Forge gives more the domestic than the military aspect of things, and may therefore, with good reason, form the supplement to Steuben's characteristic sketch.

"We dined," says he, "twice or thrice a week with General Washington. We visited him also in the evening, when

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Mrs. Washington was at head-quarters. We were in a manner domesticated in the family. As to the situation of our army, suffice it to say that we were in want of provisions, of clothing, of fodder for our horses, in short, of every thing. I remember seeing the soldiers popping their heads out of their miserable huts, and calling out, in an under tone, 'No bread, no soldier!' Their condition was truly pitiful, and 'their courage and their perseverance is beyond all praise.' We, who lived in good quarters, did not feel the misery of the times so much as the common soldiers and the subaltern officers; yet, we had more than once to share our rations with the sentry at our door. We put the best face we could upon the matter. Once, with the baron's permission, his aids invited a number of young officers to dine at our quarters, on condition that none should be admitted that had on a whole pair of breeches. This was of course understood as *pars pro toto*; but torn clothes were an indispensable requisite for admission, and in this the guests were very sure not to fail. The dinner took place. The guests clubbed their rations, and we feasted sumptuously on tough beefsteak and potatoes, with hickory nuts for our dessert. Instead of wine we had some kind of spirits, with which we made 'salamanders,' that is to say, after filling our glasses, we set the liquor on fire and drank it up, flame and all. Such a set of ragged, and, at the same time, merry fellows, were never brought together. The baron loved to speak of that dinner, and of his 'sansculottes,' as he called us. Thus this denomination was first invented in America and applied to the brave officers and soldiers of our revolutionary army.

"In the midst of all our distress there were some bright sides of the picture, which Valley Forge exhibited at that time. Mrs. Washington had the courage to follow her husband to that dismal abode, and other ladies also graced the scene. Among them was the lady of General Greene, a handsome, elegant and accomplished woman. Her dwelling was the resort

of foreign officers, because she spoke the French language and was well versed in French literature. They often met at each other's quarters, and sometimes at General Washington's, where the evening was spent in conversation over a cup of tea or coffee. There were no levees or formal soirées, no dancing and playing, or amusements of any kind, except singing. Every gentleman or lady who could sing was called "upon in turn for a song."

Two months before Steuben arrived in camp, the office of inspector general had been created, in conformity with the propositions and wishes of General Conway. Congress, in their session of December 13, 1777, resolved,*

"That it is essential to the promotion of discipline in the American army, and to the reformation of the various abuses which prevail in the different departments, that an appointment be made of inspector general, agreeable to the practice of the best disciplined European armies; that this appointment be conferred on experienced and vigilant general officers, who are acquainted with whatever relates to the general economy, maneuvers and discipline of a well regulated army."

The duties of these officers, or rather of this officer, as Conway alone was elected for this office, were shaped after the model of the French army, and consisted in instructing, maneuvering and reviewing the troops, in preparing and transmitting to Congress the necessary returns of clothing, accoutrements, payment of the men and of the casualties.

This plan, like that of creating the office of commissary general, was proposed in direct opposition to the opinion of the commander-in-chief. "It created," to use Judge John Marshall's words, "an *imperium in imperio*;" it made the inspector only accountable to, and removable by, Congress, and at the same time independent of the commander-in-chief. "It conferred powers," as Alexander Hamilton justly

* Journal of Congress, iii., 1777, pp. 574 and 575.

remarked, "which could not fail to produce universal opposition in the army, and by making the previous concurrence of the board of war requisite to the introduction of every regulation which might be found necessary, opened a continual source of delay, which was calculated to defeat the usefulness of the institution."

Conway expected to use it as an effectual though indirect means of attack in his notorious cabal against the commander-in-chief, whom he did not dare to assail directly. The worthless intriguer, however, never exercised the duties of his office. After his cabal against Washington had exploded, he retired from the army, where his promotion to the rank of major general had caused great dissatisfaction, and resigned his commission about the end of April. Thus, the whole plan never went into operation, and existed only on paper when Steuben joined the army at Valley Forge.

Washington knew but too well, by the experience of the last campaigns, that a well-organized inspectorship was the best remedy against the principal defects and irregularities of the army, and was at the same time aware that Congress, after having appointed Conway to the office of inspector general, could not but agree with his wishes of a permanent and efficient establishment of this important branch of military discipline. Steuben arrived, therefore, very opportunely at the camp. Offering his services as a volunteer, he could give no umbrage to the native officers by claiming a rank equal or superior to them, and having been trained in the best war school of his time, and strongly recommended by competent judges and impartial friends, he was just the man whom the commander-in-chief wanted, as the American officers were almost entirely ignorant of military tactics. Steuben most cheerfully accepted the offer of a temporary inspectorship which Washington made to him, and commenced the discipline and exercise of the troops early in March, 1778.

"I found it useless," so he continues in the above-quoted

memorial, "to trouble myself about the many things which I could not remedy. I directed my attention to the organization and discipline of the army. To establish the inspection on the same footing as in France and Prussia would not have answered the purpose. In these services the inspector general reviews the troops at the beginning and end of a campaign ; he examines the state of the men, their arms and accouterments ; exercises and maneuvers them ; sees that they adhere to the prescribed regulations ; that they follow the system laid down by the minister at war, to whom he makes his reports, and recommends for promotion, pardon, and reward.

"I found here neither rules, nor regulations, nor system, nor minister at war, nor pardon, nor reward. The inspector general in Prussia and France has nothing whatever to do with the money department ; here it was necessary that he or some one else should take charge of it. This mysterious department was a mere farce. The war commissary in France examines the books and accounts of the different regiments and companies ; here, there were no books and no accounts, and consequently no one to examine them.

"All this required an immediate remedy. But how to commence, was the question.

"General Conway followed the routine of the inspectors in France, but that did not answer the purpose. It was, therefore, essential to create a department, under some name or other, to organize it so as to rectify the abuses, found some simple but firm system, and put it into execution at once. I found a committee of Congress in camp concerting with the commander-in-chief for regulating several matters connected with the army, such as fixing the number of regiments and companies, which was one of the most essential things to be determined. Congress approved of their resolution on that head, but the means for putting it into execution were yet wanting. There was no established system of maneuvers, no settled regulations for discipline and good order, and no uni-

formity in the service. General Washington proposed to me to sketch out a plan for establishing an inspection in order to introduce system and uniformity into all these matters. I sketched a variety of different plans, but it was exceedingly difficult to find an arrangement likely to succeed so as not to disgust the officers belonging to so many different States, and to form a plan in conformity with the spirit of the nation, and with the prejudices, however well or ill founded they might be, against foreigners. I was often obliged to abandon ideas I had formed; I was in want of information and advice, and I was fortunate enough to find a few officers of merit, who gave me every satisfaction; they were General Greene, Colonel Laurens, and Colonel Hamilton. Having drawn out my last plan, I communicated it to these three officers, and made the alterations they deemed advisable, before I presented it to the commander-in-chief. Time was precious, and I worked day and night. I finally proposed that an inspector general ought to be appointed at once who should establish a uniform system for forming the troops; for exercising and manœuvring them; for their duties in camp and on the march; and for the duties of guards, pickets and sentries. He should also define and point out the duties of every officer, from the colonel to the corporal; the manner in which returns or lists of the men, arms, accouterments, clothing, and camp equipage, should be made, and appoint a uniform method of book-keeping, according to which the books of the regiments, of companies, as well as those of the adjutant, pay-master, quarter-master, and clothing-master of each regiment, should be kept; that this inspector should review the troops every month, exercise and manœuver them, examine the returns and books, and make his written return to the commander-in-chief and to the board of war, etc., etc.; that a colonel from each division should be chosen by the inspector general, whose duty it should be to see that the ordinances and arrangements which the inspector might think proper to establish, with the consent of the commander-in-chief, be duly executed and obeyed.

“That a major from each brigade be chosen by the inspector general to exercise the same functions in the brigade, in addition to those of a brigade major in the French service. He should also receive all the returns of every description, and examine them accurately before transmitting them to the adjutant general or chief of the department to which they are addressed, whether that of the quarter-master, clothing-master, pay-master, or commissary. All orders for the brigade should be addressed to that officer to communicate them to the brigade.

“That the colonels shall be called inspectors of divisions, and the majors, inspectors of brigades. That the former brigade majors, who, in imitation of the English army, were merely aids-de-camp to the brigadier general, and who, for the most part, are young men who never saw a guard mounted, should be abolished, and that the brigadier general be at liberty to take a subaltern officer as aid-de-camp. That the inspectors of divisions be allowed additional pay of thirty dollars, and the inspectors of brigades twenty dollars, a month, and some additional rations more than other officers of the same rank.

“I added to the above that the inspector general be obliged to draw up a sort of military code which, when approved by the commander-in-chief and authorized by Congress, shall take effect as an ordinance for the army.

“This plan was approved by General Washington and communicated to Congress. Some days after I had delivered it the general asked me if I was willing to undertake its execution myself? I replied that I would do so on condition that the general should give me the support and assistance necessary for so important a task.

“Among the many obligations which I owe to General Washington, I shall always esteem it among the greatest, the selection which he made among the officers to aid me in this work. It is with peculiar satisfaction that I again mention

the names of my first inspectors of divisions, Colonels Williams, Brooks, Fleury, Sprout, Barber, Harmer, Davies, Seammel and Ternant, and of brigade majors Fish, English and many others, who would be considered excellent officers in any service in Europe.

"I commenced operations by drafting one hundred and twenty men from the line, whom I formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some officers entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy, and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision.

"It must be owned that they did not know much of the manual exercise, and I ought to mention the reasons why I departed altogether from the general rule of all European armies, and commenced with the manual exercise in drilling recruits like children learning their alphabet. In the first place, I had no time to do otherwise. In our European armies a man who has been drilled for three months is called a recruit; here, in two months I must have a soldier. In Europe we had a number of evolutions very pretty to look at when well executed, but in my opinion absolutely useless so far as essential objects are concerned. In Prussia, to fire and charge several times a minute is a matter of boast; the consequence is that the men, when they are using ball cartridge, often load badly. A company is drilled for a long time in platoon firing, and the more the firing resembles the noise of a cannon shot, the better it is.

"I have often remarked that the Prussians, after the first

charge in action, no longer practice platoon firing, do not load so often in a minute and fire quite as badly as the Russians, Austrians or French. I, nevertheless, taught my company to carry arms, stand at ease, present arms, to load, take aim, fire by platoons, and to charge bayonets. Another reason that induced me to pay but little attention to this eternal manual exercise, was that several of my predecessors commenced with it, and before they had surmounted these preliminaries, were obliged to quit the service, having lost their influence, and before the young officers had an opportunity of seeing the practical advantage of this elementary instruction. This induced me to reverse the old system, and instead of commencing with the manual and platoon exercise and ending with maneuvers, I commenced with maneuvers and finished with the exercise. I recollect that in the beginning of my second campaign I executed a maneuver with a portion of the army, which was remarkably well done. After it was over the officers came round me to receive the approbation to which they were accustomed, believing that they had proved themselves perfect tacticians. They were very much astonished when I told them that it was now time to begin with the alphabet; that we should drill the men, one by one; then by six, and afterward by platoons; teach them how to carry themselves, to march well, to use their arms with alacrity and precision, and so on until they had learned every thing. No objection was made. I had the satisfaction of seeing (without being seen) the colonel and his officers drill the men, one by one, and I thought that had I proposed to them to do this at Valley Forge, I should never have succeeded.

“Another reason that induced me to omit as much as possible the manual exercise was, that as the army had no special ordinance or fixed rules on the subject, every colonel had introduced a system of drill of his own—one on the English, another on the French, and a third on the Prussian plan; and those who had taken the greatest pains were naturally the

most attached to their own work. Had I destroyed their productions, they would all have detested me. I therefore preferred to pay no special attention to this subject until I had won their confidence. It was not so with regard to maneuvers. They had not meddled with them. Fortunately there was not a single good English book that contained the rules of tactics.

"To follow the thread of my operations, I had my company of guards exactly as I wished them to be. They were well dressed, their arms clean and in good order, and their general appearance quite respectable.

"I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army, and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers with an entire division in presence of the commander-in-chief."

Steuben's statements are corroborated by the testimony of some eye witnesses, which furnishes additional proof of the manner in which he went to work.

Lieutenant Colonel L. Fleury, who acted as sub-inspector of the Maryland brigade and executed strictly Steuben's orders, describes his duties and those of his troops, in a letter dated Wilmington, April 5th, 1778, as follows:*

"At six o'clock in the morning the division is ordered to general parade, and the soldiers in squads of always eight, are drilled in ordinary marching. A non-commissioned officer marches at their right, a little in advance, to give the time and the step, and he drills them in marching with and without

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

music or drums. This drill lasts two hours. At nine o'clock is the parade; the soldiers are then taught the few movements in which they are to be instructed after the use of arms. At noon particular instruction is given to the non-commissioned officers. At three o'clock, drilling in divisions as in the morning; at six o'clock, p. m., meeting of the adjutants in my quarters for instruction in theoretic maneuvering and the emphasis to be used in giving the word of command."

"Baron Steuben," says A. Scammel, in a letter dated Valley Forge, April 8th, 1778, to General John Sullivan,* "sets us a truly noble example. He has undertaken the discipline of the army, and shows himself to be a perfect master of it, not only in the grand maneuvers, but in the most minute details. To see a gentleman, dignified with a lieutenant general's commission from the great Prussian monarch, condescend, with a grace peculiar to himself, to take under his direction a squad of ten or twelve men in the capacity of drill-sergeant, commands the admiration of both officers and men, and causes them to improve exceedingly fast under his instructions."

The most interesting narrative of the energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is given by his favorite aid-de camp and intimate friend, William North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his biographical sketch:

"Certainly it was a brave attempt! Without understanding a word of the English language, to think of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word, a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first parade, the

* I am obliged to Thomas C. Amory, jr., Esq., the biographer of General Sullivan, for the kind communication of this interesting letter.

troops neither understanding the command, nor how to follow in a changement to which they had not been accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B. Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the orders and interpret to the troops. 'If,' said the baron, 'I had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more rejoiced.' The officers in the army who spoke English and French fluently were indeed very few in number—how few were so capable of giving assistance to the baron in the formation of his system. Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp, and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time, no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his hair, he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was on horseback at sunrise, and with, or without his suite, galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept. Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite sufficient. It was a question, why, in the first instance, our troops had been put to the performance of the great maneuvers. I beg pardon for calling them great, but they were great to us, for we were ignorant. Bland's exercise and Symmes's military guide were almost the only poor and scanty sources from which we drew. To the question, it was answered that in fact there was no time to spare in learning the minutiae—the troops must be prepared for instant combat; that on a field of battle, how to display or fold a column, or to change a front, was of the first consequence; that the business was to give the troops a relish for their trade, a confidence in their skill in the performance of

complicated evolutions; that, even if time permitted, the officers, copying the bad example set them by the British, of referring all instruction to the sergeants, would feel themselves degraded in attending to an awkward squad. 'But the time will come,' said he, 'when a better mode of thinking will prevail; then we will attend to the a b c of the profession.' This prophecy was amply fulfilled. A year or two afterwards the baron said to me, 'Do you see there, sir, your colonel instructing that recruit? I thank God for that!'"*

Things were progressing as well as possible. Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief. Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in the army, he had greater power and authority than any general could boast of.

* Page 3 of "A Biographical Sketch of the Life of Baron Steuben, Interspersed with a Variety of Anecdotes and Historical Facts Relating to the Revolutionary War." The author of this highly valuable pamphlet, of fourteen pages, is General William North, Steuben's aid-de-camp. Thacher and Bowen have amply quoted from it. There are very few copies of the pamphlet now in existence; we have, therefore, thought it expedient to make copious extracts from its pages.

CHAPTER VII.

STEUBEN COMMENCES MANEUVERING OF THE TROOPS.—WASHINGTON APPRECIATES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INSPECTORSHIP.—GENERAL ORDERS ACKNOWLEDGING THE RESULTS OF HIS EXERTIONS.—WASHINGTON'S LETTER OF THE 30TH OF APRIL, 1778, ABOUT THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AND STEUBEN'S MERITS.—STEUBEN APPOINTED MAJOR GENERAL AND INSPECTOR GENERAL.—THE NEWS OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE REACHES THE CAMP.—UNIVERSAL JOY.—SANGUINE HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.—PEOPLE RELAX THEIR EXERTIONS.—STEUBEN APPREHENDS A SPEEDY PEACE.—INTERESTING CORRESPONDENCE WITH HENRY LAURENS.—CELEBRATION OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE BY STEUBEN'S GRAND MANEUVER.—GENERAL ORDER OF THE 7TH OF MAY THANKS STEUBEN FOR HIS ACTIVITY.—HIS APPOINTMENT THE SIGNAL FOR A CABAL.—STEUBEN'S AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS CURTAILED.—BAD EFFECTS OF THIS JEALOUSY.—LETTER OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO WILLIAM DUER, ILLUSTRATING THIS FEELING.—STEUBEN CONTINUES TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.—HIS LETTER TO THE BOARD OF WAR, EXPLAINING HIS IDEAS ABOUT THE INSPECTORSHIP.—THE BOARD OF WAR ADOPTS STEUBEN'S VIEWS, AND LAYS A PLAN BEFORE CONGRESS, WHICH IS NOT APPROVED.—THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE FRENCH TREATY HIGHLY ENCOURAGING TO THE ARMY.—COUNCIL OF WAR.—SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE ARMY.—GOOD CONSEQUENCES OF STEUBEN'S DISCIPLINE, ORDER, AND GENERAL IMPROVEMENTS.—COTEMPORARY WITNESSES.—GORDON AND PAGE.—SIR WILLIAM NAPIER.—EVACUATION OF PHILADELPHIA BY THE BRITISH.—THEIR MARCH THROUGH NEW JERSEY.—STEUBEN GOES TO YORK TO GET THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE SETTLED BY CONGRESS.—WASHINGTON'S LETTER AND TEMPORARY ORDERS OF THE 15TH OF JUNE, 1778.—INSPECTOR GENERAL DEGRADED TO A DRILL-SERGEANT.—STEUBEN'S LETTER OF THE 15TH OF JUNE.—CONGRESS POSTPONES THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MATTER.—BAD POLICY OF THIS INDECISION.

THE commander-in-chief also very soon perceived and appreciated the enormous advantage which the army derived from the labors of its temporary inspector, and fully sensible of the value of his services, interposed his authority on Steuben's behalf, and used all his influence to advance the object at which the latter aimed.

Steuben commenced his military instructions on a larger scale on the 24th of March, 1778, with the elementary maneuvers of the troops. He exercised them in the morning and afternoon, during an entire month, at the end of which they were able, on the 29th of April, to perform the grand maneuvers. We need not to enter into the details of these instructions, as

they correspond with the regulations for the order and discipline of the army, laid down a year afterwards, and as we shall allude to the latter in a subsequent chapter.

Washington's orders show the importance which he attached to Steuben's office, while they are, at the same time, the official acknowledgment of the good consequences which his labors produced. We quote here a few which illustrate Steuben's efficiency and the progress of his system :*

" VALLEY FORGE, March 28th, 1778.

" On Sunday, the 29th of March, at ten o'clock in the forenoon, all the brigade inspectors, with the officers and non-commissioned officers, who are to mount guard on Monday, will attend at head-quarters, where the inspector general will instruct them in what is to be done the next day.

" The Baron Steuben, a lieutenant general in foreign service, and a gentleman of great military experience, having obligingly undertaken the exercise of inspector general in the army, the commander-in-chief, till the pleasure of Congress shall be known, desires he may be respected as such ; and hopes and expects that all officers, of whatever rank in it, will afford him every aid in their power in the execution of his office. Lieutenant Colonels Davies, Brooks and Barber, and Mr. Ternant, are appointed to act as sub-inspectors ; the three former retaining their rank and order in the line.

" The importance of establishing an uniform system of useful maneuvers, and regularity of discipline, must be obvious ; the deficiency of our army in those respects must be equally so ; but the time we probably shall have to introduce the necessary reformation is short. With the most active exertions, therefore, of officers of every class, it may be possible to effect all the improvement that may be essential to success in the ensuing campaign. Arguments surely need not be

* Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, from 1778 to 1782. Selected from John Whiting's manuscripts by Henry Whiting, Lieutenant Colonel United States Army, New York and London, 1844.

multiplied to kindle the zeal of officers in a matter of such great moment to their own homes, the advancement of the service, and the prosperity of our arms."

"April 19, 1778.

"The sub-inspectors will each superintend the discipline of each brigade, according to the following division, viz., Mr. Ternant, Woodford's, Scott's and McIntosh's; Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, First and Second Pennsylvania, Poor's and Glover's; Lieutenant Colonel Davies, Larned's, Patterson's, Weedon's and Muhlenberg's; Lieutenant Colonel Barber, Maxwell's, late Conway's, Huntington's and Varnum's."

"April 21, 1778.

"The colonels and commanding officers of regiments are to make it an invariable rule to review their respective regiments once a week, look into the state and condition of the men's arms, accouterments and clothes, and know precisely the state of them, and where every man is.

"The brigadiers and commanding officers of brigades are to do the same in their respective brigades, at least once a fortnight. In a word, it is expected from both that every care and attention will be paid to keep their men together, and the arms and accouterments belonging to them in good order.

"This is also to be considered as a standing order, but not to supersede the daily inspection by subordinate officers, agreeably to former orders."

"May 4th, 1778.

"The sub and brigade inspectors are to be pointedly exact in pursuing the written instructions of the inspector general, that the strictest uniformity may be observed throughout the army.

"They are not to practice one single maneuver without his direction, nor in a method different from it. Any alteration or innovation will again plunge the army into that contrariety and confusion from which it is endeavoring to emerge.

“The hours of exercise will also be exactly attended to by each brigade, for which purpose, and that no other difference may arise on account of watches, proper attention will be paid to the order of the 1st of April last, for regulating them by that of the adjutant general. The commander-in-chief requests the brigadiers, and officers commanding brigades, to see that these orders are strictly complied with, that the golden opportunity which now presents itself for disciplining the army may be improved. And he hopes that the brigades will vie with each other in arriving at the highest pitch of excellence.”

On the 30th of April, 1778, about six weeks after Steuben had commenced his active duties, Washington made the following report to Congress:*

“The extensive ill consequences arising from a want of uniformity in discipline and maneuvers throughout the army, have long occasioned me to wish for the establishment of a well-organized inspectorship, and the concurrence of Congress in the same views has induced me to set on foot a temporary institution, which, from the success that has hitherto attended it, gives me the most flattering expectations, and will, I hope, obtain their approbation.

“Baron Steuben’s length of service in the first military school in Europe, and his former rank, pointed him out as a person peculiarly qualified to be at the head of this department. This appeared the least exceptionable way of introducing him into the army, and one that would give him the most ready opportunity of displaying his talent. I therefore proposed to him to undertake the office of inspector general, which he agreed to with the greatest cheerfulness, and has performed the duties of it with a zeal and intelligence equal to our wishes. He has two ranks of inspectors under him; the lowest are officers charged with the inspection of brigades, with the title of brigade inspectors; the others superintend

* Washington’s Writings, by J. Sparks, v., 347.

several of these. They have written instructions relative to their several functions, and the manœuvres they are to practice are illustrated by a company, which the baron has taken to train himself. The brigade inspectors were chosen by the brigadier and commanding officers of regiments in each brigade. The inspectors are Lieutenant Colonels Barber, of Jersey, Brooks, of Massachusetts, Davies, of Virginia, and Mr. Ternant, a French gentleman.

“Upon the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Fleury in the camp, as he was unemployed and had exercised the office of aid major in France, the baron proposed to have him employed as an inspector, in which I readily acquiesced, as Congress had given him the rank and pay of lieutenant colonel.

“I should do injustice, if I were to be longer silent with regard to the merits of Baron Steuben. His knowledge of his profession, added to the zeal which he has displayed since he began upon the functions of his office, leads me to consider him as an acquisition to the service, and to recommend him to the attention of Congress. His expectations with respect to rank extend to that of major general. His finances, he ingenuously confesses, will not admit of his serving without the incidental emoluments, and Congress, I presume, from his character and their own knowledge of him, will, without difficulty, gratify him in these particulars.

“The baron is sensible that our situation requires a few variations, in the duties of his office, from the general practice in Europe, and particularly that they must be more comprehensive, in which, as well as in his instructions, he has skillfully yielded to circumstances. The success which has hitherto attended the plan, enables me to request, with confidence, the ratification of Congress, and is, I think, a pledge of the establishment of a well combined general system, which insurmountable obstacles have hitherto opposed.”

Congress answered this letter, by the following resolution, on the 5th of May, 1778, viz.:—

"That Congress approve of General Washington's plan for the institution of a well-organized inspectorship. That Baron Steuben be appointed to the office of inspector general, with the rank and pay of major general, his pay to commence from the time he joined the army and entered into service of the United States. That there be two ranks of inspectors under the direction of the inspector general; the first to superintend two or more brigades, and the second to be charged with the inspection of only one brigade."*

"The honor," says Steuben on the 16th of May, 1778,† in reply, "I have lately received at your hands, has afforded me so much the greater pleasure, as it was unsolicited. The success my efforts have already met with, adds not a little to the satisfaction I feel on this occasion. I shall endeavor to deserve, more and more, the good opinion you have entertained of me in intrusting me with so extensive a department as the inspection of your army. Please, gentlemen, to accept my sincere thanks for the confidence you have placed in me, and the opportunity you have afforded me of being useful to you."

On the 4th of May the news of the French alliance had reached the camp. Suddenly the public distress seemed to be forgotten amidst universal joy. Dinners, toasts, songs, *fête de joie* and rejoicings were general throughout the army; satisfaction and happiness were depicted in every countenance, and everybody entertained the most sanguine hopes for the future. These dreams and hopes, however, were a little too much ahead of the embarrassment and difficulties of the present situation. Supposing that immediate peace would be the natural consequence of the French alliance, hundreds and thousands relaxed their exertions for the common good, and thus endangered the success of the Revolution.

Steuben, although not belonging to this class of expectant citizens, nevertheless, to some extent, shared their expecta-

* Journals of Congress (Dunlap's edition), vol. iv., pp. 261 and 262.

† Steuben MSS. Papers, vol. xi.

tions in the probability of an early conclusion of peace. This is not surprising when it is remembered that he had been but a short time in America, and was, consequently, in some measure, unacquainted with the full extent of the exasperated feelings which existed between Great Britain and her revolutionary colonies. Anxious to engage in the cause of his adopted country for its independence, and feeling his ability and desire to exert his talents and experience, he feared any intervention which could possibly have prevented him from using them in the service of the United States.

"I congratulate you"—so he writes on the 7th of May, 1778, to Henry Laurens, then President of Congress*—"on the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with the court of France, as honorable as advantageous to both powers. I esteem myself extremely happy in being in America at so interesting an epoch, and feel a sensible pleasure in seeing the independence of America established on so solid a basis. I may not, perhaps, have an opportunity of drawing my sword in your cause, but no matter, be free and happy, and I shall not regret my having undertaken the voyage to offer you my services."

"It is my opinion," answers H. Laurens, very justly, on the 11th of May, 1778, "that we are not to roll down a green bank and toy away the ensuing summer. There is blood, much blood in our prospect, and in all appearance, in my view, there will be opportunity and incitement to unsheath your sword. Britain will not be hummed by a stroke of policy; she will be very angry, and if she is to fall, her fall will be glorious. We, who know her, ought to be prepared. A powerful army in our fields may, I should say, will, be the only means of securing an honorable peace. If we universally adopt and indulge the idea of peace, it would be presumptuous in me to intimate to a gentleman of Baron Steuben's experience, what probably will be the consequence. I am

*Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

desirous of banishing from the minds of the people the assurance, even the hopes, of a peace for the present year."

The general-in-chief wished that Steuben should celebrate the alliance by a great maneuver with the entire army, which went off marvelously well. Major Generals Lord Stirling commanded on the right, Lafayette on the left, and Baron De Kalb on the second line. A cannon shot announced the advance of the army in five columns, which, having taken up their position on the heights, deployed and fired a *j'en de joie*. Washington gave a grand dinner. Before the party sat down, he handed Steuben the commission of major general and inspector general of the army, that Congress had just sent him.* On the following day he issued the following general order :

"The commander-in chief takes great pleasure in acquainting the army that its conduct yesterday afforded him the highest satisfaction. The exactness and order with which all its movements were formed, is a pleasing evidence of the progress it has made in military improvement, and of the perfection to which it may arrive by a continuance of that laudable zeal which now so happily prevails. The general, at the same time, presents his thanks to Baron Steuben, and the gentlemen acting under him, for their exertions in the duties of their office, the good effects of which are already so apparent, and for the care, activity and propriety with which they conducted the business of yesterday."

The act of May 5th, 1778, creating Steuben an American major general, and making his appointment as inspector general definite, instead of being approved of by the superior officers, was the signal for a cabal, at the head of which were three major generals (Lee, Lafayette and Mifflin), who, being senior to him, lost nothing by his appointment, and nearly all the brigadier generals. Not suspecting any thing, Steuben continued to maneuver his battalions, brigades and divisions. All of a sudden, an order was issued that major generals

* Steuben MS. Papers. Sprague.

should, in future, exercise their divisions themselves, and that brigadiers should do likewise with their brigades, but that they should not depart from the system laid down by the inspector general. Steuben afterwards learned that the major generals complained of the too great authority of the inspector general in being able to call out the brigades whenever and however he pleased, and other absurdities of a similar nature. Steuben, mortified as he was to find his operations checked when they were making such progress, concealed his annoyance as well as he could, and compensated himself by the satisfaction he experienced in visiting the camp twice a day. He never found a major general exercising his division, nor a brigadier his brigade.

Steuben referred to this time five years later in the following words:* "All the brigadier generals threatened to quit the service. I, however, in no way changed my conduct; I continually pursued the object I had in view, and flattered nobody, even not the general-in-chief. The nature of my office in the army obliged me to a severity to which our officers were then little accustomed, but I was equally severe towards my inferiors, and am so still at present. And here is my greatest triumph. The same brigadiers who opposed the inspectorship, are eager to-day to serve under my orders. These same officers, whom I never had flattered, honor me now with the title of friend and father. In the military career the testimony of the inferiors is the most honorable; our subalterns use to be our most severe judges. The affection and estimation of my officers fill my heart with the greatest pride and satisfaction."

This jealousy, on the part of the general officers, emanating from their entire ignorance of the indispensable necessity of military order and subordination, proved, in the highest degree, detrimental to the progress of discipline. Just when things were in the best train, a sudden stop was

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

put to them. Steuben, in the interest of the army defended his system, but thought it prudent to yield somewhat rather than endeavor to stem the torrent of prejudice. The bad consequences of this interruption and curtailing of the inspectorship was a greater calamity for the troops than the loss of a battle. The members of Congress, and those who participated in the suspicions of the general officers, injured their own cause by giving way to their feelings, which is best expressed in a letter of Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, and which, although written in June, 1778, may be inserted here as an impartial illustration of the opposition made to Steuben.

"I take the liberty," says he,* "to trouble you with a few hints on a matter of some importance. Baron Steuben, who will be the bearer of this, waits on Congress to have his office arranged upon some decisive and permanent footing. It will not be amiss to be on your guard. The baron is a gentleman for whom I have a particular esteem, and whose zeal, intelligence, and success, the consequence of both, entitle him to the greatest credit. But I am apprehensive, with all his good qualities, a fondness for power and importance, natural to every man, may lead him to wish for more extensive prerogatives in his department than it will be for the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to excite any prejudice against him on this account; perhaps I may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give will do no harm if I am right; if I am not, it may be useful. In either case, the baron deserves to be considered as a valuable man, and treated with all the deference which good policy will warrant.

"On the first institution of this office, the general allowed him to exercise more ample powers than would be proper for a continuance. They were necessary in the commencement, to put things in a train with a degree of dispatch which the exigency of our affairs required; but it has been necessary to restrain them, even earlier than was intended. The novelty

* Alexander Hamilton's Works, i., 56.

of the office excited questions about its boundaries ; the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and discontents were rising to a height that threatened to overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a remedy. The general has delineated the functions of the inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be sent to Congress. The plan is good, and satisfactory to the army in general.

“It may be improved, but it will be unsafe to deviate essentially from it. It is, of course, the general’s intention that whatever regulations are adopted by him, should undergo the revision and receive the sanction of Congress ; but it is indispensable, in the present state of our army, that he should have the power, from time to time, to introduce and authorize the reformation necessary in our system. It is a work which must be done by occasional and gradual steps, and ought to be intrusted to a person on the spot, who is thoroughly acquainted with all our defects, and has judgment sufficient to adopt the progressive remedies they require. The plan established by Congress, on a report of the board of war when Conway was appointed, appears to me exceptionable in many respects. It makes the inspector independent of the commander-in-chief ; confers powers which would produce universal opposition in the army ; and, by making the previous concurrence of the board of war requisite to the introduction of every regulation which should be found necessary, opens such a continuous source of delay as would defeat the usefulness of the institution. Let the commander-in-chief introduce, and the legislature afterward ratify or reject, as they shall think proper. Perhaps you will not differ much from me, when I suppose that, so far as relates to the board of war, the former scheme was a freak of faction, and therefore ought to be renounced.

“There is one thing which the baron has much at heart, which, in good policy, he can by no means be indulged in : it

is the power of enforcing that part of discipline which we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders. This power can only be properly lodged with the commander-in-chief, and would inflame the whole army if put into other hands. Each captain is vested with it in his company; each colonel in his regiment; each general in his particular command; and the commander-in-chief in the whole."

It can easily be imagined that, under these circumstances, Steuben tried in vain to get the duties of his office settled on a more permanent basis. It took him more than four years to convince the army and Congress of the necessity for adopting his plans. For the present, however, we have to refer to the correspondence which Steuben, in regard to this matter, had with the board of war, and which shows that both corresponding parties can not be made answerable for the delay in putting their proposals in execution.

"I am sensible," writes he, on the 27th of May, 1778,* "that my duty obliges me to submit my operations to the approbation of the board of war. This I should have already done had I not looked upon the few instructions I have given as a mere essay till it should please the honorable Congress to confide in me the office of inspector general of the army.

"The dispositions I have hitherto made, have been under the title of instructions. I am well aware that it is not the business of the inspector general to make any regulations without the approval of the board of war. These instructions I presented to the commander-in-chief before I put them in execution, and as they were given just as circumstances and our present situation required, it is necessary that they should be corrected and put in order, before they are submitted to the board of war, to be regularly established.

"On my arrival at the army the commander-in-chief proposed that I should sketch out a plan of the duties of the office of inspector general, to introduce uniformity in the

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

service, in the exercises, maneuvers, discipline, and police of the army. The regulations of the Prussian, French and English armies, did not appear to me exactly adapted to the present circumstances of our army. It was, therefore, necessary to find out some other means of obtaining the end we desired. I drew the subjoined plan, which, having been submitted to his Excellency, was approved of, and thought worthy of being put into execution.

"His Excellency did me the honor to confide the direction of it to me as a volunteer. Though it was nearly thirty years since I had had any thing to do with that department, I hazarded the enterprise and commenced with the infantry.

"I had as assistants, William Davies of the Virginia troops, Colonel Brooks of Massachusetts Bay, Colonel Barber of New Jersey—all officers of merit—and Mr. Ternant, a French gentleman who speaks English perfectly, and who, in addition to considerable military knowledge, has the greatest zeal and activity, and being already settled in this country, may be regarded as a citizen. He has undertaken the department of inspector as a volunteer, and has not yet demanded any rank, though he has merited it by the pains he has taken and the progress of the brigades committed to his care. Besides these four adjutants the commander-in-chief made choice of a field officer from each brigade, as inspector of the brigade. Captain Walker of the second New York regiment, who, besides his knowledge of the French language, possesses every quality of a good officer, was attached to me as an aid-de-camp.

"To the assistance of these gentlemen I owe the little success I have had, and which now begins to be perceptible.

"In sketching out the plan for an inspector general, I fixed upon three objects:

"1st. Not to burthen the States with a number of officers for that department only, the appointment of whom would have been a great expense.

"2d. To employ as much as possible American officers in

that department, on whose services the States could always depend, the majority of the foreigners being likely to quit the service either during or after the war.

“3d. To employ in that department officers who had already acquired a reputation in the army, in whom the officers and soldiers would have most confidence.

“The return of the Marquis De La Fayette obliged me to add one to the number of inspectors in the person of Colonel De Fleury, who requested to be employed in that department. The merits of this officer are well known to the army. He is well acquainted with the English language and has every requisite quality, so that the commander-in-chief appointed him inspector of the corps under General Smallwood, where he executed the instructions I have given him, with the utmost success. This, gentlemen, is the footing on which the establishment is at present. The short time, the situation of the army and a variety of other circumstances have prevented me from making greater progress. I have hitherto confined myself to a uniform formation of the troops (which I have regulated as nearly as possible in conformity with the new arrangement of regiments which Congress has resolved to introduce), to an easy marching exercise, and a few evolutions to enable the officers to form some idea of the way to conduct their corps.

“We have not taught the soldiers yet, however, the elementary principles, nor have I ever instructed them in the manual exercise. Indeed, discipline is as yet scarcely touched upon. A uniformity in the service of the guards is beginning to show itself, but there has not been any review of the troops. In all these things I was obliged to submit to circumstances, which, as I before observed, have hindered me from proceeding further.”

Steuben says in another memorial, “I began by forming battalions of the strength of about half a regiment, according to the new arrangement, *i. e.*, of about two hundred rank and

file, and as the strength of the regiments differed so considerably, I divided the brigades into battalions, according to their numbers, in order to make the corps nearly equal in strength. In a word, I made use of such means as I found at hand to effect, as far as I could, regularity in service, and I can say that the arrangements I made *pro tempore* produced a good effect."

"The board," answered Richard Peters, by their order, on the 2d of June, 1778,* "have had the favor of your letters and papers by Mr. Ternant, with whom they have had much and very satisfactory conversation on the subject of the inspection; but find that your orders and letters give sufficient information to show the necessity and great utility of your department, from which the board promise themselves, on the public behalf, the most permanent and substantial advantages.

"Many of the regulations, however proper and wise, we perceive are only temporary, and therefore can not be interwoven into a system. As it requires much time to perfect the arrangement in all its parts, and to establish certain rules for present as well as future government, the board desire you will proceed as you have begun, for the present, and they have drawn up a report to Congress, to give weight to your orders and plans of discipline; and the determination of Congress thereupon will be communicated to you in its right season."

The plan just alluded to, and the motives which led to its formation, read as follows:†

"The board having received sundry letters from the Baron Steuben, with accounts of his proceedings and copies of his orders and arrangements, and having conversed with Mr. Ternant, sent by the baron for the purpose of giving further information on the subject, are happy to find that the business of the inspection has produced much reformation in the article of discipline; and as the department has experimentally proved itself of great importance, the board think it well de-

* Steuben M.S. Papers, vol. i.

† Ibid., vol. xiii.

serves the immediate attention of Congress, and they have submitted the following resolutions for consideration, which are formed agreeably to the baron's and the opinion of the board, resulting from the information they have received of the matter :

“ *Resolved*, That there be but one inspector general of the armies of the United States.

“ That there be an assistant inspector general in each military department of these States where an army is stationed, and Congress shall judge the appointment necessary.

“ That there be as many inspectors, and brigade inspectors, under the immediate orders of the inspector general, with the grand army, or in the several departments, as the inspector general and the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, or the commander-in-chief of the respective departments for the time being, shall deem necessary ; that the said inspectors shall be recommended to the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, or the commanders-in-chief of the several departments by the inspector general, and if approved by him and them respectively, their names and duties are to be returned to the board of war, who are to report the same to Congress. These inspectors to be of the rank of lieutenant colonels or majors, and to be taken out of the line, with such exceptions with regard to foreigners having no rank in the line, as the commander-in-chief shall think proper.

“ That the inspector general, with the concurrence of the commander-in-chief, shall make such regulations for the discipline and police of the army, reporting the same to the board of war, as the service shall require from time to time, until a permanent system can be established for the inspection by Congress ; and all officers and soldiers in the armies of the United States are directed to pay due obedience to the orders of the inspector general and assistant inspectors general, on matters of military discipline and police, signified personally or

through the several inspectors and brigade inspectors, under pain of being subject to a trial by court martial, and punished according to the nature of the offense, as a court martial shall think proper.

“That the inspector general shall have liberty to select six young gentlemen, natives or residents in these States, as volunteers, who shall be equipped at Continental expense, as light dragoons, be engaged for one year, and receive the pay and rations of ensigns. These young gentlemen are to be under the command of a skillful person, to be instructed how to take points of view, help lay out a camp, to direct the artificers in the opening the way for a column, to lead columns on a march, to reconnoiter and sketch out the routes, to carry orders, and such other proper service as the inspector general shall direct.

“That a secretary of inspection, with the pay of a brigade major, be appointed, to be nominated by the inspector general, with the approbation of General Washington, to be reported to Congress for the appointment.

“That the inspector general be authorized to appoint a secretary to assist him in the duties of his department, who shall receive the pay, rations, and subsistence of a brigade major.

“That the commander-in-chief, and the general commanding in each separate department, appoint as many inspectors and brigade inspectors as they shall respectively judge necessary, for the aid of the inspector general and assistant inspectors general, in the execution of the duties of their offices.

“That these inspectors and brigade inspectors be taken from the line, with such exceptions in favor of foreigners as the commander-in-chief, and general commanding in each separate department, shall judge proper to recommend to Congress, to appoint to the office of inspector or brigade inspector.

“That the inspector general draw up such instructions and

regulations as he shall judge necessary and expedient for fulfilling the duties of his department, and present the same to the commander-in-chief, which being approved of by him, the inspector general will then transmit them to the board of war, and being by them established, the inspector general is then to transmit copies of them to his assistants in separate departments, which assistants, in performing the duties of their office, shall scrupulously observe the instructions and regulations so established, and not attempt the smallest alteration, without first communicating the same to the inspector general, which meeting his concurrence and the approbation of the commander-in-chief, and established by the board of war, shall then be adopted."

Congress, however, did not determine upon this plan, and therefore only temporary regulations could be given by the commander-in-chief. It is Steuben's great merit, and it can not be too highly appreciated, that he wisely left to time and service to fix his station, and that he did not relax his exertions for the benefit of the army. His disinterested course forms a striking contrast to the somewhat mean envy of his brother officers. Hundreds of others perhaps would have abated their zeal and energy for an army, the officers of which attributed his actions to the lowest personal vanity and ambition.

To return, however, to the camp; the intelligence of the French treaty proved highly beneficial and encouraging to the army. On the 8th of May a council of war was convened, at which, besides Major Generals Greene, Gates, Lord Stirling, Mifflin, De Kalb, Lafayette, and Armstrong, for the first time Steuben was present, and in which they were requested by the commander-in-chief to decide what measures were the best to pursue. Although it was the unanimous opinion of the council that it was more advisable to remain on the defensive and wait events, and not attempt any offensive operation against the enemy, yet the mere circumstance of considering the expediency of the offensive, shows clearly that officers and men

had regained confidence in themselves, and that they felt strong enough to take again the open field.

It is not an idle conjecture, but a fact witnessed by impartial cotemporaries, that the discipline, order, and general improvements, which Steuben introduced into the American army, contributed chiefly to that reliance in a successful issue, which they felt at the opening of the campaign. We have in this respect a highly creditable authority in Mr. Page, who in his speech, delivered on the 7th of May, 1790, before the House and in favor of Steuben's claim on the United States, mentions as one of the most conspicuous merits of Steuben's discipline, that when the Marquis De Lafayette, with a detachment under his command, to occupy Barrenhill on the 20th of May, 1778, was in danger of being cut off on his return to the army, and the commander-in-chief was determined to support that invaluable officer, the whole army was under arms and ready to march in less than fifteen minutes from the time the signal was first given. "The orderly manner," says W. Gordon,* "in which the Americans retreated on this occasion, and which contributed much to their escaping, is to be ascribed to the improvements made in their discipline, owing greatly to the Baron De Steuben, the inspector general."

Finally, Sir William Napier, the historian of the Peninsular war, and, like Wellington, the sworn enemy of undisciplined mass fighting, in objecting to the loose guerilla warfare of the Spaniards, instances the American example, to prove that the victories of the revolutionary war were not fought by the undisciplined militia of the first campaigns, but by the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge.

The next favorable consequence of the arrival of the French treaty was the evacuation of Philadelphia by the British, which was no longer tenable, now that the Delaware was exposed to a blockade at any moment, by the arrival of a French fleet when least expected. Some weeks, however, passed, before

* History of the War of Independence, vol. iii, 92.

Clinton evacuated the city, and crossing the Delaware on the 18th of June, 1778, marched through the State of New Jersey, in order to make the Hudson and New York the basis of the operations for the ensuing campaign.

On the same day Steuben went to York, in order to get the duties and powers of his department minutely defined and settled by Congress. Washington gave him a letter to the president, and inclosed a copy of orders which were issued on the 15th of June, to quiet the minds of the general officers, and to remove a spirit of jealousy which but too apparently was rising among them. "These contain," he continues, "my ideas of the principal duties of the inspector's office, and I have reason to think are generally agreeable to the army. While I am on this subject, I must do justice to the baron's intelligence, zeal and indefatigable industry, from which we have experienced very happy effects."*

These orders degraded the inspector's office to that of a drill-sergeant, and in their harmless shape were of course found satisfactory. They prescribe the following rules:†

"Till the duties of the office of inspector general shall be defined and fixed by Congress, the commander-in-chief thinks proper to establish the following plan :

"The functions of it are to comprehend the instituting the system of rules and regulations for the exercise of the troops in the manual and manœuvres for their formation, for the purpose of exercising on guard and on detachment, and for camp and garrison duty, by which is to be understood whatever relates to the service of guards, the ordinary routine of duty in and the internal police of camps and garrisons, in the execution of which rules and regulations the inspector general and his assistants shall be employed as hereafter specified. All rules and regulations shall first be approved and authorized by the commander-in-chief, and either published in general orders or otherwise communicated through the adjutant general, from

* Washington's Writings, vol. v., 409. † Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

whom the division and brigade inspectors will receive them, and communicate them to the major generals and brigadiers, and to their respective divisions and brigades.

“The major generals will exercise their respective divisions according to the rules and regulations so established ; the brigadiers their brigades, the colonels their regiments, or in the absence of either, the officers present next in command. The division and brigade inspectors will assist in the execution, under the immediate orders of the major generals, brigadiers and colonels commandant.

“The major generals shall make such dispositions as they think proper for grand maneuvers in their own divisions, and the brigadiers in their own brigades, conforming exactly to the general principles of maneuvers, which shall be established.

“Grand maneuvers will be occasionally executed by the inspector general with particular brigades, or with detachments from the line, of which previous notice will be given in general orders, and of the corps which are to perform them.

“The inspector general will occasionally attend the troops while exercising. His directions relative to the exercise and agreeable to the rules laid down, are to be observed by every officer of inferior rank who may command. When any new maneuver is to be introduced, it is in the first instance to be performed by the division or brigade inspector, after which the brigadier or colonel will take the command. Each division inspector shall attend his major general when he is of the day, and under his directions assist the field officers of the day in examining whether the duty of the guards is performed according to rule. Each brigade inspector shall likewise attend his brigadier when he is of the day for the same purpose.

“On the daily parade of the guards the inspector general or the sub-inspector of the day is to exercise the parade under the orders of the major general of the day.

“The division and brigade inspectors are immediately to

furnish their respective major and brigadier generals with all the regulations which have been heretofore made."

Steuben feigned not to understand the bearing of these orders, or, perhaps, he did not imagine at that time that the general officers wanted the removal of the inspector general rather than the increase of their own labor. Before setting out for York, he wrote, on the 18th of June, 1778, to Washington:*

"It gives me great satisfaction to see that your Excellency has taken such a wise step in my department, as to engage the general officers and field officers of regiments to take the command of the troops in our daily exercise. Nothing could be more useful in the present moment. I had wished, some time ago, it might soon be the case; but, in the meanwhile, I was endeavoring, with the gentlemen under me, to make the officers and soldiers a little more perfect, in order to enable the general officers to pass immediately to grand maneuvers, and save them the trouble of descending to those toilsome and fastidious details which we cheerfully encountered from the beginning for the good of the service. No pains will be spared on my part to help on the general officers, and I shall always think myself happy if I can contribute in any manner whatever to the advancement of the American army, and prove a useful instrument in your hands. As it will take a few days for the general officers to become acquainted and familiar with the instructions and principles heretofore approved of and established by your Excellency, and for the officers and soldiers to arrive to a tolerable degree of perfection in the performance of the evolutions and maneuvers before practiced, I will seize this opportunity, with your Excellency's leave, to take a short journey to York, there to settle some affairs with my friend Mr. De Franey, and take my leave of him before he goes to South Carolina, as Congress has not yet come to any positive determination about the department. If your Excel-

* Department of MS. State Papers in Washington, vol. xxiv., p. 46.

lency foresees that I can be of some use, I beg you will give me such orders and directions about the whole as you think proper. I must likewise beseech your Excellency to give me the satisfaction to let me know whether you are satisfied, as I am, with the officers your Excellency has appointed inspectors under me, and whether you are willing to have them continued in the exercise of that office. I will likewise propose to your Excellency the reuniting the office of brigade inspector to that of brigade major, with the denominations of brigade majors, which officers will be taken from the line of majors, and not as it was before, some being captains, others majors or colonels. There is such an analogy between both offices as renders it, in my opinion, almost indispensable to join them in one office, were it but to prevent difficulties naturally arising between two officers acting in two different analogous departments, between which there is no certain line drawn. Upon these different heads I beg your Excellency's opinion and orders."

Congress, however, left the matter undecided, and indefinitely postponed its settlement. This was bad policy, and full of bad results. The army was no longer drilled, and, consequently, could not be brought to that perfection which guaranteed victory, and which, at less expense of life, blood, and money, would sooner have secured success to the American eagle.

CHAPTER VIII.

WASHINGTON PURSUES THE ENEMY.—STEBUEN HASTENS TO JOIN THE MAIN ARMY.—PHILADELPHIA.—FILTHY CONDITION OF THE CITY.—THE GERMAN QUARTER.—POPULARITY OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY.—COUNCIL OF WAR AT PRINCETON.—STEBUEN SENT TO RECONNOITRE.—HIS REPORTS.—HE IS WITH THE LEFT WING.—THE PART HE TAKES IN THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.—NEARLY TAKEN PRISONER.—HE COLLECTS PART OF THE RETREATING TROOPS OF LEE.—HE PLACES THE BATTERIES OF LORD STEELING, AND RE-FORMS THE TROOPS TOWARDS ENGLISHTOWN.—STEBUEN'S ACCOUNT ABOUT THE DUTIES PERFORMED BY HIM, BEFORE THE COURT MARTIAL FOR THE TRIAL OF LEE.—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN STEBUEN AND LEE.—STEBUEN CHALLENGES LEE.—THE LATTER DECLINES.—HAMILTON'S OPINION.—AMERICAN ARMY MARCHES TO WHITEPLAINS.—STEBUEN CONDUCTS LEE'S DIVISION.—SOON ORDERED TO GIVE UP HIS TEMPORARY COMMAND.—JEALOUSY OF THE BRIGADIER GENERALS.—STEBUEN GOES TO PHILADELPHIA.—DIFFICULTY WITH COLONEL DE LA NEUVILLE.—STEBUEN THREATENS TO GIVE IN HIS RESIGNATION.—WASHINGTON'S OPINION ABOUT THE FOREIGN OFFICERS IN GENERAL, AND STEBUEN IN PARTICULAR.—HIS LETTERS TO GOVERNEUR MORRIS AND THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.—THE POSITION OF FOREIGN OFFICERS IN THE AMERICAN ARMY.—THE POLITICAL SPIRIT OF THE LAST CENTURY MORE COSMOPOLITAN THAN NATIONAL.—THE FRENCH ABSOLUTISM ARBITER OF EUROPE.—THE STANDING ARMIES COMPOSED OF ALL NATIONALITIES.—NATIONALITY NO OBSTACLE TO SUCCESS.—WAR THE REGULAR BUSINESS OF THE NOBILITY.—THE GREATER PART OF FOREIGN NOBLEMEN A VALUABLE ACQUISITION FOR THE UNITED STATES, ALTHOUGH SOME BAD CHARACTERS AMONG THEM.—THE INFUX OF FOREIGNERS INDISPENSABLE TO SUCCESS.—THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITIES SUBSERVIENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PARTIES.—NATIONALITY NO STANDARD OF A MAN'S CAPABILITY AND UTILITY.—THE FOREIGN OFFICERS HERE FELT VERY BITTERLY THE FORTUITOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR DESCENT.—NOT STATED WHAT CONSTITUTED THE PRECISE ATTRIBUTES OF A FOREIGNER.—IT APPEARS THAT WHOEVER WAS NOT ANGLO-SAXON WAS A FOREIGNER.

IMMEDIATELY after the news of the evacuation of Philadelphia had reached the head-quarters of the army, Washington quitted Valley Forge, crossed the Delaware some fifteen miles above the city at Corryel's ferry, and went in pursuit of the enemy.

Stebuen hastened from York to join the main army in New Jersey, and passed, on his way, through Philadelphia, which did not present, by any means, a pleasant appearance.

"The first observation I made on entering Philadelphia,"

says Duponceau, who accompanied Steuben,* "was, that the city had been left by the British and Hessians in the most filthy condition. I joined Baron Steuben at the Slate House in Second street, the celebrated boarding house so much spoken of in Graydon's Memoirs. Such was the filth of the city that it was impossible for us to drink a comfortable dish of tea that evening. As fast as our cups were filled, myriads of flies took possession of them, and served us as the harpies did the poor Trojans in the *Æneid*. Some said they were Hessian flies, and various other jokes were cracked on the occasion, for the evacuation of the city had put us all in good spirits, and we enjoyed ourselves very well, the filth notwithstanding. The next day a house was provided for us in New street, where we staid but a few days, being anxious to join the army. That quarter of the city was then inhabited almost entirely by Germans; hardly any other language than the German was heard in the streets, or seen on the signs in front of the shops, so that Baron Steuben fancied himself again in his native country. A great number of the inns in town and country bore the sign of the King of Prussia, who was very popular, particularly among the Germans. We were, however, not captivated with the delights of Capua; we bade adieu to Philadelphia and all its German attractions, and joined General Washington's army in New Jersey."

The commander-in-chief had sent, in the meanwhile, Maxwell's brigade after the enemy, and ordered that general to coöperate with General Dickinson, of the New Jersey militia, in harassing and impeding, as much as possible, the march of the English. Lee and Wayne were soon after dispatched, each with a division for the same purpose, into Jersey, and ordered to follow the enemy closely, but to halt on the first strong ground and wait for the main army, which was advanc-

* MS. Letters of Peter S. Duponceau, vii. letter, dated Philadelphia, June 24, 1836.

ing with great celerity. Washington, eagerly seeking a general engagement, reached Hopewell, five miles from Princeton, on the 24th of June. Here he held a council of war, for the purpose of obtaining its opinion about the best mode of attacking the British. No decision, however, was arrived at. Six of the generals present, under the leadership of Lee, were of opinion that a general engagement ought to be avoided, and not more than fifteen hundred men sent to hang on the rear of the enemy, and interfere with their operations; the other six—and among them Steuben—were for a battle, should favorable circumstances present themselves. In consequence of this diversity of opinion, Washington took his own course, and fully aware of his personal responsibility to the country and the reputation of the army, he decided to avail himself of the opportunity to give battle to the retreating British army. In execution of this plan he ordered a large detachment, first under Lafayette, and afterward under Lee, to reinforce the troops already close to the enemy, for the purpose of attacking their left flank.

Clinton had moved slowly from Gloucester Point, on the left bank of the Delaware, to Haddonfield and Mount Holly, and thence to Crosswicks and Allentown. From this point two roads led to New York, one via Brunswick and South Amboy, the other via Freehold and Sandy Hook.

Washington's movements were of course dependent on the route Clinton might select. In order to ascertain the British general's design, he sent Steuben to reconnoiter, a service which demands for its efficient fulfillment the highest order of military capacity, both as a strategist and a commander. This selection of Steuben shows the estimation in which the commander-in-chief held his character and abilities.

On the 25th of June Steuben discovered that the enemy was directing his march from Allentown to Freehold and Sandy Hook, and having ascertained this important fact, he immediately made it known to the army. One of his dis-

patches* to Brigadier General Scott, dated Hightstown, on the 25th of June, 1778, three o'clock, P. M., reads as follows :

“SIR : By intelligence already forwarded, you are, no doubt, acquainted that the enemy have certainly taken the direct road from Allentown to Monmouth court-house. I, therefore, submit to your judgment whether it would not be best to advance your corps as far as this place, and make no doubt you will communicate the intelligence you receive to the commanding officers of all our advanced corps.”

Clinton, however, did not reach the neighborhood of Monmouth court-house until the 27th of June. Steuben pursued him closely, and communicated his observations to the commander-in-chief in the following report :†

“About two miles on the left of the COURT-HOUSE,
June 27th, 12½ o'clock, P. M.

“SIR : We arrived here this morning, and it being the best position we can find to observe the motions of the enemy, have remained ; we have advanced our parties so near as to fire a pistol at their horsemen while feeding their horses. They now lay encamped, one line on the main road by the court-house, and another line extended on their left from the head of their column, which is not advanced one hundred and fifty paces beyond the court-house, having sent a man there to discover ; they have some tents pitched, and their horses are at pasture, and have not the least appearance of moving.

“When we first arrived here, they had a party of infantry posted in a wood on their left and about five hundred paces in our front, from which we could discover several detachments to go to the adjacent houses, two of which they have burnt, viz., Colonel Henderson's and Mr. Wickoff's. So soon as they move, I shall endeavor to discover their route, and immediately acquaint you.”

* Washington MS. State Papers, vol. xxiv., p. 164.

† Ibidem.

While thus reconnoitering, Steuben suddenly heard a rustling in the wood, and looking toward it, saw two of the enemy's light horse emerging. Steuben had just time to discharge his pistols before he turned his horse and leaped a fence, his hat falling off as he rode. After this narrow escape, he returned to the camp. The horsemen did not fire at him, but hallooed to him to stop. The two aids had gone in succession nearer the British than Steuben. These, he supposed, were captured, the horsemen having passed between him and them. While making his report at head-quarters, he was surprised by the entrance of Walker and his companion, and exclaimed, "How is this? I thought you were taken prisoners!" "O no," said Walker, "they were intent on the high prize, and overlooked us!" "Have you brought my hat?" "O no, baron, we had not time." After the battle, some prisoners were brought to head-quarters, and one of them, after being examined, addressing Steuben, said, "I believe, general, I had the honor of seeing you yesterday, and thought to get a more splendid prize than your hat." "Why did you not fire?" "You were recognized by General Knyphausen, and our orders were rather to take you, if we could do it without harming you."*

On the next morning, the 28th of June, the memorable battle of Monmouth court-house was fought. It is beyond the limits of our task to give a full description of the events of that sanguinary day, the particulars of which are doubtless familiar to all our readers; but it is our duty to describe the part taken by Steuben in that battle. In all American histories, from Marshal down to Dawson (who gives the clearest account of the battle),† Steuben's name is scarcely mentioned in connection with it, except for the promptness which the soldiers exhibited on that occasion, and which proved the good effects of his dis-

* Verbal communication of John W. Mulligan.

† Battles of the United States by Sea and Land, by Henry B. Dawson, New York, Johnson, Fry & Co., 1858, vol. i., 385-411.

cipline.* This may possibly be accounted for from the fact that he held no regular command in the line. We will, however, endeavor briefly to supply this omission.

Steuben says himself, in a letter already quoted, and addressed to Mr. De Frank at Hechingen, "At the battle of Monmouth I commanded on the left wing of the first line, and was fortunate enough to decide the day to our advantage." This statement is wholly consistent with the other accounts, and is corroborated by the events of the day.

The commander-in-chief having been informed that the British, under Sir Henry Clinton, were on the point of quitting their position and descending into the plain which lies between the court-house and Middletown, ordered General Lee to move forward with the advance, and attack the enemy without delay. At the same time the main body was put in motion towards Freehold to sustain him. The right wing was commanded by Greene, and the left by Lord Stirling. Washington was with the left wing, and Steuben was attached to his staff.

When Clinton, on his march towards Middletown, was made aware of General Lee's advance, and of the peril to which the detachment under Knyphansen (the baggage train was under the convoy of this general), was exposed, he quickly saw that the only way in which he could extricate himself, was to engage the advanced corps of the Americans who menaced his rear. To effect this purpose he assumed the offensive, and with the divisions commanded by himself and Cornwallis, he repulsed the American vanguard under Lee, and drove them back in disorder. Washington came up at this critical moment, and seeing the confusion into which Lee's corps was thrown, of which he had no previous notice, saw the necessity for prompt and energetic action to check the advance of the enemy. It was absolutely necessary to restore order and collect the retreating troops, to re-form them in the rear of his first line, and

* Washington Irving's *Life of Washington*, 8vo edition, iii., 430.

thus resist the vigorous attack of Clinton and Cornwallis. On the success of this movement depended the fortunes of the day. To execute a maneuver of such importance under the galling fire of the enemy required no little coolness and decision, and needed an officer accustomed to command, and in whom the troops had implicit confidence.

This critical duty was intrusted to Steuben on the left, and to Wayne on the right wing. The latter was directed to form his men, and hold the enemy in check. Clinton, reinforced by some of Knyphausen's troops, attacked Wayne at the parsonage with great spirit. This was the point where the battle was the fiercest, and where Wayne entitled himself to a high meed of praise. The British were finally repulsed, and their gallant leader, Lieutenant Colonel Monekton, killed.

The choice of Steuben to collect the men on the left wing was equally fortunate. So accustomed had the soldiers become to his direction, and so firmly did they rely upon his guidance, that they, although severely pressed by the enemy, wheeled into line with as much precision as on an ordinary parade, and with the coolness and intrepidity of veteran troops. Alexander Hamilton was struck with this change, and was afterwards heard to say that he had never known or conceived the value of military discipline till that day.*

Clinton, after his repulse, moved the main body of his army against the left of the American army under Lord Stirling, but the batteries were so well served that he was glad to retreat. It was here that Steuben was first engaged, and from his statement before the court martial against Lee, which we quote below, we may reasonably conclude that it was he who placed some of Stirling's batteries.

The enemy, after he had been driven from the left wing, moved again towards the right of the American position, but on account of Greene's energetic resistance, and the heavy fire of his artillery, commanded by the Chevalier Du

* William North's Biographical Sketch.

Plessis de Mauduit, he was equally unsuccessful in that direction. At this moment General Wayne advanced with a body of troops, and kept up so well directed and severe a fire that the enemy was soon compelled to retire behind a defile, where the first stand was made in the beginning of the action.*

After having performed his duties on the left wing, Steuben was ordered to re-form the troops towards Englishtown.

"On the 28th of June," says he in his deposition made on the 18th of July, 1778, before the court martial for the trial of General Lee, "after having been reconnoitering, I returned from Monmouth, in order to make my report to the commander-in-chief, whom I found at Englishtown. Having seen that the enemy was marching, and doubting of our being able to overtake them, and having seen nothing in my way but some militia, which followed at some distance, I stopped at a house in Englishtown to take some rest, where I staid about an hour and a half. I afterwards continued my road to meet the commander-in-chief. On my way I heard several firings of cannon, and made the greatest haste to arrive near the general, whom I found on the high ground, beginning to form the troops as they arrived. It was there that I saw General Lee's division retreating in great disorder, followed by the enemy, whose strength I conceived to be fifteen hundred men of infantry, and about one hundred and fifty horse.

"As I was employed in placing a battery, General Lee passed by me, without our speaking to one another. About a quarter of an hour after, the commander-in-chief ordered me to stop the retreating troops and form them toward Englishtown. I sent some officers forward to stop the men, and I went there myself, accompanied by Mr. Ternant and my aides-de-camp, to form them. As I passed through Englishtown I found General Lee on horseback before a house. He asked me where I was going. I acquainted him with my orders, upon which he said to me, that he was very glad of my

* Henry B. Dawson, l. c., part i., 409.

having taken that charge upon me, for he was tired out. I assembled part of General Maxwell's brigade and part of General Scott's detachment, which I formed behind the creek at Englishtown. General Maxwell was himself there. Scarcely had the troops taken their position, when General Paterson arrived with three brigades of the second line and desired to know where he was to be stationed. I placed his three brigades a little more in the rear on a high ground, and I established a battery on the right wing, in front of the second brigade of General Smallwood. The cannonade continued more or less briskly till past five o'clock. Half an hour after it had ceased, Colonel Gemat arrived and brought me the order from the commander-in-chief, that the enemy was retreating in confusion, and that I should, therefore, bring him a reinforcement. I ordered General Maxwell to take the command of the troops I had placed behind the creek, and to remain there till further orders. I then marched off with the three brigades of the second line. As I passed through Englishtown I met again General Lee, who asked me where I was going? I imparted him the order I had received from the general-in-chief, which I declared in the very expressions of Colonel Gemat, that the enemy was retreating with confusion. Upon the word 'confusion,' he took me up and said, 'that they were only resting themselves; but,' said he, afterward, 'I am sure there is some misunderstanding in your being to advance with these troops.' I told him that I had received the order from Mr. Gemat. I ordered, however, General Mühlenberg to halt, and sent for Captain Walker, my aid-de-camp, who repeated, in presence of General Lee, the order which Colonel Gemat had brought me; 'then,' said he, 'you are to march,' and I went on with the troops."

Having successfully executed his orders, Steuben was commanded to proceed to the front, to pursue the advantage which the American forces had thus gained. Before this movement could be effected, night set in and put a stop to

the action, which it was intended should be renewed on the next morning. This, however, did not take place, Clinton having silently withdrawn his forces during the night, and proceeding, unmolested, to Sandy Hook, embarked his men for New York.

Steuben's evidence before the court martial, respecting the situation of the enemy and the column commanded by General Lee, induced that gentleman, in his defense, to make some remarks, of which Steuben thought it proper to ask an immediate explanation in the following letter, dated Philadelphia, the 2d of December, 1778 :

"It has been reported to me, sir, that in your defense you have allowed yourself to cast indecent reflections on my account. I made haste to arrive at Philadelphia to inquire into the matter, and I find the report confirmed by the journal of the court martial, which I got possession of an hour ago, and where I read the following paragraph: 'Of all the very distant spectators,' etc. Were I now in my own country, where my reputation is long ago established, I should have put myself above your epigrams and would have despised them. But, here I am a stranger. You have offended me; I desire you will give me satisfaction.

"You will choose the place, time and arms; but as I do not like to be a distant or slow spectator, I desire to see you as near and as soon as possible.

"You will explain to Captain Walker, who will deliver this to you, if your present situation will permit you to bring this affair to as quick a conclusion as I wish it. I am, sir, yours," etc.

"I believe," says Lee in reply, "you have misunderstood the sense of this article of my defense. Very likely the sentence 'very distant spectators,' has appeared to you a reflection cast upon your courage. If such be your opinion, I assure you that I had not the least idea of it. I am ready to acknowledge it to all the gentlemen of your acquaintance, to all the

world if you will. It is true that I found fault with your forwardness (as I took it to be) to witness against me. I was piqued and thought myself justifiable in making use of the phrases which you have seen in print; but, I repeat it, without the least intention of intimating a reflection on your courage.”*

Steuben was satisfied with this explanation. “I have read,” writes Alexander Hamilton, from head-quarters, on the 19th of December, 1778, “your letter to Lee, with pleasure. It was conceived in terms which the offense merited; and if he had any feeling, must have been felt by him. Considering the pointedness and severity of your expressions, his answer was certainly a very modest one, and proved that he had not a violent appetite for so close a tête-à-tête as you seem disposed to insist upon. This evasion, if known to the world, would do him very little honor.”

Washington marched first to Brunswick, and via Bergen, Paramus and Haverstraw, to the western bank of the Hudson, which he crossed at King’s Ferry, whereupon he established his head-quarters at Whiteplains. On this march from Brunswick, as there were but few major generals, and almost the whole of the brigadiers were engaged at the court martial against Lee, either as members or as witnesses, Washington appointed Steuben to conduct Lee’s division to the North river.

The army arrived at Whiteplains on the 20th of July, 1778, whereupon Washington, in the general orders of the 22d, directed Steuben to give up his temporary command “and to resume his office of inspector general.” The commander-in-chief changed the order of battle and incorporated Lee’s, respectively Steuben’s, division in his own command. The latter went direct to Washington and expressed his entire dissatisfaction. The general-in-chief replied that he was sorry, but that the case was such that all the brigadier generals would throw up their

* Steuben MS. Papers. Sprague.

commission, if Steuben retained his command ; and that during the entire march in Jersey the army had been commanded by foreign generals, De Kalb, Lafayette, and Steuben ; that they believed that Congress only intended his commission to be that of inspector general, giving him the nominal rank of major general, and that eight brigadiers having made this declaration, he could find no other means of quieting them. Steuben asked his leave to go to Congress, demand an explanation, and get the duties of the inspectorship settled, the more so as a Colonel De la Neuville, who had hitherto acted as inspector general of General Gates's army, denied any subordination to Steuben and positively refused to serve under him. He, therefore, thought it neither satisfactory to himself nor in the interest of the army, to take again upon himself the responsibilities of the office of inspector general, before it had been positively regulated on fixed principles, and before he knew how far his authority extended. He explained his views in the following letter to the commander-in-chief, written at Wright Mills, on the 24th of July, 1778.*

“ I beg leave to refer you to my letter of the 18th of June, on the subject of the inspection, and to your kind answer of the 18th, in which you granted me permission to go to York, and desired me to lay before Congress such a plan as would be most likely to obviate all the difficulties I was acquainted with, and comprehend all the essential duties of my office. The final determination of Congress, which appeared to me at that time highly necessary, seems at present indispensable, before I can resume, with satisfaction to myself, and benefit to the army, the functions of my office. I foresee some difficulties in the way, particularly with regard to the inspector appointed by Congress to General Gates's army. That gentleman declared to me, not long since, that he was by no means subject to my orders or control in the exercise of his office. In short, as I am willing to avoid every difficulty, and to labor unmo-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

lest for the good of the service, I beg your Excellency to postpone my entering into the office of inspector general until Congress have, after your opinions and directions about the matter, finally pronounced."

It appears, however, that Steuben expected to be continued in the post which he temporarily filled, and that he threatened to give in his resignation if his wishes of an actual command in the line should not be granted. Washington writes, in this respect, to Gouverneur Morris, on the same day on which he received Steuben's letter :*

"Baron Steuben, I now find, is also wanting to quit his inspectorship for a command in the line. This will be productive of much discontent to the brigadiers. In a word, although I think the baron an excellent officer, I do most devoutly wish that we had not a single foreigner among us, except the Marquis De Lafayette, who acts upon very different principles from those which govern the rest."

The letter of the commander-in chief to the president of Congress is more explicit than the foregoing. "Baron Steuben," says he,† "will also be in Philadelphia in a day or two. The ostensible cause for his going, is to fix more certainly with Congress his duties as inspector general, which is necessary. However, I am disposed to believe that the real one is to obtain an actual command in the line as a major general, and he may urge a competition set up by Monsieur Neuville, for the inspector's place on this side of the Hudson, and the denial by him of the baron's authority, as an argument to effect it, and for granting him the post, as a means of satisfying both. I regard and I esteem the baron as an assiduous, intelligent and experienced officer, but you may rely on it, if such is his view, and he should accomplish it, we shall have the whole line of brigadiers in confusion. They have said but little about his rank as major general, as he has not had an actual command over them ; but when we marched from Brunswick,

* Washington's Writings, vi., 15.

† Ibidem, p. 19.

as there were but few major generals, and almost the whole of the brigadiers were engaged at the court martial, either as members or witnesses, I appointed him, *pro tempore*, and so expressed it in orders, to conduct a wing to the North river. This measure, though founded in evident necessity, and not designed to produce to the brigadiers the least possible injury, excited great uneasiness and has been the source of complaint. The truth is, we have been very unhappy in a variety of appointments, and our own officers much injured. Their feelings, from this cause, have become extremely sensitive, and the most delicate touch gives them pain. I write as a friend, and therefore with freedom. The baron's services in the line he occupies can be important, and the testimonials he has already received are honorable. It will also be material to have the point of the inspector generalship, now in question between him and Monsieur Neuville, adjusted. The appointment of the latter, it is said, calls him inspector general in the army commanded by General Gates, and under this, as I am informed, he denies any subordination to the baron, and will not know him in his '*official capacity*.' There can be but one head."

And in another letter, addressed to the president of Congress, which bears date of the 26th of July, 1778, Washington refers again to the same object, as follows, viz. :*

"Baron Steuben will have the honor of delivering you this. I am extremely sorry that this gentleman's situation and views seem to have determined him to quit the service, in which he has been heretofore and is capable still of being extensively useful. Some discontents which arose among the officers, on account of the powers with which the office was at first vested, induced me to arrange the duties of it upon a plan different from that on which it began. The moving state of the army has, for some time past, in a great degree suspended the exercise of the inspectorship. When the troops marched from

* Washington's Writings, by Sparks, vi., p. 20.

Brunswick, the scarcity of general officers occasioned my giving the baron a temporary command of a division during the march. On our arrival near our present encampment, I intended he should relinquish this charge and resume his former office, for which purpose a general order was accordingly issued. But I find that he is entirely disinclined to the measure, and resolves not to continue in the service unless he can hold an actual command in the line.

“Justice concurring with inclination constrains me to testify that the baron has, in every instance, discharged the several trusts reposed in him with great zeal and ability, so as to give him the fullest title to my esteem as a brave, indefatigable, judicious and experienced officer. I regret there should be a necessity that his services should be lost to the army; at the same time I think it my duty explicitly to observe to Congress that his desire of having an actual and permanent command in the line can not be complied with without wounding the feelings of a number of officers whose rank and merits give them every claim to attention, and that the doing of it would be productive of much dissatisfaction and extensive ill consequences. This does not proceed from any personal objections on the part of those officers against the baron; on the contrary, most of them whom I heard speak of him, express a high sense of his military worth. It proceeds from motives of another nature, which are too obvious to need particular explanation, or may be summed up in this, that they conceive such a step would be injurious to their essential rights and just expectations. That this would be their way of thinking upon the subject I am fully convinced, from the effect which the temporary command given him, even under circumstances so peculiar as those I have mentioned, produced. The strongest symptoms of discontent appeared upon the occasion.”

Alexander Hamilton, in a letter of the 26th of July, 1778, to E. Boudinot, says about the same subject:

“Baron Steuben will do me the honor to deliver you this. He waits upon Congress in a temper which I very much regret—discontented with his situation and almost resolved to quit the service. You know we have all the best opinion of this gentleman’s military merit, and shall, of course, consider his leaving the army as a loss to it. Whether any expedient can be adopted to reconcile difficulties and retain him in the service, at the same time that no disgust is given to others who ought not to be disgusted, I can not certainly determine. But I should conceive it would not be impossible to find such an expedient. You have no doubt heard, while you were with the army, of the obstacles thrown in his way by many of the general officers, excited to it by Lee and Mifflin, as I believe, in the execution of the inspectorship; and you have, it is equally probable, heard of the arrangement the general was in a manner obliged to adopt to silence the clamors which existed among them, and place the inspectorate upon a footing more conformable to their ideas. The opposition the baron met with in this case was one cause of dissatisfaction to him. In our march from Brunswick, as the baron was unemployed, and there was a great deficiency of general officers, notwithstanding the ideas of the army are against giving a command in the line to a person vested with an office similar to that held by him, the general ventured to give the temporary command of a division during the march, in consequence of which the command of a wing devolved upon him. This was a source of offense to many. When we came near the Whiteplains the general thanked him, in general orders, for his services, and requested he would resume the exercise of his former office. To this, on account of the opposition he had already met with, and from the original plan for the inspectorship being mutilated, he discovered very great disinclination, and expressed a desire to preserve a command in the line, and from some conversation we have had together, I apprehend he means to resign his present appointment if he can not have a

command suited to his rank annexed to it. You will see by the general's letters what are his sentiments both with respect to the duties of the inspectorship and the baron's holding a command in the line. Far be it from me to wish to contravene his views; you may be assured they can not be essentially departed from without very serious inconvenience. But if any thing could be done, consistent with them, to satisfy the baron, it would be extremely desirable. Perhaps the principle on which the general's arrangement is formed may be preserved, and at the same time the objects of the inspectorship enlarged so as to render it a more important employment. Perhaps a resolution of Congress giving the baron a right to be employed on detachments might, for the present, compensate for the want of a permanent command in the line, and might not be disagreeable to the officers. You can sound him on these heads. I need not caution you that this is a matter of great delicacy and importance, and that every step taken in it ought to be well considered.*

Just at this period, when Steuben insisted upon a permanent command, a great jealousy and animosity existed among the American officers against the promotion of foreigners, who swarmed around Congress and were full of pretensions, and often applied unfair means in order to be appointed and promoted. It is to be inferred that Washington refers to them in the following extract of the above-quoted letter to Gouverneur Morris:—

"They (the foreign officers) may be divided," says he there, "into three classes, namely, mere adventurers without recommendation or recommended by persons, who do not know how else to dispose of or provide for them; men of great ambition, who would sacrifice every thing to promote their own personal glory; or mere spies, who are sent here to obtain a thorough knowledge of our situation and circum-

* History of the Republic of the United States, as traced in the writings of A. Hamilton, by John C. Hamilton, New York, 1857; i., 488.

stances, in the execution of which, I am persuaded, some of them are faithful emissaries, as I do not believe a single matter escapes unnoticed or unadvised at a foreign court."

It is far more reasonable to suppose that the above expressions are the result of momentary irritation on the part of Washington, perfectly justified perhaps by the immense crowd and the often exaggerated pretensions of the foreigners, than to believe that they are his positive opinions and final judgment. We think, however, that the above-quoted remarks of Washington exactly express the opinions which a large portion of the American people entertain on this subject still, at the present time, and we therefore propose in this place to examine more closely the position of the foreign officers in the American army.

There is no doubt that the influx of foreign adventurers was productive of considerable inconvenience, and that the nuisance was felt by all officers. But this is not the point which we seek to demonstrate. We desire to establish a few leading facts in order to place the relations of the foreign officers to the revolutionary army in their true historical light.

In the first place, the fact is generally overlooked in this country that the political spirit of the last century was much more cosmopolitan than national. States and political forms were constructed, not according to the limits or differences which nature intended, but thrown together or torn asunder, according to the will of the conqueror, without the least regard to descent or relationship. The French absolutism which, ever since the peace of Westphalia, had constituted itself the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, was the ruling spirit of the eighteenth century. In the same way that it caused cities and parks to spring out of the desert to prove its power and ascendancy over nature, in the same way did it destroy every individual inclination, every independent character, uniting the most discordant elements in one artificial mass. Politics and literature, art and fashions, taste and man-

ners, all came from France at that time, and the influence of France throughout Europe was all powerful. The rulers and the ruled, whether voluntarily or the reverse, bowed before her, and by these means lost all national limits and distinctions. The natural consequence of this system in political life was the most complete submission to the will of the prince. It was immaterial who obeyed, so long as somebody obeyed. The standing armies, with their officers recruited from the nobility, might, therefore, be composed of as diverse elements as they pleased, so long as they were always willing to fulfill blindly the commands of the prince. The sovereign felt himself so safe and unrestrained in the fullness of his power, that he did not observe, much less fear, the variety of the nationalities of which his army was composed, and thus do we find, in almost every European army of that time, representatives of all the most important nations. The internal arrangement of the armies was almost the same everywhere. The officers had the same code of honor, and had ingeniously cultivated among them the consciousness of that rank which made them feel at home in every country in Europe. Germans served in France, Frenchmen in Germany, Englishmen in Russia, and Italians in Sweden, according as circumstances and inclination led them. Lord Keith, a Scotchman, served successively in Spain and Russia, and was killed at the battle of Hochkirch, a field marshal in the service of Prussia. Loudon, an Englishman, and Browne, an Irishman, were Austrian field marshals and commanders of armies. The famous Austrian commander, Prince Eugene of Savoy, offered his services in the first instance to the King of France. Count St. Germain, the French minister of war, was for some time a Danish general. Frederick the Great had special agents to find out the officers of distinction who traveled through his dominions, and to induce them to enter his service. They fought for honor, glory and profit, and had precisely the same claim to promotion as the native officers. Nationality was no obstacle to success. When war,

which was the regular business of the nobility, was at an end in one country, they looked for another where it existed, and it often happened that they found themselves in arms against their native land.

When, therefore, at the outbreak of the American Revolution, the European officers applied to Congress, or its agents, to obtain that active employment which they could not find at home in consequence of the comparatively long peace, it was only the application of a practice which had been recognized in Europe during more than an entire century. The greater number of them had been trained on the battle-fields of Europe, and were a valuable acquisition for the United States, whose officers, at the commencement of the war, were lamentably deficient in military knowledge and experience. Together with these old, experienced officers, came a number of others, it is true, to enter the service of Congress, who were young and inexperienced, for the most part enthusiastic French noblemen, who were anxious to take vengeance on England for her wrongs to France, and to realize their own somewhat confused aspirations. Among these volunteer allies, it is natural to suppose that there were many bad, intriguing, useless, and even suspicious individuals; but on the whole, this influx of foreign strength and talent was in the last degree advantageous, nay, indispensable to the cause of the Revolution; because it not only gained by this means a number of able combatants at home, but support and popularity abroad.

It shows a great amount of simplicity to expect that none but superior men ought to have come here, or to have been accepted by Congress. It betrays a complete ignorance of the state of the country at that period, and of the financial helplessness of Congress, to suppose that the expectation of personal profit alone induced the European officers to come over here. It is a gross injustice to make all the foreign officers responsible for the baseness of a Lee, a Conway, or a Neuville. What man of calm judgment would deny the abil-

ity and respectability of the American officers, because an Arnold had risen to eminence among them, or because a Stephen was one of their number ?

In politics and history, and particularly in times of great crises and revolutions, conflicting contrasts are never strictly classified according to the nations to which they belong. Thus, we do not find here Americans alone on the side of freedom and independence, nor foreigners exclusively on the side of oppression and tyranny. The question of nationalities in the American Revolution was clearly subservient to the principles of the parties. And yet it but too often happened that distrust of the foreign officers was readily entertained. Even during the war, a nationality which had no real existence, which was still to be created, was taken as the standard of a man's utility and capability. People were envious of that which they did not possess, which did not exist, and for the attainment of which these very foreigners were assisting them to do battle. The inward motive of this envy was not so much the Anglo-Saxon exclusiveness or self-sufficiency ; not so much the ambition of the native officers, as a mistrust of their own capability, which they sought to silence by a great outcry against foreigners. This was a proof that the officers and people did not feel themselves sufficiently strong to master the foreign element ; it is a tacit admission that they were divided among themselves, and strong evidence that they were more convinced of their weakness than of their strength ; nay, that they did not believe in the absolute success of their cause.

It is seldom that an army so weak in itself has received such rich and powerful accessions of strength, with so small an expenditure of time and money, as the Continental army ; and seldom have friends in need, like these foreign officers, been made to feel so bitterly the fortuitous circumstances of their descent, or to have had it cast in their faces as a reproach. Washington, of course, could not change the con-

dition of affairs. He was obliged to make the best of circumstances as they presented themselves, to advance the interests of all. He was obliged, at the worst, to decide against the foreigners, in order to insure the coöperation of his own countrymen.

It is nowhere distinctly stated what constituted the precise attributes of the foreigners. It is, however, to be inferred, indirectly, that the Polanders, French and Germans were the "foreigners." At all events, the English do not appear to be counted among them. Gates—who was himself a foreigner, as an Englishman—made the reproach to De Kalb, that he, being a foreigner, did not properly understand the matter, *i. e.*, the loss of the battle of Camden. Hamilton, born in the West Indies of a Scotch father, is never spoken of as a foreigner. It is to be supposed, therefore, that whoever was not Anglo-Saxon was considered foreign.

CHAPTER IX.

STEBEN GOES TO PHILADELPHIA.—DIFFICULTY WITH NEUVILLE SETTLED.—GOVERNEUR MORRIS'S LETTER.—NEW PLAN FOR THE INSPECTION.—STEBEN'S LETTER TO WASHINGTON RELATING TO IT.—HIS MEMORIAL TO CONGRESS.—IT CONTAINS TWO QUESTIONS: 1. WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES WHICH INDUCE THE STATES TO ESTABLISH AN INSPECTION IN THIS ARMY?—2. IN WHAT MANNER CAN THIS INSPECTOR BE ESTABLISHED, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE GENIUS OF THE COUNTRY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARMY?—THE ADOPTION OF STEBEN'S PLAN DEFERRED.—HE IS ORDERED TO GO TO RHODE ISLAND TO ASSIST GENERAL SULLIVAN.—HE COMES TOO LATE.—STEBEN REMAINS AT WASHINGTON'S HEAD-QUARTERS.—HE EXERCISES THE TROOPS.—LETTERS OF HENRY LAURENS, RICHARD PETERS, AND J. FERNANT.—THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSPECTION ON A PERMANENT BASIS STILL DEFERRED BY CONGRESS.—STEBEN GOES HIMSELF TO PHILADELPHIA.—HIS LETTER TO WASHINGTON REFERS TO THE CAUSES OF THE DELAY.—WASHINGTON'S ANSWER.—CONGRESS FINALLY REGULATES THE INSPECTORSHIP BY RESOLUTION OF THE 19TH OF FEBRUARY, 1779.—STEBEN'S OPINION CONCERNING THE RESULT OF THE LAST CAMPAIGN.

STEBEN was thoroughly impressed with the annoyances and disadvantages of his situation; but he was sensible enough to accommodate himself to circumstances. He went to Philadelphia, but finding Congress not at all anxious to comply with his wishes, he abandoned the idea of applying for a regular command in the army, and contented himself with preparing and laying before Congress a new plan for the permanent establishment of the inspectorship.

The difficulty in regard to Neuville was easily settled. "I feel the full force of your reasoning," answered Gouverneur Morris, on the 2d of August, 1778, to Washington.* "The faith of Congress is, in some measure, plighted to Mr. De la Neuville; but it is not their interest that his brevet shall give command. I will take care to get this expressed by a particular resolution. The baron has a claim from his merit to be

* Life of Gouverneur Morris, by Jared Sparks. Boston, 1832. Vol. i., p. 174.

noticed, but I never will consent to grant what I am told he requests, and I think Congress will not. At least, they will not if I can help it."

Congress, consequently, adopted Washington's opinion, that "there can be but one head,"* and pronounced in favor of Steuben's superiority in rank. Neuville, thus superseded, and offended by this decision, sent in his resignation, and in the course of the same year returned to France.

It first appeared that Congress at last was willing to regulate, for the benefit of the army, the duties of that important office, and to comply with Steuben's wishes in regard to its establishment.

"Immediately after my arrival here," he writes to Washington, in August, 1778,† "Congress were pleased to appoint a committee to hear my proposals. The committee consists of General Reed, Messrs. Bondinot and Chase, and met for the first time on Saturday, the 8th instant. In the meantime, I am preparing a plan for the establishment of an inspection; and as it is my wish, it shall be my endeavor, to form it on such principles as may be agreeable to your Excellency and the army in general, and, at the same time, comprehend all the essential duties of the office. In preparing this plan, the good of the service is my only motive; all personal views will be laid aside, and the duties of inspector general laid down and defined, not for myself, but for any person Congress may think proper to appoint to that office. The plan being fixed and approved by Congress, I shall, before it receives their final ratification, insist on its being sent to your Excellency for your opinion thereon; and I beg you, my dear general, that, laying aside any partiality in my favor, you will freely make any observation on it you may think proper."

"It is absolutely necessary," said Steuben, in his memo-

* Washington's Writings, vi, 20.

† Department of State MS. Papers, Washington, vol. xxv., 306.

rial of the 7th of August, 1778, respecting the inspectorship,* "that the duties of the office of an inspector general should for the future be distinctly defined, in doing which it appears necessary to consider,

"1st. What are the motives which induce the States to establish an inspection in the army?

"2d. In what manner can this inspector be established, in conformity with the genius of the country and the constitution of the army?

"The absolute necessity of uniformity in an army is so well known that it needs no argument. To effect this, a military code, however well it might be written, would not of itself be sufficient. The rules there laid down would be differently explained and executed. Disputes would arise and uniformity never be established. It is therefore necessary that some person should be appointed to preside over the execution of these rules, and this is the duty of the inspector general.

"The commander-in-chief of an army has it not in his power to attend, in so particular a manner, to the details of the different departments. The office of inspector general should be confided to some intelligent general officer, well versed in the theory and practice of maneuvering troops, the composition and formation of the different corps of an army, the customs of different armies, the necessary equipment of the troops, all which should come under his notice. A regular system in all these matters, arming, clothing and paying the troops, is indispensably necessary. One or more regiments better clothed than the rest, will create discontent and grumbling, and often cause a revolt in an army, all which will be prevented by the appointment of an inspector general, whose duty it is to superintend these matters.

"Discipline and order should also be as regular and equally uniform in an army as exercise and manœuvres. A single reg-

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

iment, relaxed in discipline, will cause disorder in a whole army. To prevent this is also the duty of the inspector general.

“Uniformity in the camp duties and in the formation of the troops, are things not only necessary but indispensable, and this uniformity should be introduced and maintained by the inspector general.

“It remains then to be ascertained in what manner this inspection shall be established. Neither the French nor the Prussian arrangements can be adopted without alteration, in a free State where the troops of the different provinces consider themselves as allies, united to defend the same cause. In Prussia the inspector general is properly the king’s commissary. He receives all his orders from the king, and is only accountable to him for his actions. In France he is the commissary of the minister at war, whose orders he receives and sees executed ; but in America, where we have neither king nor minister, the question is, of whom the inspector general is to receive his orders, and to whom he is answerable for the execution of the same.

“Congress have established a board of war, and I imagine that the inspector general should be under the immediate control of that board, who are themselves answerable to Congress. The inspector general should then be answerable to the board of war, and each colonel to the inspector general. In that manner he will be the commissary of the States, and as such, every regiment, corps or particular officer is obliged to give him an account of every thing that pertains to his department.

“It may be asked, how far the inspector general is to be subject to the commander-in-chief. I answer, as far as the general of artillery, the quarter-master general, or any other general in the army, and that, although he were authorized by the board of war, he should not have it in his power to make the slightest alteration, without the con-

sent of the commander-in-chief; and in case he has any objection to what the inspector general wants to alter or to introduce, the execution of it must be suspended until farther order from Congress. But no person in the army, besides the commander-in-chief, has a right to give orders to the inspector general relative to his department. The military rank in the army must not be confounded with his rank of inspector.

"It is desirable, for several reasons, that no foreigner should ever be intrusted with the post of inspector general, but that employment be always in the hands of a general officer who is a native of this country. But if Congress think fit to intrust it to a foreigner, I propose that at the same time a Continental brigadier be joined with him in the office, who, acting in conjunction with him, may acquaint himself with the arrangements and duties of that department, and one day become himself the inspector general.

"In the arrangement which I made, *pro tempore*, there were only four lieutenant colonels appointed as sub-inspectors. I propose to preserve the same number for the infantry, but instead of being distributed among the several divisions of the army, I wish that they should have the inspection of the troops of the different States, *i. e.*, that each colonel inspector might have the troops of three or four States under his inspection. A colonel would also be necessary for the cavalry, and another for the light troops, all receiving their instructions, relative to the discipline, order and exercise, from the inspector general.

"The appointment of the brigade inspectors has not quite answered my wishes. I requested a major out of each brigade, instead of which I was given a great number of captains, some majors, and even some colonels, to fill that post; however, all of them officers of merit, and to whom, in a great measure, is due the progress our army has already made in maneuvering. I think it, however, more proper that this function should be joined to that of the majors of brigade, if

Congress think fit to do with regard to the latter what Marshal Broglie did in the French army last war, namely, that one of the senior majors be chosen from each brigade under the appellation of majors of brigade. His business will be to collect the returns, lists, etc., of all the battalions of his brigade. He is to keep the details and take care of the formation of all the guards, detachments, etc.; all the orders to be directed to him, and he is to impart them to the brigadiers and colonels, and by the adjutant to all the officers of his brigade. He is to inspect the police of the camp, the discipline, and the order of the service; he is to be always in camp and have his orders executed through the battalion adjutants; he is to do no duty in the line except going with detachments against the enemy.

“But then it would be necessary for the brigadiers to have an aid-de-camp with the rank and pay of first lieutenant, to be allowed two horses and a servant, and consequently entitled to two rations for man and horse, and to be under the immediate orders of his brigadier general.

“The rank of the inspector general and of the officer joined with him in the office, should always be determined by Congress. I think that the more his functions are important, the more he should be entitled to a respectable rank. In France and Prussia the inspectors general are senior lieutenant generals, who, besides their authority as inspectors, take, in their turn, the command, and enjoy the prerogatives to which their rank entitles them, and I doubt whether any officer in the service would accept of the office of inspector general, if that office deprived him of his command in the line, and of ever having an opportunity of distinguishing himself against the enemy.

“The colonels appointed as sub-inspectors preserve their command and rank in the line, but when they are acting as inspectors they are not to be considered according to the rank they hold, but to the functions they are performing as inspect-

ors appointed by the States, and authorized to make all the inquiries relating to their department. Thus no colonel is to make any objection to his regiment being inspected by a colonel younger than himself; it is not the colonel but the inspector who is performing that duty. In the performance of his office the inspector is the representative of the States, and is to be respected as such without any regard to his regular rank in the army. In France, the colonels of regiments are obliged to have their regiments inspected, not only by the inspector general, but by the commissaries of war, who have not even a military rank in the army. In Prussia, whole garrisons are inspected by inferior officers when acting as inspectors.

“No inspector is to inspect his own regiment.

“The department of the inspector being thus established, approved of and authorized by Congress, it remains to be examined in what manner the inspector general, the general officer joined with him in the office, and the colonel inspectors are to exercise their functions. Congress has already issued several resolutions which may serve as instructions to the inspector general; but to those instructions, and the duties of the inspectors in foreign service, our circumstances require several things to be added which are of the greatest importance:—

“1st. In foreign services the regiments are already formed, there is nothing to do but to keep them complete, while in our army, on the contrary, the greatest part are not yet formed, or rather have not yet been completed.

“2d. In foreign services there is an established military code, and it is by that code the inspector judges whether the troops are in order or not, while in our service that code is yet to be written, and it is the inspector general's duty to compose it and submit it to Congress to have it approved and authorized.

“3d. In foreign services the inspector general is to keep

the troops complete in arms and accouterments, while in our army several regiments are not yet completely equipped.

“Among these important objects the formation of regiments appears to me the most essential. Some of our regiments are almost complete, some want half their men, and some have scarce an eighth of their complement, which is the cause of the greatest disorder in the administration, as well as in the maneuvers and service in general. It is therefore necessary that the inspector general begin by making an exact review of every regiment in particular, and to make a report of his inspection, not only to the commander-in-chief, but to the board of war. In that review the inspector general is to examine, 1st, the number and condition of the men of each regiment; 2d, of the arms; 3d, of the clothing, and 4th, of the tents and other camp equipage. Each colonel is to be obliged to give the inspector general exact returns pertaining to all these matters. He afterwards sends his report to the board of war, and at the same time advises the several departments, that the regiments may be provided with whatever they may require.

“I have already hinted that it would be convenient to appoint the colonels inspectors to the troops of the several States, and I think it would also be convenient that they should keep up a correspondence with the Legislature of the State to whose troops they are attached, as much for the purpose of recruiting the regiments as to provide them with the necessary arms and equipment.

“At the first review, the inspector general must take exact information as to the effective men, not only of those present with the regiment, but of all the rank and file who are not otherwise employed but in the service of the guards and the line. He must examine every man singly, in order to know whether he has received accurate returns of the regiment, and he must examine the arms, accouterments and ammunition of each soldier. He must himself draw up the form for all the

returns he requires, and when he finds fault in the administration, discipline, or any other branch of the service, he must notify the commander-in-chief of his complaint, and propose a way to remedy it.

“The inspector general is to receive a collection of all the military regulations hitherto given, to add to them those he judges necessary, and arrange them in order, after which he is to submit them to the judgment and approbation of the board of war, or other persons appointed by Congress, and then they should be printed as a military code. The inspector general, and the officers under his orders, are to edit that work, and at the beginning of the next campaign, part of the regulations are to be printed and distributed among the officers of the army.

“The exercise and maneuvering of the troops will always be under the direction of the inspector general; all the maneuvers will be introduced by him, and the old ones executed according to the established principles. In order to maintain so necessary a uniformity, the colonels inspectors will cause every day a brigade to exercise in their presence; they will have two or more battalions formed out of it. They will direct the exercise or maneuver, and have it executed by the colonels of the regiments, though those colonels might be senior to them in the army. It is under these circumstances particularly, that the colonels inspectors must be respected as inspectors, not as colonels. When the inspector is not present, the brigadier, or, in his absence, the senior colonel is to order the exercise and the maneuvers, which they are at liberty to vary, as the circumstances and the ground require, without, however, changing any thing in the principles of the execution. When a maneuver is to be performed with several brigades, the inspector general is to present his plans to the commander-in-chief. The brigades and the battalions that are to execute the maneuver, are to be appointed in general orders, and are to receive their instructions from the inspector general.

“In camp or garrison, where there is a parade of the guards, the inspector is to cause his troops to perform two evolutions; the adjutant general or town major must for that purpose assemble the troops before guard-mounting, and then the inspector orders the exercise. But as soon as the drums beat ‘the general,’ the inspector leaves the command to the general of the day, in camp, and in a garrison, to the commandant of the place.

“Such, in my opinion, should be the functions of an inspector general in America, which I submit to the judgment of the honorable Congress, by whose decisions I shall always glory to abide.”

But the final ratification of Steuben’s plan was again postponed; the matter was dropped, and not taken up again until February, 1779.

Steuben had only been two weeks in Philadelphia, when the news arrived that the French fleet, under Count d’Estaing, had been forced to abandon the project against Rhode Island, and that General Sullivan’s position there was critical. On the evening of the 28th of August that this intelligence reached Philadelphia, Congress resolved,* “that Baron Steuben be requested forthwith to repair to Rhode Island, and give his advice and assistance to Major General Sullivan and the army under his command.” Steuben started before daybreak on the following day.

However flattering this resolution of Congress may appear as an acknowledgment of Steuben’s military talents, it was, in fact, the best way to get rid of his pressing demands for the present, and to evade a final decision in regard to the inspectorship. At all events, its passage was too late, as, on arriving at Whiteplains on the third day, General Washington informed Steuben that General Sullivan had already effected his retreat, and that he was safe at Providence.

Washington approved of Steuben’s not going further unless

* Journals of Congress, C. Dunlap’s edition, iv., 502.

the enemy should make some enterprise against Sullivan's corps. As this did not happen, Steuben sent the resolution of Congress to General Sullivan, with an account of the reasons which prevented him at this time from being under his orders. In the latter part of September the army retired from Whiteplains to Fredericksburg, and thence to their winter quarters in the Highlands.

In pursuance of the desire of the commander-in-chief he there began to exercise the troops, and directed his sub inspectors to manœuver with the brigades upon the principles and regulations he had prescribed. While discharging this duty he waited at head-quarters until Congress should adopt the plan he had drawn for the establishment of the inspection. Some prominent members, and even its president, took a great interest in bringing it forward; but the general business of Congress, which was deemed more pressing and important, caused its consideration to be postponed from day to day.

"I think it fortunate for yourself," writes Henry Laurens, president of Congress, on the 17th of September, 1778, to Steuben,* "that you did not proceed to Rhode Island; it would have been on every account a disagreeable embassy. The commander-in-chief having returned to Congress the report of the committee on the inspectorate with his Excellency's remarks and observations, the whole is recommitted and will probably be soon reported on; but the House is so overcharged with business as renders it impossible even to guess at a time when it will be taken under consideration and concluded."

"I hope to hear of your being"—such are the words of Richard Peters, in a letter to Steuben, dated the 16th of September, 1778†—"more agreeably circumstanced than formerly as to your business at camp. It is an obvious matter that our army are in want of discipline, although their improvements in this respect are amazing; and as the men are docile and capable,

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

† Ibidem.

it is a pity that any obstacles should be thrown in the way of their receiving instruction. While you are here, I could wish to make every use of your willingness to serve this country, therefore, I wish to see the inspection in its full vigor, for the greater our discipline, the sooner we shall discomfit our enemies and be at peace, which to me is the most desirable of all objects, except my liberty and the independence of my country. When you have ceased to be serviceable as a soldier, you shall sit down with us and enjoy the pleasing calm which will succeed the present tempest. *A propos*, we will and must take possession of the Bermudas, and you shall be governor."

Lieutenant Colonel Ternant, who, on the 25th of September, having been appointed inspector of the troops in South Carolina and Georgia, spent the end of that month in Philadelphia, and had daily intercourse with the board of war, positively expected the ultimate approbation and acceptance of Steuben's plan. "Although it has not yet received the sanction of Congress," says he,* "it nevertheless attracts and fixes the attention of that body, and I dare assure you, that in spite of all opposition the final establishment will be carried, the more so as Congress just received the plan revised by Washington."

Congress, however, could not arrive at a resolution, and wasting month after month, referred the whole question to a committee. Steuben made the best of this bad bargain, and on the 4th of October, 1778, wrote from Quakerhill to President Reed, chairman of that committee:†

"Congress could not have intrusted the plan I have proposed, into better hands than those of the committee of arrangements, especially when presided over by a gentleman of your merit, and for whom I entertain the highest esteem. It is an unhappy circumstance that this committee being so dispersed causes a delay in an arrangement which I thought very necessary for the good of our service, and in which is to be found the basis of all the arrangements that are to be made—I mean

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

† Ibidem, vol. iv.

the formation of our regiments to an equal number. When this is neglected, I do not see the possibility of ever establishing good order, whether in administration, service, exercise, or manœuvres of the troops. Being of no use at the army, my presence would perhaps be more necessary near the persons appointed for the arrangements I wish might be settled; but as experience teaches me that offered services do not always prove acceptable, I shall wait with a respectful silence for the orders of Congress, which are to regulate all my actions."

Notwithstanding, nothing was done during October and November; and when the army retired into winter quarters, Steuben went himself to Philadelphia. Obligated to give his instructions in an *extempore* manner, and even to adapt the plan of his operations to the circumstances rather than to his particular system, he proposed to put in order those instructions he had already perfected, to add those which he thought indispensably necessary, and to write, under the direction of the commander-in-chief, a code of military regulations, to introduce a thorough uniformity in the service. The general approved of his design, and in order to facilitate its execution, ordered him to repair to Philadelphia, where he might be at hand to have the necessary information from the board of war. Steuben endeavored at the same time to get his office finally arranged upon a more definite and permanent footing. He let no opportunity pass to call the attention of Congress to this—as it justly appeared to him—indispensable business, and to the importance of its settlement. It is not difficult to guess at the motives which predominated in that body and prevented them from deciding upon a satisfactory solution of the question. Steuben partly touches on them in the following letter which, on the 28th of November, 1778, he addressed to the president of Congress:*

"* * * At the same time, I lay before them the plan I

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

propose to follow in my operations relative to the department they have been pleased to confide to me, and which, if approved by them, I shall execute with the greatest exactness. Your Excellency will risk nothing in answering for me, that on my side I shall surmount every obstacle I meet with. Those which may affect my sanity, rank, authority, command, or any other distinction, will be the last sacrifice I shall make to the good of the service. I am, sir, prepared to experience the fate of foreigners; in every state, in every army, already have I experienced it. Envy raised its standard in the moment when our troops were beginning to make some progress; the interruption it gave to my projects, was the only chagrin it caused me. To their criticisms and remarks I paid not the least attention; it is much easier to criticise than to execute, and their remarks were beneath my notice.

"I willingly allow, that what few things I have hitherto shown, the essentials are so simple that each major could perhaps have introduced them. Notwithstanding the number of foreign officers of merit who arrived long before me, I found it left for me. Be it as it may, whatever military talents I may possess, they are dedicated to the service of this country, to which I join a zeal for which I can answer, and I believe I can offer no more."

The letter which Steuben at this time wrote to Washington, shows, on the one hand, his uncertainty, and the very slender hopes he entertained in regard to the final regulation of the inspectorship, and proves, on the other hand, the indecision of Congress in the matter.

"On my arrival in this city," says he, dated Philadelphia on the 6th of December 1778,* "I delivered your Excellency's letter to Mr. President Laurens, accompanied with one from . . . acquainting Congress in what manner I intended to proceed in the business. I afterwards, in another letter, requested to know to whom I was to apply for the necessary information on

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

the subject. To these letters I have had no other reply than a resolve, directing the board of war to furnish me with every information I may want on the subject. I have not hitherto been able to get a sight of the plan proposed by a former committee, and to which your Excellency subjoined your remarks, nor can I get the least information in whose hands that plan is. All I can learn from Mr. President Reed, who presided in that committee, is, that that plan, though founded on the one I proposed, differed from it materially, and that the authority of the inspector general was therein much more extended than I proposed, and when I can procure the other I shall see wherein we have differed. However it may be, I repeat that I shall, without the least deviation, conform to any remarks your Excellency has been pleased to make. I shall endeavor to convince your Excellency and the whole army, that nothing but the good of the service, and not any personal views, shall direct my actions. The American soldier under my orders is, at the same time, a member of the republic I serve. If every officer and soldier would consider me in the same light, it seems to me many obstacles would be avoided. With respect to your Excellency, I again beg you to consider me as an instrument in your hands for the good of the army which has the honor to serve under your orders."

"I had the honor," answered Washington, on the 19th of December,* 1778, "of receiving, a few days since, your letter of the 6th instant. I am much obliged to you for the polite assurances you give; and, in my turn, I beg you will believe that when the institution, at the head of which you have been placed, can once be established on a footing mutually agreeable to you and to the army, to which end all the measures I have taken in it have been directed, I shall be happy to give you every support in my power, to facilitate your operations. In doing this, I shall equally consult the personal consideration I have for you, and the improvement and benefit of

* Washington's Writings, vi., 147.

the army, which, I am persuaded, will be greatly promoted by a full exertion of the talents, experience, and activity of which you have already given the most satisfactory proof."

"I am sorry," adds Alexander Hamilton, Washington's aid-de-camp,* "that your business does not seem to make so speedy a progress as we all wish, but I hope it will soon come to a satisfactory termination. I wish you to be in a situation to employ yourself usefully and agreeably, and to contribute to giving our military constitution that order and perfection it certainly wants."

All the good wishes of Washington, Hamilton, Laurens, and others, were, however, ineffectual, and the greater part of the winter passed before Congress adopted Steuben's plan and views. On the 18th of February, 1779, it took into consideration the reports of the committee, consisting of Mr. M. Smith, Mr. Ellery, Mr. Ellsworth, Mr. Paca, and Mr. T. Adams, appointed to confer with the commander-in-chief; and, thereupon, agreed to the following plan for the department of inspector general:†

"*Resolved*, That there be an inspector general to the armies of the United States, with the rank of major general, who, in all future appointments, shall be taken from the line of major generals:

"That the duty of the inspector general shall principally consist in forming a system of regulations for the exercise of the troops in the manual evolutions and maneuvers, for the service of guards and detachments, and for camp and garrison duty:

"That the inspector general, and his assistants, shall review the troops at such times and places, and receive such returns for that purpose, as the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer in a detachment, shall direct; at which reviews, he or they shall inspect the number and condition of the men, their discipline and exercise, the state of their arms, accouterments

* Alexander Hamilton's Works, i., 72. † Journals of Congress, v., 56-58.

and clothes; observing what of these articles have been lost or spoiled since the last review, and, as nearly as possible, by what means; reporting the same, with the deficiencies and neglects, to the commander-in-chief, or the commanding officer of a detachment, and to the board of war:

“That all new maneuvers shall be introduced by the inspector general, and all old ones performed according to the established principles, under his superintendency; but he shall not introduce or practice any regulations relative to the objects of his department, save such as are made and established in manner following: all regulations whatsoever to be finally approved and established by Congress. But the exigence of the service requiring it, temporary ones may, from time to time, be introduced by the inspector general, with the approbation of the commander-in-chief. These regulations to be communicated to the army through the adjutant general, and to be transmitted to the board of war with all convenient dispatch, that, being examined and reported by them to Congress, they may be rejected, altered, amended, or confirmed, as Congress shall deem proper:

“That there be as many sub-inspectors as the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer in a detachment, shall, on consideration of the strength and situation of the army, from time to time deem necessary, to be taken from the line of lieutenant colonels, and to receive their instructions relative to the department from the inspector general:

“That there be one brigade inspector to each brigade, who shall be one of the majors in the brigade, and that the office of brigade inspector shall in future be annexed to that of major of brigade. He shall accordingly keep a roster of the battalions of his brigade, regulate the details, and take care of the formation and march of all guards, detachments, etc., from the brigade. He is to receive the general orders and communicate them to the commanding officers of the brigade and regiments, and through the adjutants to all the

officers of the brigade. He is, so far as concerns his brigade, to inspect the police of the camp, the discipline and order of the service. In time of action he is to assist in executing the necessary maneuvers of the brigade, according to the orders of the brigadier or officer commanding. He is to do no duty in the line :

“That all the officers of the inspectorship, having appointments in the line, shall retain their rights of command, succession, and promotion, in the same manner as if they had not assumed the office. But as the duties of this department are sufficient to employ their whole time, they are to suspend the exercise of their respective commands, except on particular occasions, when the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer in a detachment may deem it necessary to invest them with command. They are to be exempted from all common camp and garrison duty, that they may attend the more carefully to those of the inspector, and in time of action they are to be employed in assisting in the execution of the field maneuvers :

“That the inspector general, so far as relates to the inspection of the army, be subject to the orders of Congress, the board of war, and the commander-in-chief only ; but the sub-inspectors shall also be subject to the officers commanding the divisions and brigades to which they are attached on the principles herein established :

“That there be allowed to the inspector general, in consideration of the extraordinary expenses which attend the execution of his office, eighty-four dollars per month, in addition to the pay and rations of a major general, heretofore provided.”*

At the session of the 29th of March, 1779, “a letter of the 25th, from Baron Steuben, was read, accompanied with a system of regulations for the infantry of the United States ; also a letter from the board of war, representing that Baron Steuben, inspector general, has formed a system of exer-

* Journals of Congress, session of the 18th of February, 1779.

cise and discipline for the infantry of the United States; that the same has been submitted to the inspection of the commander-in-chief, and his remarks thereon and amendments incorporated in the work; that it has been examined with attention by the board, and is highly approved, as being calculated to produce important advantages to the States, and therefore praying 'that it may receive the sanction of Congress and be committed to the press;' whereupon,

"Congress passed the following order, to be prefixed to the said regulations for the order and discipline of the troops of the United States:—

"Congress judging it of the greatest importance to prescribe some invariable rules for the order and discipline of the troops, especially for the purpose of introducing a uniformity in their formation and maneuvers, and in the service of the camp:

"*Ordered*, That the following regulations be observed by all the troops of the United States, and that all general and other officers cause the same to be executed with all possible exactness.

"*Ordered*, That the board of war cause as many copies thereof to be printed, as they shall deem requisite for the use of the troops."

Before we pass from the consideration of the events of the year 1778, it may not be amiss to give Steuben's opinion concerning the result of the last campaign, as detailed by him in an interesting letter, which he wrote at the end of that year, to James Lowell, chairman of the Committee of foreign affairs.*

"If I have not answered the two letters which I had the honor to receive from you, it was in order not to trouble you with a correspondence less interesting than the affairs with which you are charged. All that I can say, dear sir, in regard to the inspection, is that I shall respectfully wait for the de-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

cision of Congress in this matter. When I made application for various arrangements which I thought necessary for the good of the army, I have fulfilled a self-imposed duty. Should the said arrangements not be carried out, then I have eased my mind, and shall be justified in the eyes of every military man. Let us, however, leave this matter, and look for a moment on the actual situation of our war operations.

“We have very fortunately escaped a serious danger at Rhode Island. The enemy can not boast of having gained the least advantage over the allied fleet, nor over our army. A change in the wind has favored him and caused the failure of our plan. As it is but fair to render justice even to our enemies, we ought to admit that the English and the wind have made us miss two highly important strokes—that on the Delaware because the French fleet did not arrive a little earlier, and that on Rhode Island. If, when I made war under the King of Prussia, we had escaped two such strokes in one campaign, we should have called that a successful campaign. Here we are now on the defensive, a species of warfare extremely difficult and oftentimes dangerous. We have two objects to attain equally important—to retain possession of the North river, and to bring our main force close to Boston.

“In case the enemy should undertake any operation, these two objects are very far distant from one another. Our land force, such as it is, must be ready to resist, at the right or the left, wherever the enemy thinks proper to attack us. Now what will become of that unhappy province, the Jerseys, which is actually menaced with devastation and fire by the enemy? Lord Cornwallis has entered it with a body of probably six thousand men. Will Lord Stirling be able to oppose such a force with his three brigades, the number of which I will not mention, so as not to annoy you? Perhaps you will say, ‘The militia of New Jersey.’ But is the militia still animated by the same spirit as it was when America had no regular army? Now, allowing for the said three brigades,

and two more at Providence, look at this side of the river and tell me what other forces have we there? Do not be deluded, sir, by the rolls of our regiments or brigades; deduct therefrom, unhesitatingly, one third for those who, either for the want of clothing or shoes, are unable to make a single march in the present season of the year, when the nights are already cold and wet. I am not afraid to tell you the truth, disagreeable as it is; no, on the contrary, I consider it my duty to show you the actual situation of our army. I beg you rather, sir, to examine attentively the land forces which the enemy possesses on this continent; look at their number, their nourishment, clothing, arms, order and discipline; see how much we are inferior, in all these respects, to them, and then answer me if our game is not a very hazardous one?

“How long will our country continue to stake her fortune upon the issue of one day? How many more millions has the devastation of the Jerseys devoured than it would have taken for the States to have completed the regiments upon the plan adopted by Congress, in which case we should have had an army of forty thousand men? Had we had this force, nay, had we had only thirty thousand, would the enemy ever have dared to put a foot out of New York island?

“Too numerous an army is expensive, but too small an army is dangerous. In 1776 General Washington had the glory to maintain himself at the head of an army of eighteen thousand man. I sincerely hope that he may not have that glory a second time. If too much backwardness had not been exhibited in this matter, the war would probably have been already at an end. In order to secure peace on a solid and honorable basis, it is prudent to redouble every preparation for carrying on the war.

“This is the system which I think is adapted to our present situation, besides which, if our regiments are not completed and put upon an equal and uniform footing, numerically speaking, it is out of the question to introduce order or uni-

formity in the administration or discipline of the army. . . . * a regiment of cavalry which we have lost by surprise. In consequence of the bad discipline, the service of the picket guards of patrols is entirely neglected in our army. Our cavalry is without a leader—not a single officer of that arm understands the duty. They are brave, I have no doubt, but bravery alone does not constitute an officer.

“Is that not a long jeremiade upon the condition of our army? If, however, I had described the things as they really are, the truth would surpass all probability. Be persuaded, sir, that it is only to you that I venture to make these confidential communications. I know very well that under the present circumstances it is necessary to look cheerfully when one feels most sadly. I most sincerely wish the welfare of this country, and that alone is the motive of my solicitude.”

* Illegible in the original.

CHAPTER X.

STEUBEN'S STAY AT PHILADELPHIA.—HE COMPOSES THE "REGULATIONS FOR THE ORDER AND DISCIPLINE OF THE TROOPS OF THE UNITED STATES."—BASIS OF HIS SYSTEM.—HIS ASSISTANTS.—THE CONTENTS OF THE BOOK.—REVIEW OF ITS TWENTY-FIVE CHAPTERS.—APPENDIX, CONTAINING THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR OFFICERS, SERGEANTS, AND SOLDIERS.—THE WAY IN WHICH THE BOOK WAS FINISHED.—WASHINGTON'S ACKNOWLEDGING LETTER.—STEUBEN'S ANSWER.—CONGRESS ADOPTS HIS WORK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ARMY.—RESOLUTION OF THE 29TH OF MARCH, 1779.—DELAY IN PRINTING THE BOOK.—STEUBEN'S IMPATIENCE.—LETTERS OF PICKERING AND PETERS.—WANT OF WORKINGMEN AND MATERIALS IN PHILADELPHIA.—RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS OF THE 5TH OF APRIL, 1779.—LETTER OF WILLIAM LIVINGSTON.—LETTER OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR.—STEUBEN PREPARES TO JOIN THE ARMY.—REWARDS TO HIS ASSISTANTS.—COMIC PROPOSITION OF MR. ROOT OF CONNECTICUT.—HE GOES TO HEAD-QUARTERS AT MIDDLEBROOK.

WE have seen in the preceding chapter, that one of the principal objects of Steuben's stay at Philadelphia during the winter of 1778-1779, was to compose a book of regulations for the American army. He selected for that purpose Colonel Fleury and Captain Walker as his assistants, Captain De l'Enfant to draw the plans, and Mr. Duponceau as his secretary. He began his work with the infantry regulations. The rules which he laid down for himself were—not to be influenced by any predilection for any European work on the subject, and to extract the good and leave the bad and the useless of them all; to be as short and explicit as possible, and only to treat the most essential matters; to divide his book into four parts—1st, the service of the infantry in the field; 2d, service in garrison and on parade; 3d, service of the cavalry, and 4th, the service of light troops. He only intended to finish the first part during the winter; in fact the others have never been finished since for want of time and means, although that part relating to the cavalry was in manuscript ready to be printed.

These "*Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*," contain twenty-five chapters, the first of which speaks of the arms and accouterments of the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers (they should be uniform throughout); the second details the objects with which the officers and non-commissioned officers should be acquainted.

The officers and non-commissioned officers of each regiment are to be perfectly acquainted with the manual exercise, marchings and firings, that they may be able to instruct their soldiers when necessary; they must also be acquainted with the dress, discipline, and police of the troops, and with every thing that relates to the service. The commanding officer of each regiment is to be answerable for the general instruction of the regiment, and is to exercise, or cause to be exercised, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, whenever he thinks proper.

The third chapter treats of the formation of a company.

To be formed in two ranks, at one pace distance, with the tallest men in the rear, and both ranks sized with the shortest men of each in the center.

The fourth chapter relates to the formation of a regiment.

A regiment is to consist of eight companies, which are to be posted in the following order from right to left. First, captains, colonels; fourth, captains, majors; third, captains, lieutenant colonels; fifth, captains; second, captains. For the greater facility in maneuvering, each regiment consisting of more than one hundred and sixty files, is to be formed in two battalions, with an interval of twenty paces between them, and one color posted in the center of each battalion. When a regiment is reduced to one hundred and sixty files, it is to be filed in one battalion, with both colors in the center. Every battalion, whether it compose the whole or only half of a regiment, is to be divided into four divisions and eight platoons, no platoon to consist of less than ten files, so that a regiment consisting of less than eighty files can not form a battalion, but must be incorporated with some other, or employed on detachment. When the light company is with the regiment it must be formed twenty paces on the right, on the parade, but must not interfere with the exercise of the battalion, but exercise by itself; and when the light infantry are embodied, every four companies will form a battalion, and exercise in the same manner as the battalion in the line.

The fifth chapter teaches the instruction of recruits.

The commanding officer of each company is charged with the instruction of his recruits, and as that is a service that requires not only experience, but a patience and temper not met with in every officer, he is to make choice of an officer, sergeant, and one or two corporals of his company, who, being approved of by the colonel, are to attend particularly to that business; but in case of the arrival of a great number of recruits, every officer, without distinction, is to be employed on that service. . . . The recruits must be taken singly, and first taught to put on their accouterments, and carry themselves properly.

It then prescribes the position of the soldier, 1st, without arms; 2d, under arms, and lastly, the manual exercise.

When the recruits have practiced the foregoing exercises till they are sufficiently expert, they must be sent to exercise with their company.

The sixth chapter gives the exercise of a company. It is divided into five articles. The first treats of opening the ranks; the second, of the firings; the third, of the march; the fourth, of wheeling; and the fifth, of breaking off and forming by the oblique step.

Two or more companies may be joined to perform the company exercise when they have been sufficiently exercised by single companies, but not till then; the inattention of the soldiers, and difficulty of instructing them, increasing in proportion with the numbers.

The seventh chapter treats of the exercise of a battalion; the eighth, of the points of view; the ninth enters into the details of the formation and displaying of columns, with the method of changing front, and consists of ten articles, the last of which "of changing the front of a line," concludes as follows:

If it be necessary to change the front of a line consisting of more than a brigade, the simplest and surest method is to form close columns, either by brigades or battalions, march them to the direction required, and display.

The tenth chapter speaks, in five articles, of the march of columns. We insert here the first two:

The march of columns is an operation so often repeated, and of so much consequence, that it must be considered as an essential article in the instruction of both officers and men.

ARTICLE I. *The March of an Open Column.*—*Column! March!* The whole column must always begin to march, and halt, at the same time, and only by order of the commanding officer. After the first twenty paces, he should command—*Support—Arms!* when the men may march more at their ease, but keeping their files close. Before the column halts, he should command—*Carry arms! Column! Halt! Dress to the right!* When marching in open column, the officer commanding will open from battalion, by wheeling to the right or left, in order to see if the officers have preserved the proper distances between the platoons.

ARTICLE II. *Columns changing the Direction of their March.*—When a column is obliged to change the direction of its march, the front platoon must not wheel around on its flank, but advance in a direction more or less circular, according to the depth of the column, that the other platoons may follow. An open column changes the direction of its march by wheeling the front platoon, the others following; in doing which the officers commanding the platoons must be particularly careful that their platoons wheel on the same ground with the front platoon, for which purpose a sergeant should be left to mark the pivot on which they are to wheel.

Article three of this chapter treats of the passage of a defile by a column; article four, of a column crossing a plain, liable to be attacked by cavalry; and article five, of a column marching by its flank.

The eleventh chapter—*Of the March in Line*—is divided into nine articles, the first three of which are the most important.

ARTICLE I.—*The March to the Front.*—*Battalion! Forward!* At this caution, the ensign, with the colors, advances six paces; the sergeant who covered him taking his place. The whole are to dress by the colors. The commandant of the battalion will be posted two paces in front of the colors, and will give the ensign an object to serve as a direction for him to march straight forward—*March!* The ensign who carries the colors will be careful to march straight to the object given him by the colonel; to do which he must fix on some intermediate object. If many battalions are in the line, the ensign must dress by the ensign in the center; if only two, they will dress by each other. They

must be very careful not to advance beyond the battalion they are to dress by, it being much easier to advance than to fall back. Should a battalion by any cause be hindered from advancing in line with the rest, the ensign of that battalion must drop his colors as a signal to the other battalions (who might otherwise stop to dress by them) not to conform to their movements; the colors to be raised again when the battalion has advanced to its post in the line. The commanding officer of each battalion must be careful that his men dress and keep their files close, and to preserve the proper distances between his own battalion and those on his flanks; and when he finds that he is too near the one or the other, must command—

Obliquely—to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Right!} \\ \textit{Left!} \end{array} \right.$

when the battalion will march by the oblique step, as ordered, till they have recovered their distance, and receive the command—*Forward!* upon which the battalion will march forward, and the ensign take a new object to march to. If the distance is augmented or diminished only two or three paces, the commanding officer will order the colors to incline a little, and thus march forward, the latter line conforming to their movement. The officers commanding platoons will continually have an eye over them, immediately remedying any defect, carefully dressing with the center, and keeping step with the colors. The officers in the rear must take care of the second rank, remedying any defect, in a low voice, and with as little noise as possible. The soldier must not advance out of the rank the shoulder opposite the side he dresses to; he must not crowd his right or left hand man, but give way to the pressure of the center, and resist that of the wings. He must have his eye continually fixed on the colors, turning his head more or less, in proportion to his distance from them.

Battalion! Halt! The whole stop short on the feet thus advanced.

Dress to the right! The men dress to the right, and the colors fall back into the ranks.

ARTICLE II.—*Of the Charge with Bayonets.*—The line marching, the commanding officer, on approaching the enemy, commands, *March! March!*—on which the whole advance by the quick step. *Charge—bayonets!* The line charge their bayonets, and quicken their step; the drums beat the long roll, and the officers and men must take care to dress to the center, and not crowd or open their files. *Battalion!—Slow step!*—The battalion fall into the slow step, and carry their arms. *Halt!*—*Dress to the right!* The battalion halts, and dresses to the right.

ARTICLE III.—*Method of passing any Obstacle in Front of a Line.*—When an obstacle presents itself before any division, platoon, or number

of files, the officer commanding the platoons, etc., commands, *Break off!*—on which the files obstructed face outwards from their center, and follow by files the platoons on their right and left; if the platoons on the wings are obstructed, they will face inwards, and follow in the same manner. In proportion as the ground permits, the files will march up to their places in front, dress, and take step with colors.

ARTICLE IV.—*Passage of a Defile in Front by Platoons.*

ARTICLE V.—*Passage of a Defile in Front by Files.*

ARTICLE VI.—*Of the March in Retreat.*

ARTICLE VII.—*Passage of a Defile in Retreat by Platoons.*

ARTICLE VIII.—*Passage of a Defile in Retreat by Files.*

ARTICLE IX.—*Method of passing the Front Line to the Rear.*

The twelfth chapter—*Of the Disposition of the Field-pieces attached to the Brigades*—we give in full :

The field-pieces attached to the different brigades must always remain with them, encamping on their right, unless the quarter-master general thinks proper to place them on any advantageous piece of ground in front. When the army marches by the right, the field-pieces must march at the head of their respective brigades; when it marches by the left, they follow in the rear, unless circumstances determine the general to order otherwise; but, whether they march in front, center, or rear of their brigades, they must always march between the battalions, and never between the platoons. In maneuvering, they must also follow their brigades, performing the maneuvers and evolutions with them, observing that when the close column is formed they must always proceed to the flank of the column opposed to that side their brigade is to display to; and, on the column's displaying, they follow the first division of their brigade, and, when that halts and forms, the field-pieces immediately take their post on its right.

The thirteenth chapter—*Of the Firings*—begins as follows :

When the troops are to exercise with powder, the officers must carefully inspect the arms and cartridge-boxes, and take away all the cartridges with ball. The first part of the general will be the signal for all firing to cease, on the beating of which the officers and non-commissioned officers must see that their platoons cease firing, load and shoulder as quick as possible. The commanding officer will continue the signal till he sees that the men have loaded and shouldered.

And then treats, in four articles—

1. *Of Firing by Battalion.*
2. *Of Firing by Divisions and Platoons.*
3. *Of Firing Advancing ; and*
4. *Of Firing Retreating.*

The chapters fourteen to eighteen prescribe the rules for the march of an army or corps, for the baggage on the march, the manner of laying out a camp, with the order of encampment ; the manner of entering a camp, and the necessary regulations for preserving order and cleanliness in the camp. We insert here the fourteenth chapter—*Of the March of an Army or Corps*—in full, in order to show the minuteness with which the smallest details of the service are alluded to :

The greatest attention on the part of the officers is necessary at all times, but more particularly on a march. The soldiers being then permitted to march at their ease, with the ranks and files open, without the greatest care, these get confounded one with another ; and, if suddenly attacked, instead of being able to form immediately in order of battle, the whole line is thrown into the utmost confusion. The order for the march of an army being given, the adjutant general will appoint the field officers for the advanced and rear guards, and issue orders to the brigade majors to have ready their respective quotas of other officers and men for the advanced guard, which will consist of the number necessary for the guards of the new camp. These, together with a pioneer of each company, and a sergeant from the regiment to conduct them, must be warned the evening before. At the beating of the general, the troops are immediately to strike their tents and load the wagons, which must then fall into the line of march for the baggage. At this signal, also, all general and staff officers' guards, and those of the commissaries, must return to their respective regiments. At the beating of the assembly, the troops will assemble, and be formed in battalion on their respective parades. The guards ordered must then be conducted by the brigade majors or adjutants of the day, to the rendezvous appointed for the advanced guard, where the field officers warned for that duty will form them in battalions or other corps, according to their strength, and divide them regularly into divisions and platoons. The officer commanding the advanced guard must take care to have a guide with him, and to get every necessary information of the road. The camp guards must, at the same time, retire to the rendezvous appointed for the rear guard, where they must be formed in the same manner. At the same time, also, the quarter-masters and pioneers of each battalion must as-

semble on the ground appointed by the advanced guard, where one of the deputies of the quarter-master general must form them in platoons, in the same order as their respective battalions march in the column. Each detachment will be conducted by its quarter-master, who must be answerable that it marches in the order prescribed; and the quarter-masters of brigades will conduct those of their respective brigades, and be answerable for their behavior.

The signal for marching being given, the whole will wheel by platoons or sections, as shall be ordered, and begin the march.

The advanced guard will march at a distance from the main body proportioned to its strength, having a patrol advanced; and must never enter any defile, wood, etc., without having first examined it, to avoid falling into an ambuscade.

The pioneers are to march behind the advanced guard, and must repair the roads, that the column may be obliged to file off as little as possible.

The advanced guard, besides its patrols in front, must have a flank guard, composed of a file from each platoon, and commanded by an officer, or non-commissioned officer, to march at the distance of one hundred paces on the flank, and keep up with the head of the advanced guard.

If it be necessary to have a flank guard on each side, a file must be sent from the other flank of each platoon to compose it; and, as this service is fatiguing, the men should be relieved every hour. The like flank guards are to be detached from each battalion in the column.

For the greater convenience of the soldiers, the ranks must be opened to half distance during the march.

When the column meets with a defile, or any obstacle, the commanding officer must stop till the column has passed it, taking care that they pass in as great order and as quick as possible; and when one has marched through, he must command the front to halt, till the whole have passed and formed, when he will continue the march.

When a column crosses a road that leads to the enemy, the patrols or guards on the flanks of the first battalion must form on the road, and halt till the patrols of the next battalion come up, which must do the same; the others proceed in the same manner till the whole have passed.

When the commanding officer thinks proper to halt on the march, immediately on the column's halting, the advanced flank and rear guards must form a chain of sentinels, to prevent the soldiers from straggling; and all necessaries, as wood, water, etc., must be fetched by detachments, as in camp.

On the beating of the long roll, the whole are to form and continue the march.

On the march no orders are to be communicated by calling out, but must be sent by the adjutants from regiment to regiment. The signals for halting, marching slower and quicker, must be given by beat of drum. (See chapter xxi.)

The commanding officer of the advanced guard being informed by the quarter-master general, or his deputy, of the grounds the troops are to encamp on, will go ahead and reconnoiter it; and immediately on the arrival of the advanced guard, post his guards and sentinels, as directed in chapter xxii.

March by Sections of Four.—The roads being very often too narrow to admit the front of a platoon, and the troops being, therefore, continually obliged to break off, which fatigues the men; to prevent this, when the road is not sufficiently large throughout, the battalions may be divided into sections in the following manner:

Each platoon is to be told off into sections of four files; if there remain three files, they form a section; if two files or less, they form one rank. At the word *By sections of four! To the right—wheel! March!* they wheel by fours and march, the second rank of each section taking two paces distance from the front rank. The officers commanding platoons take post on the left of their first section; but on the right, if the sections wheel to the left. The file-closers fall in on the flanks.

The officers must take great care that the distance of two paces, and no more, is kept between the ranks. At the word *Halt!* the front rank of each section stops short, and the second rank closes up, which gives the proper distance between the sections; and by wheeling to the right or left, the line is formed: or, if the commanding officer chooses, he may form platoons by the oblique step.

If a column be already on the march by platoons, and the road becomes too narrow and inconvenient to continue in that order, it may be formed into sections of four, in the following manner:

Caution by the commanding officers: *Take care to break off by sections of four!* Upon which the officers commanding platoons tell them off as before, but without halting.

At the word *Sections of four! Break off!* the sections on the right of each platoon incline by the oblique step to the left; and those on the left of each platoon following the former, incline to the right, till they all cover; when they march forward, opening the ranks as before directed. If the number of sections in a platoon be uneven, that in the center is to march straight forward; the section on the right inclining on the left and covering it in front; and those on the left inclining to the right, and covering it in the rear.

Chapter nineteen speaks of *Roll Calls*.

Chapter twenty treats *Of the Inspection of the Men, their Dress, Necessaries, Arms, Accouterments and Ammunition*.

The oftener the soldiers are under the inspection of their officers the better; for which reason, every morning, at troop-beating, they must inspect the dress of their men; see that their clothes are whole and put on properly; their hands and faces washed clean; their hair combed; their accouterments properly fixed, and every article about them in the greatest order. Those who are guilty of repeated neglects in these particulars, are to be confined and punished. The field officers must pay attention to this object, taking proper notice of those companies where a visible neglect appears, and publicly applauding those who are remarkable for their good appearance.

Every day the commanding officers of companies must examine their men's arms and ammunition, and see that they are clean and in good order. (See further, chapter xxiii.)

That the men may always appear clean on the parade, and as a means of preserving their health, the non-commissioned officers are to see that they wash their hands and faces every day, and oftener when necessary. And when any river is nigh, and the season favorable, the men shall bathe themselves as frequently as possible, the commanding officers of each battalion sending them by small detachments successively, under the care of a non-commissioned officer; but on no account must the men be permitted to bathe when just come off a march, at least till they have reposed long enough to get cool.

Every Saturday morning the captains are to make a general inspection of their companies, and examine into the state of the men's necessities, observing that they agree in quantity with what is specified in the company book; and that every article is the man's who shows it. For which purpose, and to discover theft, every man's things should be marked; if any thing is deficient, strict inquiry must be made into the cause of it; and should it appear to be lost, pledged, sold or exchanged, the offender must be severely punished.

That the men may not be improperly burdened and fatigued, the captains are not to suffer them to carry any thing which is either useless or unnecessary.

Chapter twenty-one prescribes *The Different Beats of the Drum*.

Chapter twenty-two enters into the details of *The Service of the Guards*, and contains six articles: 1. Of the dif-

ferent guards, with their use ; 2. Of the grand parade ; 3. Of relieving guards and sentinels ; 4. Instruction to officers on guard ; 5. Method of going and receiving the grand rounds ; 6. Honors due from guards to general officers and others.

Chapter twenty-three treats *Of the Arms and Ammunition, with the Methods of Preserving them*, which was especially, in the revolutionary army, of the highest importance. We quote it in full :

The preservation of the arms and ammunition is an object that requires the greatest attention. Commanding officers of regiments must be answerable for those of their regiments, and captains for their respective companies.

An officer of a company must, every morning, at roll-call, inspect minutely the state of the men's arms, accouterments and ammunition ; and if it shall appear that a soldier has sold, or, through carelessness, lost or damaged any part of them, he must be confined and punished, and stoppages made of his payment as hereafter mentioned : For which purpose such officers shall certify to the commanding officer of the regiment the names of the delinquents, and the losses or damages which shall appear of their arms, ammunition and accouterments ; and the commanding officer, after due examination, shall order stoppages to be made for whatever shall appear to have been sold, lost or damaged, as aforesaid. The stoppages to be as follows :

For a firelock, sixteen dollars ; a bayonet, two dollars ; a ram-rod, one dollar ; a cartridge-box, one dollar ; a bayonet-belt, one dollar ; a scabbard, two thirds of a dollar ; a cartridge, one sixth of a dollar ; a flint, one twentieth of a dollar ; a gun-worm, one fourth of a dollar ; a screw-driver, one twelfth of a dollar ; and for arms, accouterments and ammunition damaged, such sums as the repairs shall cost the States, to be estimated by the brigade conductor, or, when a corps is detached, by such person as its commanding officer shall appoint for that purpose ; provided that such stoppages do not exceed one half the delinquent's pay monthly.

It is highly essential to the service that the ammunition should be at all times kept complete ; for which purpose, as often as is necessary, a return is to be made by each company of the number of cartridges deficient, to the quartermaster, that he may make out a general one for the regiment, to be signed by the commanding officers of the regiment and brigade, and no time lost in supplying the deficiency. The like care is to be taken that all deficiencies of arms and accouterments are supplied without loss of time.

All arms, accouterments and ammunition unfit for service, are to be carefully preserved and sent by the commanding officer of each company to the regimental quarter-master, who shall deliver the same to the brigade conductor, they respectively giving receipts for what they receive. The arms, accouterments and ammunition of the sick and others, when delivered up, are to be taken care of in the same manner. Before the cartridge-boxes are put in the arm-chests, the cartridges must be taken out, to prevent any loss or accident.

A conductor shall be appointed to each brigade, who shall have under his immediate care and direction a traveling forge and five or six armorers, an ammunition wagon, and a wagon with an arm chest for each battalion, each chest to hold twenty-five arms, to receive the arms and accouterments wanting repair, or of the men sick or absent; and when the arms delivered in by a battalion shall exceed the above number, the surplus shall be sent to the commissary of military stores.

The brigade conductor shall issue no ammunition but by order of the commanding officer of the brigade; but may receive and deliver the arms and accouterments of each battalion, by order of its commanding officer.

The ammunition wagon shall contain twenty thousand cartridges; and in order to keep the same complete, the conductor shall, as deficiencies arise, apply to the field commissary, or one of his deputies, for a supply, or otherwise for the necessary materials of cartridges, and to the major of brigade for men to make them up under the direction of the conductor; and for this purpose the brigade major shall order out a party of the most careful soldiers.

The non-commissioned officers of each company will be provided with gun-worms; and every day, at the noon roll-call of the company, those men who have returned from duty are to bring their arms and have their charges drawn; the first sergeant to receive the powder and ball, and deliver the same to the quarter-master.

The twenty-fourth chapter is devoted to the *Treatment of the Sick*. The twenty-fifth and last chapter speaks *Of Reviews* in two articles, viz., of *Reviews of Parade* and *Reviews of Inspection*. The first one commences as follows:

When a battalion is to be reviewed, it must be drawn up in the following manner:

The ranks at four paces distance from each other; the colors advanced four paces from the center; the colonel twelve paces before the colors; the lieutenant colonel four paces behind the colonel; the major on the right of the battalion in the line of officers; the adjutant behind the center; the officers commanding platoons eight paces before their

intervals; and the other officers on the same line, equally divided in front of their respective platoons; the sergeants who covered officers take their places in the front rank of their platoons; the other non-commissioned officers who were in the rear, remain there, falling back four paces behind the rear rank; and the drummers and fifers are equally divided on the wings of the battalion, dressing with the front rank.

Appended to these regulations are the instructions for the different commissioned and non-commissioned officers and soldiers, viz., the commandant of a regiment, the major, the adjutant, the quarter-master, the captain, the lieutenant, the ensign, the sergeant major, the quarter-master sergeant, the first sergeant of a company, the sergeants and corporals, and the private soldier. To show the spirit in which these instructions were given, we reprint here those for the captain and the private soldier:

A captain can not be too careful of the company the State has committed to his charge. He must pay the greatest attention to the health of his men, their discipline, arms, accouterments, ammunition, clothes and necessaries.

His first object should be to gain the love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his company by name and character. He should often visit those who are sick, speak tenderly to them, see that the public provision, whether of medicine or diet, is duly administered, and procure them, besides, such comforts and conveniences as are in his power. The attachment that arises from this kind of attention to the sick and wounded, is almost inconceivable; it will, moreover, be the means of preserving the lives of many valuable men.

He must divide his company into four squads, placing each under the particular care of a non-commissioned officer, who is to be answerable for the dress and behavior of the men of his squad.

He must be very particular in the daily and weekly inspections of his men, causing all deficiencies to be immediately supplied; and when he discovers any irregularity in the dress or conduct of any soldier, he must not only punish him, but the non-commissioned officer to whose squad he belongs.

He must keep a strict eye over the conduct of the non-commissioned officers; oblige them to do their duty with the greatest exactness; and use every possible means to keep up a proper subordination

between them and the soldiers; for which reason he must never rudely reprimand them in presence of the men, but at all times treat them with proper respect.

He must pay the utmost attention to every thing which contributes to the health of the men, and oblige them to keep themselves and every thing belonging to them in the greatest cleanliness and order. He must never suffer a man who has any infectious disorder to remain in the company, but send him immediately to the hospital, or other place provided for the reception of such patients, to prevent the spreading of the infection. And when any man is sick, or otherwise unfit for duty, or absent, he must see that his arms and accouterments are properly taken care of, agreeably to the regulations prescribed.

He must keep a book, in which must be entered the name and description of every non-commissioned officer and soldier in his company; his trade or occupation; the place of his birth and usual residence; where, when and for what term he enlisted; discharges, furloughs, copies of all returns, and every casualty that happens in the company. He must also keep an account of all arms, accouterments, ammunition, clothing, necessities and camp equipage delivered his company, that on inspecting it he may be able to discover any deficiencies.

When a company arrive at their quarters after a march, he must not dismiss them till the guards are ordered out, and, if cantoned, the billets distributed, which must be as near together as possible; and he must strictly prohibit his men from vexing the inhabitants, and cause to be punished any that offend in that respect.

He must acquaint them with the hours of roll-call and going for provisions, with their alarm post, and the hour of marching in the morning.

If the company make any stay in a place, he must, previous to their marching, inspect their condition, examine their knapsacks, and see that they carry nothing but what is allowed, it being a material object to prevent the soldier loading himself with unnecessary baggage.

* * * * *

The recruit having received his necessities, should in the first place learn to dress himself with a soldier-like air; to place his effects properly in his knapsack, so as to carry them with ease and convenience; how to salute his officers when he meets them; to clean his arms, wash his linen and cook his provisions. He should early accustom himself to dress in the night; and for that purpose always have his effects in his knapsack, and that placed where he can put his hand on it in a moment, that in case of alarm he may repair with the greatest alertness to the parade.

When learning to march, he must take the greatest pains to acquire a firm step and a proper balance, practicing himself at all his

leisure hours. He must accustom himself to the greatest steadiness under arms, to pay attention to the commands of his officers, and exercise himself continually with his firelock, in order to acquire vivacity in his motions. He must acquaint himself with the usual beats and signals of the drum, and instantly obey them.

When in the ranks, he must always learn the names of his right and left hand men and file leader, that he may be able to find his place readily in case of separation. He must cover his file leader and dress well in his rank, which he may be assured of doing when he can just perceive the breast of the third man from him. Having joined his company, he must no longer consider himself as a recruit, but as a soldier; and whenever he is ordered under arms, must appear well dressed, with his arms and accouterments clean and in good order, and his knapsack, blanket, etc., ready to throw on his back in case he should be ordered to take them.

When warned for guard, he must appear as neat as possible, carry all his effects with him, and even when on sentry must have them at his back. He must receive the orders from the sentry he relieves; and when placed before the guard-house, he must inform the corporal of all that approach, and suffer no one to enter until examined; if he is posted at a distance from the guard, he will march there in order, have the orders well explained to him by the corporal, learn which is the nearest post between him and the guard, in case he should be obliged to retire, or have any thing to communicate, and what he is to do in case of alarm; or if in a town, in case of fire and any disturbance. He will never go more than twenty paces from his post; and if in a retired place, or in the night, suffer no one to approach within ten paces of him.

A sentinel must never rest upon his arms, but keep walking on his post. He must never suffer himself to be relieved but by his corporal; challenge briskly in the night, and stop those who have not the countersign; and if any will not answer to the third challenge, or having been stopped should attempt to escape, he may fire on them.

When on a patrol, he must observe the strictest silence, nor make the least noise with his arms or accouterments.

In action he will pay the greatest attention to the commands of his officers, level well, and not throw away his fire; take particular care to keep his rank and file, incline to that side he dresses to, and encourage his comrades to do their duty.

When ordered to march, he must not charge himself with any unnecessary baggage; he will march at his ease, without, however, leaving his rank or file; he should drink as seldom as possible, and never stop but when necessity obliges him; in which case he must ask leave of the commanding officer of the platoon.

When arrived at camp or quarters, he must clean his arms, prepare his bed, and go for necessaries, taking nothing without leave, nor committing any kind of excess.

He must always have a stopper for the muzzle of his gun in case of rain, and when on a march; at which times he will unfix his bayonet.

Seldom was a work composed in such a manner as this. Every chapter was first roughly written in German, then translated into bad French, then put in good French by Fleury, translated again into bad English by Duponceau, afterwards written in good English by Captain Walker; and when all this was completed, Steuben did not understand a word of it himself, from his ignorance of the English language. His confidence in his assistants, however, which was well merited, caused him to proceed successfully amid all these troubles.

“The difficulties he encountered in carrying out that work—relates North—were indeed great. The book-stores were not then filled with military authors and compilers. All he set down was drawn from his own recollections of the Prussian code and service; these to be arranged in order in which they were written, to be translated into English, and by those not conversant with military evolutions, scarcely with military phrase. To sketch, re-sketch the plates, and fit them for the engraver—the engraver, the paper, the types and printer, with difficulty to be found. None but those who lived in those dark days of poverty and dearth of every thing, can think a thousandth part of all the penury with which we were surrounded. The *Blue Book* at last appeared, and was studied, and, except the Bible, was held in the highest estimation.”

When the work was completed, De l'Enfant drew the plans, and the manuscript was sent to the commander-in-chief.

“Enclosed I transmit to you,” writes Washington, on the 26th of February, 1779,* “my remarks on the first part of your manuscript. The remainder shall follow as soon as

* Washington's Writings, vi., 176.

other affairs of equal importance will permit. I very much approve of the conciseness of the work, founded on your general principle of rejecting every thing superfluous, though, perhaps, it would not be amiss, in a work of instruction, to be more minute and particular in some parts."

And on the 11th of March, when he returned the continuation of the book, accompanied by a few notes, Washington wrote to Steuben:*

"It gives me great pleasure to learn that the first part is in such forwardness for the press. With respect to the title, I think 'Regulations for the Infantry of the United States' will be sufficient. In a letter to Congress I have signified my approbation of the work. It remains for them to give it a final sanction, and preface it with such order as they may judge proper. As the fine season is advancing, you will, I flatter myself, shortly have the satisfaction, so rarely enjoyed by authors, of seeing your precepts reduced to practice; and I hope your success will be equal to the merit of your work."

To these letters Steuben replied on the 17th of March, 1779, as follows, viz. †

"Your Excellency's approbation of the regulations I had the honor of presenting, gives me the greatest hopes that they will be easily reduced to practice, and prove agreeable to the army. Encouraged by this hope, I shall immediately present them to Congress for their sanction.

"As I am convinced of the necessity of the regulations taking place as soon as possible, your Excellency may depend I shall do every thing in my power for that purpose. The engraving of the plates, and correcting the press, will, I am afraid, detain me till the middle of April, and, as before that time the season will permit the troops to exercise, I think it would be necessary they should be exercised in detail on the principles laid down. If your Excellency approves it, I will

* Washington's Writings, vi., 193.

† Washington MS. State Papers, vol. xxx., p. 301.

send Colonel Fleury, who has assisted me in composing the regulations, to receive your orders on the subject. He may carry with him a copy of that part of the regulations which is necessary, and each adjutant may take a copy, that the troops may begin to put them in practice. I shall have the honor to forward to your Excellency a model of the several tools mentioned in the regulations, and which I think are necessary, if circumstances will allow to procure them."

Congress approved Steuben's work without delay or alteration, and ordered three thousand copies to be printed, as appears from the resolutions of the 29th of March, 1779.*

"A letter of the 25th, from Baron Steuben, was read, accompanied with a system of regulations for the infantry of the United States; also a letter from the board of war, representing that Baron Steuben, inspector general, has formed a system of exercise and discipline for the infantry of the United States; that the same has been submitted to the inspection of the commander-in-chief, and his remarks thereon, and amendments, incorporated in the work; and is highly approved as being calculated to produce important advantages to the States, and, therefore, praying 'that it may receive the sanction of Congress, and be committed to the press;' whereupon,

"Congress passed the following order, to be prefixed to the said regulation for the order and discipline of the troops of the United States:—

"Congress judging it of the greatest importance to prescribe some invariable rules for the order and discipline of the troops, especially for the purpose of introducing a uniformity in their formation and manœuvres, and in the service of the camp:

"*Ordered*, That the following regulations be observed by all the troops of the United States, and that all general and other officers cause the same to be executed with all possible exactness.

"*Ordered*, That the board of war cause as many copies

* Journals of Congress, v., 122.

thereof to be printed as they shall deem requisite for the use of the troops."

In consequence, however, of unforeseen difficulties, the printing of the book was retarded for some months, and it was only in June that all the materials were collected, and the books distributed. The embarrassments which the board of war met in getting the Regulations completed, were very great, and put Steuben's patience to a hard test. Timothy Pickering and Richard Peters, however, rebuked him mildly. Their letters contain, at the same time, so many interesting materials about the scarcity of labor in Philadelphia, that we can not refrain from quoting some passages.

"We expected," writes Pickering, on the 19th of June, 1779, to Steuben,* "to send you more copies of the Regulations, of which the bookbinder gave us encouragement, but his workmen failed him. It is not so easy to get work executed in America as in Europe. Here, under the present scarcity of hands, you can place no dependence on your workmen—to day they are with you, and to-morrow on board of a privateer, with hopes of making their fortunes. I have, indeed, had much trouble about the Regulations, but I went through it with pleasure, because I judged they would prove highly useful to my country.

"I regret exceedingly that the publication is so tardy, but it has really been difficult to get the work executed with the dispatch we wished for. The plates were at first but indifferently engraved, and being badly worked off by Normann, there were many of them intolerable. Besides, so many errors and imperfections remained uncorrected, that we were obliged to throw away above six hundred prints. . . . The only copper-plate printer we could find after Normann, was one who was working for the Treasury at the same time. He is an excellent hand, and works off the plates as well as the engraving will admit. . . . Though we have employed but one

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

bookbinder, he is the most capital hand in town, and will bind the books as fast as we can get the plans for them. . . . I now persuade myself that you will not think the board of war so inattentive as your late letter supposed.

“Should I again discover marks of extreme impatience, and even asperity, in the inspector general, I will impute them to his anxiety to introduce a perfect order and discipline in the army, and to his zeal in securing the safety and independence of America.”

Peters's letter, of the same date, in the most jovial manner ridicules Steuben's bad humor, and, in a jesting way, administers a very well merited reprimand :

“I have been favored with your letters,” says Peters,* “and I am sorry to perceive that the air and exercise you have had since your leaving Philadelphia, which, in general, are supposed of the greatest efficacy in bilious complaints, have not removed those nausea and exacerbation with which you were affected while in this city.

“I have the strongest hopes, however, that time, with its lenient hand, will administer some drug which will conquer the irritability of your system. When this happy day arrives, I am clear that the little feverish flight which has induced you to censure where no blame was merited, will no longer disturb your rest, or hurt the sensibility of your friends. Colonel Pickering tells me he will explain to you the difficulty we have labored under in procuring the books ; and let me be serious for a moment, while I beg of you not to impute to studied neglect any seeming inattention to you or your officers.

“We should violate our private feelings if we personally disregarded you, and we should, in my opinion, our public trust, did we not, by every means in our power, assist you in the important business of your department. Real embarrassments have occasioned our not complying with our, as well as your wishes, and however trifling the rubs thrown in our way

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

may seem to one used to countries full of needy artificers, and stored with materials for work, yet to us they are not unimportant, or, what is worse, uncommon. These difficulties will continue during the present war, and as we can not conquer, we must endeavor to bear them.

"There is an actual courage which distinguishes the soldier in the field, and there is also a patient fortitude which we, at a distance from immediate personal danger, have often occasion to exercise.

"I am sorry that carpenters, tailors, smiths, wheelwrights, and what has now stirred your wrath—a d——d bookbinder, who is not, by-the-by, so much to blame—should call forth the exercise of a virtue which ought not to be thrown forth but upon great occasions.

"I can not but smile at your mention of leaving Duponceau, a good natured man and stranger, to deal with such surly, knowing, and great men as our tradesmen; and as to stimulating the workman (for workmen we could not get), he is of no more use than if you had left him to observe an eclipse without a telescope. You tell me to make a distinction between the Baron Steuben and the inspector general. I will make another distinction: I will distinguish between the Baron Steuben uninformed and the Baron Steuben acquainted with facts and difficulties. A third difference I will observe, and that is between the Baron Steuben in good humor and the same gentleman (zoonically) angry and fretted. You see how readily I observe your injunctions."

As an evidence of the absolute want of the necessary materials in a city like Philadelphia, it may be mentioned here, that two copies of the Regulations, which Steuben had ordered to be superbly bound for General Washington and the French minister, could not be finished because the bookbinder, after searching the whole city over, had not been able to procure any gold leaf for gilding the books.

Congress, on the 5th of April, 1779, acknowledged Steu

ben's work* by resolving "that Baron Steuben, inspector general, be informed by the president that Congress entertain a high sense of his merit, displayed in a variety of instances, but especially in the system of military order and discipline formed and presented by him to Congress."

The governors of the different States, and presidents of Assemblies also, to whom Steuben had sent copies of his Regulations for their adoption by the several militias, most cheerfully declared that a great want was supplied by his book. We quote only one of these letters, which is of more general interest.

"I acknowledge myself under great obligations to you," writes Governor William Livingston, of New Jersey, from Trenton, on the 22d of May, 1779,† "for your generous offer of introducing your military regulations among our militia. The advantages that will result from carrying your proposal into execution must be evident on the least reflection. Our militia is composed of materials capable of being formed into as good soldiers as any part of the world can produce, and disciplined upon your plan, would certainly constitute the best and most natural defense of a republican State against all hostile invasion. It will, however, be attended with some difficulty to prevail on a people subsisting by agriculture, to devote a proper portion of their time to this purpose. But as the State is about raising and incorporating a corps of militia for its own defense, the discipline proposed may be easily introduced among those troops; and their officers being made masters of it, will by degrees diffuse it through the whole State. Whenever, therefore, this body is raised, I shall take the liberty to apply to you to request the commander-in-chief to send me an officer capable of teaching your rules, and giving the necessary explanations. From a certain passage in your letter, sir, I should be led to conclude that you had ac-

* Journals of Congress, v., 137.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

compained it with a copy of your Regulations, but if you did I have not had the pleasure of receiving it.

"The eminent advantages which our army has derived from your skill and industry in improving their discipline will, I doubt not, be gratefully acknowledged by every true American, and by none with more sensibility and ardor than by me."

The French ambassador, Mr. Gérard, to whom Steuben had sent copies of the Regulations for the Prince De Montbarey and Count Vergennes, on the 16th of July, 1779, answered,* that with the books he would inform those personages of Steuben's success, of which he had already given them most flattering accounts.

During his stay at Philadelphia Steuben, besides writing out his regulations for the army, was often consulted in matters pertaining to his department. Thus Joseph Reed, president of Congress, invited him to assist in the survey of the neighborhood of Philadelphia, in order to establish better defenses of the city.

"The season and weather growing favorable," writes Reed, on the 21st of February, 1779,† "to attend to the defense of the river and city, I shall take it as a particular favor if you would accompany me on this service this week.

"It is proposed to cross, with our horses, at Gloucester Point on Tuesday morning, if the weather will admit, and to proceed thence to Redbank and Billingsport, crossing over thence to Mudisland and the Pennsylvania shore, so as to complete the whole survey before we return to town again.

"As your good judgment and experience may suggest remedies for former defects, and perhaps some new measures for the greater security of this important city, I hope you will not find any inconvenience in devoting two or three days to so valuable a purpose."

Steuben, after having finished his work, prepared to join the main army, which was then in winter quarters at Bound-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

† Ibidem. Sprague.

brook and Middlebrook. Before leaving Philadelphia he proposed an indemnification for the officers who had assisted him in his work, and asked a thousand dollars for Colonel Fleury, eight hundred dollars for Captain Walker, six hundred dollars for Captain De l'Enfant, and four hundred dollars for Mr. Duponceau, all of which were granted. He addressed this application to the board of war, at that time composed of Messrs. Peters and Pickering.

"I can not refrain," says Steuben,* "from relating an anecdote in this place, which has since caused me as much mirth as it at first irritated and annoyed me. Although the board of war was only composed of Peters and Pickering, there was always a member of Congress who took part in their deliberations. At this time it was Mr. Root, of Connecticut, who filled this office. I came one day to the war office, probably at the time when they were deliberating how they should reimburse me for the expense I had been at while employed preparing my work. Mr. Root asked me how many copies of it had been printed? I said three thousand. 'How many,' he replied, 'shall you require for the officers of the army?' 'About eighteen hundred,' was my answer. 'There will therefore be twelve hundred left over,' said Mr. Root; 'the book will sell well.' He then made a calculation in an under tone, and resumed—'But you could sell the remaining copies, and that would pay your expenses while in town.' If I had not remarked that Mr. Peters bent his head and blushed at hearing this proposal, I should certainly have told them my mind in pretty strong language. For a long time I did not utter a word; at last I rose and said to Mr. Root that I was the more astounded at his proposition as I had not asked for any reimbursement of my expenses out of the public money."

On the 26th of March, 1779, Steuben hastened to join the army in New Jersey.

* Steuben MS. Papers. Sprague.

CHAPTER XI.

STEBEN PUTS HIS THEORY IN PRACTICE.—HE REVIEWS THE TROOPS AND FORMS THE BATTALIONS ON A FIXED STANDARD.—HE CREATES LIGHT INFANTRY.—ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE WAR AND ITS ADOPTION IN EUROPE.—DR. THACHER'S DESCRIPTION OF STEBEN'S REVIEWS, AND NORTH'S REMARKS ABOUT THE INSPECTION.—MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY.—STORMING AND CAPTURE OF STONY POINT.—ATTACK WITH THE BAYONET.—THE ARMY BEGINS TO UNDERSTAND THE VALUE OF THE BAYONET.—WAYNE'S MONUMENT.—LITTER OF EX-PRESIDENT PIERCE.—STEBEN'S OPINION ABOUT THE SITUATION OF THE AMERICAN ARMY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF STONY POINT.—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GERAUD AND STEBEN.—THEIR HIGH OPINION OF THE GALLANTRY OF WAYNE AND FLEURY.—STEBEN ACCOMPANIES THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR INTO THE CAMP.—HE ACTS HERE, AS ON LATER OCCASIONS, AS MASTER OF CEREMONIES.—HAMILTON'S LETTER.—STEBEN IN WEST POINT.—HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES DESCRIBED BY DUPONCEAU.—HIS POPULARITY AMONG THE SOLDIERS.—HIS LETTER TO FRANKLIN.—THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS TAKE THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE POPE'S TROOPS AND THE PRUSSIAN, I. E., THE WORST AND THE BEST OF THE TIME.—WINTER QUARTERS AT MORRISTOWN.—STEBEN ENJOYS THE ENTIRE CONFIDENCE OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.—THE ARMY CONVINCED OF THE NECESSITY OF STEBEN'S REFORMS.—HIS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.—WASHINGTON'S LETTER TO CONGRESS IN REGARD TO THEM.—NARROW-MINDEDNESS OF THE NATIVE OFFICERS.—SMALLWOOD AND BARON DE KALB.—STEBEN RECEIVES A SMALL LOAN FROM BOUDINOT.—HE APPLIES REPEATEDLY TO CONGRESS EITHER FOR SUPPORT OR FOR HIS DISCHARGE.—WALKER'S APPREHENSIONS ON ACCOUNT OF STEBEN'S IRRITATION.—CONGRESS RESOLVES TO PAY HIM TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY LOUISDOBS.

STEBEN made no delay in putting his theory into practice. He reviewed all the regiments, and ordered the introduction of the system of maneuvers contained in the Regulations. He was most particular about the formations in battalions, and if the strength of a regiment was not sufficient to form a battalion, he joined to it another regiment equally weak, so that both might form a battalion, and if this was impracticable, he formed it into two divisions. In this way the number of a battalion signified a certain number of men, by which it was easy to form an estimate of their force, and to maneuver troops. Congress, by its resolution of the 9th of March, 1779, had fixed the effective strength of the infantry at eighty battalions, each of

which, according to the resolution of the 27th of March, 1778, had to number four hundred and seventy-seven privates, so that the whole infantry would have consisted of thirty-eight thousand one hundred and sixty men. But as Congress had no power to command, and could only make recommendations to the different States, scarcely one half of this number was ever under arms.

We have not been able to find any correct statement of the strength of the southern army, but without doing injustice to the South, we may reasonably suppose that matters stood much worse there than in the North, because the South was more vehemently divided in itself, and less enthusiastic than the North. On the other hand we find, in the Steuben Papers, the strength of the principal army exactly stated.

General Washington's army, at the beginning of the campaign of 1779, consisted of six divisions, of two brigades each, numbering in all eleven thousand and sixty-seven men—forty-six regiments. These regiments had from one hundred and fifty (seventh Virginia) to four hundred and thirty (sixth Connecticut) rank and file. Steuben selected from each regiment, in proportion to its strength, a number of picked men, to form eight light infantry companies, and then, where they were too weak, united the regiments in one battalion. Thus the whole army consisted of thirty-five battalions (nine thousand seven hundred and fifty-five men), making two hundred and seventy-eight the average strength of each battalion, and the eight companies of light infantry before mentioned. Each of the latter had one field officer, four captains, eight subalterns, twelve sergeants, and one hundred and sixty-four rank and file. The divisions were severally known as the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina.

The creation and organization of the light infantry is one of the greatest services Steuben did to the American army. It is a convincing proof of his talent for organization; how he

turned to account the natural advantages which the Americans possessed from the beginning of the war in consequence of their riflemen and mode of fighting in irregular bodies; and how he drilled and exercised them by military rules, and made them an important arm of the service. By their engagements with the Indians, the colonists were accustomed to isolated and scattering fighting, and even in the revolutionary war, availing themselves of every advantage of the ground, they gained final success over the close masses of the enemy. Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga was caused, in a great degree, by this system of fighting, the masses of skirmishers having decided the fate of the day. To guard against similar disasters in future, the English increased the number of their light troops, and exercised their light infantry in skirmishing and fighting in extended lines. Lord Cornwallis proved afterward in the South how much an able general could achieve with this sort of troops. The great point now was not to be outdone by the enemy. The formation of the light infantry companies of the best and most tried soldiers, was the surest means of guarding against this, and Steuben gained his object most completely. Their first glorious exploit was the storming of Stony Point, which Steuben thought equal to any event of the Seven Years' War. From 1780, when they were newly raised and established on a more permanent basis, these troops were the model corps of the entire army, and proved their usefulness and ability on all subsequent occasions, as, for instance, in Virginia, where Lafayette's soldiers were the light infantry which Steuben had formed and drilled the year before.

We have to enter more particularly into the details of its formation in the history of the campaign of 1780; but it may here be observed, that the light infantry was soon transplanted from American to European soil, and that the skirmishing and sharp-shooting mode of fighting was introduced into European armies in opposition to the close lines and masses still

in vogue during the Seven Years' War. Developed and arranged by master hands, it replaced the old system in the wars of 1792-1815. Frederick the Great, after careful observation of what had taken place in America, laid the foundation of light infantry, in the latter years of his reign, by the creation of three light infantry regiments, and the employment of several Hessian, Brunswick, and Anspach officers, who had taken part in the American war. His successor extended the new formation in 1787 to twenty battalions, under the name of "fusilier battalions," and gave them in 1788-'89 the first written regulations on rifle-practicing and skirmishing, for which the examples of the American war served as a basis.* Finally, Napoleon brought this new system to its present perfection.

When the army took the field, Steuben continued to review and drill the troops. Thacher relates how these reviews were held, and his report may be inserted here to give an adequate idea of the system which Steuben had inaugurated.

"On the 28th of May Baron Steuben reviewed and inspected our brigade. The troops were paraded in a single line, with shoulder arms, every officer in his particular station. The baron first reviewed the line in this position, passing in front with a scrutinizing eye; after which he took into his hands the muskets and accouterments of every soldier, examining them with particular accuracy and precision, applauding or condemning, according to the condition in which he found them. He required that the muskets and bayonets should exhibit the brightest polish; not a spot of rust, or defect in any part, could elude his vigilance. He inquired, also, into the conduct of the officers toward the men, censuring every fault and applauding every meritorious action. Next he required of me, as surgeon, a list of the sick, with a particular statement of their accommodations and mode of treatment, and even visited some of the sick in their cabins. The baron

* Gneisenau. Erste Abtheilung. Redigirt von der Historischen Abtheilung des General-Stabes. Berlin, 1856. E. S. Mittler & Sohn. 8vo, pp. 30, 31.

is held in universal respect, and considered as a valuable acquisition to our country. He is distinguished for his profound knowledge of tactics, his ability to reform and discipline an army, for his affectionate attachment to a good and faithful soldier, and his utter aversion to every appearance of insubordination and neglect of duty. The Continental army has improved with great rapidity under his inspection and review.*

"With what strict scrutiny were the inspections made," relates William North. "I have seen the baron and his assistants seven long hours inspecting a brigade of three small regiments! Every man not present must be accounted for; if in camp, sick or well, they were produced or visited; every musket handled and searched, cartridge boxes opened, even the flints and cartridges counted; knapsacks unslung, and every article of clothing spread on the soldier's blanket, and tested by his little book, whether what he had received from the United States within the year was there, if not, to be accounted for. Hospitals, stores, laboratories, every place and every thing, was open to inspection and inspected, and what officer's mind was at ease if losses or expenditures could not, on the day of searching, be fully and fairly accounted for? The inspections were every month, and wonderful was the effect, not only with regard to economy, but in creating a spirit of emulation between different corps. I have known the subalterns of a regiment appropriate one of their two rations to the bettering the appearance of their men, but this was at a later period of the war, when supplies and payments were more ample and more regular."

The enemy commenced the campaign of 1779 by a movement of frigates and transport ships on the North river. The commander-in-chief was anxious for the safety of West Point, and hastened his march by the Clove, to arrive there in time. But General Clinton having spent three days taking the little

* A Military Journal, p. 160.

redoubt at Verplanck's Point, contented himself with the possession of King's Ferry, fortified Stony Point, left a garrison of eight hundred men there, made some additions to the works at Verplanck's Point, left about four hundred there, and then returned to New York. The American army remained on the hills round West Point, until General Wayne, with twelve hundred light infantry, took Stony Point at the point of the bayonet, and took the entire garrison prisoners. An attempt was made next day against Verplanck's Point, but it was unsuccessful. General Clinton advancing, with almost the whole of his army, ascended the river with several frigates, but before his arrival Stony Point was demolished, all the wood work and fascines burnt, and the American troops returned to their former position. He withdrew the garrison from Verplanck's Point, and retired to New York.

The engagement at Stony Point proved the value of the bayonet as an arm. Previous to this time Steuben preached in vain on the usefulness of this weapon. The soldiers had no faith in it. The day of the attack, General Wayne forbid his division, on pain of death, from loading a single musket. When coming to the charge, one soldier fell out of the ranks to load his musket, and the officer of his company ran him through at once. The attack was made and the fort captured without firing a shot. The next day, Steuben accompanied the general-in-chief to Stony Point. The moment they appeared, Steuben was surrounded by all his young soldiers, and they unanimously assured him that they would take care for the future not to lose their bayonets, nor roast beef-steaks with them, as they used to do. Steuben availed himself of this moment of enthusiasm for the bayonet to obtain an order from the commander-in-chief, that henceforth the bayonet should be continually fixed to the muskets on all occasions. He took away the belts and sheaths from the men, and had them returned to the store, with orders to the commissary not to serve out any more. By this arrangement he not only saved the expense of

belts and scabbards—very considerable in itself—but he also saved about four thousand bayonets per annum, in an army of twelve thousand men. Since then, the drill for fixing and unfixing bayonets has been abolished, and the bayonet is considered as essential a part of the musket as the lock.

It may be stated in this connection that, on the 16th day of July, 1857, at the very place where the old fort once stood, the corner-stone of a monument was laid, in honor of General Wayne. On this occasion patriotic orations and toasts were delivered by dozens, and all the revolutionary generals and officers praised in the highest Fourth of July style, but in all these orations we can not find Steuben's name mentioned. Mr. Ex-President Pierce says, in his letter to the committee, that "there was nothing in the Peninsular war, in which such striking advantages were occasionally gained by fixed bayonets and locks without flints, more complete in its plan, daring, and success, than the storming of Stony Point. . . . It is difficult to determine which is most worthy of admiration—the dashing intrepidity of the commanding general as he entered the works, wounded and bleeding, or the coolness and quick military perception which, Washington says, improved upon the plan which he had recommended."

It would seem that Mr. Pierce did not know that it was Steuben who taught the American soldier to make use of the bayonet, and that Steuben's sub-inspector, Fleury, shared with Wayne the glory of this grand exploit. Wayne really does not lose by giving to others their due. If there be any thing that shows Steuben's noble and modest character in its proper light, it is the fact, that he was the first who unreservedly admired the bravery of Wayne and Fleury—that he was happy at the brilliant achievement, and that, even in the private intercourse with his friends, he did not allude to his indirect participation in the success of the enterprise.

Thus we find in the "Steuben Papers" a very interesting letter, addressed to him by the French ambassador, Mr.

Gérard. As all that relates to that glorious exploit deserves to be preserved, we translate it here, the more readily as it shows, at the same time, Steuben's sentiments with regard to it.

"Nothing is in my opinion more just, my dear baron," writes Gérard, from Philadelphia, on the 27th of July 1779, "than the eulogy which you bestow upon the expedition against Stony Point. Plan, execution, courage, discipline, address and energy, in short, the most rare qualities were found united there, and I am convinced that this action will as much elevate the ideas of Europe about the military qualities of the Americans, as the success . . . * had devoted the talent of our illustrious and amiable general. I have sent an express to Baltimore to look out for a vessel which might immediately carry the news of this triumph to France. Although I am not as fond as you are of all the individuals here, the success of this country touches me as much as that of our own arms. As to General Wayne, I believe that we both entertain the same sentiments. (Steuben's letter of the 21st of July, to which this passage refers, is lost; but Greene writes, on the same day to his wife, that Steuben thought this gallant action would fix the character of the commanding officer in any part of the world.) When you see him, please tell him that nobody regards with more pleasure than I the glory which he is going to acquire. The honor which our brave and noble Fleury won on this occasion touches me equally, and I expect with pleasure the flattering recompense which he is destined to receive. I consider this brilliant success as a new inducement for him to stay in America; he at least can not leave us in the course

* Mr. Gérard's handwriting is so excessively difficult to decipher, that we could not read two words, which are marked with periods. It took us more than three hours to make out the hieroglyphics of this short letter. It is a characteristic trait of the French noblemen of that day, to write in a manner that was exceedingly difficult to read. This forms a striking contrast to the clear, legible and bold handwriting of their American contemporaries.

of this campaign. I am going to write to my court, that it may grant him such rewards as prove the interest which it takes in the success of America.

“Colonel Pickering has sent me a copy of your Regulations and promised me six more. Courage, my dear baron; those talents, which know how to do good without giving umbrage and causing jealousy, are always sure to triumph ultimately over all obstacles. Your success can not increase the attachment of your friends; but they will be happy if they are certain that you are as happy as you deserve to be.”

Mr. Gérard, two months after having written this letter, left the country and was relieved by Mr. De la Luzerne, who arrived at Boston toward the end of August, 1779. Steuben was at that time just reviewing the corps of General Gates in Providence, and was requested by the chevalier to join him on his route to head-quarters. After having finished his inspection, he went to Hartford, where he met the French minister, and whence they proceeded together by Wethersfield, New Haven, Fairfield and Danbury to Fishkill, where General Washington had arrived to receive Mr. De la Luzerne.

“I had not the honor of knowing him before,” says Steuben in one of his memorials; * “and although he received me with the utmost politeness, I saw that he knew nothing of me, and that the French ministry had not informed him how it happened that I had come to this country. This convinced me that they had sent me adrift and that I was to manage for myself as well as I could. I took good care not to allow Mr. De la Luzerne to perceive what I thought, and mentioned only incidentally my acquaintances at Versailles and the way I came to America, and determined to play the part of an American officer who had no other protection or support.”

At head-quarters they did not know the etiquette to be observed to receive the French minister. Steuben was therefore appealed to as the person most likely to know how to

* Steuben MS. Papers. Sprague.

make the necessary arrangements. He had thus an opportunity of using his old experience as court marshal, and was afterward constantly applied to both by the government and the foreign ministers to be, as it were, the master of ceremonies in their mutual relations. "Will you have the goodness," writes Alexander Hamilton, then adjutant general, on the 5th of September, 1779, to Steuben,* "to send on an express to the general, informing him of the daily stages which it is proposed to make and the time of your intended arrival at camp? If the general should meet Mr. De la Luzerne at Fishkill, as a private gentleman, will he think the compliment amiss? This is *entre nous*: I see no impropriety in it; but I shall be obliged to you to favor me with your opinion on this, and on any other point that may occur to you, *avec franchise*. At his Excellency's debarkation at head-quarters, Major Gibbs has a violent inclination to make a little flourish at the head of his men. Will this be an infringement on your plan?"

When he had seen a part of the army and the works at West Point, the Chevalier De la Luzerne left to pay his respects to Congress at Philadelphia.

We found among the Steuben papers an opinion of Steuben, which, written at West Point on the 27th day of July, 1779, by order of General Washington, describes the situation of the American army after the capture of Stony Point, and sheds an interesting light on the condition of affairs. It reads in the translation as follows:

"Our present situation is about the same as it was at the commencement of this campaign. The enemy is still numerically superior. Their troops are better provided than ours. They are better able to carry out their plans, and on account of their ships, they are masters of the coast, and of the mouth of the North river.

"The taking of Stony Point was a great advantage for our side. It has not only encouraged the army but the people.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

It has shown the enemy that our generals know how to make a plan, and that our officers and soldiers know how to carry it out with boldness and precision. It has delayed the field operations of the enemy, but it has not altogether defeated their plans.

“Let us examine what those plans probably are. The great preparation which the enemy have made to protect themselves on both sides of the river at King’s Ferry; the time, labor and expense they have employed in fortifying this point—can they have any other object than the burning and plundering of the coast of Connecticut? Would they have fortified Stony and Verplanck’s Points to terminate their conquests there for this campaign? Neither supposition is at all probable. Their plans must be more comprehensive. Having fortified these two points, and leaving a sufficient garrison in them, they are at liberty to take the rest of their forces wherever they think proper, and in case of a reverse these two points are a support for their troops, and a harbor for their vessels.

“They will then invade the country, with a view to encouraging us to follow them by detachments, or with our full force, while they will be ready at any moment to make an attack on West Point, with three or four thousand men, and the vessels necessary for their transport. If, on the other hand, we do not allow ourselves to be drawn from our present position by their invasions, it is possible that they may send a corps of five or six thousand men, on either side of the river, to seem to threaten our flanks, and to try to maneuver in our rear, so as to attack West Point. This, however, seems to me very difficult, particularly on the side of the fort.

“Whatever means they may employ, I am positive that their operations are directed exclusively to getting possession of this post, and of the river as far as Albany. If this is not their plan they have not got one which is worth the expense of a campaign. On their success depends—the fate of America. The con-

sequence is, therefore, that there is nothing of greater importance to us than to avert this blow. Let them burn whatever they have not burned already, and this campaign will add to their shame but not to their success. Were West Point strongly fortified, supplied with sufficient artillery, ammunition and provisions, and a garrison of two thousand men, we ought not to be induced to take our forces more than a day's march from it. To have the means of relieving it, I go further, and say, that our army should be destroyed or taken, before we allow them to commence an attack on West Point.

"Our position is good, on both sides of the river, for an army inferior in point of numerical strength. The enemy can not easily turn it. It is favorable with regard to our magazines and the river transports. If this ground has any disadvantage, it is that one post can not readily succor another. Each brigade is obliged to defend itself; and for this reason it is absolutely necessary, not only that the generals, but all the officers should reconnoiter the ground and all the roads and accessible paths. The right wing, which extends to Sufferns, is very advantageously placed. Nevertheless, were it possible to place a brigade or two somewhere between Sufferns and Fort Montgomery, the enemy would be compelled to keep more men and ships near Stony Point, and although I do not think it advisable to risk a second enterprise against the same point, I should wish the enemy to apprehend it. The more of their forces that we keep in check from this side, the less they will have to operate elsewhere. Small vidette detachments along this side of the river to Newark, and on the other side of the Croton river as far as Norwalk, with relays of horses, will be able to give us timely notice of all the enemy's movements, and warn the militia to take arms. The harvest is nearly over, and the people are therefore better able to take arms in case of need. But, in my opinion, neither Jersey nor Connecticut ought to rely much on the detachments of these troops. Let us defend the North river and

hold West Point, and the end of our campaign will be glorious.

"P. S.—The above is my opinion upon the present condition of affairs. The arrival of our ally's fleet on the coast would materially change our plan of operations."

The army remained inactive at West Point, and the English equally so at New York. "Our troops," relates Duponceau,* "during this bloodless campaign frequently shifted their quarters, and we of course followed. My labor during that time was any thing but pleasant. The reports of the different corps and departments of the army, which were called returns, containing the number of men, the quantity of provisions, clothing, arms, ammunition, etc., were all sent to Baron Steuben, as inspector general of the army. From those documents we had to make extracts, and to frame out of them general returns to be laid before the commander-in-chief. That was a tedious business. A more agreeable duty was that of attending the baron on horseback when he went to inspect the troops. He was much beloved by the soldiers, though he was a strict disciplinarian, and passionate withal. But there was in him a fund of goodness, which displayed itself on many occasions, and which could even be read in his severe countenance, so that he was extremely popular. He never did an act of injustice but he repaired it, as soon as discovered, by the most public acknowledgment. Of this I have seen several instances. The Marquis De Lafayette and the Baron De Steuben were great favorites with the army, and were called by no other names. A woman went once to the latter to ask his permission to call her child after him. 'How will you call him?' said Steuben. 'Why, to be sure,' replied she, 'I'll call him Baron.'

"His fits of passion never offended the soldier. When some movement or maneuver was not performed to his mind,

* Duponceau's MS. Letters. No. ix., dated Philadelphia, August 31, 1837.

he began to swear in German, then in French, and then in both languages together. When he had exhausted his artillery of foreign oaths he would call to his aids, 'My dear Walker, or my dear Duponceau, come and swear for me in English—these fellows will not do what I bid them.' A good-natured smile then went through the ranks, and at last the manœuver or the movement was perfectly performed."

From West Point, on the 28th of September, 1779, Steuben wrote the following letter to Benjamin Franklin, then in Paris:*

"I take the liberty of transmitting you a few copies of the Regulations published last winter for the service of the infantry. As this work has been under my direction, I must let you know that circumstances have obliged me to deviate from principles adopted in the European armies, such as the formation in two ranks, the weakness of our battalions, etc. Young as we are, we have already our prejudices as the most ancient nations. The prepossession in favor of the British service has obliged me to comply with many things which are against my principles. However, we have now fixed regulations, which will at least produce a uniformity in the service; and our system, though imperfect, is far preferable to having none.

"I leave it to your other correspondents to give you an account of the present state of our army. If they tell you that our order and discipline equal that of the French and Prussian armies, do not believe them; but do not believe them, either, if they compare our troops to those of the pope; and take a just medium between those two extremes. Though we are so young that we scarcely begin to walk, we can take already Stony Point and Paulus Hook with the point of the bayonet, without firing a single shot. This is very premature, yet we still have many weaknesses which bespeak our infancy. We want, above all, the true meaning of the words *liberty*, *independence*, etc., that the child may not make use of them against his father, or the soldier against his officer.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

"I will say nothing of our political affairs—these do not fall within my province. All I can assure you of is that the English will not beat us, if we don't beat ourselves."

In November, 1779, the general-in-chief left a sufficient force at West Point and the environs, and the rest of the army took up winter quarters in the vicinity of Morristown, in New Jersey, where head-quarters were established, and Steuben continued to perform his duties in inspecting and reviewing the troops. Officers and soldiers placed the utmost confidence in him, and strictly obeyed his orders. The brigadiers no longer protested against his command, and the cabals against him were at an end. Two of the major generals who had made the first difficulty no longer belonged to the army (Lee and Mifflin); and the third (Lafayette) was absent. Steuben had succeeded in convincing the army of the absolute necessity of his reforms, and from his indefatigable zeal they now readily perceived that it was the good of the army, and not personal ambition, that prompted him in his endeavors for the firm establishment of the inspectorship. He had made some progress in the English language, so that he could express himself more intelligibly. Prospects became brighter, and an ultimate success certain.*

Steuben was, however, very badly off in a financial point of view. He did not receive any pay more than the rest of the army, and was often obliged to buy forage for his horses and food for his servants. His own funds were exhausted, and very often he was in want of the greatest necessities.

Washington, to remedy this injustice, as early as the 17th of August, 1779, had laid the matter before Congress in the following letter :†

"Inclosed is also," he says, "a memorandum of the money for which I have given warrants to Baron Steuben in the course of the present year. It amounts to a considerable sum

* Steuben MS. Papers. Sprague.

† Washington's Writings, vi., 325.

more than his pay established by Congress (\$2000 per year). This is a subject which embarrasses me. It is reasonable that a man devoting his time and services to the public, and by general consent a very useful one, should at least have his expenses borne. His established pay is certainly altogether inadequate to this. A large nominal sum goes but a little way. But while there is a sum fixed by Congress, I am certainly not at liberty to exceed it; and though I have hitherto complied, from the indelicacy of a refusal to a foreigner, to a man of high rank, to one who is rendering the most indefatigable and beneficial services, yet I shall be under the necessity of discontinuing the practice. Neither could I recommend that a sufficient allowance should be formally determined; for though there may be less reason to expect foreigners than natives to make pecuniary sacrifices to this country, and though some of them may have no private resources, so remote from home, for their support, yet it would be difficult to reconcile our own officers to a measure which would make so great and palpable a difference in the compensation for the respective services.

"It is true, the baron, from the nature of his office, will often have to travel from one part of the army to another, which will occasion extra expense, and will justify an extra allowance. It is upon this principle that my last warrant was granted, as he was just setting out on a journey to Providence. But perhaps the best mode to enable the baron, and others in his situation, to defray their necessary expenses in the service, may be to invest the board of war with a discretionary power to grant such sums, from time to time, as they shall judge reasonable, and proportioned to the circumstances of the persons."

Congress, however, for more than six months, did not act agreeably to these suggestions, and things became the worse for Steuben, as Washington could not continue issuing warrants for him. Another great inconvenience was, that while

the officers belonging to particular States sometimes received small sums from their respective States, those who were not so situated, got nothing. Steuben was not the only person who was treated in this way.

We find an interesting and significant instance of the mode in which foreign officers were treated, and in which Baron De Kalb was even subjected to insult by a subordinate officer.* De Kalb commanded the army of Maryland, in which General Smallwood was brigadier. The State sent a leather chest, containing coffee, brandy, etc., for the use of the officers. Brigadier Smallwood put a guard on the chest, with orders not to give out the smallest thing to General De Kalb, or to his order—the same De Kalb who was soon afterward killed for the benefit of the State of Maryland, as well as the other States. Steuben's situation was similar to that of Mr. De Kalb and all the foreign officers. They belonged to the continent at large, which was the same as belonging to nobody. When Steuben entered his winter quarters at Morristown, he received neither rations for his servants nor forage for his horses. He could not even get a payment on account in paper money. Without funds or credit, his situation was extremely disagreeable, and if Mr. Boudinot, formerly member of Congress, had not had the kindness to lend him a proportionally small sum, he would, in fact, have been reduced to starvation. To put an end to this misery, Steuben asked from Congress either an increase of his pay, adequate to meet his expenses while on duty, or his dismissal. On the 7th of March, 1780, Congress allowed him two hundred and fifty louisders for reimbursement of his expenses in coming to America, but took no measures to comply definitely with his wishes.† These two hundred and fifty louisders (à \$3.83) were paid to him in bills of exchange, which he negotiated at a discount of forty per cent.

* Steuben MS. Papers. Sprague.

† Resolutions, Acts and Orders of Congress, vol. vi., p. 39. C. Dunlap's edition.

"Your intention of quitting us," writes Colonel Benjamin Walker, on the 10th of March, 1780, to Steuben,* "can not but give me much concern, both as an individual and as a member of the commonwealth, convinced as I am of the necessity of your presence to the existence of order and discipline in the army. I can not but dread the moment when such event shall take place, for much am I afraid we should again fall into that state of absolute negligence and disorder from which you have in some measure drawn us. However, I hope Congress will so far see the interest of the country as to make your stay among us consistent with your regard to yourself."

Although by the above act Steuben's absolute wants were provided for, there was no definite provision made for the extra expenses of his peculiar office, nor was there any fixed arrangement by which he could guide himself for the future. He nevertheless remained convinced that the faithful and diligent performance of his duty would suggest to Congress the absolute justice of performing theirs.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

CHAPTER XII.

STEBEN, BY ORDER OF WASHINGTON, GOES TO PHILADELPHIA, TO PROPOSE TO CONGRESS THE ADOPTION OF NEW LAWS FOR THE RE-FORMATION OF THE ARMY.—CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, THE BOARD OF WAR, AND CONGRESS, FROM JANUARY TO APRIL, 1780.—VERY IMPORTANT RESULTS ARRIVED AT.—RE-FORMATION OF THE ARMY.—STEBEN'S PROPOSALS FINALLY ADOPTED.—A COMMITTEE OF THREE APPOINTED TO GO TO HEAD-QUARTERS.—REFORMS INTRODUCED IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1780.—STEBEN ACCOMPANIES THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO CAMP.—MANEUVER IN HONOR OF THE LATTER.—WASHINGTON'S ORDER OF THE DAY.

TOWARD the end of January, 1780, when it became necessary to prepare for the next campaign, Washington ordered Steuben to Philadelphia, to propose to Congress the adoption of certain laws for the formation of the army on a more permanent and efficient basis. This mission involved the vital question of the real existence of the army, which, on account of the insufficient recruiting system, and the expiration of the term of a large portion of the soldiers, was about to lose almost one third of its strength, when not even one man could be spared on the eve of a new campaign.

The transactions which Steuben had on the one hand with Washington, and on the other with the board of war and Congress, form an interesting chapter in the history of the war, and have never before been completely published. Having access to all the important letters which refer to this mission, we think it best to communicate them here, unabridged and in their original form. They give the entire narrative of the proceedings and require neither comment nor additions.*

* We found Steuben's draft and copying-book for 1780 among the Walker Papers, in the possession of Charles A. Mann, Esq., in Utica, who has since presented all that relates to Steuben to the New York Historical Society,

"Having arrived here," reports Steuben to Washington, from Philadelphia, the 26th of January, 1780, "on the night of the 22d instant, I delivered, next day, early in the morning, your Excellency's letter to the president of Congress, and I am informed but to day that the board of war is charged to confer with me on the present state of the army. I do not know as yet what this conference will tend to. There is a talk of a committee being to repair to camp, in order to give a new formation to our army. It is spoken likewise of incorporating forty-one regiments, but I really believe that nothing is yet determined upon this subject.

"The minister of France has communicated to me that he is on the point of asking Congress what means they intend to employ for the operations of the next campaign, that he may give notice to his court, and to the chiefs of squadrons to make their arrangements. He has given me certain assurances that we may reckon on the arrival of a French fleet upon our coast, in case we are able to coöperate on our side. He has told me he has sent his opinion to your Excellency on the subject of the cartel proposed by the enemy.

"Wednesday, the 26th instant.—I have just received an order from the board of war to attend at their office tomorrow at six o'clock, P. M.

"Some gentlemen in Congress, and especially the eastern members, appear extremely well disposed to reinforce the army for the next campaign, and to do all in their power to promote vigorous operations. There are indeed different where it can now be found. We are under more than ordinary obligations to this gentleman for his kind permission to peruse and use these papers. They were chiefly dictated by Steuben, and corrected by North and Fairlie. That they were correctly copied from the original drafts, is proved by the letter of the 23th of March, 1780, which is published by Sparks, in volume ii. of the Revolutionary Correspondence, and by two or three others, which we found and compared, in the Washington State Department. Here we were unable to compare them all, as we were suddenly interrupted in the perusal of the State Papers, further access to them being forbidden to us by the Assistant Secretary of State.

schemes proposed, but I shall not contradict any, provided we have an army.

“Thursday, the 27th instant.—I have delivered to the board of war the returns of the infantry, and, as far as I could, I have acquainted them with the state of our army. I am desired to give without delay my opinions of the preparations that are to be made for the next campaign.”

The memorial itself which Steuben delivered to the board of war, on the 28th of January, 1780, reads as follows, viz. :

“The incomplete state and extreme inequality of our regiments of infantry against all good order and regular formation, induced me last campaign to present to his Excellency, the commander-in-chief, a plan of formation for an order of battle, in which I joined two and three regiments together, in order to form a single battalion according to the regulations. In consequence of this formation, the army, under General Washington, was divided into thirty-five battalions, and eight battalions of light infantry.

“Although such an arrangement was very necessary, yet it was very difficult to bring the commanding officers of regiments to agree to it. The one insisted on the strength of his corps, the other on the older date of his commission, and both claimed the commandment-in-chief of the battalion. Hence several representations, on the part of the officers, were produced, which were accommodated but with the greatest difficulty by the commander-in-chief and myself.

“The formation of eight battalions of light infantry met with no less obstacles, and excited no fewer clamors. Some regiments complained of furnishing too much, others of not furnishing enough. This arrangement was, however, finally adopted; the eight battalions of light infantry were formed, and when under arms the regiments were formed into battalions.

“Although this formation was extremely defective, yet it was the only one which we could adopt. The arrival of the

nine months' recruits from New England brought disorder into it, in the midst of the campaign. But now it is totally subverted by the diminution of about five thousand men, whose enlistment expires before the beginning of next campaign. Some regiments will be so diminished that it will be necessary to join four or five together to form a battalion, others will be almost reduced to nothing; few are strong enough to form a battalion for themselves. Hence there will be very weak battalions with twelve field officers at their head, whilst others, of the same strength, will perhaps have but one. To remedy this evil I know of but two means: that of reducing the officers and incorporating the regiments, and that of completing them. The first will be dangerous and impolitic, and the latter impossible. If we reduce the number of regiments in the midst of the war, we shall show the enemy that we are not able to maintain our army on the present footing.

"The re-formed officers, even in preserving their appointment and rank, will be disgusted at the service, and I fear we shall lose thereby a number of good and brave officers.

"If we preserve their rank to restore them to their commands in case of vacancies, we shall justly offend those who will remain, for, supposing that a regiment loses several officers in action, it would be hard for those who have run all the dangers to be superseded by those who have been all the while enjoying their rank and appointments in the midst of their families and connections. I dare say that the only proposal of an incorporation will disgust most of our officers, and I apprehend produce the most fatal consequences. To complete the regiments is an enterprise impossible to the United States; and supposing even that we might find a sufficient number of recruits, we would then have so disproportionate an army that it would be out of the power of the States to maintain it. The regiments of infantry alone would amount, according to the establishment, to near forty-two thousand, rank

and file; add to this three thousand cavalry, two thousand artillery, and at least—for the proportion of such an army—six thousand men for the train of the army, artificers, etc., and then the army will amount to fifty-three thousand privates, without including the officers, whose number must amount to between five and six thousand, which will make about fifty-eight thousand men. And even supposing the States should not have all the necessary means to form an army, it would be ridiculous to keep up a force so superior to that we have to oppose. Thus it appears to me, that speaking of completing the regiments, is speaking of an absolutely ill calculated scheme. If I am asked what means I would then propose, I will answer, that I think we must form our army on a number proportionable to the abilities of the States and the operations we have to undertake. The first object requires an exact calculation on the part of our legislators, who are best acquainted with the abilities of the different States. In this calculation it is not only necessary to determine the number of men that can be assembled, but likewise the means of arming, paying, clothing and otherwise supporting them.

“The next is to determine whether we intend to act with vigor in an offensive campaign, or if we mean to protract the war by acting defensively and waiting for the issue of events. In both cases our army must be reinforced, more or less, for such as it is it can not anyhow stand another campaign. Besides, we must determine on a regular formation, and adopt some particular system.

“In order to oppose our enemies in the North and in the South, and act offensively against them, our army ought to be considerably augmented, and sufficiently provided with all the necessaries for next campaign. In order to know to what number the army ought to amount to serve that object, the general who commands it and directs its operations ought to determine.

“I will, however, venture to give here my opinions which I

submit to the examination of the commander-in-chief and the approbation of Congress.

"Before I enter upon my calculations, I will observe that among the number of men I include only the fighting men in rank and file, without including even the officers, sergeants, drummers, etc., and still less the men employed as wagoners, artificers or servants, who are returned as soldiers and are not such in reality.

"Supposing, then, that our army is to be put on a footing to resist the efforts of the enemy in Georgia and Carolina, and not only to oppose their progress, but to dispossess them of what they have already conquered :

"That we wish to be able to keep them close at the northward, and be ready at every instant to coöperate with a fleet of our allies, and strike a powerful blow wherever we shall think proper: that we wish to be able to fill our garrisons on the frontiers and reinforce them in case of need :

"Methinks the following numbers will be necessary for this purpose :

Infantry,	23,616
Cavalry,	1000
Artillery and artificers,	2000
Train of artillery,	400
Train of the army,	2,952
Including commissaries, quarter-masters, } forage masters, etc.,	29,968

This force might be divided in the following manner :

THE ARMY UNDER WASHINGTON.

Infantry,	16,000
Cavalry,	600
Artillery and artificers,	1200
Train of artillery,	300
Retainers, etc.,	2000

THE ARMY UNDER GENERAL LINCOLN.

Infantry,	6000
Cavalry,	400
Artillery,	600
Train of artillery,	100
Staff, etc.,	952

IN GARRISONS.

Infantry,	1616
Artillery, etc.,	200

“To bring up our army to these numbers it is neither necessary to complete the regiments according to the establishment nor to re-form or incorporate them.

“Each State should only level their regiments—each to consist of three hundred and twenty-four men. They ought then to divide each regiment into eight companies, and one of light infantry. Each company should consist of thirty-six men, out of whom four should be drawn to be put under the quarter-master general’s orders, who might employ them as wagoners, etc., and thereby save the enormous expense to which we are subjected, by the considerable pay those wagoners receive, which it is known is no less than that of a captain of infantry.

“The regiments of the different States being once put on this footing it would be necessary to level the additional regiments, among which, that of Colonel Livingston almost reduced to nothing and without officers, might be incorporated to level the others. When these are so leveled they should be joined to the State regiments, either by lot or any other arrangement, and completed to the number of three hundred and twenty-four by the States to which they shall be allotted, who ought then to make them enjoy the same emoluments as their other regiments.

“With regard to the rank and advancement of the officers of the additional regiments, it would be proper to preserve the advancement among themselves, and to confirm to the commander-in-chief the authority which Congress has granted him of disposing of the advancement of the officers, and filling up the vacancies of the Continental regiments, in which there are a number of excellent officers.

“The cavalry ought to be completed and remounted in proportion that the whole may not exceed one thousand horses.

“With regard to the artillery, General Knox ought to be consulted whether the number I have proposed will be proportioned to his operations. I have drawn this proportion from the armies in Europe, and the returns of that corps will determine how many men will be necessary to recruit it.

“It is the same with regard to the civil departments of the staff of the army. The chief of each department ought to specify the number of men he has employed, and how many he thinks he shall want for his operations next campaign. These returns ought to be examined by the board of war and the commander-in-chief, and such persons as Congress shall appoint finally to determine upon it.

“The numbers of these corps and departments being determined for the next campaign, the wants of the army may be easily calculated. With regard to provisions and forage, it is necessary to reckon on a third more than the totality of the army, in order not to be in want. Besides those magazines proper for the immediate subsistence of the army, we should reckon on two more well supplied.

“The first for a body of militia of twenty thousand men, who will join us in case of an expedition, and this magazine ought to be furnished for three full months; the other for a fleet which our allies may send us, and which should likewise be furnished with provisions, and for three months. Besides, the eastern States ought to establish, in time, considerable spare magazines, especially of hard bread and salt provisions. The general of the artillery must, without delay, furnish a return of what he thinks he shall want for the next campaign, and the necessary preparations for a siege and bombardment ought to be made with the greatest celerity.

“The general of the engineers shall furnish a return of all he wants, utensils, etc., for the same purpose.

“With regard to the clothing of the army, it is to be wished each State would send their recruits ready clothed, no matter of what color, for next campaign, and that whatever clothing

the States shall collect or receive from France, should be all stored up, not to be delivered till when the campaign is over.

“But the most essential matter is to provide ourselves with at least ten thousand stand of arms against the beginning of May next, without reckoning on those which are expected from France. It is the least number we may want in case the army is formed agreeably to the present plan.

“The more difficult it is to make the above-mentioned regulations, the more the moments are precious, and the more necessary it is to do our utmost efforts to effect them. We are already at the end of January. If the recruits have not joined the regiments by the 1st of April, the expense and trouble of assembling them shall avail nothing.

“If the magazines are not supplied for seven months against the harvest, the army is lost. If we can not have at least ten thousand stand of arms before the recruits join, the men will become useless.

“I make no doubt of a vigorous campaign being carried on in Europe. I doubt still less of our allies assisting us efficaciously on this continent. It would be unhappy if we could do nothing on our side at such favorable instants.

“Our late disappointment at the southward should strike us: two thousand men more under the orders of General Lincoln would have insured us the defeat of the enemy in Georgia, and we would now have no fatal consequences to apprehend on that side.

“I can not forbear of observing here that most of the individuals of this continent are tired with the present war. I wish this consideration may induce us to do our utmost to bring it to a happy termination in one glorious campaign.”

Steuben informed Washington of the delivery of the memorial on the 29th of January, 1780, in the following note :

“I delivered yesterday to the board of war, the annexed memorial. It is only a general calculation, which requires a more exact examination. The Hon. Mr. Livingston, a mem-

ber of Congress, was deputed, on their part, to the board. He communicated the answer of your Excellency on the scheme of incorporating the regiments.

“If any thing should induce me to advise an incorporation, it would be the vacancies of officers, which I know not how to fill. I fear, however, it will produce a great deal of discontent and other ill consequences.

“Mr. Peters proposed to put off all arrangement, and to consider in this moment only the number of men which the respective States are to furnish for the next campaign. The number of infantry which I proposed in my memorial was admitted. I represented, however, that it would be necessary to add forty men more to each regiment, on account of the diminution which may happen from this time to the beginning of next campaign. Mr. Livingston objected to the number of cavalry which I proposed, on account of the impossibility of mounting it. This consideration was, however, suspended, not to defer the simple calculation of the men.

“Sunday, 30.—I have received an order from the board of war to procure, without any delay, the returns, the list of which is here inclosed. I beg, sir, you will interpose your authority, that these returns may be transmitted immediately.

“It appears indispensably necessary to prohibit the distribution of the arms, cartridges, etc., until the quantity now in the regiments and magazines is well known and ascertained.

“I beg, dear general, you will let me know your opinion of the proportion for an army, which you will find in my memorial, as I wish to act solely by your Excellency’s direction. Be pleased, sir, to honor me with your confidence, and be sure that my zeal for the service can only be equaled by the profound respect with which I am, etc.”

Washington acknowledged the receipt of Steuben’s letters and memorial in the following letter, dated Morristown, the 8th of February 1780 :*

* Washington’s Writings, vi., 464.

“I have received your letter, with the papers annexed, and have carefully considered the contents, on which I shall give you my sentiments with freedom and confidence. The principal point on which your memorial to Congress turns, is the force requisite for the next campaign. To determine this on good grounds, we ought first to settle the following questions: Will it be in our power to make an offensive, or must we content ourselves with a defensive campaign ?

“It is not possible to decide this question without a more intimate knowledge of our resources of finance than I at present possess, and without ascertaining whether our allies can afford a squadron for an effectual coöperation on this continent. I think, with vigorous exertions, we may raise a sufficient number of men for offensive operations, if we were able to maintain them ; but from the view I have of our affairs, I do not believe the state of our treasury will admit this without assistance from abroad. Whether this is to be obtained, Congress alone can judge. On the other hand, from the particular situation of the enemy's posts in this quarter, I should not advise you to calculate measures on the principle of expelling them, unless we had certain assurances that an adequate naval force will be ready to coöperate with us through all contingencies. If a foreign aid of money, and a fleet, are to be depended upon, I should then recommend that all our dispositions should have reference to an offensive and decisive campaign ; and in this case I should ask at least one third more men than you estimate, to be immediately raised by a general draft.

“But as I doubt whether these two preliminaries can be placed upon such a footing of certainty as to justify our acting in consequence, I imagine we must of necessity adopt the principle of a defensive campaign, and pursue a system of the most absolute economy. On this principle, however, if I understand your estimate, I do not think it will be more than sufficient. When the deductions for unavoidable casualties are made, this number will give us less than twenty thousand

for our efficient operating force. This is as little as we can well have to contain the enemy within bounds, and prevent their making any further progress. Including the detachment which lately sailed from New York, they have near twenty thousand men fit for actual service in these States; to say nothing of the recruits they will probably send over to complete their battalions, which will be an augmentation of force. For these reasons I approve the estimate you have proposed, as best suited to our present circumstances.

“The number of cavalry you propose is in good proportion, and in a military sense necessary. Cavalry, if there is an active scene to the southward, will be particularly useful there; but the question of expense is a very serious one, and, like the rest, must be referred to those who are acquainted with our *moncy* resources. Another point is, whether the regiments had better be incorporated with each other and completed to such a standard as will give the number of men required. A committee of Congress, as you have been informed, sent me a proposal, which has been referred to their consideration, for reducing the number of battalions, and asked my opinion upon it. Though I was fully sensible of the inconveniences which will infallibly attend a reduction, I did not dissuade from it, principally on two accounts; one, a conviction that the embarrassments in our finances require every expedient for saving expense; the other, the incompetency of the present number of officers to the present number of corps. But though I do not disapprove, I am far from being much attached to this plan. Congress can best balance the advantages and disadvantages, and determine which preponderate.

“I sincerely wish that what you recommend with respect to magazines, could be carried into execution, but I fear it will be impracticable in the present exigency. Every thing, however, that is possible ought to be attempted. There is no danger of the magazines exceeding our wants; and we have been under dreadful embarrassments, through the whole course of

the war, from temporary and precarious supplies. The arms ought, at all events, to be provided. I have issued an order requiring the returns demanded by the board of war to be made out with all dispatch. They will be forwarded as fast as they are collected. There are some points of inferior importance in your memorial which I approve, but do not require a particular enumeration."

In the meantime the negotiations with the board of war went on, as appears from the following letters :

"When Congress," writes Steuben, on the 5th of February, 1780, "shall have determined on the number of recruits each State is to furnish, I believe it will be necessary for the States to appoint one place of rendezvous in each State, where their respective recruits will assemble, and the commander-in-chief should at the same time order a field officer of each State, and a captain, two subalterns and four sergeants of each regiment, to repair to their respective places of rendezvous.

"In proportion as the recruits arrive, they ought to be presented to the field officers who, in presence of a deputy from his State and a skillful surgeon, must examine particularly each man and determine whether he is fit or unfit for service. These officers ought to be strictly charged not to receive any man above fifty or under eighteen years of age.

"The surgeon ought to examine whether they are not crippled or maimed, hunch-backed, lame, blind, or otherwise deformed, whether they have no rupture or fresh wounds, or any foul disorder. All such men ought to be absolutely refused.

"No prisoner of war, whether taken on sea or land, is to be accepted. As soon as one hundred recruits are accepted, the field officer will command one captain, two subalterns, and four sergeants to conduct them to the army, where they will be delivered to the inspector of the division or brigade to which they shall belong, who will distribute them among the several regiments of their State. The field officer shall conduct, himself, the last recruits.

"If you think this arrangement proper, gentlemen, I believe it must be communicated immediately to the commander-in-chief and the generals of the several States."

And on the 6th of February, 1780, Steuben continues:

"Our cavalry not being armed with carabines, nor exercised for the service on foot, as the dragoons in Europe, this inconvenience results, that they are ill-guarded both in camp and quarters. When it is somewhat too far in the front of the infantry, it is exposed to be surprised, so that instead of forming a chain to cover the army in front, the army is obliged to form a chain for the security of the cavalry. Being thereby at too great a distance from the enemy, our cavalry officers can seldom surprise the advanced posts and patrols. When they want to strike a blow of partizan, they must make a march that tires the horses out before they are brought into action.

"If our cavalry had (as the legions have now in Prussia and had lately in France) a certain number of chasseurs or light infantry with them, to guard them in their camps or quarters upon the lines, to secure their marches, support their enterprises and cover their retreat, in case of need, I am persuaded our officers would strike hardy blows and harass the enemy considerably. These chasseurs ought to be commanded by intelligent officers, and be under the immediate order of the commandant of the legion. Detachments taken from the line will not so well answer the purpose as troops already trained to those maneuvers, and known to the commanding officer of the corps.

"These reasons, among several others, induce me to propose that the corps of Major Lee, already partly formed on this footing, should be carried to a better proportion, *i. e.*, that his infantry, which now consists of eighty men, should be carried up to the number of his cavalry, which consists of one hundred and fifty. This infantry might then be divided into three companies, each of which would be attached to a squad-

ron of cavalry. The reputation this officer has already acquired supplies him with the means of enlisting the number of men he may want.

"I find this little augmentation so necessary for the good of the service, that I must recommend it to your consideration, and request you to order Major Lee to recruit his corps to the above-mentioned number."

Congress, however, did not adopt Steuben's proposition for this time; it resolved only on the 9th of February 1780,*

"That, for the ensuing campaign, the States be respectively required to furnish, by draughts or otherwise, on or before the 1st day of April next, their respective deficiency of the number of thirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven men, exclusive of commissioned officers, which Congress deem necessary for the service of the present year.

"That the quotas of the several States be as follows: New Hampshire, 1,215; Massachusetts Bay, 6,070; Rhode Island, 810; Connecticut, 3,238; New York, 1,620; New Jersey, 1,620; Pennsylvania, 4,855; Delaware, 405; Maryland, 3,238; Virginia, 6,070; North Carolina, 3,640; South Carolina, 2,430; exclusive of blacks.

"That all the men, whose times of service do not expire before the last day of September next, be counted towards the quotas of the States to which they respectively belong, whether they compose the battalions in the line of the several States, those of the additional corps, including the guards, the artillery, and horse, or the regimented artificers in the departments of the quarter-master general and commissary general of military stores, who, being credited to the States respectively, should be provided for, deemed and treated in the same manner with the men in the several State lines; and it is recommended to the several States to make like provision for the officers and men of the artillery, horse, additional corps, including the guards and regimented artifi-

* Resolutions, Acts, and Orders of Congress, vol. vi., 1780, p. 26.

cers, as may be made in pursuance of any resolution of Congress, for the officers and men of their respective battalions, with such exceptions respecting the regimented artificers as have been made by Congress in their acts concerning them.

“That the commander-in-chief be forthwith directed to transmit to the several States accurate returns of the troops now in service belonging or credited to their respective quotas, to the intent that immediate measures be taken by the governments of the States to bring the men to be raised into the field with certainty and expedition.”

The following letters comprise all the details extant, with reference to the foregoing subject :

STEUBEN TO WASHINGTON.

“PHILADELPHIA, *February 14, 1780.*

“The day before I had the honor to receive your Excellency’s letter of the 8th instant, I had sent you a copy of the resolution of Congress, which regulated the number of men which each State has to furnish for next campaign. If, as I hope, the officers are not included, and if the number of men to be employed out of the line of battalions does not exceed the proportion, our army will be considerably stronger than it was at the beginning of last campaign.

“It would be very difficult, my dear general, to judge, with any degree of certainty, of our money resources, and, consequently, the question whether we shall act offensively or defensively must remain yet some time undecided. In either case, however, we must have an army, and that army, more or less strong, must be armed and provided for. My representation to Congress has been limited to these two objects. The season being so far advanced, I was frightened to see that before my arrival the States had not yet been called upon for their quotas of men, and it was not without great importunities Congress were brought to pass the resolves which I have sent to your Excellency.

"I can not yet answer that the States will all send their full numbers; but they will at least, I believe, begin to recruit immediately.

"But, supposing we shall have all the men, is it not to be feared we shall want the arms? We can not much rely on a supply from France; the disaster which has retarded the voyage of Mr. Gérard leaves us almost no hopes to receive any thing before June or July next.

"The board of war told me that there are only about five hundred stand of arms in the military stores on which we may rely. I will, however, make the most exact researches upon this subject; wherefore I expect, with the greatest impatience, the returns of the arms of the army and those of General Knox. With regard to the provisions and necessaries, I hear there is a commission appointed to regulate that branch.

"Mr. De la Luzerne has not yet fixed the day of his departure, but it will be, I believe, towards the end of this month, and I shall give you notice beforehand. He wished much to be better acquainted with the means on which Congress may rely with some degree of certainty, before he should speak on that point to your Excellency."

"PHILADELPHIA, *February* 23, 1780.

"The delay which must result from collecting the returns of all the dispersed corps which you mentioned in your letter of the 18th inst., is a difficulty which I apprehended as soon as I saw the resolutions of Congress. Besides that, it will be almost impossible to make out those returns with the necessary exactness. We shall certainly lose two months at a time when we ought not to lose two days.

"I think that if each State had carried their regiments of infantry to a certain fixed number, in adding to each company eight men as supernumeraries, which would make seventy-two men per regiment; out of these supernumeraries the artillery, artificers' and staff departments might have been recruited.

As it is impossible to make such calculations very exact, a margin large enough is generally left to set down the unforeseen accidents.

“An indisposition which has kept me several days at home, and much more the absence of Mr. Chancellor Livingston, has prevented me from knowing the intentions of Congress with regard to the additional regiments, the cavalry and the independent corps. If our finances had permitted us, I should have wished that at the same time the States recruit their own regiments by draught, those might have been recruited by enlistment.

“The number of men we can have next campaign in rank and file, ought to determine the quantity of arms, ammunition, etc., we shall want; but the uncertainty of the former throws obscurity over all the rest. As we, however, are to make general calculations, I have conceived the number of ten thousand stand of arms more than we actually have, absolutely indispensable in the army.

“I have visited the manufactories of arms and the magazines in this town, where I have found thirty-two hundred stands ready and in good order. Besides the board of war have shown me a return of two thousand at Albany, and as many at Carlisle, which are likewise ready and in order, so that the number which I thought necessary will be together towards the beginning of April. I have found, besides, in the magazines, four thousand large muskets without bayonets, and too heavy to serve in a campaign, but very proper to serve in a fortified place. If your Excellency thinks proper, I have a mind to cause two thousand to be cleaned and sent to the forts at West Point, where they will be of more service than in our magazines. I have also found two thousand new cartridge boxes, which might now be sent to the army. I saw, yesterday, a letter from Dr. Franklin, just arrived from France, in which he says he has informed the king, in September last, of the demand which Congress has made of arms,

ammunition, and clothing for our army. Though he has as yet no certainty, yet he appears to have no doubt of the success. Thus we may hope to receive assistance from that side by the first vessel that shall arrive, and to want neither arms nor ammunition to oppose the obstinacy of the King of Great Britain, who, by his last speech, appears to be very intent in carrying on the war with spirit and vigor. I should likewise be happy if I could assure you that we shall also be able to pay and provide for our army. Congress are now endeavoring to settle these matters. God grant that they may succeed according to their wishes and mine. Count D'Estaing's fleet has suffered another storm on the coasts of Europe."

"PHILADELPHIA, *March 15, 1780.*

"Since the departure of the last letter which I had the honor to write you, I have not in the least advanced in the affairs which I had proposed to see brought to a conclusion. Before it is known whether the number of regiments is to be preserved, or whether an incorporation is to take place, it is impossible to make any calculations for the formation.

"I have exerted all the means in my power to persuade Congress to determine that important question, and to adopt any system whatever, that your Excellency and the chiefs of the several departments might make their arrangements in consequence; but it seems that the ill state of our finances has stopped all the wheels of the whole machine.

"The board of war have made a report, in which the incorporation of a fourth part is proposed. This report contains, I believe, the same plan which Chancellor Livingston has imparted to your Excellency. Several motions have been made to consider and determine upon this subject, but hitherto the decision has been deferred. The month of March is more than half spent, and I shudder, my dear general, when I think of the many important arrangements that are still to be made between this time and the opening of the campaign. There

is not a day but I apply from one to the other to represent to them the necessity of determining the present business. The day before yesterday I went to Chancellor Livingston and told him that I was ready to set off for the army, perceiving that my presence here was of no use. He requested me to defer my departure and to communicate to the board of war my opinion of the formation of the army for the next campaign.

“As this object has already engaged my attention for some time, and as I calculated and balanced the good and evil that might result from an incorporation, and being entirely persuaded that such an operation in the present crisis, and at the beginning of a campaign for which we are in general so ill prepared, would be attended with danger, I did not hesitate a moment to give my opinion in writing, such as I have the honor to transmit it to your Excellency. The board of war will send, to-morrow, that paper to Congress, and I am anxious to learn the effect it will produce.

“You know, my dear general, that I have always wished to see our regiments stronger, but I believe it will be prudent to make use in the present crisis of the simplest means, which is that of leaving the corps such as they are, and reinforcing them as well as we can. Any incorporation whatever will be a general alteration in the body of the army, at the very moment, perhaps, when it should act. Besides, as our army will have in this campaign such a great number of recruits, we must be able to rely on our officers for maintaining good order among the troops; and the less is the mass of an undisciplined body, the easier it is for him who has its direction to make it act, and to restore it to order in case of confusion.

“The vacancies of subalterns in several regiments appear to be one of the motives which might the most strongly engage us to an incorporation; but I think that the nomination might better be suspended till the end of the campaign, and as our companies are not very strong, I believe that two officers

for each will suffice, provided that the brigadiers take care to send no officers on furlough during the campaign, so that none are improperly employed out of the regiments; that the field officers company shall have two subalterns, and the other companies one, when the captain is present, and two when he is absent. The officers employed as quarter-masters and paymasters might even keep the administration of their companies, and only be dispensed from the service of the line. By these means, the number of eighteen or nineteen captains and subalterns would suffice to do the service of a regiment, and each regiment might keep five or six vacancies. Besides the numberless inconveniences which I fear from an incorporation or reduction of the regiments, I find that the proportion which is wished to be incorporated is the most difficult thing to determine. If we leave that proportion to the choice of the several States, we shall have regiments of six hundred men, while others shall consist only of one hundred and fifty, which difference I consider as the source of all disorders in an army.

“The proportion being fixed—suppose it to be the fourth part—this question results: How many regiments has each State to re-form? Now, for instance, Massachusetts has fifteen regiments; Pennsylvania, eleven; New Jersey, three; Delaware, one. With such a disproportion, I do not see how a fourth part can be re-formed without great difficulty and confusion. Such an alteration requires such extensive calculations, and such mature deliberations, that we have not time to undertake either at such an advanced period.

“I have yesterday received the honor of your letter of the 6th instant. It is with the greatest satisfaction that I see you have collected the returns of the deficiencies of men. I feared the difficulty of this collection the more as I knew the neglect and want of exactness of several officers on the important object of returns; and it is with the greatest sorrow that I must observe to your Excellency that the board of war have not

yet received the general return of January last, and that that of December, as well as several of the preceding months, is extremely imperfect.

“A necessary calculation made us lately ask for a return of General Poor’s brigade at the War office, and that brigade has not been carried into any of the general returns ever since last spring, when it joined General Sullivan’s corps.

“This object, and several others which I shall submit to your Excellency’s consideration, will engage me to join the army as soon as possible.

“PROPOSALS FOR THE FORMATION OF OUR ARMY FOR THE
NEXT CAMPAIGN.

“The distribution of the number of men which each State is to furnish for the next campaign, permits us to complete our regiments of infantry in the line to a number, indeed, below the establishment, but which puts it in our power to form each regiment into a battalion without changing the principles of formation already established in the regulations.

“If we put each regiment on the footing of three hundred and seventeen fighting men, exclusive of the commissioned officers, drummers and fifers, and divide each into nine companies; then each company will consist of thirty-five men under arms, including the sergeant-major and quarter-master sergeant, and a brigade of four regiments will be composed of one thousand two hundred and sixty-eight fighting men, and the fifteen brigades now at the grand army will make a body of infantry of eighteen thousand seven hundred and three men under arms.

“According to this calculation we shall have about three thousand infantry more than we had the last campaign, though we had then the brigades of Virginia and North Carolina, which are now at the southward. We have nothing to do, then, but to collect our recruits as quick as possible, to make the regiments equal, to exercise the troops, and to fill, in some

regiments, some vacancies of subalterns, in order to have the number of officers necessary for the service.

“We shall thus avoid every kind of reform and incorporation, which would unavoidably occasion a great deal of discontent among a number of officers, who, on account of their personal merit and the effectual services they have rendered their country, ought not to be exposed to their disagreements. Besides, every incorporation requires necessarily a new formation, which could not be arranged without employing a vast deal of time; it is, one might say, a new creation, rendered more difficult by the dispute about rank and seniority, to which such arrangements are always subjected.

“When I examine scrupulously the motives which can induce us to lessen the number of our regiments, I find none strong enough to balance the inconveniences which will necessarily result from it. The season is already so far advanced that we scarcely have time enough to collect our recruits, to exercise them, and to form our companies and battalions for the next campaign.

“At a time when a thousand important objects take up the attention of Congress and the commander-in-chief, they will be incessantly troubled with endless representations, if an incorporation should take place. Several other difficulties, which I could specify, will unavoidably arise. If, instead of this, we leave, for the present campaign, the army on the ancient footing, we shall have time enough to make a better calculated plan to lessen the number of regiments, and render them more formidable, which plan might be put in execution at the end of the campaign.

“With regard to the additional regiments, I think that in granting them leave and money to recruit about three hundred men, they might be preserved on the same footing as those belonging to particular States. Colonel Gist’s regiment is joined to the Virginia division; it wants for its completion about one hundred and sixty-four recruits, who might be en-

listed in that State. Those of Colonels Webb, Sherborn and Spencer want in all two hundred and eighty-nine recruits to be on the footing of the others ; they might be levied in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York and New England.

“Colonel Jackson’s regiment had, at last review, the complete number of three hundred and seventeen, and does not want to be recruited. The only difficulty lies with Colonel Hazen’s regiment, who insists on a particular agreement made with Congress, whereby his regiment is to consist of twenty companies, of which he has, however, given up two, so that his regiment, composed of eighteen companies, would make exactly a double one. He is, in consequence of this formation, provided with field officers, and even with captains—but he wants subalterns and privates. His regiment is partly composed of Canadians, as well officers as soldiers. These have a right to claim the protection of the United States, however difficult it may be to satisfy all their pretensions. What I might propose on this object, would be to incorporate Colonel Livingston’s regiment as the weakest, and mostly composed of Canadians, with that of Colonel Hazen. Colonel Hazen returns his regiment at four hundred men, and Colonel Livingston his regiment at one hundred and three—five hundred and three in all. Colonel Hazen should then be ordered to divide his regiment into eighteen companies—each of twenty-eight men—which would make the number of five hundred and four men, and to form it into two battalions.

“With regard to the cavalry, my opinion is, that, as in the present circumstances, it is impossible to put those regiments on the footing of the first establishment, it is, however, necessary to determine their number and formation. I propose, then, the same means as for the formation of the infantry, *i. e.*, without incorporating or re-forming regiments, or even changing the ancient formation, but only lessening the number of men and horses in each regiment, that the totality of our cavalry may not exceed the number of one thousand horses,

“The corps of cavalry which we have at present are four regiments of horse, the corps of light horse under Major Lee, and the *maréchaussée*.

“Each regiment should then be completed to two hundred and four men, well mounted, including the non-commissioned officers and trumpeters. Each regiment might be divided into three squadrons, each squadron to consist of sixty-eight horse. Each squadron should then be divided into two companies, each company to consist of thirty-four men, including non-commissioned officers and trumpeters. Each company might have six supernumeraries on foot; consequently each regiment should consist of two hundred and four horse and two hundred and forty men, thirty-six of whom are on foot. Major Lee's should still consist of one hundred and fifty horse, and his infantry should only be completed. The *maréchaussée* ought to remain on the first establishment of forty horse. With regard to Colonel Armand's legion, it ought to be left to the direction of General Lincoln to put it on the footing he shall think most conducive to the good of the service.

“Thus the cavalry, without the above-mentioned legion, will not exceed the number of one thousand and six horse in the northern and southern armies. I can not, however, forbear observing that as long as our cavalry have no carabines to guard themselves in their quarters, I wish each regiment should be joined by one hundred and fifty foot, otherwise it will never be in our power to employ our cavalry on the line, and we shall be obliged to place them behind our camps, where they will be always of very little service.”

STEUBEN TO WASHINGTON.

“PHILADELPHIA, *March 28, 1780.*”

“The propositions I made to Congress respecting the formation of the army, of which I had the honor of transmitting

* This letter may also be found in the *Correspondence of the Revolution*, by J. Sparks, ii., 420.

your Excellency a copy, remain yet on their table without any decision thereon. They have, however, set aside the report of the board of war on a motion for reducing the battalions, as you will perceive by the resolve annexed, so that all reduction or incorporation is out of the question; and for next campaign the regiments in the line will be augmented more or less by the respective States. What is to be done with the additional regiments and the cavalry? Congress can not or will not decide, though I am rather led to believe their delay in this matter proceeds from the grand cause of all our misfortunes—the bad state of our finances, which will not allow the recruiting of men or purchasing of horses.

“I observed to you, my dear general, in my last, that every wheel of the machine seemed stopped. Of the truth of this observation I become more and more convinced, and must confess that to me our situation appears very critical. The late resolves respecting the money, though attended with all the success that can be wished, can not make any immediate alteration for the better. Some months must elapse before their good effects will be felt; and during this time we are disabled from doing any thing, while, at this very moment, the greatest exertions are necessary.

“My anxiety for our southern affairs, I can not help saying, is considerably increased by the last accounts, which seem to announce a determination of General Lincoln to defend Charleston with all his force. This to me appears to be playing a hard game.

“Another danger which threatens us, and which is much to be dreaded, is the declared division between Virginia and Pennsylvania, the latter State having actually passed a law for the raising fifteen hundred men to defend their pretended rights. All these things offer but a dull prospect, rendered still more dull by the cabals and factions which reign among us. The civil departments of the army, at a time when their whole attention should be taken up in providing for the ap-

proaching campaign, are in such a state of dissatisfaction and confusion, that I am very apprehensive they will make things still worse than they are.

"You will perhaps think, my dear general, that I am in anxiety for things which are out of my sphere; but when you consider that all my happiness depends on our success, you will not blame me for the interest I take in the cause. The same motives make me apprehensive that the necessary arrangements will never be firmly established without your personal assistance; and I submit to you, my dear general, whether your presence is not absolutely necessary at Congress, in the present critical situation of our affairs. Your right to the confidence both of Congress and the people is too well founded not to command the greatest attention to every thing you propose. The time is precious, and the prospect before us is threatening. Your presence will animate our councils as it does our armies. My attachment to the cause, and the respectful confidence I have in your person, induce me to express, in the strongest terms, the desire I have to see you here."

WASHINGTON TO STEUBEN.

"MORRISTOWN, *April 2, 1780.*"

"The propositions made by you to Congress, for the arrangement of the army this campaign, appear to me, upon the whole, best adapted to our circumstances, and especially since so much of the season has elapsed without entering upon it. I am glad the proposed incorporation has been suspended. I doubt, however, the practicability, at this time, of augmenting the cavalry or recruiting the additional men, from the circumstance you mentioned, the extreme distress of the Treasury, which seems to be totally exhausted, and without sufficient resources for the current demands of the service. The present crisis is indeed perplexing beyond description, and it is infinitely difficult to prescribe a remedy.

* Washington's Writings, vii., 9.

“When I approve your plan for the additional regiments, it is with one condition—that Congress can find means to provide for the officers, so as to put them upon an equal footing with the other parts of the army. If this can not be done, they can not continue in the service. I have incessant applications to this effect, and have just written again to Congress on the subject. If the situation of the officers can not be made more tolerable, it will be preferable to dissolve those corps, incorporate the men with the State lines, and let the officers retire, to be entitled to pay, subsistence, and the emoluments decreed at the end of the war. This will be a very bad expedient if it can not be avoided; but it is better than to leave the officers in such a state that they must be miserable while they stay in the army, obliged, in a little time, the greater part of them to quit, while the corps, for want of care, will rapidly decline, and a number of good men be lost to the service.

“Your anxiety on the score of southern affairs can not exceed mine. The measure of collecting the whole force for the defense of Charleston ought, no doubt, to have been well considered before it was determined. It is putting much to hazard; but, at this distance, we can form a very imperfect judgment of its propriety or necessity. I have the greatest reliance on General Lincoln’s prudence, but I can not forbear dreading the event. Ill as we can afford a diminution of our force here, and notwithstanding the danger we run from the facility with which the enemy can concentrate their force at our weak points, besides other inconveniences, I have recommended to Congress to detach the Maryland division to reinforce the southern States. Though this detachment can not, in all probability, arrive in season to be of any service to Charleston, it may assist to arrest the progress of the enemy, and save the Carolinas.

“My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond too much with yours. The prospect, my dear baron, is

gloomy, and the storm threatens. Not to have the anxieties you express, at the present juncture, would be not to feel that zeal and interest in our cause by which all your conduct shows you to be actuated. But I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring every thing to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to difficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon them with more tranquillity than formerly. Those which now present themselves, no doubt, require vigorous exertions to overcome them, and I am far from despairing of doing it. . . . I am very sensible, my dear baron, to the obliging assurances of your regard, and I entreat you to believe there is a perfect reciprocity of sentiments, and that I am, with great consideration and the truest esteem," etc., etc.

STEUBEN TO WASHINGTON.

"PHILADELPHIA, *April 6, 1780.*

"I had the pleasure of receiving your favor of the 2d instant yesterday. The necessity there was of having something done for the additional regiments induced me to write the board of war a letter, pressing their immediate attention to those corps, but, though some days have since elapsed, and the necessity of coming to an immediate decision in this affair is acknowledged, yet through the absence of Mr. Livingston and Mr. Pickering, no report has yet been made to Congress. Under such circumstances of delay, there appeared to me but one way of having any thing done for the army in any season; this was the appointment of a committee, with full powers, in concert with your Excellency, to make every arrangement necessary for the next campaign; to determine the formation, and every other thing necessary to be done for the additional corps, as well cavalry as infantry; to devise the means of putting the officers on a footing with the other parts of the army, and, in fact, to do every thing necessary to be done to put the army in a proper condition for the ensuing campaign.

"This proposition has been debated in Congress these two days. Yesterday Mr. Lowell gave me hopes it would take place, and I have since been informed a committee is actually named to draw up instructions for the committee before mentioned. So soon as I hear the members are actually named, I shall lose no time in putting myself more immediately under your Excellency's orders.

"From every observation I have made, I can not perceive that the State of Pennsylvania have taken the least step toward recruiting their regiments for the next campaign. What this delay can be owing to, I can not say; but I should imagine a hint from your Excellency to the president might have some effect."

The letter to the board of war, above referred to, reads as follows :

"PHILADELPHIA, *March 29, 1780.*

"I observe that Congress have, by a resolution of the 25th instant, deferred the consideration of any new arrangement of the army till the 1st of December next. The regiments in the line of the different States will, therefore, remain on their present footing, being completed more or less by their respective States; but what is to be done with the several additional regiments and corps remains yet to be decided.

"These regiments being in general too much reduced to remain on their present footing, and the only means of completing them by recruits being at this time impracticable, I would propose that power be given to General Washington to draw together such of those corps as are not at the southward, and by incorporating the regiments, or otherwise, as he may judge proper, to form them in such a manner as may appear to him most conducive to the public service.

"I would by no means be understood to incorporate them into the regiments of the different States; on the contrary, I am of opinion such a measure would have a very bad effect, es-

cially at this juncture, as the greatest part of the officers must in that case be disbanded.

"I can not help taking this opportunity to represent to the board, that a general dissatisfaction prevails in these corps on account of the disadvantages they have hitherto labored under, compared with the troops of the several States, for though by a resolution of Congress the several States have credit for the men serving with these corps, yet they have never received any benefit from that resolve, either in receiving recruits or supplies of any nature whatsoever.

"The only means to remedy this is, in my opinion, to appoint a commissary to supply them with clothing, and such other articles as are furnished by the different States to their troops, the extra prices of which should be charged to the several States which have credit for the men as part of their quota in the field; the supplies furnished to the Canadians, and others to no particular State, to be charged to the Continent. Some means should also be found for supplying the artillery, cavalry, and others, who are in the same disadvantageous situation.

"With respect to the keeping up the additional regiments, the only means that occurs, is to give them liberty and furnish them with money to recruit; the promotion of the officers should take place in that line in the same manner as in the line of the different States.

"The little time we have before the opening of the campaign, will, no doubt, induce the honorable board to lay these matters before Congress as soon as possible."

Washington sharing Steuben's apprehensions, in a letter of the 3d of April, 1780, laid the alarming state and condition of the army before the president of Congress, which, on the 6th of April, appointed a committee of three* to confer with the commander-in-chief on the subject of his letter, together with

* Resolutions of Congress. Dunlap's edition. vi., 52.

the report of the board of war and the letter from Baron Steuben. They were instructed to proceed to head-quarters, and, in conjunction with the commander-in-chief, to effect such reforms and changes in all the departments of the army as its present condition required. They were authorized, with the advice of General Washington, "to reduce, incorporate or unite to State lines the several additional corps," to inquire into and regulate the clothier's, quarter-master's, commissary's and medical departments, to visit the different posts and see that such regulations as they should adopt were carried into execution, "to abolish unnecessary posts, to erect others, to discharge useless officers, to stop rations improperly issued, and to exercise every power requisite to effect a reformation of abuses, and the general arrangement of those departments which were in any wise committed to their charge," and to inform Congress from time to time of the measures they had taken. The committee was chosen by ballot and consisted of Schuyler, Matthews, and Peabody.† They went at once to head-quarters, and it is due to the reports which they made in the course of the summer that the reforms in September and October, 1780, were adopted by Congress. The committee was discharged on the 11th of August, 1780.

Steuben had thus reached the object which he had in view while in Philadelphia, and in the middle of April returned with the committee to head-quarters. He accompanied at the same time the French minister, Chevalier De la Luzerne, who now paid his long-intended visit to the commander-in-chief. They arrived at Morristown on or about the 20th of April, 1780. Washington ordered Steuben to perform some maneuvers in honor of their distinguished foreign guest. He did so first on the 24th of April, with four battalions, whereupon in general orders, on the 25th of April, the commander-in-chief, at the request of the ambassador of France, "had the

† J. Sparks, in Washington's Writings, vii., 14 and 15.

pleasure to inform Major General Baron De Steuben and the officers and men of the four battalions, that the appearance and manœuvres of the troops yesterday met his entire approbation and afforded him the highest satisfaction.”*

On the following day a grand review was held and highly commended by Mr. De la Luzerne and the commander-in-chief, as will appear from the following general order of the 26th of April:†

“His Excellency, the minister of France, was pleased to express, in the warmest terms, his approbation of the troops in the review of yesterday. Applause so honorable can not but prove a new motive to the emulous exertions of the army. The general has seen, with peculiar satisfaction, the zeal of all ranks to manifest their respectful attachment to a gentleman who, to a title of being the representative of the illustrious friend and ally of these States, adds that of having given distinguishing proofs, during his residence among us, of the sincerest disposition to advance their interest.”

* General Orders. Steuben MS. Papers.

† General Orders, copied in Steuben's Order Book. Steuben MS. Papers.

CHAPTER XIII.

WALKER REPRESENTS STEUBEN AT HEAD-QUARTERS DURING HIS ABSENCE.—HE IS ONLY PARTLY SUCCESSFUL.—HIS LETTERS TO STEUBEN.—STEUBEN RETURNS TO HEAD-QUARTERS IN APRIL, 1780.—HIS SPECIAL REVIEWS.—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES IN NEW JERSEY.—STEUBEN AT CONNECTICUT FARMS.—HIS DISPOSITIONS FOR THE ADVANCED TROOPS AND THE MILITIA OF NEW JERSEY.—STEUBEN GOES TO WEST POINT TO ASSIST GENERAL HOWE.—HE EXERCISES AND MANEUVERS THE TROOPS, INSTRUCTS THE RECRUITS, AND CONTROLS THE ARMS.—HIS PLAN FOR THE FORMATION OF A LIGHT INFANTRY APPROVED BY WASHINGTON.—SCAMMEL'S REPORT ABOUT THE NEW COMPANIES.—STEUBEN'S MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE SAME TO THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.—ALL HIS PROPOSITIONS APPROVED.—STEUBEN'S LETTER OF THE 28TH OF JULY.—GENERAL DISTRESS.—EXHAUSTION OF THE PUBLIC CREDIT.—STEUBEN'S POVERTY.—HE CAN NOT BUY A TENT.—INTERESTING LETTER OF GENERAL GREENE.—BAD STATE OF PATERSON'S BRIGADE.—THE SUMMER IS PASSED IN INACTIVITY.—LOWELL'S LETTER COMPLAINING OF THE APATHY OF THE PEOPLE.—THE ARMS EXPECTED FROM FRANCE DO NOT ARRIVE.—STEUBEN COLLECTS AS MANY ARMS AND BAYONETS AS POSSIBLE.—THE FRENCH AUXILIARY CORPS OF ROCHAMBEAU ARRIVES.—WASHINGTON REMOVES HIS HEAD-QUARTERS TO TAPPAN.—ARNOLD'S TREASON.—STEUBEN MEMBER OF THE COURT MARTIAL AGAINST ANDRE.—HE PITIES THE LATTER AND DESPISES THE FORMER.—JONATHAN ARNOLD CHANGES HIS NAME INTO THAT OF JONATHAN STEUBEN.—HIS PETITION TO THE ASSEMBLY OF CONNECTICUT.

WHILE Steuben was in Philadelphia, Benjamin Walker, his aid-de-camp, represented him at head-quarters in all the business regarding the inspectorship. He made in Steuben's and his own name repeated representations for the introduction of a better order in camp, and by the attention that was paid to them produced a very salutary effect in the army, which this winter, for want of provisions, credit and money, and on account of the extreme cold, suffered at Morristown as much as during the encampment at Valley Forge.

Steuben tried especially to get reliable reports about the number and the state of the troops, as well as about the quantity and quality of arms, which he had to lay before Congress as the basis for the approaching campaign. The

punctual delivery of these returns was the more difficult as the army, in consequence of the inactivity during the winter and of the absence of Steuben, relaxed in its discipline. It was scattered over a very largely extended area of country, and thus the connection between the different corps was considerably weakened.

As far as circumstances allowed, Walker succeeded in remodeling the form of the returns of arms and getting them made out with more correctness. He was instrumental that the general-in-chief issued orders for the introduction of better order into the camp, and that on the 31st of January, 1780, he wrote a severe letter to the commanding officers of each brigade, in which Washington pointed out the several abuses existing in their brigades, and ordered the necessary remedies to be immediately applied, and reprimanded them for the little attention that had been paid to the regulations established, and for their want of order in every respect.

"I now inclose you," says Walker in a letter of the 24th of February, 1780, to Steuben,* "some extracts from general orders; they have the appearance of a desire of introducing some order, and I can not help thinking the general has it at heart, but, my dear baron, he is in a difficult station, and rendered more difficult by our unhappy circumstances; and the introduction of order into such an ill provided army is nearly impossible. Is there any prospect of our being better supplied?"

Walker, at the same time, undertook the arduous task to collect all the returns which Steuben wanted in Philadelphia for proving to Congress the exact strength of the army for the ensuing campaign; but all his other efforts for promoting the ends of his general were ineffectual, and thwarted by the more pressing troubles to get food and supplies for the almost starving soldiers. "I am not negligent," writes he, on the 11th of March, 1780, to Steuben,† "in my attendance at head-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ii.

† Ibidem.

quarters, though to little purpose. You who know with what reserve the general conducts himself with those in much higher stations than myself, will hardly suppose he enters into conversation with me, except at table. His inquiries are confined to, "When did you hear from the baron?"

"Notwithstanding," says he, in another letter, on the 13th of February, 1780, "I did every thing in my power to convince the majors of brigade of the necessity of your having the returns called for, as soon as possible, only those of six brigades are yet come in; those of Hand's, the second Pennsylvania and the two Connecticut brigades are yet wanting. In examining those returns which have come in, I find they have returned the men on furlough and recruiting, among those who can not appear under arms; but as I imagine your intention was to know what number of men will be actually effective at the opening of the campaign, and as those men will doubtless return before that time, I shall deduct them in making out the general returns.

"Instead of the regimental returns being digested into brigade returns, they have sent in all the regimental returns. This, and the many different forms in which they are made out, makes it difficult to get them into any order. In general returns, however, I shall do it in such a manner as will explain every thing you want to know, and I have no doubt you will be satisfied with them. I observe, also, that in their returns of arms and accouterments they have confined themselves to those articles, excluding the ammunition, drums and fifes, though I have no doubt you meant they should be included; but on a retrospection to the list you have sent, you say *a return of the arms and accouterments*, and they have been careful to put down no more than was ordered."

When Steuben, in April, joined the army, he resumed his old duties. He made a critical inspection of the arms of all brigades, in order to have an estimation of the number of arms wanting for the service of the ensuing campaign, exercised the

troops and maneuvered with them on a large scale. Thus the troops were well prepared, when, in the beginning of June, the State of New Jersey was harassed by the invasions of Knyphausen. It is certain, that on the 6th of June, Steuben took part in the affairs of Connecticut Farms and Springfield, and it is stated by eye witnesses, as for instance, Ashbel Green,* that he reconnoitered the American posts on this occasion; but it does not appear that Steuben held a command in the army. It rather seems that he acted as the chief of Washington's staff. We found at least two documents in the Steuben Papers, which refer to this kind of participation in the events of that period.

One of them, bearing date the 11th of June, 1780, contains a disposition for the advanced troops. "All reports from the advanced posts," it orders, "are to be sent in the first instance to the baron's quarters, and all deserters, prisoners, and every kind of intelligence from the enemy are to be forwarded to the same place. General Maxwell," it continues, "will command the right wing of the advanced troops, consisting of the first and second Jersey, and Spencer's Continental regiments, and Tily's, Frelinghuysen's and Webster's regiments of militia, and the detachment under Major Bryan. General Hand will command the left, consisting of the third Jersey regiment, the corps under Major Gibbs, and Courtland's and Stark's regiments of militia. In case the enemy should advance, the general has no doubt the troops will defend their respective posts with that courage and determination which has so often distinguished them; but should the superior force of their enemy oblige them to give way, they will retreat in the following order," etc.

The other paper is a plan drawn by Steuben, for the alarm posts and plans of rendezvous of the militia of New Jersey, during Knyphausen's invasion; but happily the inactivity of

* The Life of Ashbel Green, by James M. Jones, New York, 1844, p. 109.

the enemy had given time to the American army to make dispositions which rendered the calling out of the militia unnecessary, and consequently the whole was countermanded.*

The commander-in-chief apprehended at that time, that while Knyphausen engaged the main army near Morristown, Clinton meditated an attack on West Point, the key to the Highlands. Major General Howe was in command of that important post; but by some was not considered competent for the task. Washington, therefore, not to hurt the feelings of that deserved officer, resolved to send a general of approved bravery, experience and military judgment, to the assistance of Howe, and paid Steuben the compliment to order him, just in this critical moment, to West Point. It was about the middle of June when Steuben left the army, which, as late as the 21st of June, moved from Morristown toward Pompton and further on to the Highlands.

"The enemy, the day before yesterday," writes Alexander Hamilton, dated Whippany, the 25th of June, 1780,† "made a forward movement to Springfield, which they burned, and retired to Elizabethtown Point. The same evening they crossed over to Staten Island, and there are a great many concurring circumstances which make it probable we shall next hear of them on the North river. As you are at West Point the general wishes you to remain there until the present appearances come to some result. He has confidence in your judgment, and wishes you to give your advice and assistance to the commanding officer. As you have no command in the post, you can only do this in a private, friendly way; but I dare say General Howe will be happy to consult you. You will consider this as a private letter in which I rather convey you the general's wishes than his commands."

Steuben remained in West Point, and the posts under its control to the beginning of August, when Arnold was appointed to the command. His principal business during that

* Alexander Hamilton's Works, vol. ii, p. 42. † Ibidem, vol. i, p. 142.

time consisted in making the necessary arrangements for an offensive campaign, for which purpose he especially exercised the troops, formed the light infantry companies and procured arms for the northern army. There were in its eight brigades about three thousand old soldiers, allowing five hundred for the duty of the guards and pickets, and five hundred for making fascines, gabions and other necessary works for fortification. About two thirds of the old soldiers and all the recruits were daily at exercise. To render the recruits as serviceable as the short time allowed, Steuben agreed with General Howe that none of them were to be employed on guard or fatigue, and directed the particular attention of the inspectors to their instruction. They were exercised twice a day, one hour and a half in the morning at the reveille beating, and one hour and a half in the evening before sunset; the first six days without arms and wholly employed in learning to carry themselves well, to march and to dress. At this exercise the commanding officers of regiments had to attend, and they were answerable for the attendance of the officers of their respective regiments, and that no recruit was on any account exercised by a non-commissioned officer.

With respect to the arms, each colonel had to give a return of the arms and accouterments in the possession of his regiment, with which he was charged in an account kept by the inspector for that purpose, and the colonel on his part had to charge the captains, and take receipts for those in possession of their companies. When more arms were wanted the return was to be signed by the colonel and to be countersigned by the inspector, and a receipt taken by the inspector for the arms, etc., delivered in return and charged to the regiment. When it had arms to return it was directed to deliver them to the conductor and take his receipt for them, which receipt they had to change with the inspector for his receipt.

Another object to which Steuben devoted much care was the number of men absent, or improperly employed out of the

regiment. All those on furlough were immediately recalled, and those who came under the latter description called in and exercised. Standing guards which, notwithstanding the many orders to the contrary, were still in existence, were at once relieved; the wagoners, masters, and others, who were old soldiers, so far as possible changed for recruits, and, as much as circumstances permitted, discipline and improvements introduced in the corps of General Howe, which in this respect was utterly neglected.

On the 14th of July, 1780, Steuben laid the following plan for the formation of the light infantry before the commander-in-chief for his approbation :

“Each regiment to furnish one captain, one lieutenant, three sergeants, one drum, one fife, and forty-two rank and file. The colonels to be answerable that there are in each company twenty-five old soldiers, who have been well exercised, the other seventeen to be chosen amongst the most robust and active recruits. As soon as a regiment is augmented to two hundred and ninety effective rank and file, the light infantry company to be augmented to fifty. Four companies of light infantry to form a battalion, to be commanded by a lieutenant colonel or a major appointed by the commander-in-chief. Two battalions of light infantry to form a regiment, to be commanded by a colonel appointed by the commander-in-chief. Four or six battalions to form a brigade, commanded by a brigadier—the whole to form a division commanded by a major general.

“Each regiment will be obliged to keep its light infantry company complete during the campaign; each brigade in the line that furnishes a battalion of light infantry is, besides those belonging to the companies, to furnish two subalterns, one as an adjutant, the other as quarter-master and pay-master, one sergeant-major, the other quarter-master sergeant.

“Each regiment of light infantry to be furnished in the following manner ;

FIRST BRIGADE.

1st Pennsylvania brigade to furnish 4 companies, which form 1 battalion,	200
2d " " " 4 " " " " "	200
Jersey brigade, with Spencer's, to furnish 4 companies, which form 1 battalion,	200
New York brigade to furnish 4 companies, which form 1 battalion,	200

SECOND BRIGADE.

1st Connecticut brigade to furnish 4 companies, which form 1 battalion,	200
2d " " " 4 " " " 1 " "	200
1st Massachusetts " " 4 " " " 1 " "	200
2d " " " 4 " " " 1 " "	200

THIRD BRIGADE.

3d Massachusetts brigade to furnish 4 companies, which form 1 battalion,	200
4th " " " 4 " " " 1 " "	200
N. Hamp. 3 and R. Isl. regt. 1, in all 4 " " " 1 " "	200
Stark's regt. 2 and Hand's regt. 2, " 4 " " " 1 " "	200

Total	48	12	2,400
	Companies,	Battalions,	Rank & File.

As early as the 16th of July, Washington issued an order founded on Steuben's plan, and directing that one captain, one subaltern, three sergeants, and twenty rank and file, each from five feet eight inches to five feet ten inches in height, were to be drafted from each regiment of the first brigade, and particularly of the old soldiers, as light infantry.

"On the 20th of July," reports A. Scammel to Steuben,* "I finished inspecting seventeen companies of the strength above mentioned. The officers made a genteel, officer-like appearance—the non-commissioned officers appeared to be well chosen. The men were well fitted to the field, firm, and well built; their arms in general good and in fine order, and nothing but the want of clothes prevented their making a complete military appearance—all old soldiers, and the greater part of them were in the light infantry last year. When they marched from the parade they appeared equal to the storming of another Stony Point."

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ii.

In consequence of Washington's directions, Steuben, on the 25th of July, commenced drafting from the second brigade the light infantry in West Point, Fishkill and environs. For this purpose he ordered from each regiment thirty men with six sergeants, out of which number he chose twenty men and three sergeants to form a company. On the 22d of July, 1780, he wrote from West Point, as follows, to General Washington :

"To avoid all disorder, which results from drawing by separate corps, I proposed, in my last letter to your Excellency, that the light infantry should draw nothing as a separate corps, except their rations, which are to be distributed by a commissary, the forage by a forage master, the ammunition by a conductor, who are to be appointed particularly for the light infantry.

"The arms, accouterments, camp equipage, clothing, and even the pay, will be furnished by each regiment to which the company belongs. For this purpose, the quarter-master of each battalion of light infantry will keep his books and accounts with the quarter-masters and pay-masters of the regiments to which the company belongs. The first regiment of Pennsylvania, for instance, furnishes one company to the first battalion of light infantry. Then this regiment furnishes for this company one horseman's tent for the officers, eight common tents for the non-commissioned officers and privates, eight camp kettles, and the other equipage in proportion, and the same with respect to clothing, etc. I submit to your Excellency, if it will not be necessary to publish this arrangement in general orders before the battalions are formed, in order that the chiefs of the departments may become acquainted therewith.

"Another object, before the formation of this corps, is to determine in what order the battalions are to be formed in order of battle, to avoid all disputes concerning rank and posts of honor. By the inclosed arrangement, the geographical order adopted in the army will be nearly complied with,

except that three companies of New Hampshire are to be incorporated in a battalion with those of New York. Thus the order will be as follows :

1.	2.	3.
8 Companies, Penn- sylvania.	4 Companies, New Jersey; 2, Hand; 2, Stark.	3 Companies, New Hampshire; 1, Rhode Island; 4, N. York.
4.	5.	6.
8 Companies, Con- necticut.	8 Companies, Massa- chusetts.	8 Companies, Massa- chusetts.

"If you approve of this arrangement, the first and second battalions will be composed out of those five brigades which are with your Excellency, and the other four will be formed out of the eight brigades here under General Howe. I have no doubt that the first battalion of light infantry, furnished by the two Pennsylvania brigades, can and will be properly composed. The second, furnished by the brigades of Jersey, Stark and Hand, may be equally so, and as for the four battalions here, I will take all the pains in my power to form them in such a manner as to meet with your Excellency's approbation.

"If it was possible, my dear general, that our whole infantry could be uniformly clothed in linen hunting shirts and overalls, with small round hats, cocked up one side, and good shoes, it would be the most convenient uniform for the season. These we can easily procure for them. I will give orders here that all the light infantry shall be provided with bayonets, and would be much obliged to your Excellency to have the same orders issued for those with you."

On the 23d of July, 1780, Alexander Hamilton, Washington's aid-de-camp, answered from head-quarters :*

"On the formation of the light infantry the general has already written to you. I presume it will be ultimately nearly as you have proposed. . . . *Entre nous*, it is not easy to find good majors for this corps in the Massachusetts line, and as it

* Alexander Hamilton's Works, vol. ii., 42.

will act a good deal with the French troops, we wish it, for this additional reason, to be well officered. Prescott will answer the purpose, but he is not yet to know that he is in contemplation. We shall not long continue in our present position. The distinctions of departments are an old story, which now do not exist, except with respect to South Carolina. You are with a detachment of the main army. I dare say all you are doing will be found right."

"I have made," reports Steuben, from Fishkill, on the 28th of July, 1780, to Washington, "the necessary arrangements for the light infantry, and shall be happy if they meet your Excellency's approbation. The companies are formed agreeably to your Excellency's orders. I have myself chosen the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and even the arms, and I dare flatter myself that the corps will be the admiration of our allies as much as the terror of our enemies. There is hardly a man under twenty or above thirty years of age; they are all robust and well made, and have indeed a military appearance, and as many of the recruits have served before, nearly two thirds of every company will be old soldiers. I have chosen from each regiment, besides three sergeants, two drummers and fifers, and forty-two, rank and file, as a reserve. They are to remain with their companies and be ready to reinforce or fill up any vacancy that may happen in the light companies."

An extremely great evil still prevailing in the northern army, and arising from the want of discipline, was the scarcity of arms and provisions, which again led the soldiers to mutinies, marauding and disobedience. Public credit was totally exhausted; the pay of the soldiers amounted to nothing, as it was made in entirely worthless Continental money, without allowance for depreciation. The people at large, especially in the summer of 1780, were tired of the war, or expected all aid, and their deliverance from the British, from their French allies. A large French fleet and army were expected,

and mostly on this account individual exertions were thought superfluous. To illustrate this ruinous state of things we need not to quote hundreds of letters and complaints which we found in the MS. Steuben Papers. It is more than evident from Washington's letters and other documents with which the public are already familiar. With respect to the person of Steuben it may suffice to state, that notwithstanding repeated applications, he suffered as much as any other officer, and that he was even unable to get a tent for his own use.

"I am exceedingly mortified"—writes Nathaniel Greene, then quarter-master general, to Steuben, from Preakness, on the 18th of July*—"that you meet with so much trouble in getting a few horses and a marquee to cover you. Will any man at a future day believe that a people, contending for the first rights of human nature, would leave those employed upon this important business so badly supplied with the sinews of war that the common conveniences requisite for a soldier's comfort can not be had? Tell it not in Dan! publish it not in Askalon! But so it is; and how can I help it?

"I have no marquees here. There are ten coming from Boston, and I have given Colonel Hay directions at all events to reserve one for you. The saddles may be had at Morris's. What shall we do this campaign? We are most like a broken merchant, too poor to undertake any thing great, and too proud to attempt what is within our power. Ambition hurries us beyond our abilities, and I wish it may not expose our poverty in more disagreeable colors than we at present imagine. It is noble to attempt, but will it not be ruinous to fail?"

If officers of the highest rank were thus exposed to suffering and hardship, it was nothing but a natural consequence of this culpable neglect that not the least attention was paid to the wants of the private soldier. "I esteem it my duty," writes General John Paterson, on the 15th of September, 1780, to Steuben,† "to represent to you the disagreeable and

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ii.

† Ibidem.

distressing circumstances of the brigade under my command, for the want of provisions. Had this been new or accidental, I should not have taken notice of it, but for a number of weeks we have not had an allowance of meat more than half the time; particularly in this month we have had but seven rations and a half. Should this continue, I am fearful of the consequences. The officers, already fretted by the treatment they have met with from the country, are, I believe, in general determined to quit the service at the close of the campaign, and unless times have a better aspect, I fear the others will follow their example. Those in my brigade are really in distress, and depend solely on the ration they receive for their support, not one to twenty being able to purchase a dinner. It has also a very bad effect upon the soldiery; they, from being moral and peaceable, I find, are giving way to those vices which are the peculiar attendants of an army without provision.

“You may depend, sir, this representation does not proceed from a feverish, complaining disposition, but the contrary. My wish is to see the army well supplied, which I think will effectually prevent all those evils we fear. Resignations, mutiny and marauding, would in a great degree, if not totally, be prevented, and a spirit of obedience take place in their stead.”

But there was no money to provide for the necessary supplies and the most indispensable articles of the troops, and the whole summer of 1780 passed away under deliberations whether the army should be confined to the defensive or take the offensive. When Washington himself ceased to hope for any improvement, was it, then, to be wondered at that other prominent men, like James Lovell, for instance, gave up all hopes that the people would awake from their apathy? “What course is to be pursued,” he asked Steuben, in a letter of the 15th of July, 1780, “when the French fleet arrives? An angel from heaven, warlike as the best of Milton’s, could not now tell. He would be, as we are, obliged to go into the dis-

tracting field of *ifs*, and *ands*, and *buts*, suppositions and conjectures. Above all, he would be obliged to say, 'If there is any true spirit remaining in the people at large, we may hope to ruin the enemy.'"

It was a severe blow to the army that just now, when the arms were most wanted for the light infantry and the army in general, the expected supplies from France did not arrive. Steuben endeavored to procure them from other sources, and in concert with Generals Knox and Howe did his utmost to get as many arms as possible, and to meet the immediate emergency.

"Previous to the reception of your last favors," he writes, from Fishkill, the 28th of July, 1780, to Washington, "I had been informed of our disappointment in regard to the arms expected from France. Mr. Izard made no secret of this detention. The distress I foresaw this disappointment would bring upon us, determined me on a measure for which, if disappointed by your Excellency, I must be accountable. I engaged General Howe to write to Connecticut and Massachusetts. I wrote myself, and engaged also Generals Huntington and Paterson to write to them, to lend us fifteen hundred stand of arms each, and to send them on immediately, and I have made myself answerable for their return whenever our arms arrive from France; these three thousand, and what we shall be able to collect from our stores, will, I hope, suffice.

"I have disarmed all the wagoners, general and staff officers' waiters, and indeed every man who will not be present, in rank and file, in action. This will add a considerable number of arms. With regard to the recovery of arms carried off, it will, I fear, be difficult, if not impossible; it would even be difficult to discover to whom to attribute such negligence. The field officers were absent and the regiments commanded sometimes by a captain, sometimes by a lieutenant; under these circumstances what individual officer can be made answerable?"

How difficult it was to get the arms collected appears from Steuben's letters to General Knox, of which we give here some extracts.

"As it is very uncertain," he writes, on the 16th of July, "what number of recruits may join us, I am endeavoring to collect together at this place all the arms and accouterments I can hear of. Those from Albany I expect every day. I have ordered on six hundred new cartridge boxes and two thousand bayonet belts and scabbards which were at New Haven; those from Morristown I beg you will order here immediately, as I imagine the brigades at head-quarters will be more than supplied from those which come from Philadelphia."

And on the 21st of July he continues:

"I would be glad if you would have all the bayonets that can be collected forwarded on this way as soon as possible, as the arms from Albany amount in all but to thirty-one hundred and six, and but nine hundred and forty-one bayonets. You will also please to send orders to all the laboratories, that the cartridges to be made in future shall be of the size of nineteen to the pound, as the generality of the arms are French, and the cartridges of that size may upon occasion be used with English muskets, and the English size cartridges (sixteen to the pound), can not be used with French muskets. I would be much obliged to you if you would give orders to all the field commissaries, conductors, etc, not to deliver any arms, etc., to any order but that of the inspectors, as I have an instance of an abuse being committed, for want of an arrangement of that kind, the other day, by General Glover's brigade, which drew a large quantity of military stores at Springfield, more than their proportion would come to. Such an unequal distribution will never do, my dear general, and if you do not give the above orders I must renounce having any thing to do with the distribution. . . . I have given orders for whatever Glover's brigade have received to be returned and distributed equally with the rest."

. . . . "Among the three thousand arms arrived from Albany," he writes on the 27th of July, "nine hundred only have bayonets, nor do I know where to procure them. We shall also be very short of cartridge boxes. I have ordered fifteen hundred to be repaired here. God knows if it will be done. These fifteen days past I have been endeavoring to get the arms from Chester to Newburg, where I have prepared a store for their reception, to deliver them to the brigades. I have been also ten days trying to get the arms from Albany from on board the sloops, but neither the one or the other can be done. My orders are less respected than those of a corporal. The army is under marching orders, and nearly four thousand are unarmed; the arms are here, and can not be delivered because nobody will do his duty. There were at Philadelphia, I believe, five thousand arms with bayonets, and fifteen hundred new cartridge boxes, with drums, fises and other articles, and there are, I believe, one thousand arms at Carlisle. In our present circumstances they should all be collected or we shall lose the campaign."

Steuben joined the main army when, in consequence of the arrival of the French auxiliary corps under Rochambeau on Rhode Island, and the movements of Sir Henry Clinton, Washington crossed and recrossed the Hudson; and acted on his staff when he established his head-quarters near Tappan. Steuben's services being no longer required at West Point on account of Arnold's appointment to the chief command there, he continued with the head-quarters of the army.

Towards the end of September the world was startled by the treason of the notorious Arnold. His crime led to the capture of the unfortunate André. Steuben was one of the members of the board of the fourteen general officers appointed to examine into the case of André, and who, on the 29th of September, 1780, were compelled to sentence him to a felon's death. The baron was exceedingly afflicted, relates North, with the inevitable fate of the unfortunate British adjutant general. "It

is not possible," he said, "to save him. He put us to no proof, but in an open, manly manner, confessed every thing but a premeditated design to deceive. Would to God the wretch who drew him to death could have suffered in his place!"

Arnold's flight, however, gave birth to equally strong, but very different feelings in Steuben's breast. He let no occasion pass to manifest his utmost abhorrence of the name and character of the traitor, whose name ever grated harshly on Steuben's ear. It is characterized by an anecdote frequently told, and published in almost as many different forms as narrators, which we give here after Jones,* in the correct version, as it was obtained from the former neighbors of Jonathan Steuben.

"On one occasion, after the treason, the baron was on parade at roll-call, when the detested name, Arnold, was heard in one of the infantry companies of the Connecticut line. The baron immediately called the unfortunate possessor to the front of the company. He was a perfect model for his profession; clothes, arms, and equipments in the most perfect order. The practiced eye of the baron soon scanned the soldier, and, 'Call at my marquee, after you are dismissed, brother soldier,' was his only remark. After Arnold was dismissed from parade, he called at the baron's quarters as directed. The baron said to him, 'You are too fine a soldier to bear the name of a traitor—change it at once, change it at once.' 'But what name shall I take?' replied Arnold. 'Any that you please, any that you please; take mine, if you can not suit yourself better; mine is at your service.' Arnold at once agreed to the proposition, and immediately repaired to his orderly, and Jonathan Steuben forthwith graced the company roll, in lieu of the disgraced name of him who had plotted treason to his country. After the United States had con-

* *Annals and Recollections of Oneida County*, by Pomroy Jones. 8vo. Rome, 1851, p. 441.

quered their independence our hero returned to Connecticut, and on his petition the General Court legalized the change of name.* A few years after, he wrote the baron, who had now settled on his patent in this country, that he had married and had a fine son born, and that he had named him Frederick William. The baron replied, that when the son had arrived at the age of twenty-one he would give him a farm. The baron soon after paid the debt of nature, but his letter was carefully preserved. A few years after its settlement, Jonathan Steuben removed to the town of Steuben, with his family. When Frederick William arrived at his majority, the letter was presented to Colonel Walker, one of the baron's executors,

* We insert here a copy of the petition found among the Steuben MS. papers in Utica, as characteristic of the man and of the spirit of the times :

STATE OF CONNECTICUT.—At a General Assembly of the Governor and Company of the State of Connecticut, in America, holden at Hartford, by special order of the Governor, on the eighth day of January, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three :

Upon the Memorial of Jonathan Arnold, of Hartford, in the county of Hartford, in the State of Connecticut, shewing to this Assembly that he is a sergeant in the Continental army, and unfortunately bears the surname of the infamous Benedict Arnold, once a Major General in the Armies of the United States, now a traitor and deserter; that some time after the desertion of the said Benedict, the Honorable Major General Baron Steuben, pitying the Misfortune of any person Friendly to the American cause doomed to bear the same name with a Notorious Traitor, offered the Memorialist Liberty to assume the Name of Steuben, and by that name to be known and called, and engaged to your Memorialist, on his taking and assuming the said name of Steuben, to pay him the sum of Two Dollars per month, during the present war, etc.; praying this Assembly to permit him to assume the surname of Steuben, and by that Name to be hereafter known and called, as per Memorial on file. Dated January, A. D. 1783 :

Be it Enacted, by the Governor, Council, and Representatives, in General Court Assembled, and by the authority of the same, that the said Memorialist have Liberty, and Liberty is hereby granted to him, to take upon himself the surname of Steuben instead of that of Arnold, and that the Memorialist's surname be Steuben, and that by that Name, in all legal proceedings, he be ever hereafter known and called.

A true copy.

Examined by

GEORGE WYLLYS,

Secretary.

who at once executed to him a deed, in fee, of fifty acres of land, but which had been previously leased to Samuel Sizer, and as the recipient preferred the enjoyment of the land to the receipt of the rents, he purchased the lease, and at once went into possession.

“Jonathan Steuben lived to become a pensioner, and died some fifteen or sixteen years since. His widow survived him; she also drew a pension.

“In the war of 1812, Frederick William went with the militia to Sackett's Harbor, where he was taken sick and died. For his services his widow received a pension. He was orderly sergeant of his company, and with the name of the baron he seems to have inherited at least a portion of his distinguishing qualifications, for he was considered one of the best disciplinarians in his regiment.”

CHAPTER XIV.

REASONS WHY WASHINGTON, IN 1780, DID NOT ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE.—STEBEN'S TWO PLANS OF OPERATION.—CONTENTS OF THE FIRST PLAN.—CONTENTS OF THE SECOND PLAN, WRITTEN ON THE 10TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1780.—WASHINGTON ACTS IN CONFORMITY WITH STEBEN'S PROPOSITIONS.

THERE were two principal reasons why Washington did not assume the offensive in 1780, and strike a decisive blow. In the first place, the thirteen States did not furnish one half of their contingent which they ought to have furnished; and then the assistance from France, particularly the fleet, was too long delayed to open the campaign with them.

It is, however, interesting, notwithstanding this forced inactivity of Washington, to follow the plans in detail, which he formed in the beginning of summer. We therefore subjoin here two proposals* made by Steuben, which give a clear view of the situation, and prove the ability and activity of their author in another capacity. The first of these has no date, but it must have been written between the arrival of the news of the surrender of Charleston, and that of Rochambeau in Newport, and, therefore, probably, in the beginning of June. It reads as follows:

“The great preparation made by the belligerent powers in Europe, since last December, announced an intention on both sides to render this campaign as decisive as possible. The intentions of the court of France were made known to the honorable Congress the beginning of January last, by the minister, who at the same time exhorted the United States to employ every effort in making the necessary preparations for

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

a vigorous campaign on their part. It is not now necessary to examine into the motives that prevented the different Legislatures from making the necessary arrangements. But it is proper to know that, instead of augmenting our force, it has diminished near five thousand men, whose term of service has expired.

“About this time, also, Charleston was invested, and it did not require any superior knowledge in the art of war to presume the place would fall. This has, in fact, happened; and by the capture of the garrison we have suffered a loss of two thousand five hundred men. These, added to the five thousand above mentioned, make about one half the force we had last campaign.

“On the arrival of the Marquis De Lafayette, the latter end of April, we were assured of the intentions of the court of France to send a fleet of ships-of-the-line, and seven or eight thousand troops, to coöperate with the American forces on the continent, in such manner as Congress should judge for the interest of the United States. It was then thought proper to reinforce the army, and accordingly Congress recommended, and the States resolved, to raise troops for that purpose. But the bad state of our finances, with other difficulties, which have occurred, has prevented the execution of these resolves to the present moment. Such is the situation of things at this time.

“The enemy having left a garrison of three thousand men at Charleston, are returned with the remainder of their force to New York, where they have about ten thousand regular troops, and four thousand new levies, in all fourteen thousand, together with four ships-of-the-line in the harbor; besides which it is reported that Admiral Graves has arrived at Penobscot with a fleet, the force of which we have not ascertained.

“On the other hand, we are in expectation of the arrival of the promised succor from our allies, and expect to receive

from the different States the number of men, and every other assistance necessary to coöperate with them, and strike a decisive stroke, whenever the commander-in-chief shall think proper to direct his operations.

“The several objects which present themselves are, first, the reduction of New York, with the capture of the garrison—an event which will terminate the war. The second object is the conquest of Canada—an event which must, first or last, take place, to secure the peace of the continent, from which many immediate advantages must result to the United States. It will secure our frontier from the savages, and by changing the seat of war relieve the States of New York and Jersey, which have so considerably suffered; while, at the same time, we can take every advantage of the French fleet, without the assistance of which an attempt to conquer Canada must prove abortive and ineffectual.

“The third object is the reduction of Halifax and Penobscot—objects important to us in proportion as they are pernicious to the enemy by the loss of their naval magazines, which are of the greatest importance for carrying on their operations on this continent.

“The fourth object is the retaking of Charleston, by which the enemy will lose the whole fruits of an extensive campaign, and we shall receive a principal port for the exportation of our most valuable produce, tobacco and indigo.

“I might add a fifth object, which is the reduction of the Floridas, by the assistance of the Spaniards, but this appears too distant, compared with the others.

“We must now examine which of these objects is the most important to us, the most destructive to the enemy, and in fact the most decisive. We must then examine the means necessary to attain success in any and every of these objects, without risking every thing; and lastly, we must examine what means we can reckon on with any degree of certainty.

“The first object is the taking of New York with its garri-

son—without doubt the most important of the whole. A success in this will, in all probability, terminate the war. New York once reduced, the peace, independence and happiness of America are established. To attain this object, so important for us, let us consider the situation and strength of the enemy, and what will be necessary on our part to succeed. The strength of the enemy is fourteen thousand men. These are divided on Long Island, Staten Island, and York island, on each of which they are strongly intrenched, and without doubt sufficiently provided with artillery and ammunition. With respect to provisions we are not certain; but it is very likely that they are provided at least for three months. The port of New York blockaded and the place invested by land, nothing remains for the enemy but to defend themselves to the last extremity, or, by signing the capitulation, to give peace and independence to America. Can we expect this but in the last necessity? Let us now see what means we have to force them to it. According to the calculations of the greatest military men, to invest a fortified place requires thrice the number of the garrison. The situation of the place and other circumstances, especially having nothing to fear from without, may induce a general to undertake it with double the number of the garrison; but I know very few examples of such an enterprise being undertaken with less, especially when the most expensive preparations are necessary for the undertaking. Reckoning, therefore, the enemy's force at fourteen thousand, we must at least have twenty-eight thousand for this enterprise. Our present force is about seven thousand, and we expect about six or seven thousand French troops to coöperate with us. We want, therefore, a reinforcement of fourteen thousand recruits to have double the number of the enemy. Our army will then consist of fourteen thousand soldiers and fourteen thousand recruits. But may we expect ten thousand? If we receive the fourteen thousand recruits between this and the 1st of August, with respect to the number of men, we

may, I think, undertake the enterprise. With the arms and ammunition we expect with the French fleet, and those we have now in store, I think we shall be sufficiently provided in that respect. I will take it for granted that the States have taken precautions for providing the army with provisions and forage necessary for the enterprise. With respect to artillery I suppose that with what we have, added to what the French will bring, and what the State of Massachusetts can lend us, we shall have a sufficient number of cannon, but I am not certain if we shall have a sufficiency of bombs. I suppose, also, that the States of York and Jersey will furnish workmen, artificers and material necessary for constructing the batteries and other works necessary for a regular siege. In fact, I take for granted that the whole of the States will exert every nerve to assist in an enterprise on which so much depends. In this case we ought certainly to undertake the enterprise against New York. But as success will depend in some measure on naval operations, it is necessary to compare the force we may expect, with that of the enemy. At present we only know with certainty that the enemy have four ships-of-the-line at New York. What the French will bring, or what force Admiral Graves has with him, is uncertain. We should, therefore, consider whether we can hazard the enterprise with a force of three or four vessels less than the enemy. This can only be determined by those who are more acquainted with naval operations. But taking it for granted that we can, we have only to consider the manner of carrying it into execution. It is impossible for me to enter into a detail of the operations necessary for the fleet—operations in which I confess myself entirely ignorant. Nor shall I mention any further than it is necessary they should facilitate and cover the movements of the army. As the little knowledge I have of the ground is gained entirely from maps and information, my opinion on the operations of the army will, doubtless, in many instances, be erroneous, and I submit it entirely to the judg-

ment of the commander-in-chief and those officers who are better acquainted with the ground than I am.

“Having on our part the number of men and means before mentioned, the French fleet should enter the harbor and immediately land two thousand men on Staten Island; at the same time the Jersey brigade, with one thousand militia, should go on the island and join them. If the enemy on the island stay there till this is done, it appears to me their retreat to New York will be cut off by the fleet, and none left but by way of Constable’s Point or Bergen Neck, which I should think might be also cut off by a sufficient force towards Paulus Hook. Their works on the island must then be reduced either by assault, cannonade, or bombardment, and that part of their force, which I estimate at from fourteen hundred to sixteen hundred men, must be ours whether we succeed at New York or not. In this enterprise I doubt not the Jerseys will assist with a great many brave volunteers, who will render the success still more probable. I do not imagine the enemy will undertake to defend Staten Island without having reason to expect a superiority on the water. But whatever may be their determination thereon, ours must be to render ourselves masters of the island as soon as we possibly can. In the meantime our army should pass the North river, and approach towards King’s Bridge. For the safety of this maneuver I suppose some frigates or vessels of force should run up the North river. The enemy will then be shut up on York island and the Heights of Brooklyn. Should we attempt our approaches on York island, the great number of works they have would afford them the opportunity of disputing every inch of ground, and even where they have no works the nature of the ground is such that our superiority of numbers would be rendered useless. Suppose, on the contrary, that two or three Continental brigades, a large number of militia, and all the cavalry could shut up the enemy at King’s Bridge, whilst the remainder of the army, joined with four

thousand French troops, go on Long Island, and form a regular attack on their works at Brooklyn; these once reduced, either by regular approaches or by a *coup de main*, the situation of the enemy would become critical. We could establish batteries and bombard the city. The French troops alone could guard those Heights, whilst all our army might enter by King's Bridge and shut the enemy within narrower limits. In the meantime the fleet might enter the East river, burn the vessels, and afford us an opportunity of harassing the enemy in their position on York island. The remainder of our operations follow, of course. If we arrive at this period of the affair, success and glory will attend us. To cover our passage to Long Island, to keep open the communication, and to protect the vessels that may arrive to our assistance from New England, it would be necessary to have a couple of vessels of force in the Sound, which may be detached for that purpose round the east end of Long Island.

“Allowing as granted all the favorable suppositions which precede my plan for this enterprise, I would also wish and expect that all America, and especially New England, would concur in assisting all in their power, that all privateering should be suspended, and every vessel, whether large or small, should be employed in seconding an enterprise of such importance, on which the salvation of America so much depends.

“The more important this enterprise is, the more ought we to be cautious in undertaking it without a certain probability of success. Nothing, it is true, can be gained without risk; but prudence will dictate to us not to hazard in one unhappy hour what has cost us so much trouble and danger. Let New York be our first object for gaining an honorable peace, but let it be our last if we are to risk for it not only our own honor, but that of our allies. If we are not very certain that the fleet of our allies is at least equal to that of the enemy—if our land force does not exceed that of the enemy by ten thousand men—if we have not the necessary am-

munition, provision, and other necessities to the enterprise—if our operations can not begin before the 20th of August—I say, in any of these cases, I reject all thought of the enterprise, and refer to the second object, which is the conquest of Canada.

“I have already mentioned the advantages which may be expected from this enterprise. To them I add two other motives, which appear to me important. In the first place, the inhabitants of that country who are well affected to our cause have been in anxious expectation of our assistance since the taking of the northern army. Seeing that we do nothing for their assistance, they will detach themselves from our interest, and attach themselves to the enemy. In the second place, we can never hope so favorable an opportunity as the present, when we have a French fleet and army to second the enterprise. The reciprocal attachment the Canadians and French have for each other, would also make both act with more zeal and vigor. In this enterprise, as well as that against New York, I would also suppose the superiority of the French fleet, without which all the operations will be attended with much difficulty. But, taking the superiority for granted, I would desire that the fleet should enter the port of Newport and land and refresh the troops; the ships named for the expedition, with half the French troops, should then proceed for the river St. Lawrence, provided with every thing necessary for the siege of Quebec, and with four thousand stand of arms, with ammunition, to distribute to the Canadians who would join; the New York and New Hampshire brigades to be also embarked on the French fleet, and joined with the French for this expedition; Stark's and Hand's brigades to go up the Connecticut river, and enter Canada by the road made by Colonel Hazen, and form a junction with the French troops.

“The taking of Quebec would certainly be the principal object in this expedition; but we should put ourselves in a state of safety in the country, even should Quebec not be re-

duced in the course of this campaign. If I am not wrongly informed, the river St. Lawrence forms a strait twenty-four miles below Quebec, where the channel does not permit the entry of more than one vessel at the time, by which means the passage to Quebec may, perhaps, be disputed by some vessels or frigates. However, of this the old French seamen will be the best judges. The little general knowledge I have of that country does not permit me to sketch out a plan for the operations which may be practicable. This expedition will change our campaign in this quarter to a defensive one. We shall have the troops from Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Jersey, Pennsylvania, joined with three thousand French troops, the cavalry, and in case of necessity, a body of militia, to keep the enemy in New York. I even think we might do this and reserve a detachment of French troops at Newport.

“Should the enemy send any detachments from New York we shall perhaps be able with the help of the French vessels left on our coasts, to form an expedition against Penobscot or some other place. The expedition against New York being laid aside, the danger would not be so imminent, should we, instead of twelve or fourteen thousand, receive only seven or eight thousand recruits, and it is in this case that I would propose an expedition to Canada, not to lose the advantages to be derived from the French fleet and army.

“The third object which presents itself is the conquest at Halifax, on which I can say nothing. It seems to me that this should be undertaken only in case we can not hope for success from the first and second objects; that then we should keep with our army entirely on the defensive, and leave this expedition entirely to the French general and admiral.

“The fourth object is the retaking of Charleston; certainly a very interesting object for us, but equally difficult and expensive. And as this season will not permit us to act in that country, I am of opinion that after having tried something to

the northward we may then see what is to be done in that warm climate in a season more advanced, and consequently more favorable for military operations.

“I say little of the conquest of Florida. If our southern States should perceive that the Spaniards have any real intention against that quarter, I doubt not they will afford every assistance the proximity of their situation permits.”

The second proposition bears date the 10th of September, 1780, therefore, at a time when the proposed attack against New York was already abandoned, and Washington obliged to confine himself to the defensive from want of troops. It is a very able exposé, and contains ideas and historical parallels which prove that Steuben was an able staff officer and a credit to his military school, even in this line. It is as follows:

“By the state of affairs that your Excellency has been pleased to lay before the council of war, our situation seems such that it will be extremely difficult to determine what should be our operations during the course of this campaign. The only thing that appears certain is that neither circumstances nor the means we have, permit us at the present moment to think of any offensive operation whatever. What can be undertaken against an enemy placed on three islands, superior in naval force, and at least equal in land force, without mentioning the advantages that an army of veterans has over one, the half of which is composed of young recruits? We can not even expect to keep them within their limits. They have it in their power to pass the rivers and make incursions wherever they think proper, and I shall be much astonished if the enemy do not assemble their whole force, pass the river and try to engage us in a general action. If any consideration prevents them it is that, having so large a proportion of German troops, they are apprehensive of their deserting on such an occasion, while the English fleet blocks the port of New York, and thereby prevents a junction with the French troops.

“Let us examine what the enemy could risk by such an enterprise. We could not hinder their debarkation ; they can take a position opposite to ours, and keep up a sure communication to their vessels on the river, and to Paulus Hook. They can from thence examine our position, which, in my opinion, is good for defense in front, and even on the flank ; but so soon as the enemy make a movement towards our left, we shall be obliged to quit this position, to gain a march of them towards King’s Ferry. In either case we are exposed to a general affair, in which, for the above-mentioned reasons, the enemy has no other risk but a repulse. In an army of old soldiers a check exposes it only to the loss of a certain number of men ; but in an army composed of one half recruits, a check often brings on a total defeat. If our position was at such a distance from the North river, that a body of militia, mixed with some light troops, could threaten their rear and cut off their communication, in that case we might, I think, venture to offer them a general action.

“I repeat that I think our position advantageous. Our front is covered by Hackensack river, and by throwing some large trees in it, at the places where it may be forded, the enemy might be prevented from forcing a passage to a good distance on our left. But if this position had been one or two marches further from the place where the enemy could debark, without losing sight of the two objects we have in view, which are the communication with Pennsylvania and with King’s Ferry, I confess I should think it more advantageous. But in this case we must abandon Dobbs’s Ferry, which I should think can be easily reoccupied, whenever our circumstances will permit us to act offensively. In our present situation I can not think it of any great utility, and I fear that the enemy will one day carry it without our being able to secure it.

“Upon a general view of the situation, and especially after the unhappy affair to the southward, I think that our only object should be to stop the progress of the enemy, till some

more fortunate events permit us to act on our part. To do this I would not only wish the army to be kept together, but I should wish for as speedy a junction as possible with the French troops. How far this will be possible, both with respect to the safety of the French fleet and the subsistence, in case they join, I confess I am not able to judge. But suppose it possible, we shall then be superior to any force that the enemy can bring against us, and they will consequently be obliged to keep on their islands, till the arrival of a fleet of our allies gives us an opportunity to change our system. What appears to me most likely is, that the enemy, after the defeat of General Gates, will endeavor to push their conquest to the southward, and being sure that we are not able to undertake any thing against the three islands, they will embark what troops can be spared, and make a descent in Virginia, where there is nothing but militia to oppose their progress. How to stop them in that quarter is the most difficult to answer. The successive detachments we have already sent have lost us the troops of six States. Always inferior to the enemy, and not supported by the provincials or militia, they have been sacrificed as fast as they have been sent. Can we now risk to expose the Pennsylvania line to the same fate? At any rate we can not before the junction of the French troops with our army.

“But suppose this line was detached, considering how much they would be weakened in the march, by desertion and sickness, they would not be sufficient to resist the enemy without the assistance of a considerable corps of militia. So soon as the southern States have a body of at least three thousand men, and we are joined by the French, I will not then hesitate in giving my advice to reinforce them by sending the Pennsylvania line to the southward; but I should give it up for lost, if it was to be opposed alone to the efforts of the English.

“To attempt to retake, by detachments of our army, what we have lost in that quarter, we shall in the end be defeated

by detail. I could cite many examples in Europe where whole armies have been defeated by detachment. Prince Eugene, against the French, risked his reputation and the loss of the house of Austria for having weakened his army by detachment—he was totally defeated by detail. But our own experience will suffice. The troops of six States have already been lost, and if these States can not, or will not, replace their troops, the State of New Hampshire would at last be left to defend the whole thirteen States.

“To detach any part of the army at present seems to me of more dangerous consequences than any progress the enemy can make to the southward. In fact, they can only ravage the country, and this we can not hinder even with a superior force; and should they take possession of any places on the coast, so soon as the maritime forces of our allies become superior to theirs on their coast, they must abandon them.

“However critical our situation may seem at present, the moment the second division of the French, or a fleet from the West Indies, arrives on the coast, the face of affairs will entirely change.

“The greatest danger, in my opinion, that can threaten the country is a defeat of our army. The disaffected would then raise their heads, the people would be discouraged, and all our resources become more difficult. We should even in that case lose every advantage that we might reap from the arrival of a fleet of our allies to our assistance. My opinion then is absolutely this, to play a sure game, and rather suffer some little insult than risk the whole; to keep our army together as much as possible, and prepare ourselves to act with vigor when our allies arrive to our assistance.

“To these observations I must add, that the only assistance we ought to give to the southern States would be to send one or two officers perfectly acquainted with the order established in our army, to give the necessary instructions to the new officers the States will be obliged to create. This is, I think,

all we can do in the present moment. But should a fleet of our allies arrive, and put us in a situation to act offensively, what are the objects which then present themselves to our operations? The season and the strength of our allies must decide this. The enterprise against New York appears out of the question for this campaign, at least if we have not a superiority by sea by the 15th instant; and even then I think the force we have, which is not half from what was demanded from the States, will not permit us to hazard it.

“The second object is Charleston, against which an advantageous expedition may be carried on by sending two or three thousand men to reinforce those already to the southward. With the rest of our army we must take a position in the mountains of West Point. The French fleet and army at Rhode Island, joined with those we expect, will be able to carry on the operations on the sea side, whilst five or six thousand men from us can shut them within their lines at Charleston. The climate of that country will permit us to act in winter. The harvest has been abundant both in rice and corn, and the country abounds in cattle. Nothing then is wanting but proper arrangements to support the troops destined for the expedition during their operations.

“With regard to an expedition against Canada, I must confess I am not sufficiently acquainted with the situation of that country. I am told that an expedition by land is most practicable during the winter. If an excursion with a small corps is meant, I believe it; but if we mean to maintain our ground, I think the coöperation of a fleet in the river St. Lawrence is absolutely necessary, and how far this can take place in winter, it is not in my power to judge.

“The other objects are Halifax and Penobscot, the latter of the least importance. The operations by sea have too much influence in these enterprises for me to form any judgment of them.

“In all cases we should endeavor to draw advantage from the arrival of a fleet, proportioned to the superiority it gives us over the enemy. This we may do, provided we keep our army together, and are ready to act immediately on their arrival.”

CHAPTER XV.

HISTORY OF THE INSPECTION OF THE ARMY, FROM THE 19TH OF FEBRUARY, 1779, TO THE 25TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1780.—GENERAL ORDER OF THE 12TH OF MAY, 1779, CONFIRMS THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS, AND DEFINES THE DUTIES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ASSISTANT INSPECTORS, AND BRIGADE MAJORS.—THE ADJUTANT GENERAL FOR THE TIME APPOINTED ASSISTANT INSPECTOR.—REGULAR MONTHLY INSPECTION OF THE TROOPS ORDERED BY WASHINGTON.—THE MUSTER-MASTER'S AND INSPECTOR'S DEPARTMENTS UNITED.—STEBEN'S PROPOSALS OF THE 7TH OF MAY, 1780.—THE INSPECTION EXTENDED TO THE CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY.—INCREASE OF THE ASSISTANT INSPECTORS.—RESOLUTION OF THE 25TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1780.—STEBEN NOT SATISFIED WITH IT.—HIS LETTER TO WASHINGTON OF THE 23D OF SEPTEMBER, 1780, SPECIFIES HIS OBJECTIONS.—HE CONTINUES TO ACT ON THE STAFF OF THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.—HIS PLAN FOR THE DAILY MEETING OF THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF WITH THE GENERAL OFFICERS.—HIS SERVICES IN THE NEW FORMATION OF THE ARMY.—RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS OF THE 3D AND 11TH OF OCTOBER, 1780; THE LATTER CORRECTING THE FORMER BY ADVICE OF WASHINGTON, BASED ON STEBEN'S OPINION.—EXCELLENCE OF WASHINGTON'S STAFF.—STEBEN'S LETTER TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THE ADOPTION OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENT.—HE PROPOSES ANOTHER DIVISION OF THE CAVALRY.—HE DETAILS HIS PLAN FOR THE FORMATION OF A NEW ARMY.—HIS REASONS FOR THE SAME.—STEBEN IS SENT SOUTH.—HIS DEPARTURE A SERIOUS INJURY TO THE DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY.

WE have seen in chapter IX. that on the 19th of February, 1779, Congress, repealing all former temporary orders, issued by the commander-in-chief, first resolved on the permanent establishment of the department of inspector general. This plan was somewhat modified by the resolution of the 25th of September, 1780.

We propose to give in this chapter the acts, orders and memorials constituting the exterior progress of the inspectorship for the period included between the first and second resolutions, viz., from the 19th of February, 1779, till the 25th of September, 1780.

The preceding chapters have furnished ample proof that the office of inspector was without doubt the most important in the army, and that Steben's preëminence is principally based upon his labors in this department. He created it, and

in spite of the ill feelings, suspicion and animosity of the general officers at the beginning, gradually extended its duties, and finally succeeded in convincing the whole army of its pressing necessity. Without his energy the Americans would never have gained confidence in their own strength nor learned to turn to account apparently adventitious circumstances.

In consequence of the resolve of the 18th of February, 1779, Steuben formed his system of regulations, which, as stated above, was approved by Congress, and ordered to be published on the 29th of March, 1779. "Congress having established a system of regulations," say the general orders of the 12th of May, 1779,* "the commander-in-chief flatters himself that all officers will zealously employ themselves to become thoroughly acquainted with them, and with all possible punctuality and dispatch put them in practice within the limits of their respective commands. To forward this desirable purpose, the inspector general is immediately to enter upon the exercise of his office as established by Congress.

"He will take care that copies of the Regulations are distributed to all the regiments, one for each officer, who is to be answerable for it, and in case he quits the regiment is to deliver it up to the commanding officer. He will give the necessary instructions to the sub-inspectors and majors of brigade, relative to the duties they are to perform. He will see that a uniform formation takes place forthwith in the several regiments, and whenever he perceives a regiment so far reduced as not to be able to turn out under arms the number prescribed for forming a battalion he is to report the same to the commander-in-chief that the necessary arrangements may be made accordingly; for the present the battalions to be divided into eight companies, from which the light infantry will be drawn. He will by turns visit the different regiments at the hours of exercise, and see that every thing is conducted in strict conformity with the regulations. He will at all times pay particular

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

attention that the service of the guards be performed with the greatest exactness."

On the 22d of May the duties of the sub-inspectors were defined by the following general orders :

"The sub-inspectors have to consider themselves as under the orders of the commanding officers of the divisions to which they belong. They are to receive their instructions relative to the department, from the inspector general, and to see that the new regulations are carried strictly into execution ; they will take the general orders from the adjutant general and communicate them to their major generals ; they are to receive all division orders and communicate them to the majors of brigade. When their division is detached they are to perform the duties of adjutant general. On a march they remain with the general commanding the division, and assist in executing the maneuvers. In camp or garrison they are to see that the established duties are regularly performed, and particularly to attend to the formation, and above all, to the service of the guards ; to take care that all orders are communicated with precision and dispatch, to see the brigade majors themselves take the order from the adjutant general, and in case a brigade major is sick, that duty must be performed by some other major in the brigade, or by the oldest captain. To see the brigade majors keep their . . . * and detail in exact order, and that no regiment furnishes more than its proportion for duty. In camp to have two orderly sergeants from the division to carry orders, and on march a dragoon for that purpose."

On the 20th of June the duties of the brigade majors were likewise defined by general orders :

"They had to consider themselves as under the orders of the officer commanding the brigade, and to receive their instructions relative to the department from the inspector general ; to remain on all occasions with the brigade ; to keep

* Torn off in the original.

the details and see that every thing prescribed in the regulations is carried strictly into execution ; to be present at the formation of all guards and detachments from the brigade, and see that they are formed agreeably to the rules established ; to receive the general orders from the adjutant general, and direct orders from the sub-inspector, both of which they are to communicate to their brigadier, and having added those he may issue, communicate the whole through the adjutants to the several regiments in the brigade. If a brigade major is hindered, by sickness or any other cause, from attending for orders, he is to inform the brigadier who is to order another major or the oldest captain to attend in his stead ; in camp to have an orderly sergeant ; extraordinary orders to be sent from the adjutant general to the nearest major of brigade, noting on the order the hour he sent it. The brigade major having taken a copy will immediately dispatch it to the next, noting the hour, etc., etc. ; so with the rest till it returns to the adjutant general. When a brigade major leaves the brigade to go for orders or any other purpose, he must leave an adjutant to perform his duty in case any order come during his absence. To regulate their watches by the adjutant general, that the different beats may begin at the same time ; the brigade major of the day to attend the formation of all detachments in camp."

Congress, on the 22d of June, 1779, appointed the adjutant general, for the time being, assistant inspector general.* On the 1st of July, Washington directed the regular monthly inspections of the troops, by the following general orders:†

"The whole army for the future to undergo a monthly inspection, in which the state of the arms, accouterments, clothing, and camp equipage, is to be carefully examined. At these inspections the following returns to be made to the inspector :

"1. A return of the strength of each company regimentally

* Journals of Congress, v., 264.

† Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

digested, accounting for all absentees, together with the alteration since the last return.

"2. A return of the different articles of clothing in possession of each corps, with the quantity received, lost, worn out, or otherwise deficient, since the last inspection.

"3. A return of arms, ammunition and accouterments of each company, accounting for the alterations, and distinguishing such as are in the hands of the men absent on command, etc., from those present."

It is already seen that Steuben, in the course of 1779, established, as much as circumstances allowed, good order and discipline in the service, in the exercise and maneuvers of the infantry, and the formation of battalions. His next object was to introduce economy in the government of the corps, and to establish an administration calculated to stop the abuses hitherto existing in the grant of furloughs and discharge of the men, as well as in the waste of arms.

For this purpose Steuben exerted himself to get the muster-master's and inspector's departments united in one. He considered this union as the corner-stone, and the only solid basis on which the edifice of inspection could be erected. Without it the inspection was nothing more than a nominal establishment, the object of which was perpetually regarded with jealousy. It was inconsistent with the proper duties of an inspector to review only the men, while they were to be mustered by another; it was impossible to discover and avoid the disorder resulting from this duality; it was a wholesale squandering of money and time that two duties which belonged together were thus separated. Before the inspection was introduced, the muster-master department was supposed to perform its task in some way or the other; but after the inspection was established, it became a nuisance, and utterly superfluous. "Redouble your efforts, my dear general," wrote John Ternant, from Philadelphia, on the 30th of September, 1779,* "that

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

this union may soon take place, and that finally we may decidedly be something. Congress, some time since, thought seriously of this plan, and I let no opportunity pass to prove to my acquaintances what large advantages would result from it for the army and the public treasury. Everybody seems to wish this change, and the matter would probably soon be settled were it not for the ministerial dispatches which engage at present the attention and the care of Congress."

Steuben, however, finally succeeded. Congress, by resolution of the 12th of January, 1780, discontinued the mustering department, and annexed to it that of the inspection, in consequence of which the commanders of corps and regiments were compelled to give to the inspector an exact account of their men, arms, accouterments, ammunition, clothes, and camp equipage. It is due to this arrangement that considerable savings were effected in men as well as in the above-mentioned articles. Only from this time can it be said that the inspectorship was firmly established.

On the 7th of May, 1780, immediately after his return to the camp at Morristown, Steuben laid the following remarks before the commander-in-chief:*

"The inspection in the army has hitherto extended only to the infantry in the line; the cavalry, light infantry, and independent corps have yet no other rules than the articles of war, resolves of Congress, and occasional orders given them. Their discipline and manner of performing the service is different as they have commanders who have each prescribed such rules as they thought proper. This variety is the greater in this part of the army, as it has no chief to establish uniformity.

"The artillery, having a general officer at its head, is not subject to that inconvenience; the service is more uniform, and wants no other inspection but that of its general, or persons appointed by him. General Knox has, however, thought proper to appoint an inspector of brigade to receive the in-

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

structions of the inspector general, and introduce them into the artillery.

“By a resolve of Congress of January last, the department of muster-master was annexed to the inspection, by which arrangement every part of the army, without exception, must be reviewed and mustered by the inspectors, and an exact account given of the men, horses, arms, accouterments, clothing, camp equipage, and every thing belonging to the Continent.

“The department having become thus extensive, will require an additional number of officers, and specific instructions in the duties of the inspector general, inspectors and sub-inspectors. The following resolutions will be necessary:

“That the department of the inspector general shall in future consist of the following officers, viz.:

“1. An inspector general.

“2. An assistant inspector general, to be the adjutant general for the time being.

“3. An inspector for each division of the army, to be a colonel or a lieutenant colonel in the line.

“4. A sub-inspector for each brigade, to be a major or one of the oldest captains of the brigade.

“5. An inspector for the artillery, artificers, general's guard, and all detached corps of infantry, as also for the militia which may join the army, to be a colonel or lieutenant colonel, and to have under his direction two sub-inspectors of artillery, nominated by General Knox, one for the main army and one for the southern department.

“6. An inspector for the cavalry, who shall be a colonel or lieutenant colonel, and have under his direction two sub-inspectors, one for the cavalry in the northern, and the other for the cavalry in the southern department.

“The two inspectors for the artillery and cavalry to be always near head-quarters, where the inspector general's office will be established, from whence they will receive their instructions.

“In consideration of the multiplicity of business the inspector general will have, he shall, in addition to the two aids allowed him as major general, be permitted to take one or two officers from the line as aides-de-camp to assist in the business of his office; that he be also allowed as many orderly dragoons as occasion may require, to distribute his orders to the inspectors, and for every other military purpose necessary; and in traveling from one part of the army to another he shall have a sufficient guard of cavalry to escort him; that he be allowed a covered wagon, with the necessary chests for the transportation of the books and papers belonging to the office, and that the board of war furnish him with the books, paper and other things necessary for the business of the office:

“That each inspector be allowed, during the campaign, a small wagon with two horses, to transport his baggage and papers, and a marquee for himself; and as one riding horse is not sufficient for the fatiguing duties of the office, that he be allowed a good public horse, which is to be returned on his relinquishing the office:

“That the inspectors and sub-inspectors be appointed by the commander-in-chief; that they keep their rank and right of command and promotion in the line in the same manner as if they had not accepted the office of inspector, but that they suspend the exercise of their respective commands, unless when ordered to exercise them by the general-in-chief or commanding officer in a separate department; that when an inspector is ordered to review any troops detached from the army, his traveling expenses be paid by the States; that each inspector be allowed a sergeant from the line as a clerk:

“The aides-de-camp of the inspector general shall furnish themselves with one horse at their own expense, but as that will not be sufficient to perform the respective duties of their office, that they be allowed each one good horse by the public, with the necessary allowance and forage; that they be also allowed, in addition to their present pay as aides-de-camp, the same addition as is allowed to the sub-inspectors:

"That the commander-in-chief shall give particular instructions to the inspector general relative to the duties to be performed by him, and the officers in his department, particularly recommending him,

"1st. To form a system of discipline for the cavalry and light troops:

"2d. To collect into one volume all the resolves of Congress which relate to the arrangement of the army:

"3d. To furnish every month, to the commander-in-chief, as exact a return as possible of the state of the army:

"That the inspector general always establish his office as near to head-quarters as circumstances will permit; that all returns which pass through the office to the board of war be signed by him; that no person whatever have a right to demand any return or extracts from the office, but by the express order of the board of war or commander-in-chief; that in the absence of the inspector general the office be under the direction of the adjutant general, as assistant inspector general."

How far these propositions were taken into consideration and acted upon by Congress, will appear from the following resolutions, bearing date the 25th of September, 1780:*

PLAN OF THE INSPECTING AND MUSTERING DEPARTMENT.

"*Whereas*, The institution of this department hath been found of great utility to the armies of these United States, and experience hath shown that it may be rendered still more useful by an extension of its powers and objects; therefore,

"*Resolved*, That the former establishment, by a resolution of the 18th of February, 1779, and all subsequent resolutions relative thereto, be repealed, and the department hereafter have the following form, powers and privileges:

"There shall be an inspector general with the main army

* Journals of Congress, vi., 190-195. Session of the 25th of September, 1780.

of the United States, to be appointed by Congress, who shall be allowed two secretaries, in addition to the aid he is allowed in the line of the army, to be taken from the rank of captains and subalterns, who shall receive, in addition to their pay, six dollars per month.

“There shall be one assistant inspector general with the main army, who shall be adjutant general for the time being, and shall receive, in addition to his pay, ten dollars per month; and one to every separate army, when consisting of two or more divisions, who shall be the deputy adjutant general, and shall receive, in addition to his pay, eight dollars per month.

“There shall be one inspector to each division of the army of the United States, one to the corps of cavalry, and one to the corps of artillery, to be taken, when the service will admit, from the line of colonels, lieutenant colonels, who shall be allowed, in addition to their pay, seven and a half dollars per month, and forage for three horses, including what they are entitled to in the line of the army, and one extra ration of provision, when the state of the magazines will admit.

“There shall be one sub-inspector to every brigade in the army of the United States, one to the corps of cavalry, and one to the corps of artillery, if thought necessary by the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army, to be taken from the line of majors in the brigade, when the service will admit, who shall be allowed, in addition to their pay, five dollars per month, and one extra ration, when the state of the magazines will admit.

“The commander-in-chief and commanding officer of a separate army are hereby empowered to appoint inspectors and sub-inspectors to the militia, while in actual service, agreeably to the foregoing plan, who shall have the same powers, privileges and emoluments as those serving with the Continental army.

“It shall be the duty of the inspector general to frame a sys-

tem of regulations for the exercise and discipline of the troops in the manual evolutions and maneuvers, for the service of guards and detachments, and for all camp and garrison duty ; and if approved of by the commander-in-chief, and ratified by Congress, such regulations shall be enforced by the order of the commander-in-chief throughout the army.

“The assistant inspectors general shall assist in the general duties of the department, agreeably to the directions they shall receive from the inspector general, through the order of the commander-in-chief, and when the inspector is not present, shall have the chief direction of the same, agreeably to the orders they may receive as aforesaid : they shall nevertheless continue to perform their duties of adjutant and deputy adjutant generals.

“The inspectors shall attend to the execution of the regulations established for the army in their respective divisions, and in such garrisons as they may be ordered by the inspector general or assistant inspectors general ; at all times performing the duty of adjutant general to the same ; and when a detachment of more than one division is sent from the army, the oldest inspector of the marching troops shall act as adjutant general to the detachment.

“The sub-inspectors shall do the duty of majors of brigade to the brigades to which they belong, and attend to the execution of the regulations established for the army, in their respective brigades, and such garrisons, detachments and independent corps as they shall be ordered by the inspector general, or assistant inspector general with a separate army.

“The inspector general, and the assistant inspector general, shall review and muster the troops, in service, once every month, at which review he, or they, shall inspect the number and condition of the men, their discipline, the state of their clothes, arms, accouterments and camp equipage, and the number of rations they have drawn since the last review ; reporting such soldiers and recruits as are unfit for service, to the

major general or commander of the division, the brigadier or commander of a regiment detached from the brigade or division to which such disabled soldier may belong, to be by them, or either of them, discharged or transferred to the corps of invalids if, on the examination of the surgeon of the regiment, they shall be found unfit for further service in the field. But no such soldier shall be deemed legally discharged or transferred, except his discharge or transference is signed by the major general, brigadier or commandant, as aforesaid, and a certificate of his inability, specifying the nature of it, signed by the surgeon, is annexed thereto ; noting, at the same time, all alterations that have happened since the last review or muster, and, as far as possible, in what manner, reporting them with the deficiencies, neglects and abuses to the commander-in chief, or commanding officer present, and the board of war.

“At every muster three rolls shall be made out by the commanding officer of each troop or company, signed and sworn to by him ; one of which rolls shall be returned to him, certified by the mustering officer ; one shall be retained by the mustering officer, the other shall be certified and delivered to the regimental pay-master, to be affixed to the pay rolls.

“Each brigade shall be mustered by its sub-inspector, under the superintendency of the inspector of the division, who shall be responsible with the sub-inspector for the exactness and fidelity of the musters ; and, in like manner, all garrisons, independent corps and detachments, shall be mustered by such inspector, or sub-inspector, as the inspector general, or assistant inspector general with a separate army, shall order.

“The sub-inspectors shall deliver an abstract of all such musters, regimentally digested, to the inspector of the division, who shall digest them into division abstracts, in the same form, and transmit them to the assistant inspector general, and in a separate army, to the commanding officer.

“The inspector general shall transmit, once every month,

a copy of the abstract of the musters of the whole army, to the commander-in-chief, and another to the board of war.

“No commanding officer of a regiment shall muster the regiment he commands, but another inspector shall be ordered to do that duty by the inspector general.

“The assistant inspector in a separate army, shall do the same duties in that army as the inspector general doth in the main army, respecting the musters, according to the directions he shall receive, and orders of the commanding officer.

“The commissary of issues shall be obliged to deliver to the inspector general, and assistant inspectors with a separate army, an abstract, by brigades, of the rations actually issued, and of all issues to all separate corps, garrisons and detachments.

“All muster-rolls shall be sworn to before a general officer, or commandant of a separate post or detachment, who are hereby empowered to administer the oath, and certify it on each muster-roll, in the words following, to wit :

“I, A. B., do swear, that this muster-roll is a true state of the company under my command, without fraud to the United States, or to any individual, according to the best of my knowledge.

A. B., CAPTAIN, LIEUTENANT,

“ENSIGN, OR CORNET, *Commandant.*

“*Sworn before me, this day of 17 .*

“The mustering officers are empowered and directed to require from all the officers, whose troops are mustered, all papers and vouchers relative to their enlistments and musters.

“The inspector shall keep accounts, with officers commanding regiments, of all the arms and accouterments delivered their regiments, and returned in by them ; no arms or accouterments shall be delivered without an order from the inspector of the division, to whom returns for arms and accouterments

wanted shall be made, in the form directed in the resolution for the order and discipline of the troops of these United States.

"All officers of the inspectorship shall retain their rights of command and promotion, in the same manner as if they had not assumed the office. They are to suspend the exercise of their respective commands, except when they happen to be the superior in the division, brigade, or regiment to which they belong, or when they are appointed to execute any particular service by the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army; and are exempt from all common camp and garrison duty, that they may attend to that of the inspecting as well in time of action as at all other times.

"The inspector general, as often as the commander-in-chief shall think fit to order, shall visit every part of the army, and review the same, to see that uniformity prevails throughout the armies of these United States.

"The inspector general shall keep books, in which the returns, etc., passing through his office, shall be registered. He shall be charged with collecting into one or more volumes all the resolves of Congress, and regulations of the board of war, relative to the army.

"The traveling and other incidental expenses for the execution of the business of the office, shall be settled by the auditors with the army, upon such principles as shall be established by the commander-in-chief, and paid out of the military chest.

"The quarter-master general shall furnish all necessary books, papers, etc., for the department.

"Each inspector shall be allowed, when the circumstances of the army will permit, a marquee and common tent; each sub-inspector a horseman's and common tent; if not provided for as officers in the line.

"All the regulations respecting the objects of this department shall be finally approved and established by Congress, but, exigency of the service requiring it, temporary ones may,

from time to time, be introduced by the inspector general, with the approbation of the commander-in-chief, and transmitted to the board of war within one month after their introduction; that, being examined and reported to Congress by them, they may be rejected, altered, amended, or confirmed, as Congress shall deem proper.

“Resolved, That Baron Steuben be and hereby is continued inspector general of the armies of these United States, and vested with power to appoint all officers necessary to carry the aforesaid plan into execution, they being first approved of by the commander-in-chief.

“Resolved, That the assistant inspector be allowed four hundred dollars per month, of the old emission, in addition to his pay as adjutant general, from the 1st day of February last to the 1st day of October next. The inspector shall be allowed, from the 1st day of February last to the 1st day of October, three hundred dollars per month, of the old emission, and the sub-inspectors shall be allowed two hundred dollars per month, of the old emission, from the 1st day of February aforesaid, to the 1st day of October next, in addition to the pay and subsistence to which they are entitled by their respective ranks.”

Steuben himself says, about these resolutions, in a letter from Philadelphia, on the 23d of October, 1780, to the commander-in-chief: * “I am not very happy in the arrangement of my department. The plan relative thereto, which your Excellency has delivered to the committee which was at camp, after having been a little altered by that committee, was sent to Congress. Congress referred it to the board of war, who, after having altered it, sent it back to Congress, who thought proper to refer it to a committee of three, who made new alterations. Now it has been so much altered, that it does not at all resemble itself. No intimation was given me of it, and I read it in a printed copy, which fell accidentally into my hands.

* Revolutionary Correspondence, vol. iii., p. 128.

"The monthly addition of from five to eight dollars* to the pay of officers of such merit as those whom your Excellency has chosen for the inspectorship, appears to me so very mean, that I will not take upon myself to make them such a proposition. When the ancient majors of brigade, who, in the first institution, were taken from the line of lieutenants or ensigns, had an addition to their pay of twenty-four dollars per month, how can nine dollars now be proposed to a colonel for discharging so important and painful a function? I am now endeavoring to find how much the muster-master's department has cost the States. I am sure that the addition I ask for the officers of inspectorship will not amount to an eighth part of it.

"Several resolutions, in this arrangement, are contradictory to one another, and others are not sufficiently clear. I am, therefore, determined to present a memorial to Congress, in order to have the inspector's department established on the footing proposed by your Excellency, without any alteration. If Congress desire that I should continue in this office, I flatter myself that they will have a regard to my representation."

Steuben, however, did not confine his activity to the inspection of the troops; he continued to act on Washington's staff and give his opinion on all the important questions respecting the army.

Thus we found among his papers the draft of a plan† for the daily meeting of the commander-in-chief with the general officers, to keep up a continual communication between and consult with each other. "For this reason," said he, "in every European army, every day, at a certain fixed hour, which is generally between eleven and twelve o'clock, all the general and field officers of the army, and the chiefs of the several departments, assemble at head-quarters, where the orders of the day are issued to them by the commander-in-

* Steuben speaks of silver money, the Congress of paper money.

† Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

chief, or, in case he is prevented from attending, by the officer next in command; and if any general or chief of any department can not attend in person, such general sends an officer of his corps to represent him. The English army, it is true, have not this custom, but were obliged to submit to it in the last war, when commanded by Prince Ferdinand." He then described the way in which things were done in the Prussian army, and showing the advantages arising from this practice, finally proved that this daily meeting was the more necessary in the American army, from the great distance at which the generals and heads of departments lived from each other, and their consequent imperfect acquaintance. The commander-in-chief himself did not see the officers so often as he should, to communicate his sentiments to them, and to know their opinions on the different subjects he would desire. Steuben therefore proposed that an arrangement should be introduced into the army, according to which the orders should be issued every day, at eleven o'clock, at head-quarters, at which the general and field officers of the day, and those of the day preceding, the adjutant general, quarter-master, inspector general, inspectors and majors of brigade, and other general officers, were to attend.

To remedy the many abuses still existing in the army, and absolutely contrary to the military constitution, Steuben submitted to Washington sundry regulations for the better preservation of order and discipline. Thus he fixed the punishment of officers who absented themselves without leave from their regiments, regulated the number of the soldiers who were taken from their regiments as servants for the general and other officers, abolished the standing guards, prohibited that guards should be sent too far from the corps to which they belonged, and ordered precautions against the surprise of advanced posts by the enemy.

Steuben's services, however, were of the utmost importance in the new formation of the army.

Congress, as stated in chapter XIII., had made only temporary arrangements for recruiting and drafting the army for the campaign of 1780. In the course of the summer of that year, Washington's and Steuben's apprehensions, that scarcely half the number required on paper would be in the field, were more than amply confirmed. Congress finally arrived at the conviction that the large number of the regiments was one of the principal impediments in the way of a thorough and definite reform, and that mere recommendations to the several States to supply their quotas would not answer the purpose. They therefore concluded a new arrangement, and, informing Washington of their design, asked his opinion thereon, and his objections to the alterations which had passed Congress on the 3d of October, 1780,* and which read as follows:

“*Resolved*, That such of the sixteen additional regiments as have not been annexed to the line of some particular State, and all the separate light corps of the army, both of horse and foot, and also the German battalion, be reduced on the 1st day of January next; that the non-commissioned officers and privates in those several corps be incorporated with the troops of their respective States, and that such of them as do not belong to any particular State, be annexed to such corps as the commander-in-chief shall direct.

“That the regular army of the United States, from and after the 1st day of January next, consist of four regiments of cavalry, or light dragoons; four regiments of artillery; forty-nine regiments of infantry, exclusive of Colonel Hazen's regiment, hereafter mentioned; and one regiment of artificers.

“That each regiment of cavalry, or light dragoons, consist of six troops, and that each troop consist of sixty-four non-commissioned officers and privates, with the same number of commissioned officers as at present.

“That each regiment of artillery consist of nine companies, and that each company consist of sixty-five non-commissioned

* Resolutions of Congress, Vol. VI., page 206-209.

officers and matrosses, with the same number of commissioned officers as at present.

“That each regiment of infantry consist of nine companies, and each company consist of sixty-four non-commissioned officers and privates ; and

“That the regiment of artificers consist of eight companies, and each company of sixty non-commissioned officers and privates.

“That the several States furnish the following quotas, viz. : New Hampshire, two regiments of infantry ; Massachusetts Bay, ten regiments of infantry and one of artillery ; Rhode Island, etc., one regiment of infantry ; Connecticut, five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry ; New York, two regiments of infantry and one of artillery ; New Jersey, two regiments of infantry ; Pennsylvania, six regiments of infantry, one of artillery, one of cavalry, and one of artificers ; Delaware, one regiment of infantry ; Maryland, five regiments of infantry ; Virginia, eight regiments of infantry, one of artillery, and two of cavalry ; North Carolina, four regiments of infantry ; South Carolina, two regiments of infantry ; Georgia, one regiment of infantry.

“That the States shall select from the line of the army a proper number of officers to command the several regiments to them respectively assigned, taking notice that no new appointment is to be made of a higher rank than that of a lieutenant colonel commandant.

“That the States be, and they are hereby called upon, in the most pressing manner, to have their regiments completed and in the field by the 1st day of January next, at furthest.

“That it be recommended to the States to fill up their respective regiments by enlistments for and during the war ; but, in case the full quota of any of the States can not be completed with such recruits, by the 1st day of December next, that it be recommended to such State or States to supply the deficiency with men engaged to serve for not less than one

year, unless sooner relieved by recruits enlisted for the war, which they are requested to exert their utmost endeavors to obtain as speedily as possible; and, in order thereto, it is further recommended, that the officers at camp be empowered and directed to use every prudent measure and improve every favorable opportunity to enlist, for the continuance of the war, such of the men belonging to their respective States as are not engaged for that period, whether now in the field or hereafter, from time to time, joining the army; and that a recruiting officer from each corps be kept in the State to which the regiments respectively belong, to enlist recruits for the war, as well to relieve those who are engaged for a shorter or limited term, as to supply casual deficiencies.

“That two dollars be granted to the recruiting officer for every able-bodied soldier he shall enlist for the war, who shall join the army; and that a sum not exceeding fifty dollars be allowed as a bounty to every such recruit.

“That the commander-in-chief be, and hereby is, directed to cause returns to be made as speedily as possible to the several States, of the number of men they will probably have in the field on the 1st day of January next, that the States may take immediate measures for completing their respective quotas, as above recommended, by that time.

“That the commander-in-chief be, and he is hereby, directed to make a return annually to Congress, on or before the 1st day of September, of the number of troops from each State, in order that Congress may be enabled to make their requisitions from the several States with certainty and in season.

“That the clothing be furnished and regularly served out to the troops as it becomes due, and that a full compensation be made for any arrearages of clothing.

“That the regiments of cavalry, artillery, and of artificers, as they now stand, be considered as belonging to the States, respectively, to which they are or may be assigned, which

States shall complete them to the full complement, supply them with necessaries, and in every respect treat them as if originally raised therein, and that such other States as now have non-commissioned officers and privates in any of the regiments aforesaid, be credited in their quotas for such men according to their numbers, from time to time; for which purpose the commander-in-chief is hereby directed to specify such non-commissioned officers and privates, and the States to which they formerly belonged, in the returns which he shall make to the States, and in his annual returns to Congress.

“That the regiment commanded by Colonel Moses Hazen be continued on its present establishment, and that all non-commissioned officers and privates, being foreigners, belonging to any of the reduced regiments and corps, be incorporated therewith, and all volunteers from foreign States, who are now in the service, or may hereafter join the American army, be annexed to the said regiment.

“And whereas, by the foregoing arrangement, many deserving officers must become supernumerary, and it is proper that regard be had to them,

“*Resolved*, That from the time the reform of the army takes place, they be entitled to half pay for seven years, in specie or other current money equivalent, and also grants of land at the close of the war, agreeably to the resolution of the 16th of September, 1776. •

“*Ordered*, That a copy of the foregoing arrangement of the army be sent to the commander-in-chief, for his opinion thereon, and that if there shall appear no material objection, the same be carried into immediate effect.”

Washington gave his remarks at length, in his letter of the 11th of October, 1780,* which often literally adopted Steuben's views and proposals, and effected a change in the arrangements of Congress, as will appear from the resolutions of the 21st of October. On this day Congress resumed the

* Washington's Writings, vii., 245.

consideration of the report of the committee on Washington's letter, and thereupon

“Resolved, That the several regiments of infantry, requested from the respective States by a resolution of the 3d instant, be augmented, and consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, and one major, where the full colonels are continued; or one lieutenant colonel commandant and two majors, where full colonels are not continued; nine captains, twenty-two subalterns, one surgeon, one surgeon's mate, one sergeant-major, one quarter-master sergeant, forty-five sergeants, one drum-major, one fife-major, ten drums, ten fifes, and six hundred and twelve rank and file.

“That there be one captain and two subalterns to each company, and that the four supernumerary subalterns shall each have the rank of lieutenant, one of whom is to reside in the State to which he belongs, to enlist and forward on recruits; one drum and fife from each regiment to attend the recruiting officer; the other three supernumerary officers to do the duty of pay-master, quarter-master, and adjutant in their respective regiments.

“That the regiments of artillery be augmented to ten companies each.

“That, instead of four regiments of cavalry, there be four legionary corps, consisting of four troops of mounted dragoons and two of dismounted dragoons, each consisting of sixty privates, with the same number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers to each troop as at present.

“That there be two partisan corps, consisting of three troops of mounted and three of dismounted dragoons, of fifty each, one of which corps to be commanded by Colonel Armand and the other by Major Lee, and officered by appointment of the commander-in-chief, with the approbation of Congress; and that the commander-in-chief be authorized to direct a mode for completing, recruiting, and supplying the said corps.

“That the whole of the troops be enlisted during the war, and join their respective corps by the 1st day of January next.

“That the commander-in-chief and commanding officer in the southern department, direct the officers of each State to meet and agree upon the officers for the regiments to be raised by their respective States, from those who incline to continue in service; and where it can not be done by agreement, to be determined by seniority, and make return of those who are to remain, which is to be transmitted to Congress, together with the names of the officers reduced, who are to be allowed half pay for life.

“That the officers who shall continue in the service to the end of the war shall also be entitled to half pay during life, to commence from the time of their reduction.”

Steuben was instrumental in these happy amendments. Washington was one of those sagacious men who understood perfectly well how to make the most ample use of the talent of his subordinate officers for the common cause. He examined carefully, judged calmly, and put all his officers in the right place. Hence it is to be inferred that his staff was an excellent one—better than even that of the King of Prussia after the Seven Years' War—and for this combination of military talent he won the admiration of competent judges, as, for instance, that of Frederick the Great. The achievements of the army were much below the common standard of warfare, but the conceptions, ideas, and plans of his staff, and their execution, were inferior to none of any army. We, therefore, instead of detracting from, add only a new luster to the well-deserved glory of the American commander, by stating the part which Steuben had in the re-formation of the army. At this time he wrote to Washington:*

“I feel that I am troubling your Excellency with representations, which I need not, were I not actuated by zeal for

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

our service, the comfort of our army, and that of their esteemed commander-in-chief. I was mortified, during the last campaign, to witness the difficulties which you had to encounter daily, and the obstacles which you alone were capable of surmounting. They certainly add to your glory in the eyes of every soldier in the world.

“I examined the causes of these difficulties, and I soon found that they were the radical defects in the constitution of the army. Respect for the framers of that constitution would cause me to refrain from allusion to the subject were I not convinced that it is diametrically opposed to that order and organization which are recognized as absolutely necessary in every army in the universe. It is in vain to assure me that the American arms have won glory and distinction without that order and regular formation which are supposed to be so essential. I admit that our brave troops have achieved exploits so brilliant that posterity will scarce credit them. I am positive that the same spirit still animates our officers and soldiers, and that they would still fight with the same heroic energy that they have hitherto displayed. But I maintain also that order and a regular military formation would not only much facilitate military operations, but spare the lives of many brave soldiers, and largely diminish the now enormous expenses of the State, which are caused by the present disorder. To seek to prove by any chain of argument the truth of my opinions in this regard, would be to doubt the penetration of so experienced and enlightened a general as your Excellency. Besides, what I have just said is only a recapitulation of what you have frequently remarked yourself.

“Concerning the remedial measures, of the necessity for which your Excellency is quite as much convinced as I am, the following, I believe, are the most important considerations: to amend, without destroying, the constitution already established, and so satisfactory to a part of our officers, notwithstanding its many defects; to amend it so as not to wound

the ambition and laudable sensibility of our brave officers, who have won rank and dignity at the expense of their blood and fortune. Nothing is more distasteful to a brave soldier than, after having served his country with zeal and devotion, to see the army re-formed with which he won distinction. But it appears to me utterly impossible to keep all the regiments which we have nominally on foot. In the plans which I have presented to your Excellency, I have pointed out, perhaps, the only means of maintaining the old constitution in the formation of battalions as feeble as I have proposed. But if we can not keep the strength of our regiments formed in battalions to eighty files, and if the battalions below that number can not be incorporated with others in the same position, then I own that I am incapable of finding a better way to establish a permanent formation. The mode of dividing brigades into battalions, which was tried during the last campaign, caused immediate discontent among the colonels. Besides this, that formation was only used on field days, and on the march, when it was so altered from day to day that one day the brigade marched in four battalions, another in three.

“On entering camp the formation of battalions ceased altogether, and each regiment camped by itself. At the affair at Monmouth, if I am not mistaken, I saw that each colonel led on his own regiment, no matter how strong or weak it was. The general of the division can never judge whether the regiments or battalions are complete, or whether the half of them is wanting. In camping, also, the quarter-master general can never calculate the necessary space for so many regiments if their force is not equal. The adjutant general experiences the same, if not greater, difficulties for the details of the service. The distribution of all necessaries, the discipline, service of guards—in short, every thing connected with the service goes wrong from this disproportion in the strength of the different corps. I consider it, therefore, quite impossible to establish order and uniformity in any one branch, if uniformity of form-

ation be not adopted. I am as much opposed as any one to the introduction of novelties. I feel the difficulties, and I display in all my operations my desire to maintain all that is not absolutely injurious in the present constitution. But uniformity is impossible, without it is to be found in the formation of the corps. Every system is a mere chimera without the permanent establishment of a uniform formation."

It appears that in consequence of this letter, and the previous correspondence of the last winter, Washington asked Steuben's opinion about the new formation of the army, which he gave in the following memorial :*

"Last winter Congress were about determining on a new arrangement of the army. The motives then prevailing being the weakness of the regiments, it was proposed to diminish their number, and thereby give more respectable commands to those officers who might remain. It was also proposed to make some provision for those officers who, by this reduction, would be thrown out of the line. All this was in operation, but put off from time to time till the campaign was near opening, when it was thought too late, and the number of regiments, therefore, remained the same, except Sherborn's additional regiment, which was incorporated into the others.

"The regiments, very far from being complete in men, were as little so in officers. Those of the New England line especially were so destitute that it was with difficulty the service could go on. Two thirds of the companies were commanded by subalterns, many by sergeants, and some even by corporals, and many regiments were without any field officers, the result of which was a continual disorder and loss in the army, and every species of camp equipage. The greatest necessity obliged some officers to go on furlough during the winter. Those who remained suffered the greatest misery, and were obliged to do severe duty by absence of others and the great number of vacancies in every regiment. As fast as

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

the regiments were recruited, the officers joined their colors, and stimulated by a true love of their country, redoubled their zeal in forming the recruits; and I must do them the justice to say, that their success in perfecting themselves in so short a time, and in the middle of the campaign, exceeded my greatest hopes. I appeal to the commander-in-chief and all the general officers, that our army was never in such perfection of discipline and order as in the present moment. With what pains then must those officers see the moment approach when all that labor and pains shall be lost in the dismissal of the greatest part of the soldiers who have cost them so much trouble.

"This moment will, however, inevitably arrive, and all we can do is to prepare for the creation of a new army for the next campaign. The manner to procure men is, I believe, the principal object that at present occupies Congress. It is, however, to be wished that some means might also be thought of to keep together our brave officers. The great sacrifices they have already made for their country, with the many disgusting circumstances they meet with in the service, threaten us with dangerous consequences, besides the great number of vacancies already in the regiments. It is with pain I see every day officers who have served with reputation from the beginning of the war, resign their commission for no other motive but that they can no longer support the misery to which they are reduced, without any prospect of a remedy.

"The last year the want of men induced Congress to think of reducing the number of regiments. This year the want of officers will be another motive for an incorporation for next campaign.

"Congress proportioned the forces to be raised for the defense of the United States in the following manner :

New Hampshire,	3.	South Carolina,	6.	New Jersey,	4.
Delaware,	1.	North Carolina,	9.	Maryland,	8.
Virginia,	15.	Pennsylvania,	12.	New York,	4.
Connecticut,	8.	Massachusetts,	15.	Rhode Island,	2.

or eighty-seven regiments altogether. To this was added Hazen's regiment, raised in Canada, and sixteen additional regiments, the greatest part of which no longer exist, the remains of four being all that is left, viz., Jackson's, Webb's, Livingston's, and Spencer's. The State of Massachusetts have adopted Jackson's, Connecticut Webb's, and Jersey Spencer's. Livingston's is, therefore, the last of the sixteen additional regiments remaining. The extreme weakness of this regiment, and its consisting in great part of Canadians, are motives which would induce its being incorporated with Hazen's. Money then being given to Colonel Hazen, with permission to complete his regiment to the established strength, the army would consist of eighty-eight battalions of infantry. Should it be thought necessary to reduce the number to one half, the proportion will then stand thus :

New Hampshire,	1.	North Carolina,	4.	Canada, with Livingston,	1.
Pennsylvania,	6.	South Carolina,	3.	Massachusetts,	8.
Delaware,	1.	Connecticut,	4.	New York,	2.
Maryland,	4.	New Jersey,	2.	Virginia,	7.

or forty-four regiments altogether.

"The disproportion in these quotas can easily be settled between the States by money or recruits.

"Each regiment to consist of

1 Colonel Commandant,		9 Captains,
1 Colonel Second,		9 Lieutenants,
1 Lieutenant Colonel,		9 Ensigns,
1 Major,		2 Sergeant-Majors,
1 Quarter-master,	} These officers to have their rank and promotion in the regiment, but not to be attached to any company.	1 Quarter-master serg't.
1 Pay-master,		45 Sergeants,
2 Adjutants,		1 Drum-Major,
1 Recruiting officer,		1 Fife-Major,
1 Surgeon,		10 Drummers,
1 Mate,		10 Fifers, and

612 Rank and File.

Each regiment divided into nine companies, each to consist of one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, one drummer, one fifer, sixty rank and file, eight supernumeraries without arms. Of these eight supernumeraries, all extra service men, such as

wagons, etc., are to be taken. Each regiment to be formed into two battalions—each battalion to consist of

2 Field Officers,	20 Sergeants,
1 Adjutant,	5 Drummers,
4 Captains,	5 Fifers,
4 Lieutenants,	240 Rank and File, and
4 Ensigns,	32 Supernumeraries,

and the light company, four of which form a battalion during the campaign.

“Should such an arrangement be determined on by Congress, it should be carried into execution as soon as possible. The regiments should be absolutely completed by the 1st of March.

“As a regiment is during a campaign continually decreasing, and as it is difficult at the end of the campaign to raise so many recruits as are necessary to complete the vacancies, I propose, that besides the regiment being complete at the opening of the campaign, a recruiting officer of each regiment, with two sergeants, shall be continually recruiting, in order, if possible, to complete the vacancies that may arise. This officer is to recruit under the direction of the State, whence he is to be supplied with the necessary sums for that purpose. Those States which furnish more than two regiments are to choose a field officer to have the direction of all the recruiting officers in the State, and he to be accountable to the State. This officer is to reside always at the capital, and to act at the same time as the agent for the troops of the State. He has to represent to the Legislature the vacancies in officers and men, and every other thing respecting the troops of the State. Those States which furnish only two regiments, to appoint a captain for the same purpose.

“The infantry being put on this footing, the next thing is to complete the other corps in the army, as the artillery, artificers, cavalry, independent corps, etc., in proportion.

“In the above plan it appears that the forty-four regiments of infantry, exclusive of commissioned officers, amount

to twenty-six thousand eight hundred and forty men, and the eight supernumeraries for each company for dragoons, servants, etc., to three thousand one hundred and sixty-eight men—in all thirty thousand and eight. The resolve of Congress of the 9th of February, 1780, fixes the total to be raised at thirty-five thousand two hundred and eleven, making a difference of five thousand two hundred and three, which is sufficient to complete the under-mentioned corps. It will first be necessary to fix on the number of which each corps shall consist, and then portion it to each State.

“The cavalry is to be reduced to four regiments, besides Lee’s legion, Armand’s legion, and the corps of *maréchaussée*. Each regiment of cavalry to consist of two hundred dragoons, mounted, divided into five troops of forty each, exclusive of officers, and three companies of infantry of fifty each, armed with rifles or fusils, to guard the cavalry in their quarters. Armand’s legion to consist of one hundred and fifty dragoons in three troops, and one hundred and fifty infantry in three companies. Lee’s legion the same. The *maréchaussées* to remain on their first establishment of fifty horses in one troop. The whole cavalry will then consist (including their infantry), of eleven hundred and fifty horse and two thousand and fifty men. It might be determined for New England to complete the two regiments with the northern army; Virginia to complete Lee’s corps, and the other States to complete the two regiments to the southward; Armand’s legion and the *maréchaussée*, composed of strangers, to be recruited at the expense of the Continent.

“To complete the whole infantry, cavalry, and the trains of the army, will amount to thirty-two thousand and fifty-eight men, which leaves three thousand one hundred and fifty-three to complete the artillery, artificers, sappers and miners.

“I am of opinion that a diminution of the number of regiments, on some just plan, will be for the benefit of the service, and agreeable to the officers; the command of a regiment will

be as respectable for a colonel as that of a company for a captain. The regiments will never be destitute of officers, and the number of officers is proportioned to the number of men. The officers will not be put to the pain of being reduced, which would give cause to many complaints, and, I dare say, all would stay honorably employed, and have it more in their power to render service to their country."

RECAPITULATION.

44 regiments infantry, each of 682 men, inclusive of commissioned officers,	30,008
Deduct supernumeraries,	3,168
							<hr/>
Leaves number of fighting men,	26,840
4 regiments cavalry, each 200 men,	.	.	800				
4 regiments infantry, each 150 men,	.	.			600		
Armand's legion,	.	.	150		150		
Lee's "	.	.	150		150		
Maréchaussées,	.	.	50		—		
							<hr/>
							900
							<hr/>
Total infantry,	27,740
Total cavalry,	1,150
							<hr/>
Total men,	28,890

Washington, in his letter of the 11th of October, 1780, often literally adopts Steuben's views and proposals; and that they had the desired effect will be apparent from a comparison of his memorial with the last resolve of Congress. On the 23d of October, 1780, Steuben, then on his way to the South, wrote as follows to the commander-in-chief:*

"It is with the greatest satisfaction I acquaint you that the plan of arrangements for the army, which your Excellency sent to Congress, has been agreed upon yesterday, without any alteration. The granting the half pay for life, to the reduced officers, has met with some opposition, but the propo-

* Correspondence of the Revolution, iii., 126, 127

sition has not only passed, but it was moved and resolved, immediately after, to extend these advantages to all the officers in the service.

"In the minutes which Colonel Hamilton has delivered me, by your Excellency's order, I find that the four regiments of cavalry, or rather legions, were thus fixed :

Four troops of mounted dragoons, sixty men each,	240
Four companies dismounted, or chasseurs, sixty men each,	240
	<hr/>
Total,	480

"General Sullivan and Colonel Bland have told me that this is altered in your Excellency's letter, and that there are to be

Four troops of mounted dragoons, sixty men each,	240
Two companies of chasseurs, sixty men each,	120
	<hr/>
Total,	360

"Your Excellency will allow me to make here a short observation on the subdivision of this cavalry, without altering the totality of the foot or horsemen. Cavalry, especially when two deep, are not very terrible in their attacks in front, and least so when against infantry. The attacks of the cavalry, when they intend to overthrow or break a line, are generally made by troops or squadrons, or in column, or *en échiquier* (checker-wise). The deeper they are the surer they are to break through. If then, instead of four, a regiment was divided into six troops, the object would be better answered.

"There is another reason which has determined the King of Prussia to divide his light horse, or hussars, into six companies, forming three squadrons. The cavalry, after an attack, are generally in disorder ; they must then be rallied by the sound of the trumpet. When they are divided into thren squadrons, the right, left, and center only indicate how the men are to rally, which is not so easy when they are divided

into four troops. When three squadrons are in order of battle, the signals, whether the right, left, or center squadron is to charge, still meet with difficulty when the cavalry is divided into four squadrons or troops; and this is the reason why, in several European services, an odd number has been adopted for the maneuvers of the light horse.

“ Besides, our regiments of cavalry will have, I believe, as those of infantry, three field officers. Each of them will then command a squadron, which will consist of two companies. Wherefore I propose that each regiment of cavalry may be divided into three squadrons, each squadron into two companies, each of which shall consist of forty men, which will make eighty men for a squadron. The companies of chasseurs ought to be likewise three in number, each company to consist of fifty men, rank and file, attached, on all occasions, to the first, second, and third squadron of a regiment. And, as it often happens that the squadrons are separated from one another, each company of chasseurs ought to be always attached to its squadron, as well to support it in its maneuvers as to guard it in its quarters. As by this subdivision the totality will not suffer a great alteration, I believe it will not alter the general plan. I will, therefore, mention it to no one besides your Excellency, and I think it is in your power to order this subdivision, if you think proper.”

When Steuben wrote this letter he was already on his way to the South. A more urgent necessity had determined the general-in-chief to take the inspector general from the field of action which was particularly suited to his tastes and abilities. It was unfortunate for the army that it was left by Steuben at a period when his system just commenced to take root, and when his presence was more than ever required, on account of the reformation of the troops. However honorable this change might have been for Steuben, it was pernicious in its effects on the army, as the edifice, scarcely erected by him, was threatened with overthrow, in consequence of his absence.

More than a year passed away before Steuben could resume his activity in this sphere, and devote his attention to the inspection and re-formation of the army. During this time nothing, of course, was done in his department.

Let us follow him to the South.

CHAPTER XVI.

WAR IN THE SOUTH FROM 1778 TILL 1780.—CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.—CLINTON PROCEEDS TO THE SOUTH.—CAPTURE OF CHARLESTON.—GATES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY.—HIS DEFEAT AT CAMDEN.—GREENE HIS SUCCESSOR.—GREENE'S ANTECEDENTS.—HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH STEUBEN.—STEUBEN APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN VIRGINIA.—WASHINGTON'S FLATTERING LETTER TO STEUBEN.—CONGRESS RATIFIES GREENE'S AND STEUBEN'S APPOINTMENTS.—STEUBEN GOES FROM PHILADELPHIA TO RICHMOND.—VISIT TO MOUNT VERNON.—GREENE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO STEUBEN.—STEUBEN'S TASK VERY DIFFICULT.—CONFLICTS WITH THE STATE GOVERNMENT UNAVOIDABLE.—CONDITION OF VIRGINIA.—STEUBEN'S RELATIONS TO JEFFERSON.—THE STATE OF THINGS THERE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE ARMY AT VALLEY Forge.—STEUBEN'S REQUISITIONS ON THE STATE NOT COMPLIED WITH.—LAWSON'S CORPS ORDERED TO JOIN GREENE'S ARMY.—IT REFUSES TO MARCH.—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GREENE AND STEUBEN ABOUT THE SUBJECT.—SQUANDERING OF THE RICH RESOURCES OF THE STATE.—GENERAL DISORDER.—STEUBEN'S LETTER TO WASHINGTON.—COLONEL GREEN IS DETACHED TO THE SOUTH.—HIS OFFICERS AT FIRST REFUSE TO MARCH.—MULLENBERG BRINGS THEM BACK TO THEIR DUTY.—MULLENBERG'S CHARACTER AND LIFE.—THE STATE GOVERNMENT ORDERS NEW LEVIES, BUT THE RECRUITS DO NOT COME.—RENDEZVOUS AT CHESTERFIELD COURT-HOUSE UNDER COLONEL DAVIES.—STEUBEN'S DESCRIPTION OF HIS SITUATION.—HIS MEASURES AGAINST DESEOTION.—HIS PRECAUTIONS AT THE ASSEMBLING OF THE RECRUITS.—BAD SITUATION OF THE TROOPS AT CHESTERFIELD.—WANT OF DISCIPLINE.—INSUBORDINATION.—THEFT AND ROBBERY NOT UNCOMMON.—LETTERS OF DAVIES, GIBSON, AND LEE.—THE GOVERNOR'S ORDERS FOR BLANKETS AND CLOTHING FOR FIVE HUNDRED MEN.—STEUBEN INDISPOSED.—GREENE WANTS HIM TO JOIN HIS ARMY.—IMPEDIMENTS THROWN IN HIS WAY.—ARNOLD'S INVASION.

TO the state of inactivity in which, during the years 1779 and 1780, the two armies in the North remained watching each other, the theater of war in the South formed a striking contrast. Towards the end of the year 1778, an expedition was sent into Georgia by Clinton, Savannah taken, and part of his troops left by him in Georgia and South Carolina. The occupation of these States was of the greatest importance to the English, inasmuch as the richness of the country put them in possession of plenty of victuals and of various stores, while they were able, not only to deprive the Americans of a part of their necessary supplies, but also to prevent them from invading Florida.

The hot season of the year very soon put an end to the plundering expeditions into the interior, carried on by the English. At the beginning of the winter 1779-'80, however, Clinton himself left for the South, and besieged, in the commencement of 1780, Charleston, which was forced to surrender in May. This success, on the part of the English, secured to them, forthwith, the possession of the whole State of South Carolina. Cornwallis, to whom Clinton had left the command, soon after the capture of Charleston invaded the interior without finding any obstacle, and there was nothing to prevent him from advancing as far as Virginia, if Congress did not dispatch at once a new army and a new and qualified general for the submission and relief of the southern States.

In this critical state of things nearly all eyes in Congress were bent upon General Gates. Although the splendid success achieved by him at Saratoga was due rather to General Philip Schuyler, his predecessor in the command, it was, as it always happens in similar cases, exclusively credited to Gates, and as nothing since had disturbed his fame so easily acquired, he was esteemed by all equal to Washington as an officer, and by some ranked above him. Without, therefore, asking the opinion of the general-in-chief, Gates was at once made commanding general of the southern army. The hope of reaping new laurels, accelerated his journey, and having arrived at the place of his destination, he thought himself so sure of success that he did not heed the good advice of officers as tried as General De Kalb. Venturing to attack an enemy so greatly superior both in numbers and in the talent of their leader, he staked the issue of the whole campaign upon a single battle. The result was, that on the 16th day of August, 1780, he was totally defeated in the battle of Camden. The gallant De Kalb received a mortal wound, the regular army was annihilated, and the militia, especially the Virginians, totally and ignominiously dispersed, and in consequence of this defeat the whole South was exposed to the operations of Lord Corn-

wallis. At this critical period all depended upon Gates's successor. Congress, distrusting their own judgment, gave Washington the power to appoint him, and Washington selected for the command Nathaniel Greene, one of the ablest, most patriotic and energetic generals of the Revolution. He justified the choice of the commander-in-chief, and won for himself immortal laurels on the field which was thus offered as a scope for his talents and enterprise.

The reputation of Greene was at this time already established. As the officer in whom Washington placed the greatest confidence, he had shared with him the honors and exploits of all the campaigns. Being the son of an humble miller and blacksmith in Rhode Island, who at the same time was a Quaker preacher, it is not strange that his school education was very limited. What Greene afterwards became he owed solely to himself. After having worked all day at the plow or at the anvil, we find him spending the night in study. In his thirst after knowledge nothing was beyond his reach. History and mathematics he fancied above all; Cæsar and Plutarch were his favorite authors. At the outbreak of the difficulties with England, the young and enthusiastic Greene sided, of course, with the colonies. He had already acquired considerable personal importance at home, and in the year 1770 was elected to the House of Representatives of Rhode Island. When war became inevitable he passed the whole of the time in the study of the military art. Soon after the battle of Lexington the militia of Rhode Island met, and Greene, in the capacity of brigadier general of that colony, conducted sixteen hundred men to the camp near Boston. A few months later he was honored by a commission of equal rank in the Continental army.

Washington in his instructions informing Greene of his appointment to the command of the southern army, remarks:*

"I also propose to send Baron Steuben to the southward

* Washington's Writings, vii., 272.

with you. His talents, knowledge of service, zeal and activity, will make him very useful to you in all respects, and particularly in the formation and regulation of the raw troops, who will principally compose the southern army. You will give him a command suited to his rank, besides employing him as inspector general. If Congress approve it he will take your orders at Philadelphia."

In a letter dated Preakness, October 22, 1780,* Washington acquaints Steuben, in the most flattering way, of his appointment. "Though I am sensible," says he, "how important your services would be in this quarter, yet, as at the southward there is an army to be created, the mass of which is without any formation at all, your services there would be still more essential; and as I am persuaded that your inclination is to be wherever you can be most useful, I have recommended it to Congress to send you with General Greene to the southern army. If Congress approve, you will take his orders and proceed as speedily as possible. I wish you may have been able previously to obtain a satisfactory establishment of your department, which, in your absence, will become more necessary than it has been heretofore. But, if it is not done, I would not have it detain you. Assure yourself that, wherever you are, my best wishes for your success and happiness attend you."

Congress, in their session of the 30th of October, 1780, approved the appointment, by the commander-in-chief, of Major General Greene to the southern army, and adopted his opinion that the talents and service of Major General the Baron Steuben, inspector general, would be very useful in the southern department, to which he was directed to repair.

Greene and Steuben were old friends. They had been drawn near to each other at Valley Forge, when the latter was aided by the former in the introduction of his system of tactics. From the very moment of Steuben's entering the

* Washington's Writings, vii., 276.

army, the importance of his acquisition was acknowledged and appreciated by Greene, who became thenceforth the sincere and eloquent advocate of Steuben's reforms, while Steuben, at all times, was ready to assist and advise him in his new position of quarter-master general. They were both active in departments closely related to each other, and thus had every opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted, and of appreciating their mutual value. Steuben, therefore, placed himself most readily under the command of his old friend, who shared the same zeal and disposition. During the whole of the campaign, their relation was kept up, pure and undisturbed, and affords a very favorable contrast to the various chicaneries and jealousies so often indulged in by other generals, who thus render their own respective positions tedious and disagreeable.

Steuben at once proceeded to Philadelphia to receive his orders from Greene, and to make his preparations. He left that city in the beginning of November, 1780, in company with General Greene. The family of the latter consisted of his two aids, Major Burnet and Colonel Morris; that of Steuben, of Major Benjamin Walker and Duponceau. "We spent," relates Duponceau,* "the first night together, if I recollect right, at Chester. General Greene, having some business to transact with the Governors of Delaware and Maryland, we parted somewhere in the State of Delaware, and pursued our route to Richmond, in Virginia. On our way, the baron paid a visit to Mrs. Washington at Mount Vernon. We were most cordially received and invited to dinner. The external appearance of the mansion did not strike the baron favorably. 'If,' said he, 'Washington were not a better general than he was an architect, the affairs of America would be in a very bad condition.' The house at that time might be considered handsome, and perhaps elegant; but at present, the most that can be said of it is, that it was a modest habitation, quite in keeping with

* Duponceau, MS. Letters, No. xi., dated Philadelphia, September 9, '80.

the idea that we have of Cincinnatus, and of those of the other great commanders of the Roman republic. In the interior we saw only two rooms, separated by an entry, one of which was a parlor, the other the dining-room. They were respectably, but not luxuriously furnished. The baron having accepted the invitation, we sat down to dinner. Mrs. Washington was accompanied by a young lady, a relative, whose name, I think, was Miss Custis. The table was abundantly served, but without profusion."

Greene arrived at Richmond about the middle of November, and after a short stay went further south. "The distress and suffering," he wrote to Jefferson, on the 20th of November, "of the inhabitants of North and South Carolina deserve the most speedy support to keep alive that spirit of enterprise which has prevailed among them lately so much to their honor; and it is much easier to oppose the enemy in those States while the tide of sentiment is in our favor, than it will be to secure Virginia after they are overrun; a misfortune which may prove fatal to the happiness and independence of America."

On the other hand, Greene was too good a general not to discover at once that his success in the South depended in no small degree upon the state of things in Virginia; that unless affairs there were put on a better footing, he could not hope to satisfy what was generally expected from him. If he were to reconquer the Carolinas, he had to rely on Virginia, which had to secure and cover his rear, and provide him with the means of carrying on an obstinate war. In this emergency, Greene counted on Steuben, from whose energy, talents, and discretion, both he and the army looked for the happiest results. On the 20th of November, 1780, before leaving Richmond for Hillsborough to take the command of the southern army, he gave the following instructions to Steuben:*

"As the enemy are still in Chesapeake Bay, and as it is altogether uncertain whether they mean to leave this State or

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. iii.

not, I leave you to take command here. I have such an entire confidence in your capacity and experience, that I shall not pretend to give any particular instructions, but leave you perfectly at liberty to govern yourself as circumstances shall render necessary.

“You will, as soon as possible, collect a state of the force now on foot in this State, the different corps and time of service, which you will be kind enough to forward me, with such remarks thereon as may occur. It is also my earnest desire that you collect, as soon as possible, all the officers belonging to the Virginia line, and fix with them the names and number that will continue in service. The resolutions of Congress will be your guide in this business.

“I wish you to examine into the conditions of all the public works and stores belonging to the Continent in this State, and that a general return be made of the articles belonging to the different departments.

“The quarter-master general’s department is totally deranged in this State, and no deputy appointed to act. You will get the governor to make an appointment without loss of time, and give the persons appointed directions to lay in forage, and provide for forwarding the public stores through this State coming from the northward. The stores from Philadelphia will come by the way of Lancaster, York, Fredericks-town, in Maryland, and Fredericksburg, in Virginia. This matter is of great importance, and will claim your immediate attention.

“I am told there is a great number of arms in this State which are out of repair, but that a considerable part of them are easily put in order. As there is a pressing demand for this article, and as it will increase upon the recruits coming in to be raised in this State, it will be highly important to the service to fix upon some plan to have them repaired. You will, therefore, concert with the governor, as they are State arms, the most proper measures for having them put in repair.

"It is my desire that Colonel Lawson's corps of horse and foot should march immediately and join the southern army; and you will give the orders accordingly, having first settled with the governor whether they are under Continental orders or not.

"Let an officer be appointed to superintend the recruiting service in the State, and direct him to fix the places of rendezvous for receiving the recruits as soon as possible. Colonel Davies, I think, will be a very suitable person for this service. I shall leave with you a copy of the requisition made to this State, and desire you to urge an immediate compliance.

"You will write Congress and the board of war the state and condition you find things respecting our prospects of supplies of clothing, and means of transportation.

"As soon as Major Lee's legion arrives at this place, you will order them on to the southern army without loss of time.

"I am altogether uninformed respecting the ordnance department in this State. I beg you, therefore, to call upon Colonel Harrison, the commanding officer of artillery in the southern department, and who is now with the troops below, and get an account of him of the state of artillery and other branches of the ordnance department in the southern States, which I wish you to provide me a copy of.

"I beg you to let me hear from you as often as possible, giving a state of the train the public business is in."

The task thus imposed upon Steuben was extremely difficult and odious, especially that part of it which consisted in forwarding as many reinforcements as possible from Virginia, for Greene's army. While its proper fulfillment required a good deal of judgment and military experience, the duties of his office were such as to lead to an inevitable conflict with the State government. He was placed in this dilemma, either to please the State of Virginia and neglect the general interest, or to serve the general interest and incur the certain enmity

of the State of Virginia. It is superfluous to say that he chose the latter at the risk of his popularity. However respectfully his solicitations and demands were received at first, the nature of the relation between the commanding general and the State government was such that in the course of time they grew tired of each other, and the governor considered the interests of his State injured by yielding to the demands which Steuben made for the public good.

Considering this awkward position, all the entanglements and troubles Steuben had afterwards with the State government may be easily accounted for. From different standpoints, and with a great deal of pre-occupation, the executive and legislative power, as well as Steuben, have been eulogized and reprehended, or what blame was due to one has been charged to the other. This, however, is not just.

Steuben was in Virginia to attend to and provide for the interests of the whole continent. He looked upon the single State merely as the coördinate means for promoting and obtaining the higher end. The State, however, was looking only to itself, and no matter how good its intentions, often was wanting in judgment and failed to acknowledge the necessity of such military measures as the circumstances called for. The State imagined itself more than once a victim of conspiracy, when Steuben, for the sake of the southern army, for the benefit of the entire South and the whole Union, disposed of what belonged to the State; it saw usurpation of rights, and transgression of powers, in the orders of the general commanding. Though it may be admitted that sometimes these were rather at variance with what was commonly understood as liberty and independence, they were not the less in accordance with the interests of the country. An army managed upon democratic principles is an absurdity, a contradiction in itself. Never did a nation prove the truth of this doctrine better than the Americans. They were only successful, and continued to be so, after their army was disciplined; in other words, after

every man had learned to obey and bow to the absolute will of the general-in-chief or his superiors.

There is no doubt that Steuben, with the views and principles of strict obedience he had acquired in the Prussian army, often came in conflict with the ideas prevailing at the time in this country, and that he must have hurt the feelings of a good many. But if he made a mistake now and then, he was prompted by his anxiety to promote the general welfare, and even a blunder ought not to detract from his great merit.

On the other side, party fanatics went so far as to accuse Jefferson, the governor at the time, that he had done too little for the defense of the State. This imputation is just as groundless as that against Steuben, and probably would never have been raised if Jefferson had not been so famous in politics in later years. He did all he could, and responded to Steuben's requisitions, so long as it was in his power, but as energetic and active as he was, he was not able to overcome the difficulties with which the people of the State blocked his path. In regard to Jefferson's relations with Steuben, we must remark, that no matter how often they varied in their respective plans and pretensions, they esteemed each other highly. Steuben did not hold the governor responsible for the delays and faults of the State; but found that the slow movements of the Legislature, and the want of enthusiasm in the people, produced them. Jefferson, on the other hand, did not look upon Steuben as an obstinate grumbler, but as a general ever ready and anxious to promote the interests of his country. These amicable relations continued until Steuben's death.

The evil which affected the whole of Virginia, and which almost led to her ruin, was the infinite disorder, the recklessness pervading all classes, and the incredibly extravagant squandering of all her resources.

The state of things which Steuben noticed on his arrival at Valley Forge was bad, but in Virginia it was still worse. We do not mean to say that the State and its inhabitants were

inactive at the start, or that they were unwilling to make sacrifices. They did every thing at the wrong time, without plan, control or system, and thus did more harm than good. Every thing was in confusion. Nowhere was any discipline noticeable. Embezzling and squandering, robbery and theft, were carried on on a great scale. The natural consequence of this chaos was, that the zeal of the people, when they saw the unavailability of all exertions heretofore made, became extremely lax. They considered their personal sufferings only; they paid no attention to the general trouble; they concealed what they possessed; nothing could move them to make fresh sacrifices, and they looked even upon the man who was to set matters and things aright, as their enemy, and opposed Steuben's arrangements wherever they could.

Under these circumstances we need not be surprised at the unwillingness, on the part of the State, to comply with the requisitions which Steuben had made on it for supplying the southern army. He had asked*

“That the State immediately furnish its quota, agreeably to the new establishment, and that the men be supplied with clothing, blankets, arms and every accouterment necessary to equip them for the field, in a winter's campaign, and that Lawson's corps, and General Stevens' militia, continue in service until the regular regiments are formed.

“That the State immediately lay up a magazine of ten thousand barrels of flour and five thousand barrels of beef and pork, at Taylor's Ferry, and upwards upon the Roanoke; and if it shall be found that provisions can be conveyed down the Wateree River in boats, that they take measures for lodging the whole upon the waters of the Yadkin, near Bythinia.

“That the State put up three thousand head of cattle, to be stall-fed for the use of the southern army, to be driven to camp for slaughter as they are called for, and that some person be appointed to set about this business without loss of

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiv.

time, as it will be impossible to feed the southern army altogether upon salted provisions, for want of the means of transportation.

“That the State furnish one hundred good road wagons, with a driver, four horses and harness complete to each wagon, and that these be got ready for service as soon as possible.

“That the State furnish forty artificers for the use of the southern army; that twelve of them be shipwrights or boat-builders, twelve house carpenters, four wheelwrights, six smiths, three armorers, two saddlers, and one harness maker. These may be negroes, if such can be had.

“That the State furnish two hundred hogsheads of rum or other spirits, to be deposited with the provisions upon the Roanoke.

“That the State furnish such quantity of provisions at the different places of rendezvous for receiving recruits, as the officer superintending this service in the State may require, and that full and ample supplies of forage be provided for the use of the quarter-master general’s department to enable him to perform the business of transportation, and other services that may be required of him.

“That the State supply the military chest with five thousand pounds of specie, or the value thereof, to defray the contingent expenses of the army, and that such sums be advanced to the officers of the Virginia line as will enable them to equip themselves for the field.”

In the course of our history we shall have to revert frequently to this state of things, in order to understand fully the protraction of the war in the South.

To resume our narrative: Greene was well aware that his weak side was not in Virginia, and wishing to secure himself against the advancing of the enemy into North Carolina, he most urgently directed Steuben, as well in his above-quoted instructions as in a letter written two days later, at Peters-

burg, that he should order Lawson's corps to march immediately southward.

Notwithstanding the representations of Steuben and the orders of the governor, Lawson made no haste to obey. He arrived on the 26th of November, 1780, in Richmond, and did not report himself to Steuben until the 28th. According to his returns his corps consisted of three hundred and seventy-eight men available for duty. Steuben proposed to pass them in review on the 30th of November, and to send them on the 1st of December to Hillsborough, on their way to join the southern army. Anxious to support Greene with all his power, Steuben informed him on the 28th of November, of his intention. He indeed reviewed the corps on the 30th at Petersburg, but found only fifty-seven cavalry and two hundred and eighty infantry, who were ordered to march the next morning. On the appointed day General Lawson told Steuben that the Assembly had passed a resolution for discharging the men at Petersburg, and the next day the resolution was really sent by the governor to Steuben, who made every effort to engage the men for a longer term. But his exertions were vain; the men had already the idea of going home, and nothing could induce them to stay. Steuben then asked Lawson and the colonel's opinion, if they thought the men would proceed under the enlistment by which they were already engaged, and was told they would proceed with great reluctance and many would desert. On considering this he was in favor of discharging them. "I can assure you, sir," says Steuben, in a private letter, of the 4th of December, 1780, to Greene, "that you need not regret their not joining you, for from the ill condition of the corps with respect to discipline, arms, etc., and the short time of their enlistment, they would have rendered very little service."

"Upon the whole," answers Greene, from the Pedee, on the 28th of December, 1780,* "I am not sorry that General

* Greene's MS. Letters.

Lawson's corps did not come on; they would have been of little use, their time of service being too short. Nor am I surprised at what you inform me respecting the officers of the Virginia line. They have been too long neglected, and on that account have been too much indulged in being at home, until all sense of duty and discipline are lost. The State either value their services too low or have not the ability to provide for them. They are either poor or blamable, which, I am not able to determine. However, you must talk one language to the State, and another to the officers. The State must be pressed to provide, and the officers to obey. Our force is so small, and that which we have so badly provided, that it is of the highest importance reinforcements come forward as fast as they can be equipped fit for service; and what renders it more necessary at this time, is, the enemy have received a large reinforcement and our force is divided."

Steuben did all he could in order to accomplish Greene's wishes, and to prevail upon the government of the State to dispatch a considerable number of troops, but he was not successful.

"Instead of forwarding to General Greene the reinforcements, he expects," writes Steuben, on the 27th of November, 1780, to Jefferson,* "we are keeping a number of corps dispersed about the State, where no enemy has been these eight days, thereby exposing General Greene with an inferior force to the enemy, and exhausting what little provision was collected in the State." Generals Mühlenberg, Wilson, and Nelson, still continued at the head of their separate armies. The expenses of keeping such a number of corps were of course enormous and wholly unnecessary. "I find confirmed," writes Greene, on the 27th of November, 1780,† "in this State, what I apprehended, that is, that the numerous militia which have been kept on foot, have laid waste almost all the country, and the policy, if persisted in, must in a little time render it alto-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. iii.

† Greene's MS. Letters.

gether impracticable to support a regular body of troops sufficient to give protection and security to the State. The expenses attending this business in the waste of stores of various kinds exceed all belief. Twelve millions of money, I am told, have been expended since last spring. I hope Virginia will avoid this destructive policy, and I beg leave to recommend it both to them and to you not to keep a man more in the field, of the militia, than is absolutely necessary for covering the country from the enemy's ravages."

Steuben fully appreciating and sharing General Greene's apprehensions, imparted them, as in duty bound, to the governor, and proposed to discharge immediately all the militia who were not destined to go South; but for a long while he could not succeed in effecting his object. It was even impossible to get a return of the number of men whom the State had on foot, or the time for which they were enlisted; and when they were finally discharged, the arms and other articles with which they had been provided on entering the service, were lost, or at least not forthcoming.

"The more difficult it is," said Steuben, in a letter to Washington, dated on the 18th of December, 1780,* "to recruit our army, the more necessary is it to remove the abuses which cause the reduction of the number of our battalions. In consequence of your Excellency's orders a good many of these abuses have already been abolished in the northern army; but they are still luxuriously growing in the southern army, where they are sapping all military order, while in the Virginia line they have even reached their highest pitch. This State, having only a handful of regulars in the field, is continually ransacked by bands of officers and soldiers, who have always a pretext for not joining their regiments, and who are drawing pay and rations for doing no service at all, while they are committing excesses everywhere. Since the Virginia line was detailed to the southern army, it was never

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

regularly formed ; nay, since I have been in the United States it has not had a regular organization. Your Excellency will recollect that in Valley Forge the brigades of Woodford and Scott consisted only of a few soldiers and officers, confusedly mixed together without any distinction of companies or regiments. In such a condition every corps must be ruined. The officers do not care for their soldiers, and they scarcely know the officers who have to command them."

This carelessness on the part of the officers was still on the increase in Virginia.

The next thing Steuben proposed to do, was to pick out four hundred of the best provided men of Mühlenberg's corps, which at that time consisted of about nine hundred men, and to send them on immediately, under the command of Colonel Green, to reinforce the southern army.

"This has produced an event," writes Steuben to Greene, at Petersburg, on the 4th of December, 1780, "which appears to me very extraordinary. Yesterday a paper was handed me, signed by the officers, complaining of ill usage from the State, and of the distressed situation of the officers and men, concluding, that till something was done for them, they would not think of marching. You may suppose I was exceedingly shocked at such a proceeding ; however, as it was not addressed to me, I thought it more prudent to take no other notice of it, than to speak to General Mühlenberg on the subject. I represented fully to him, and to Colonels Harrison and Green, the fatal consequences of such a proceeding, and they promised to speak to the officers."

Mühlenberg, Green and Harrison made every effort to answer Steuben's wish, and by their influence on officers and men they succeeded in getting the offensive resolution withdrawn. Thus the corps was brought to reason, and after being completely provided with clothing, arms and camp equipage, marched, on the 14th of December, for the southern army. The whole detachment consisted of four hundred and

fifty-six men. The peaceable means to which Steuben was obliged to resort to quell this mutiny, exposes but too clearly his helplessness and the insufficiency of his power.

We shall hereafter very often meet Mühlenberg, as he commanded under Steuben in Virginia, and during that time came in daily contact with him.

John Peter Gabriel Mühlenberg,* born on the 1st of October, 1746, in La Trappe, Montgomery county, Pennsylvania, was in his character very much like Steuben. He had the same frank and true-hearted soul, and in every respect was a capable and faithful officer. His father, Henry Melchior Mühlenberg, from Einbeck in Hanover, came to America in the year 1742, prompted by the theological circle of Francke in Halle, and became here the founder of the German Lutheran Church. He may well be looked upon as the most important and influential German who immigrated in the last century, and enjoyed the highest esteem and social position among all classes. His oldest son, Peter, was also intended for a preacher, and after having spent his boyhood in the woods and mountains of La Trappe, in the year 1763 was sent to Halle, in order to complete his education. The sprightly and energetic boy was, however, ill fitted for his intended vocation. He preferred rambling about in the woods and fields to the school hours on the benches of the Orphan Institute, and was of course an indifferent scholar. Little more than a year he bore the confinement. One day he had a fight with one of his teachers, and ran away from the college. He chose the only opening offered to him in his distress, by enlisting as a private in a regiment of dragoons which happened to pass through Halle. Being recognized by a friend of his family, Mühlenberg owed it to him that after having served nearly a year, he was discharged, and at once sent back to America. The iron discipline exercised in the military service of that time had somewhat softened his temper, and his father,

* The Life of Major General Peter Müldenbergl, by H. A. Mühlenberg, Philadelphia, 1849

glad to see him back, forgave him all his past offenses. If Peter had been allowed to pursue his own inclinations, he would have followed hunting and farming, but he felt himself bound to acquiesce in the wishes of his father, and became a preacher. In this capacity he acted at first in New Germantown, Somerset county, in the State of New Jersey, and afterwards in Woodstock, Dunmore county, Virginia. Here he took an active part in the difficulties and troubles just commencing with England, communicated with the most important politicians of the State, as Patrick Henry and Washington, and was elected member of the House of Burgesses and of the convention at Williamsburg. When, in the winter of 1775-1776, the hostilities commenced in Virginia, and six new regiments were created, in addition to those already existing, Mühlenberg was nominated colonel of the eighth. From this period he became a zealous soldier. In taking leave of his little congregation, in the middle of January, 1776, and mentioning at the end of his sermon that the hour of battle had come, he at once threw off his gown, and stood before his hearers in full uniform in the pulpit, ordered the drummers to beat a march, and opened a list for the signature of recruits. Nearly three hundred German members came forward to enter their names, and thenceforth followed the standard of Mühlenberg. This corps distinguished itself during the whole war, under the name of the "German Regiment," by its good discipline and bravery. Mühlenberg, after having been employed, during the year 1776, in defending the southern provinces, received orders, in the summer of 1777, to join the main army, where he remained until the winter of 1779. At this time he was sent once more to Virginia, and was commander-in-chief in that State until the arrival of Steuben.

It was Steuben's design and task to dispatch all the Virginia regulars to General Greene in the South, so soon as their places were filled by the new drafts of recruits who were to assemble, and so soon as the cloth, accouterments and arms

necessary for their equipment, could be collected. But the difficulty of procuring men, stores and arms was much greater than could reasonably be expected. For attaining his purpose Steuben ordered Mühlenthal's corps, and those of the militia who were engaged for three months and more, to Petersburg, while he appointed at the same time Colonel William Davies, an excellent officer, to proceed to Chesterfield to collect, equip, discipline and forward to the army the recruits who were to be raised in the State. He also ordered two magazines to be established there for the quarter-master's and field commissary's stores, and barracks provided for at least three hundred men. As soon as two hundred men were assembled and equipped in the best possible manner, Colonel Davies had to form them into four companies of fifty men each, with at least two officers to each company, and thus send them to the army.

The Virginia troops under General Greene were literally naked, and consequently dirty, and exceedingly deficient in discipline. "I wish you to inform the State," writes Greene to Steuben, on the 8th of December, from his camp at Charlotte "that the troops must be properly found with every thing to fit them for service, or that they will not be received. Urge the State to begin the forming the magazines upon the Roanoke, for I am much afraid provision will fail us in this State, not altogether from a scarcity, but the want of money. Use every argument you can to convince the Assembly of the necessity of clothing their troops. If they mean they shall render any service, or do not wish to fall a sacrifice to death, desertion and disease, I beg them to give their men good covering, for without it this will be their portion."

Thus the most prominent difficulties in Steuben's way were: how to raise the troops and keep them up to their number, and how to provide them with clothing, arms and provisions.

"By the inclosed copy of General Greene's instructions to me," writes Steuben, on the 8th of December, 1780, to the board of war and Washington,* "you will see what kind of

* Steuben MS. Copy-Book.

business I am left here to transact, but I can not so easily represent to you the difficulties I meet with in the execution. The derangement of the finances is more sensibly felt here than in any other part of the continent. All the wheels of the administration are stopped; the late invasion of the enemy has completed the confusion. The few articles which were in the Continental as well as State magazines were distributed, without any orders, to the several corps of volunteers, militia, etc., and although the strictest orders have been given to collect the whole, I fear a considerable number will be lost.

“The quarter-master’s department, and indeed almost all the departments here have no head. The executive part of the administration is carried on only by expedients, while the Legislature can not agree on any system whatsoever. They are now debating on the state of finances, and the new arrangement of the army has not yet been taken into consideration.

“I find it absolutely impossible to give you an exact account of the troops of this State. I have found under the orders of General Mühlenberg a body of about eleven hundred men, part of whom are enlisted for eighteen months, another part for eight months, and a third for three months. All these men I have found naked and as ill armed as possible. There were, besides, the scattered remains of two State regiments, consisting of one hundred and twenty men, enlisted for the war. These troops are commanded by officers of different corps and regiments who remained in the State under the order of General Scott. They dispersed since that time through the country, and some have joined General Mühlenberg on the late invasion. Another number of officers in the line are still scattered through the State and have not joined General Mühlenberg, notwithstanding the general orders he has issued to them to do so.

“Nothing will be more difficult than to arrange the line of the officers of this State according to the new establish-

ment. Those who are actually exchanged, the great number who still remain prisoners of war, those of the old and new State regiments, and of the additional regiments, all have different pretensions, of which it is not an easy matter to decide.

“The ninth regiment is now garrisoned at Fort Pitt. This regiment consists only of one hundred and fifty men; it has all its officers, and is commanded by Colonel John Gibson. Colonel Morgan is at the army under General Greene, and commands a company of Gibson’s State regiment and several other small detachments, of which no returns have as yet been transmitted to me. There are with him some officers belonging to different corps. Brigadier General Stevens commands a body of militia and three months’ men at Hillsborough, with whom, I think, he has now joined General Greene at Salisbury.

“The State had raised, besides, a body of volunteers under the command of Brigadier General Lawson. The raising of this corps occasioned a great deal of expense. They were enlisted only for six months, and were not all together when their time was so far advanced as to have nearly expired at the time of their march to the southern army. This consideration engaged the government here to dismiss them before they had rendered any service, and the whole expense is lost to the public. The brigade consisted of fifty-seven horse and two hundred and eighty-three infantry.

“Another corps of volunteers and three months’ men was in the same case. It consisted of about three hundred riflemen, and the time of their service was to expire in six weeks, which induced me to discharge them to save provisions.

“You have now very nearly, gentlemen, a complete account of the present state of the military in Virginia.

“As soon as the enemy had left the bay, my first care was to dismiss the militia and those several corps that were fruitlessly exhausting our magazines. I gave immediate orders to

collect the articles so much wanted to equip the men who are to reinforce the southern army.

"My first design was to reinforce General Greene with Lawson's corps and a detachment of infantry of eight hundred men; but the former being disbanded and the other troops unprovided with every kind of necessaries, all I could do was to equip a regiment of four hundred infantry whom I will set on their march the 10th of this month, under the orders of Colonel Green, and who will join in fifteen days the army at Salisbury.

"Colonel Lee's corps arrived here this day; I furnished him with twenty-five good men as this State's quota, toward recruiting his corps; they will set forward immediately and arrive about the same time.

"I have assembled the rest of the troops at Chesterfield, where there are barracks. In proportion as they are equipped, I will send them forward by detachments to the army.

"Neither the new arrangement nor any other formation can take place until the officers and their men have joined the army. I will, therefore, publish an order to all the officers in the line to repair to Chesterfield, whence they will conduct the detachments. When they are arrived at the army, the new establishment may in pursuance to the orders of Congress be finally determined on."

It was impossible to get a return of the number of men whom the State had on foot, or of the time for which they were enlisted. Even a return of the Virginians in service at the South, necessary as it was for determining how many men were still to be raised, could not be given by the inspector, Colonel O. H. Williams, as the Virginia troops were entirely deranged after the defeat of Camden, and as there was no regular corps left in camp except the regiment of Colonel Buford. Under these circumstances it was not in the power of Steuben to arrange the State line according to Greene's orders. The scattered situation of the officers, their different

pretensions, and several other impediments, rendered it utterly impracticable to make any arrangement before all the officers arrived at camp. The country was full of officers and men, sent from the army under various pretenses, by which the service suffered exceedingly. Steuben, therefore, ordered all the Continental officers belonging to the Virginia line, to assemble at Chesterfield Court-house, on or before the 10th of February, 1781, that their claims might be considered and finally decided upon. Those who failed to attend were to be considered as having resigned, those living in the vicinity of Chesterfield had to repair thither as soon as possible, to take charge of the troops who might be ready to join the southern army. In order the more effectually to keep the troops together, Steuben laid a plan for preventing desertion, before the governor, in which he clearly indicates the abuses and disorder prevailing in the army.

“By the long continuation,” so it begins, “of a war, it is natural that the difficulty and expense of raising men should increase; and, therefore, every possible means should be employed for the preservation of the men after they are raised, and every abuse which has a contrary tendency should be inquired into, and those who commit them severely punished.

“The incomplete state our regiments have always been in, has had a very bad effect in this respect; the regiments were obliged to be incorporated into one another, and the officers being shifted about no longer, had not that attachment to their men which is necessary for their preservation; on the contrary, being disgusted at the instability and smallness of their commands, they became careless of their men and suffered them to absent themselves when well, and when sent away sick, took no pains for their recovery or their return, and every doctor in an hospital gave furloughs and discharges, whereby numbers of men have been lost to the service.

“As discharges from the army have been without any prescribed form, and not printed, it is more than probable that

many have been counterfeited by deserters, who have thus returned with impunity to their homes. That these, and other abuses, have been too often committed in this State, is evident from the very small number of the eighteen month men now in service."

Toward the latter part of December, 1780, the State Assembly had resolved to raise three thousand men by enlistment for the war, or by draft for eighteen months, in order to complete their line on the new establishment. Steuben found this force too small for the purpose intended. Persuaded that even this number could not be collected if no greater precautions were taken than hitherto, he proposed the following plan to the government :

"That there should be one general rendezvous for all the recruits of the State at Chesterfield Court-house, where Colonel Davies was appointed to command.

"Besides this there should not be less than six nor more than eight places of rendezvous, appointed by the Legislature at places thought most proper, where the recruits should be delivered by the county lieutenant, or some person authorized by him. A captain, two subalterns, and four sergeants, to be stationed at each of these places to receive the recruits, and written instructions should be given to each captain, with a description of the recruits that were to be accepted. With each recruit a paper should be delivered specifying his age, size, trade, place of residence, county for which he served, if drafted or enlisted, and for how long, and the bounty he received ; and as the Assembly had determined that each district should furnish their recruits with certain articles of clothing, whatever clothing was delivered with the recruit should also be inserted, and the whole signed by the person who delivered them.

"The officer receiving the recruit should give duplicate receipts to the county lieutenant, one of which he had to keep, and to send the other to the governor as voucher for the delivery of the recruit. From these places of rendezvous the

recruits were to be sent, properly officered, to the general rendezvous, where they were to be equipped and sent by detachments to the army.

"Colonel Davies was to be furnished by government with the number each county had to furnish, that he might inform them from time to time what progress they made in completing the quota assigned to them.

"With these precautions," concludes Steuben, "I have hopes that the deficiencies will not be so great as they have always been. Indeed I am fully of opinion that hitherto nobody has known how many recruits have been delivered by the State or received by the army."

It is proved by the fact that the number of recruits assembling in December, 1780, at Chesterfield Court-house, did not amount to more than five or six hundred men, that energetic measures should be speedily adopted to remedy the existing abuses. These men were so naked, that if some clothing and blankets could not be procured at once for them, they must all fall sick before they could be ordered to march. While thus the poor Continentals were perishing for want of the barest necessities, the blankets, which the State of Virginia had issued, and which the militia had agreed to give up for the troops, were delivered to General Lawson's corps, which consisted mostly of persons of property—that same corps which refused to march for the South, and which, being engaged only for a short term, had come into the field well provided with clothing. "Shoes and blankets," writes Davies, on the 31st of December, 1780, to Steuben, "and, indeed, almost every kind of clothing, are universally wanting. I think not more than one hundred and fifty can take the field as at present clad, but with clothing I think four hundred might march. Indians are not more naked, nor half so miserable. We have seventy good tents, but we have not, nor have I ever been able to get, notwithstanding my frequent applications, any cords to make loops with."

"It has been," reports Davies on another occasion, "a matter of great concern to me, that the officers can not be prevailed upon to confine themselves to this station; they do not look upon the men as permanently theirs, and therefore they will not pay the same attention to them as if they were. Thus they are entire strangers to the men; many have deserted, and nobody knows any thing about it; and to this hour soldiers are dropping in, one after another, belonging to no company, and begging to be admitted. Some of the companies, too, have no officers here, owing to furloughs which have been granted, and to their delay in coming up from Petersburg, so that the greatest difficulties have occurred in completing the rolls. I thought it better to send them to you imperfect as they are, than run the risk of delay which you seemed in your letter desirous for me to avoid."

"It is needless to repeat to you," writes Colonel H. Lee, Jr., on the 17th of December, from Balesburg, to Steuben, "our nakedness and wants. Their influence I have already experienced, having lost three of my old soldiers and one wagoner since the morning. Shoes, boots, overalls, shirts, blankets, vests and coats compose the essential part of our distress. We want axes and horse shoes exceedingly, being entirely destitute of these articles."

On the same day Colonel Davies asked two or more whip saws and hand saws for the use of his post at Chestertield, as he had borrowed those he had had in use, and been compelled to return them. "We are exceedingly distressed," says Davies at another place, "for want of somebody to attend to our men in camp, as the hospital is so full we can not find room for them. Three have died in the huts within these four days, owing to the hardships of their situation."

These instances may suffice to show the nakedness of the troops, the total insufficiency of means, and the neglect on the part of the government to provide the most indispensable necessities of equipage to make the soldiers fit for duty.

It was but the natural consequence of this state of things that insubordination, want of discipline and desertion prevailed generally. Even theft and robbery sometimes occurred. "The store containing some clothing," writes Colonel George Gibson, dated Batavia, on the 22d of December, 1780, to Steuben, "for the regiment late under my command, was broken open on Wednesday last, and robbed of many valuable articles to a considerable amount. Lieutenant Russell, who first discovered the depredation, found the corporal absent from his guard and drunk, and from every other circumstance he is induced to believe the guard either were the sole perpetrators of the villainy, or else collusively so. The many robberies committed by the very rascals who were placed as guards have been so frequently practiced by the soldiery in our line, that impunity seems to have fixed this mode of doing business as a matter of duty. However, I hope in God the example that will be made of these miscreants will deter others from attempting any thing of the kind in future."

Under these circumstances Steuben's operations proceeded but very slowly. He prevailed, however, on the governor to give orders for the immediate purchase of clothing and blankets for five hundred men to equip the troops at Chesterfield; he endeavored to procure as many good arms as possible, with bayonets, and this done he intended to send to Greene another detachment like that under Colonel Green. Steuben wished himself to join General Greene as soon as he had succeeded in arranging the Virginia line. He was laboring under a severe indisposition, partly from the innumerable vexations to which his official duties subjected him, and partly from the badness of the accommodations that were provided for him. "It is the way," writes Davies, on the 25th of December, 1780, to B. Walker, "this thankless, and I was going to say, worthless country treats all her officers. If it would be equally convenient to the baron, I will cheerfully give up my quarters to him." Greene himself was anxious to get the assistance of

Steuben. "As I am now," writes he on the 28th of December, 1780, from his camp on the Pedee, "without a single general officer with me in this camp, except General Huger, who is a brigadier for this State, and not desirous of commanding other troops, it is my wish you should come forward as soon as you have made the necessary arrangements on the Virginia line. We are now in a camp of repose, and could we get clothing we might improve our discipline. Your aid in this and many other matters will be essential both to me and the service."

But it was impossible for Steuben to comply with Greene's order, although his own wishes strongly prompted him to do so. In the first place there was no prospect of his being able to conclude his business in Virginia, and in addition to this another serious obstacle arose, which still further impeded Steuben's progress. This obstacle was the invasion of the State by Arnold.

CHAPTER XVII.

INVASION OF VIRGINIA BY THE ENGLISH UNDER MATHEWS AND LESLIE.—THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STATE TO THE SOUTH.—INVASION OF ARNOLD.—STEUZEN ASKS FOUR THOUSAND MILITIAMEN FROM THE GOVERNOR.—STEUZEN'S REPORT TO WASHINGTON AND GREENE.—THE ENEMY LANDS, ON THE 4TH OF JANUARY, 1781, AT WEST-OVER.—RICHMOND IS ARNOLD'S DESTINATION.—STEUZEN CAN COLLECT ONLY ONE HUNDRED MEN.—HIS ORDERS BADLY EXECUTED.—THE MAGAZINES OF THE STATE TRANSFERRED TO WESTHAM.—ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY CONTINENTALS ORDERED TO THAT PLACE.—THE MAGAZINES AT RICHMOND TAKEN BY THE ENEMY.—STEUZEN GOES TO MANCHESTER, OPPOSITE RICHMOND.—ARNOLD PLUNDERS AND SETS FIRE TO RICHMOND, BUT DOES NOT CROSS THE RIVER.—HE RETIRES.—STEUZEN FOLLOWS HIM TO PETERSBURG.—GIBSON, DAVIES, CARRINGTON, AND SMALLWOOD ASSIST STEUZEN.—GENERAL NELSON OPERATES ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE RIVER.—WANT OF ARMS ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS.—ARNOLD EMBARKS ON THE 10TH OF JANUARY.—THE MILITIA SENT AFTER HIM PRECIPITATELY RETREATS.—STEUZEN ENCAMPS AT HOOD'S.—HE SENDS FIVE HUNDRED MILITIAMEN TO NELSON FOR THE DEFENSE OF WILLIAMSBURG.—HIS OPINION ABOUT THE FUTURE OPERATIONS OF THE ENEMY.—STEUZEN SUFFERS PRIVATION IN EVERY THING.—THE STATE REMAINS INACTIVE.—STEUZEN MARCHES WITH SEVEN HUNDRED MILITIAMEN TO CABIN POINT, AND SENDS LAWSON AFTER THE ENEMY.—THE LATTER ARRIVES, ON THE 19TH OF JANUARY, AT PORTSMOUTH.—A COUNCIL OF WAR PRONOUNCES AGAINST AN ATTACK OF PORTSMOUTH.—STEUZEN SHUTS ARNOLD UP IN PORTSMOUTH, AND MAKES HIS DISPOSITIONS.—MISERY AND WANT EVERYWHERE IN THE STATE.—THE PEOPLE ARE INDOLENT.—REASON WHY NO CAVALRY EXISTS.—THE MILITIA PLUNDER AND ROB IN RICHMOND.—JEFFERSON SUPPORTS STEUZEN AS MUCH AS HE CAN.—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM ABOUT THE DIVISION OF EXPENSES BETWEEN THE CONTINENT AND THE STATE.—BAD EFFECTS OF THIS DISPUTE ON THE WAR.—JEFFERSON TO WASHINGTON ABOUT STEUZEN.—COLONEL MEADE TO ALEXANDER HAMILTON.—DAVIES' AND HOWELL'S LETTERS TO STEUZEN ABOUT THE WANT OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ON THE PART OF THE STATE.—EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THIS POLICY.

AFTER the transfer of the seat of war to the South, Virginia, with her rich resources, was repeatedly invaded by the British. The exposed situation of the country, her scattered population and easily accessible streams, inlets, rivers and creeks contributed much to assure success to an invading army, as was proved in May, 1779, when General Mathews made a descent upon Virginia with two thousand men, and burnt, ravaged and plundered the whole sea-board without opposition.

So soon as Virginia was invaded and the great store-house

destroyed, as some had justly called this State, which chiefly supplied the South, and was so conveniently situated midway between the northern and southern theater of war, all resistance in the South was rendered fruitless, and the operations of Lord Cornwallis, in the Carolinas were greatly facilitated. The breaking up of Virginia, therefore, soon became one of the principal designs of the British.

In the fall of 1780 another attack was made upon that State. Lord Cornwallis, after his victory at Camden, sent a considerable body of troops, under Ferguson, towards Virginia, and, at the same time, an expedition sailed from New York, under General Leslie, for the same destination. They entered the mouth of James river on the 15th of October, 1780, but finding a strong opposition from the forces under General Mühlenberg, who then commanded in Virginia, they were confined to Portsmouth, and having miserably failed in their object returned to New York on the 25th of November, a few days after Steuben's arrival, Colonel Ferguson having been previously defeated at King's Mountain.

The appointment of Greene to the southern army, and the command of Steuben in Virginia, made it a matter of importance to the British to renew their efforts to cut off the supplies of men and provisions which Virginia was destined to furnish for the southern army. The notorious Arnold was deputed to accomplish the task which Leslie had failed to perform. He could not have arrived at a more inopportune moment for the Americans. The militia, which had been collected to operate against Leslie at Portsmouth, was just disbanded; the first enlistment of troops and forwarding of men to the South had scarcely begun, and the general confusion appeared greater than at any time before, when the news of Arnold's arrival spread over the defenseless and panic-stricken country.

Although the government of the State had been informed, as early as the 9th of December, 1780, of the approach of a

hostile expedition, nothing was done towards meeting at least the first difficulties and embarrassments. Everybody looked upon Steuben as their chief reliance in their hour of pressing need; but we have seen, in the preceding chapter, how little could be expected from the feeble force, if such it can be called, at his disposal.

We can not give a better description of the invasion than the reports which Steuben made to Generals Greene and Washington, on the 8th and 11th of January, 1781, and which we quote in full.

“On the 31st of December,” writes Steuben to Greene, “the governor informed me of a fleet of twenty-seven sail having arrived at Willoughby Point, in consequence of which I immediately dispatched Colonel Sent and Captain Fairlie down the south side to procure intelligence of their strength and destination; and General Nelson was sent, the same day, down the north side, to act as circumstances might require. Notwithstanding these precautions, we did not receive the least intelligence till the 2d of January, when the governor informed me that nineteen ships, two brigs and ten sloops and schooners were in Warrasquiac Bay, and were getting under way to proceed up the river, and that their destination was Petersburg. I directly waited on the governor and council, and requested four thousand militia might be called out, estimating the enemy’s force at twenty-five hundred.

“The distressed situation of the Continental troops at Chesterfield Court-house would only permit one hundred and fifty of them to be ordered out. These I formed into a battalion and sent to Petersburg to cover the public stores, and at the same time sent Colonel Carrington there to remove them. I also took proper measures for the removal of the stores and hospital from Chesterfield, in case the enemy should move that way.

“The next day, on the 3d of January, we were advised of the enemy’s arrival off Williamsburg, where General Nelson

had collected about one hundred and fifty militia. Here a flag was sent with a letter, to which General Nelson returned a verbal answer, that he would defend the town. They landed a few troops at Jamestown, but reëmbarked them again immediately and proceeded up the river. At midnight their foremost vessel passed Hood's, where we had a battery of two iron ten pounders and a brass howitzer. Three shots were fired, two of which struck the vessel, on which the rest of the fleet brought to. A party landing below, the militia (about seventy) evacuated the battery, and the cannon and howitzer fell into their hands. They burnt the carriages of the guns and carried off the howitzer.

"The 4th, in the morning, we received intelligence that the enemy's fleet lay at Westover, and were preparing to disembark. It was then evident their object was Richmond, and orders were immediately given for the removal of the public stores. As the enemy had twenty-five miles to march before they reached the town, I was in hopes a force would collect sufficient, at least, to check their progress, but, to my surprise, about one hundred men were all that could be assembled. These I sent down under the command of Major Dick, a State officer, to whom I gave orders to harass the enemy by firing at them from every favorable piece of ground. These orders were, however, badly executed. The enemy moved that evening to Four Mile Creek, where they encamped at about eleven o'clock.

"What few Continental stores were in town I sent out to Westham, having previously ordered Major Claiborne up the river to collect boats there to transport them across. I also ordered the one hundred and fifty Continental troops to march from Petersburg and take a position opposite to Westham; and Colonel Davies, having sent all the stores and the hospital from Chesterfield, was ordered to the same place with the remainder of his naked troops. The State stores, of which great quantities were in town, were under the direction of

Colonel M., by whose inactivity and downright negligence a great part was lost. Of their artillery, I secured, myself, five pieces which were mounted; the rest, consisting of three brass, and a great number of iron pieces, fell into the enemy's hands. Not a single man, except those I had sent out, undertook to oppose the approach of the enemy. I thought it prudent to cross the river in the evening, and took my quarters in Manchester, and next day, about twelve o'clock, the enemy took possession of the town, having marched twenty-five miles with eight hundred and fifty men and about thirty horse, without receiving a single shot. They left about half their force in town, and proceeded immediately with the rest to Westham, where they burnt all the public buildings, consisting of a foundery, with a boring-mill, powder magazine, and some small shops, and returned to Richmond the same evening. The Continental stores had been all sent across the river, and some of the State stores. What part was left I have not yet learned. About three hundred militia had arrived at Westham on their way down, and arms were actually recrossing for them, but hearing of the enemy's approach, and being unarmed, they dispersed.

"The next morning, I ordered the battalion of Continental troops, to which I had attached two of the State pieces of artillery, to Manchester, where there were about two hundred militia collected. With these I intended to oppose any attempts they might make to cross. They, however, did not attempt it, but about eleven o'clock began to set fire to the public buildings, and before one o'clock, had entirely quitted the town. They burnt a rope-walk, the public work-shops and two or three public stores. Two of the inhabitants came out with propositions from Arnold to pay for half of the tobacco on their giving hostages for the delivery of the whole to vessels he should send for it. The governor refused to agree to it, and as they did not come out as a flag, I refused their return. The tobacco, however, was left unhurt. A great part

of the inhabitants having removed, their houses were plundered by the soldiers. The enemy marched that night to their former position at Four Mile Creek, where they encamped, and yesterday got to Westover. On their return, great excesses were committed by straggling parties. As there were great quantities of grain and flour at the mills near Warwick, I marched my little force, on the 6th, in the evening, to that place. Yesterday I advanced to Osborn's, and this day arrived here at Petersburg. I find about four hundred and fifty militia here under Colonel Gibson, whom I had ordered to take the command in the absence of Generals Mühlenberg and Weedon. On the first intimation of the enemy's approach, I wrote these gentlemen, but have heard nothing from them. The public stores, of which great quantities were in this town, were all removed by the great exertions of Colonel Carrington and Colonel Gibson. Yesterday General Smallwood arrived here, and has been so obliging as to stop and afford us his assistance. Some vessels of the enemy were sent up this river yesterday to take or destroy some merchant vessels lying there, but by the disposition which General Smallwood made with some ship guns and the militia, they were obliged to abandon their enterprise.

"General Nelson, during all this time, was on the other side of the river. On the 3d, he was twelve miles above Williamsburg, with one hundred and seventy-five men; the next day he moved four miles higher, and wrote me that he expected to have three hundred and fifty militia by the 5th at noon; the 7th, he wrote me from Long Bridge, on Chickahominy, that the enemy were moving down to their shipping, and that the rain the preceding night had incapacitated his men for immediate service. In fact, the enemy returned as they went, without a single shot, and have lain quietly at Westover, in a scattered manner, all this day.

"As the stores were all removed hence, and a considerable force of militia collected, I do not imagine the enemy

will attack this place. I have some hopes of being able to annoy them from Hood's on their return. The river there is very narrow, but we have yet no guns. I have sent to have those which are there remounted, and shall march there myself, with all the militia I can arm, so soon as I hear the enemy are moving down.

"The greatest distress we now feel is the want of arms; great part of those belonging to the State were damaged by the militia during the late invasion, or were scattered at different places and never collected or repaired. Those at Richmond were, on the enemy's approach, sent off in such disorder that part of them are not yet found. The militia are coming in, and no arms to put in their hands, while, on the other side, General Nelson has fifteen hundred stand, and only five hundred men.

"I can not conclude without mentioning how much I am indebted to Colonel Davies and Lieutenant Colonel Carrington for their assistance on this occasion."

"The enemy," continues Steuben," at camp near Hood's on the 11th of January, 1781,* "lying still at Westover on the 9th, and some vessels which had lain at the mouth of the Appomatox, dropping down that day to their fleet, I thought it evident they had no design against Petersburg, and therefore ordered the few militia who were assembled there to march to Prince George Court-house, and went there myself, that I might be more at hand to prepare against any movement of the enemy. The 10th, in the morning, I was informed they were embarking their troops, and on reconnoitering them myself from Coggin's Point, I found their embarkation completed, and the vessels preparing to sail.

"It had been found impracticable to remount the cannon at Hood's, or to prepare any obstruction to their passing that place. Of this, however, the enemy were ignorant; and think-

* Greene's MS. Papers and Sparks's Revolutionary Correspondence, iii, 203.

ing it very probable they would land a party to examine these works before they attempted to pass, I ordered three hundred infantry and about thirty horse, under Colonel Clark, to lie in ambush to receive them. About twelve o'clock the fleet got under way, and at four o'clock I saw them, from Hood's, come to within cannon shot. At dark they landed troops from eighteen boats—deserters say five hundred—who immediately attacked a small picket we had, and pursued them to within forty paces of the ambuscade, when our troops gave them a fire; but on their returning it, and charging bayonets, the militia immediately fled. After throwing the cannon into the river, the enemy returned to their ships, which, at daylight, were five miles below. I ordered three hundred infantry and two troops of horse down to Cabin Point, and encamped with the remainder, about five hundred men, at this place. As an attempt might be made at Williamsburg, and as General Nelson had only four hundred men, I ordered five hundred and sixty militia, who were then on their way to join me, to cross the river and reinforce him. The next great object for the enemy being Hunter's works and the stores at Fredericksburg, I wrote the governor to countermand the militia from that quarter. General Weldon had already advanced with about three hundred and fifty as far as Hanover Court-house before he received the governor's letter. It is left with him to return or not, according as he, from his knowledge of the force that can be collected, may think necessary.

“I can not yet form any judgment of the future operations of the enemy. Should they mean to pillage Williamsburg, Nelson's corps may harass, but can not prevent them. If they take possession of Norfolk, I shall collect what force is necessary and endeavor to keep them *en échec*; or if they should go into the Potomac, I shall immediately march to form a junction with the militia under General Weedon, and cover Fredericksburg.

“The militia are coming in from all quarters, but without

arms, for which they apply to me. I have delivered about five hundred we had belonging to the Continent. Those of the State were so scattered in removing them on the alarm, that their officers can not collect them again. The troops have neither tents nor camp kettles. It is impossible to describe the situation I am in—in want of every thing; and nothing can be got from the State, rather for want of arrangement than any thing else.”

“The enemy,” says Steuben, in concluding his report to the board of war, “having passed Hood’s on the 13th, I marched with seven hundred militia to Cabin Point. The Continental troops being too naked to keep the field, were sent back to Chesterfield Court-house. On the 14th the enemy landed at Hardy’s Ferry, twenty-two miles below Cabin Point, and began their march toward Smithfield. Supposing Colonel Parker, with the militia of the lower counties, would oppose them in front, I detailed Major Willis with three hundred infantry and fifty horses to harass their rear. My orders were badly executed, and the enemy entered Smithfield on the 15th without opposition. Having that day received a reinforcement of four hundred men, I immediately detached them under General Lawson, with orders to march towards Smithfield, and act in conjunction with Colonel Parker, who, I supposed, had retired towards Suffolk.

“On General Lawson’s approach the enemy crossed Nanaimond river at Sleepy Hole, and encamped on the opposite bank, and General Lawson being joined by the troops under Colonel Parker, occupied Smithfield. The 19th the enemy marched to Portsmouth, where Arnold established himself, and their vessels fell down to Hampton Roads.”

At a meeting of officers, convened for the purpose of determining the question, whether the Virginia militia had the means of forcing Arnold to quit Portsmouth, it was their unanimous opinion, founded on their acquaintance with the ground, that they were not in a situation to undertake such an enter-

prise. The operations of Steuben and his generals were, therefore, necessarily confined to preventing the enemy from making incursions into the country on either side of James river, or, should they undertake to come out with their whole force, to rendering any enterprise of theirs difficult, always having in view the keeping open the communication across the James river.

To secure this object Steuben repaired to Smithfield, and having reconnoitered and obtained all possible information concerning the ground, he made the following disposition, in which he had in view a primary object, the keeping up as small a number of militia as possible.*

Colonel Parker, with the Suffolk militia, at Reddock Mills, a very strong pass, with a small advanced post at Cooper's Mills, four miles in his front, had to prevent the enemy's parties from making any excursions, and, if forced, to fall back on General Lawson. General Lawson was posted at McMay's Mills, four miles from Smithfield, with nine hundred infantry and a troop of State horse; a small detachment from this force advanced to Suffolk, to support Parker in case of need, and keep open communication. Pickets were also kept at Sleepy Hole and near the mouth of Nansimond river. General Mühlenberg was at Cabin Point with two regiments consisting of eight hundred infantry, and Armand's cavalry; General Nelson with one thousand infantry, and some volunteer horse at Williamsburg, to keep posts from thence to Newport News.

If the enemy came out in force, General Mühlenberg was to support Lawson and form a junction with him, and oppose the enemy should they march toward South Quay.

The correctness of the foregoing reports of Steuben, little flattering as they may be, is established by the statements of persons who at that time took a prominent part in public affairs; and it is also proved, that however glaring the defi-

* MS. Letters to Greene and board of war, Richmond, January 25th and 29th, 1781.

ciencies may have been, however culpable the shortcomings of others were, Steuben discharged his duties to the utmost, and where he could not remedy the defects himself, distinctly showed others how they might advantageously do so. A few instances will suffice to demonstrate the condition of affairs.

When Arnold ascended the river and demanded the surrender of Williamsburg, General Nelson, who was so destitute of all the necessary appliances that he even had no telescope, returned a verbal answer, stating that he would oppose him as long as he had a man to fight, and apologizing for not writing, as he had no pen and ink. It is unnecessary to mention that the militia's arms were unfit for service, and the little ammunition they had, almost destroyed, as it was at that time almost a matter of course. Nelson was one of the most energetic and patriotic officers in the State; but in consequence of the general confusion and slowness of the militia he could not act as he wished. He could form no communication with Steuben, nor afford him the necessary assistance. "Our expresses," he writes, on the 4th of January, to Steuben, "behave most infamously; the conduct of the county lieutenant of New Kent is censurable, and the situation of this country and other causes, which your knowledge of our affairs will readily suggest to you, have defeated my utmost exertions."

One of the greatest deficiencies on the part of the Americans was the want of cavalry. Armand's corps, the only cavalry at the disposal of Steuben, consisted at that time of only forty horses, and it was extremely difficult to supply even it with remounts. In spite of the absolute necessity of employing that corps the governor did nothing in the matter, giving as a reason, that the executive was not authorized to impress horses for the Continental service. The people did not like to sell their horses on credit, and preferred to keep them until they were afterwards seized by the British. The officer whom Claiborne, on the 10th of January, had sent out to impress horses, returned with only five. Under these circumstances

the enemy, with his one hundred horses, had even a superiority in cavalry, and ravaged the country unmolested. This want of cavalry during the whole campaign prevented the Americans not only from harassing the enemy, or in any way interfering with their operations, but from striking any decisive blow at them, as will hereafter appear from the narrative of subsequent events.

“I was pleased to see,” writes W. Smallwood to Steuben, dated Petersburg on the 7th of January, “that Colonels Gibson and Carrington had accomplished in their respective department every thing that circumstances would admit, though at the same time I lament the defenseless situation of the country at this alarming crisis, and the peculiar difficulties you have to encounter. Perhaps timely and vigorous exertions in this quarter might prevent or suspend the enemy’s approach here, which would have a salutary effect with respect to the public and private stores.”

As if the invasion of the country were a misfortune not sufficiently great, some classes of the inhabitants of Richmond availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the British, to enrich themselves by robbing and plundering, and forced the officers of the State to employ their men for the protection of the public property against the native population, instead of against their foreign invaders.

“The welfare of my country,” writes the brave Claiborne to Steuben, on the 8th of January, 1781, dated Richmond, “the comfort of the soldiers and the orders of my superiors, I have ever exerted myself to promote and execute, but empty handed as I am at present, and the little assistance I get, almost render all my efforts ineffectual. There is no commander here nor will any body be commanded. This leaves what public stores a few of the virtuous inhabitants have collected, exposed to every passenger, and the property of the individuals to the ravages of the negroes. Both public and private property have been discovered to a considerable quantity, that

was secreted clandestinely in and about town, and I am sorry to say that there is a stigma which rests upon the conduct of some of our own men with respect to the pillaging of public and private goods, that does not upon the British troops; the one acted as an open enemy, but the other in a secret and infamous manner. I shall take proper measures to find them out and have them collected. I had a party of the militia given me by Colonel Haskins and patrolled the streets of Richmond during the night. I am sorry that the militia differ so much from the Continental soldiers!"

Jefferson appreciated the difficulty of the situation in which Steuben was placed, and used every exertion to assist him in repelling the blackest traitor who had ever disgraced the American history. He did every thing that Steuben suggested for the benefit of the service, provided subsistence for the troops, and contributed to carry out Steuben's orders as far as the power with which he was invested, allowed. At this period their correspondence manifests mutual confidence, good will, and community of opinion, and though the limits of their respective departments and relations were not at all regulated or distinctly drawn, they found no difficulty in arranging them.

One of the principal items of controversy was the question, what expenses were to be considered as Continental and what as belonging to the separate States? Jefferson understood that the rule of Congress was to admit no expenses to be Continental which were incurred by any State merely under an apprehension of an invasion, but that when a State was actually invaded, all expenses became Continental. Consequently he wished Steuben to consider the militia of every place under his command from the moment of their being enlisted, and to direct their movements and stations as he pleased. "This," remarks Steuben, in a letter to Jefferson, dated the 11th of January, 1781, "naturally throws the provision for such troops as shall be employed on such particular

occasion into the hands of Continental officers upon the great scale; but as it would be impracticable for those officers to take up the business before it is brought within the view of those under whom they are acting and whose orders they are bound to obey, it certainly must of necessity be incumbent on the State officers to bring it to that point from which it will regularly be taken up by the Continental officers. I think that this might take place from the time the troops are armed, fitted for the field and brought to the place of rendezvous; then the general commanding has charge of them as a part of his force, and at the same time all his subordinate officers, both military and staff, have them under their view. As the arms to be put into the hands of the militia are the property of the State and subject to the direction of officers not under my command, I do not conceive those troops connected with me or subject to my orders before they are armed and equipped for the field."

Jefferson, although he could not state the exact time at which the expenses attending an invasion became Continental, nevertheless, maintained that the militia, as soon as they had received their call, were subject to Steuben's orders.

This difference of opinion existing between the general commanding and the governor, was a great drawback to the State itself and to the progress of the whole southern war. Steuben only executed the design of Congress and acted in accordance with its special orders, when he asked of the State to deliver to him, at its own expense, the militiamen, fit for service and properly equipped. It was, however, the interest of the State to keep up such a difference of opinion, as thus no immediate efforts were needed and no sacrifices were to be made. Owing to the constant disorder, things were advanced so far in Virginia, that the people only looked to their own safety, and cared nothing about the evil consequence of such a policy to the United States, and especially to the South. As Congress had not the means of enforcing its decrees, but

on the contrary depended for the execution of them entirely on the good will of the individual States, it was Virginia which remained in the right. Steuben had to suffer the worst consequences from this want of help, which the State would not or could not afford. Moreover, the Continent did not aid him, and always directed him in an off-hand manner to the State.

The governor, in his account of the invasion which he sent to Washington on the 10th of January, 1781, speaks in very high terms of Steuben's merits. When, in a letter addressed to the latter himself, he said that he was very sorry that the means with which he was furnished were not likely to add to his reputation, except that by undertaking to make the most of them Steuben's zeal would be still more fully displayed, Jefferson wrote to Washington in the following terms about him:*

"In the meanwhile Baron Steuben, a zealous friend, has descended from the dignity of his proper command, to direct our smallest movements. His vigilance has, in a great measure, supplied the want of force in preventing the enemy from crossing the river, which might have been very fatal. He has been assiduously employed in preparing for the militia, as they should assemble, pointing them to a proper object, and other offices of a good commander."

"I congratulate you," writes Colonel William Davies, at this time, to Steuben,† "upon the enemy's leaving this part of the country, and hope, sir, you may never again experience the mortifications which the very destitute and unprepared state of this country must have occasioned. The nakedness of the troops at this place (Chesterfield Court-house) exceeds description. Above sixty of them are so naked as to be unable to do duty in quarters, and much more so in the field. To all such who live within forty or fifty miles of this place, and can return in eight or ten days, I have given furloughs for the purpose

* Revolutionary Correspondence, by J. Sparks, iii., 202.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. iv.

of getting clothing. The troops here have been one day entirely out of meat, and without particular care I fear they will be distressed frequently for that article. I shall endeavor as well as I can to secure a sufficiency, but every thing in this country seems in so ruinous a train, that despondency has almost taken possession of me. I hope your exertions and influence will in some measure check the rapidity with which we are rushing to ruin; but something extraordinary must happen to put us on a good footing."

"Arnold, you know, was coming here," writes Colonel Meade to Alexander Hamilton on the 13th of January, 1781.*

"He has really been here, and, *with shame* be it said, marched twenty-five miles and back without having a single musket fired at him; but let me observe, in justice to the people at large, that there are fewer disaffected by far in this State than any other in the Union, and that the people turn out with the utmost cheerfulness. The misfortune on the present invasion was, that in the confusion the arms were sent everywhere, and no timely plan laid to put them into the hands of the men who were assembling. The baron has no doubt given the general the particulars of the whole affair. *He can hardly be himself and say any thing on the subject that ought not to be credited.*"

"I am still unable," writes James Lovell to Steuben on the 22d of January, 1781,† "to promise you a supply of arms and clothing. But I can not refrain from expressing to you, by this opportunity, how much I am affected with pleasure by any occurrence which redounds to your glory. The Governor of Virginia mentions very honorably your conduct with a small body of militia, of which you have condescended to take the command, while a traitorous villain was striving to make extensive ravage on James river. Your own letters to Congress have confirmed the propriety of the governor's grateful sentiments. I would to God you were at the head of a body suit-

* Alexander Hamilton's Works, i., 208.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. iv.

ably equipped to execute the directions which your great military knowledge enables you to give whenever you are in a field action. I regret much the mortification which I know your warm zeal in our cause must have met with from your inequality of men, artillery and, in short, every means of giving a final blow to Arnold's schemes. I regret more, that you have no prospect but the continuance of such disadvantages. The chapter of disadvantages has heretofore been greatly in our favor."

Unfortunately it was far from being closed, as will be seen from the following chapter.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ARNOLD'S INVASION INTERRUPTS THE MEASURES FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY.—STEBEN'S TASK.—ITS DIFFICULTIES.—THE GOVERNMENT DOES LITTLE OR NOTHING.—JEFFERSON AND STEUBEN.—THEIR CONFLICT.—STEBEN TRIES TO RAISE THREE THOUSAND RECRUITS TO BE FURNISHED BY THE STATE.—THEY ARRIVE VERY SLOWLY.—CHARACTERISTIC ANECDOTE.—GOOD EFFECT OF STEUBEN'S SEVERITY.—BAD CONDUCT OF THE MILITIA.—LETTER OF E. MEADE.—COMPLAINTS OF INNES AND MÜHLENBERG.—THE DESERTION TOLERATED AND PROTECTED BY THE STATE.—REASONS WHY.—DAVIES'S PROPOSITIONS FOR REMEDYING THIS EVIL.—THE APATHETIC PEOPLE MAKE NO SACRIFICES.—CLAIBORNE'S COMPLAINTS.—WANT OF NECESSARIES.—GOVERNMENT DOES NOT RESORT TO ENERGETIC MEASURES.—ALL BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY FALL ON STEUBEN.—COLONEL MUMFORD'S PUNISHABLE NEGLIGENCE.—STEBEN'S ORDERS AGAINST SQUANDERING PROVISIONS.—GREENE APPRECIATES STEUBEN'S EFFORTS.—GREENE'S OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AFTER HIS DEPARTURE FROM VIRGINIA.—HE DIVIDES HIS FORCES AND SEPARATES FROM MORGAN.—MORGAN'S VICTORY AT COWPENS.—GREENE ADVANCES TO THE GREAT PEDEE.—CORNWALLIS FOLLOWS HIM.—GREENE JOINS MORGAN AGAIN.—HE RETIRES TO VIRGINIA.—CORNWALLIS AT HILLSBOROUGH, THE CENTER OF THE TORIES.—THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR THE ROYAL CAUSE.—GREENE BEATEN AT GULFORD COURT-HOUSE.—CORNWALLIS GOES TO WILMINGTON.—GREENE'S DIFFICULTY WITH THE VIRGINIA MILITIA.—STEBEN TRIES IN VAIN TO ASSIST HIM.—HE DISPATCHES A DETACHMENT UNDER CAMPBELL.—STEBEN'S DESIGNS FOR THE FURTHER SUPPORT OF GREENE.—HE CAN NOT FULFILL HIS PROMISE, AS THE RECRUITS DO NOT ARRIVE.

THE greatest mischief occasioned by Arnold's invasion, was the obstruction which it offered to the preparations for the support of the southern army. The arrangements which Steuben was making for this purpose were either wholly overturned or materially delayed, the greater part of the provisions consumed, and the raising of recruits and every supply required from Virginia was retarded for two months. Whatever arms the State possessed were distributed among the militia, who scarcely amounted to four thousand men.

While the forces under Mühlenberg were watching and confining Arnold at Portsmouth, Steuben exerted himself at Richmond to collect provisions, arms and men for the reinforcement of Greene's army, which, for want of the expected supplies, was in the most distressed situation. The task was

certainly a most arduous one, as he could do little or nothing if not supported by the Executive of the State.

"Sure am I," said he, "if an officer ordered to superintend and expedite militia movements does not in that service lose his reputation, he may risk it on all other occasions." "I must beg your Excellency," he wrote at this time to Governor Jefferson, "to consider that this shameful opposition made to the last invasion of the enemy falls in some measure on me as the commanding officer in the State, and I can not but reckon it among my misfortunes to have been here at that time. My wish is to prevent a repetition of the disgrace, but I can do nothing without the assistance of the government."

It appears, however, that the latter had not the power to do what it considered to be its duty, and that it was jealous of the authority exercised by the commanding general. It is really surprising that a conflict between the civil and military officers did not break out sooner, as the ground was prepared for such a calamity from the moment they entered on the discharge of their respective duties, and as the often high-handed, though well-intentioned proceedings of Steuben, and the irritability of his temper frequently brought him in collision with the too keen democratic views of Governor Jefferson.

"We did not think proper," writes Jefferson, on the 10th of March, 1781, to Steuben,* "to resign ourselves and our country too implicitly to your demands, but thought we had some right of judgment left to ourselves. . . . We can only be answerable for the orders we give, and not for their execution. If they are disobeyed from obstinacy of spirit, or want of coercion in the laws, it is not our fault. We can only endeavor to engage the willing. The Executive have not by the laws of this State any power to call a freeman to labor even for the public good without his consent, nor a slave without that of his master."

This is a striking illustration of the inefficiency of the law

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. vi.

as it existed in cases of public emergency or danger. If the governor's power was insufficient to enforce service for the protection of the fatherland, and for the due observance of the orders he issued, what was the utility of his position? Was it not a clog on the efficiency of the military power, which was exercised only for the good of the confederacy?

Steuben's first object was to raise the three thousand (eighteen months') militiamen, whom, according to the new plan, the State had promised to provide. Virginia was for this purpose divided into ten divisions, each of which had to furnish its quota, and send them to the general rendezvous at Chesterfield Court-house, where Colonel Davies commanded, and formed the detachments for the southern army. But in raising recruits, the State was completely lethargic. On the 12th of February not a man had been engaged on the new plan, and with the greatest difficulty four hundred men had been collected and clothed at Chesterfield Court-house to be sent to the South. The men either came in very slowly, or did not come at all, or they deserted immediately after their arrival in camp, or they sent even dwarfs or children to fill their places. On the 4th of March Steuben remonstrated to the governor in regard to this ill-disposed people, who sent recruits entirely unfit for service, whom he could not accept for the defense of their own country.

If, under such circumstances, Steuben gave way to passion, and uttered contemptuous expressions, it is not to be wondered at. North, in his already-quoted pamphlet, mentions a characteristic anecdote in this respect. "Men," says he, "sufficient to form a regiment had, with much pains, been collected together at Chesterfield Court-house. The corps was paraded, and on the point of marching, when a well-looking man, on horseback, and, as it appeared, his servant on another, rode up, and introducing himself, informed the baron that he had brought him a recruit. 'I thank you, sir,' said the baron, 'with all my heart; you have arrived in a happy moment!

Where is your man, colonel?' for he was colonel in the militia. 'Here, sir,' ordering his boy to dismount. The baron's countenance altered; we saw and feared the approaching storm. A sergeant was ordered to measure the lad, whose shoes, when off, laid bare something by which his stature had been increased. The baron, patting the child's head with his hand, trembling with rage, asked him how old he was. He was very young, quite a child. 'Sir,' said he to the man, 'you must have supposed me to be a rascal!' 'O no, baron, I did not.' 'Then, sir, I suppose you to be a rascal, an infamous rascal, thus to attempt to cheat your country. Take off this fellow's spurs; place him in the ranks, and tell General Greene from me, Colonel Gaskins, that I have sent him a man able to serve, instead of an infant whom he would basely have made his substitute! Go, my boy, take the colonel's spurs and his horse to his wife; make my compliments, and say her husband has gone to fight for the freedom of his country, as an honest man should do. By platoons!—To the right wheel!—Forward—March!' Colonel Gaskins fearing the consequences, let the man escape on the arrival of the corps at the river Roanoke; nor was he tardy in returning and making application to the civil authority for redress. But Governor Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and other gentlemen of the council, not doubting the purity of the baron's motive, and fully appreciating his honest zeal, prevented any disagreeable results attending this high-handed exertion of military power."

In regard to the service, these despotic proceedings had at least one good effect, as Davies writing on the 10th of March, 1781, states that "since the treatment that men met with, people seemed afraid to bring in the dwarfs and children they formerly counted upon."

In some parts of the State young men who were entirely fit for service, did not answer the call, excusing themselves on the ground of having previously served a few days, because, according to the militia laws, they could not be called out

again after having once been discharged. On the other hand, by a law of the State, no county was obliged to draft men for the Continental lines while its militia were in actual service. Thus it happened that well populated counties as, for instance, Spottsylvania, the militia of which, during the last invasion, had been under arms for only a week or two, on the 1st of April, 1781, had sent only twenty-three recruits, while the government had fixed its contingent at ten times that number. The militia proved to be of damage and disrepute to the State rather than of honor and advantage. Their conduct was extremely loose and provoking. Complaints were continually made from all parts of the State against them, and became from day to day louder and more frequent.

"I have experienced," writes E. Meade, from camp at Edmond's Hill, on the 19th of March, "a disagreeable want of duty here—a fine field of dishonor; no reliance can be put in the major part of the militia; my feelings have been exceedingly hurt."

"I have received," says Jefferson himself on the 24th of February,* in a letter to Steuben, "repeated information that the nakedness of the militia on service near Williamsburg, and want of shoes, is such as to have produced murmurings almost amounting to mutiny, and that there is no hope of being able longer to keep them in service. The precedent of an actual mutiny would be so mischievous as to induce us to believe an accommodation to their present temper most prudent." And at another occasion, on the 27th of April, 1781,† "We have found, by experience, that the men of those counties where the enemy are, can not be kept in the field—they desert and carry off their arms."

Colonel Innes reports from York on the 11th of March,‡ "that he has no provisions for the next day, and that the militia, already dissatisfied, wants only a good plea for mutiny and desertion."

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. v. † Ibidem, vol. vi. ‡ Ibidem, vol. vi.

Major Fosey informs Steuben, from Stanton, on the 8th of March, "that not a single man could be raised in the county of Augusta, which had to furnish three hundred and forty-four men, that they had remonstrated to the Legislature against the measure of drafting for eighteen months, and begged that the term of three months be substituted."

The militia already under arms did not behave much better. We have, in this respect, Mühlenberg's interesting statement of the 8th of April, 1781, in which he says:* "The militia who have served their term of three months have partly discharged themselves, and compel me to discharge the remainder. I tried every method in my power to prevail on them to continue until I could be reinforced from some other quarters, but in vain. About one hundred deserted within two nights out of my camp, and this morning about one hundred out of Colonel Duncan's regiment, stationed at Chackatuck, stacked their arms and marched off. The remainder marched to camp with their arms and accouterments, and now claim their discharge, which I shall be compelled to grant them, as their stay will ruin the few troops I have left."

Among the innumerable complaints against the militia we have found, however, one letter which does not blame them; but even in this instance the praise resembles a strong reprobation. Captain A. Singleton, speaking of an engagement of General Greene's army on the 15th of March, 1781, says, that "the militia, *contrary to custom*, behaved well for militia."

The greatest annoyance, however, and detriment to the service was the wholesale desertion of the militia. The toleration, and even protection, with which it met through the State, was so dangerous and alarming a mischief that Steuben and Davies took every measure in their power to stop it, and to recover those who were already gone. They drew memorials upon this subject, which were laid before the Assembly, and wrote to the governor, asking that laws might be made to

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. vi.

remedy the evil. "I am just completing," writes Davies to Steuben from Chesterfield, on the 10th of March, 1781,* "the descriptive list of deserters to be put into the hands of the delegates. This I conceive to be a matter of great consequence. Above two hundred have deserted from this place, at least five hundred that were enlisted in the counties never joined the army, and they are daily deserting from different places, and not a single measure is yet taken to advertise them. Colonel Campbell has sent me a list of a number who have deserted from him. I mean, therefore, to have a descriptive, alphabetical list printed at the expense of the government, and to put three or four copies in the hands of each Assemblyman, to be published and advertised at the court-houses, churches, and other places of public resort. But I submit the matter to your decision."

All these steps, however, and the remonstrances were in vain, since it was not in the power of the government to alter this anomalous and revolting state of things, to which we find a clue in a letter of Davies, written ten days after the above quoted, which is one of the most interesting documents of the time, and on more than one account deserves to be given in full.

"I find, notwithstanding," writes Davies, "every thing that has been urged formerly, no summary mode is yet established by the Assembly for the recovery of the bounties the divisions detain from the substitutes they agree with. They bargain with a man for six or seven thousand pounds, pay him at the time one thousand or fifteen hundred,† and promise him the remainder in two or three months. The soldier inquires how it is to be got; they tell him he is to have a furlough after he gets here, or if he does not get one, they will send or bring him the money. When the poor fellow arrives

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. vi.

† Paper money of course, the relation of silver to paper being in the proportion of one to one hundred and forty at this time.

here he applies for a furlough and is refused ; the divisions never send him his money, he soon spends all he has, draws no pay, and perhaps no clothing, and finding in the midst of his distresses, that although he has a great deal of money due him, yet he never shall get a copper of it while he continues with the troops ; he, therefore, deserts with a determination to try to get it from his division. When he applies to them they refuse to pay him a farthing, tell him he is a deserter ; but for their own sake they tolerate and even encourage him in his desertion, as by that means they save the remainder of the bounty in their own pockets and evade any further demands in the law too. The rest of the people in the country think it would be very hard to apprehend the man as a deserter and bring him to his officers, who probably will punish him, when he did not get half his bounty ; and having no authority themselves to compel the division to make up the remainder that is due, of course the whole matter is overlooked, and between fraud on one side and compassion on the other, the public service is essentially injured. If some speedy check is not put to this growing evil, every law that is passed in future for raising men, will produce two deserters for one soldier, till the numbers of the former will be too considerable to be controlled, and the people at large will be entirely wearied out by the frequent drafts that are called for to make up the deficiencies. The only source, therefore, from which we can hope any relief, is in the particular interest of each respective division. The advantage of the public at large is too remote an object to make such impression ; it must be more immediately interesting to make them feel. I would, therefore, propose that every division shall be answerable for the conduct of its substitute in this particular, but I would confine this responsibility to desertion only ; all other deficiencies in the number of men should be made good by the State at large."

In the presence of all these difficulties the government, however, did not dare to resort to energetic measures. In-

stead of removing the existing and menacing impediments, the government only evaded them and made no arrangements to complete the Continental forces. In a similar manner it treated the militia, confining itself to the least possible exactions. Thus the governor wrote to Steuben, on the 19th of April, 1781, "that he should only endeavor to get the militia to the fixed term of two months in the field, with a right to retain them one week longer, if reliefs should not come in."

It was not this deficiency in the militia alone that troubled Steuben, and prevented him from supporting the southern army. The measures taken by the government for the defense of the State were so imperfect, that they threw innumerable and unforeseen obstacles in his way, and that other able officers retired from the service in disgust. The State had no money, no credit, no provision, in short, it was almost destitute. R. Claiborne, the quarter-master of the State, wrote on the 4th of April, 1781,* to Steuben, that he was unable to comply with his demands for accouterments, wagons, and camp equipage for five hundred infantry, saying that he had not a farthing of money. "To purchase by contract," he continues, "is impracticable, as there is not a person that will trust the public two days; and to make and manufacture in time, would be a vain attempt. My representations to the quarter-master general and the government of this State, have been early and frequent; but little or no aid is given to me. I have received only five hundred thousand pounds of paper money since I have been in this department, which, at one hundred and forty for one, went but a small way. I am altogether disappointed in the wagons that are to come from the counties for Continental use, and have failed in the means of transportation directed in the governor's instructions some time since, to the commissioner of the provision law. The commissary of hides for this State, upon whom I am dependent alone for leather, is in Philadelphia, and has not a gallon

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. vii.

of oil in his whole department. This has been the case for a long time, and whether it will be taken into consideration by the board of war, from whom he derives his appointment, I can not say. I have written to the quarter-master general upon the subject. With respect to wagons, I have not one that is not employed in business that can not be dispensed with; and the horses that are not engaged are such as no one would employ. To hire is impossible, as no one will take the price to which we are limited, when they can get three times as much from private individuals. I am very fearful that nothing can be done in laying up a magazine of forage at Petersburg. Camp equipage you will find we have none. In short, sir, I have no money, no materials, no credit, and beg while this is my situation, you will place no dependence on any thing to come from the department. Sensible of the increasing difficulties in transacting the public business, I find myself obliged to resign. I was in hopes, when I accepted the appointment, that it would be in my power to discharge the duties; but as I am not supported in the purchasing department, I could not expect it in the field. As to my influencing the field duties, I am preparing such instructions as will be necessary. If it is for me to do, I beg leave to remind you that I have nothing to begin with, neither people, money, credit nor materials, so that if I fail, I hope you will attribute it to its true cause—want of means.”

This state of things, animadverted upon by Claiborne, had not only reference to his department, but was to be met with throughout the whole State. Coats could not be made for want of cloth, shoes could not be obtained for want of leather, and shirts were not to be had for want of linen, nor would tailors or artificers work on trust for the country. Even Jefferson declared the procuring of hats or leather caps a desperate ease, and blankets cost too much to be able to provide the troops with them. The factories were partly stopped for want of money, partly from the refusal of the workmen to

work, on account of which refusal the government was compelled—as, for example, in the county of Prince George—to offer to each man, who had worked twelve days on the batteries at Hood's, an exemption for six weeks from military duty. Nelson complained, on the 6th of April, 1781, to Jefferson,* that for the last twelve months he had received no money for his men. In the same way all the commanding officers were in want of every thing, and, being refused on all hands, appealed as a last resort to Steuben for redress and assistance. To one of them, who, on account of insufficiency of means, did not execute his orders, he remarked, laconically, though in very indifferent English, “ You have not to inquire if my orders are *riht* or *rong*, you have to obey them, and the service will be well done.”

Notwithstanding the scarcity of provisions, they were often wasted by the negligence of officers, or stolen by the commissaries. Out of one hundred pairs of shoes, for instance, which were delivered to Colonel Davies from Petersburg, only fifty-three were forthcoming, and the one hundred at Warwick turned out to be only eighty-two pairs.† Fourteen hundred and ninety-five yards of cloth, which the governor estimated to be sufficient for four hundred suits, made only three hundred and fifty jack-coats, as the cloth was only half as wide as represented. The shoes were so bad that one day's wear destroyed them. The most shocking carelessness, however, is furnished by Colonel Mumford, about whom Davies writes to Jefferson as follows, viz. :‡

“ From the negligence of Colonel Mumford, the issuing Continental commissary general in this State, there is the most shameful waste of provisions and scandalous abuses in that department that can well be conceived. He has not, for many months, paid the least attention to his deputies, and has even refused to appoint the necessary issuers for the troops

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. vii.

† Ibid., vol. v.

‡ Ibid., vol. vii.

below. The provisions delivered by Mr. Brown for the purposes of the army in this State, are put into the hands of men appointed by anybody that chooses to call himself a commanding officer; no account is ever rendered of the issues, nor will the authority of these occasional commandants be acknowledged by Congress, and the receipts of these commissaries, acting under these appointments, will, of course, be inadmissible as sufficient vouchers to make the United States chargeable with the provision furnished by the State to their service. Independent from the difficulty which may arise hereafter in the adjustment of the commissary's accounts, I would observe, too, the amazing waste which results from the relaxed state of that department, and that, although the resolves of Congress expressly say there shall be no issuing post of provisions or of forage, at any place where there are not Continental troops stationed, yet in this State there are these petty commissaries in a variety of little towns, where perhaps there will not, and there have not, been ten Continental soldiers in a twelve-month."

To prevent a further waste of public stores, and to establish regularity, Steuben, in a general order of the 10th of April, 1781, decreed that in future no issues of provisions should be made for more than three or four days at a time, without a special order from some commanding general or field officer, and only on particular occasions; and that no person should act as issuing commissary at any post or station, who was not properly authorized for that purpose by the commissary general.

Supported only by a few able officers, Steuben had to strive against the stream of popular prejudice, native jealousy, and almost universal apathy. The only comfort which he had was, that the general whom he had to reinforce understood his difficult position; that Greene, who found himself involved in still greater embarrassments, appreciated Steuben's energetic, although fruitless efforts, and the character of Virginia—that

“lifeless and inactive State;” and that he encouraged Steuben, while narrow-minded egotists would have thrown the blame of their temporary want of success upon the insufficiency of his coöperation. Strong evidence of Greene’s conviction that Steuben was not to blame for the untoward position of affairs, is given in the letters which he wrote to Steuben.

“To your address and industry,” writes he on the 3d of February, 1781, “I feel myself principally indebted for what is coming (of reinforcements). Whatever misfortune may happen for want of force, it is no fault of ours. The southern States are in such a defenseless condition that they must fall under the dominion of the enemy, unless reinforcements are immediately sent from the northward. Such destruction of public stores (on the part of the militia) is enough to ruin a nation. These are some of the happy effects of defending the country with militia, from which good Lord deliver us! O, that we had in the field, as Henry V. said, some few of the many thousands that are idle at home!”*

It will be remembered that Greene, when he left Steuben, on the 20th of November, 1780, in Virginia, proceeded at once further South. On the 2d of December he reached the encampment of the American army at Charlotte, North Carolina, while the main body of the British army was lying at Winnsborough, South Carolina, between the Broad river and the Catawba. The forces of which Greene could dispose were not more than nine hundred and seventy Continentals and one thousand and thirteen militia, of whom eight hundred men only were properly clad and equipped for service. The destitute condition and the want of discipline in which he found them, prevented Greene from hazarding the risk of a general engagement; all he could do at present was to discipline and accustom his troops to active service in the field, and by deceiving the British commander as to his intentions

* MS. letter of February 3, 1781, in the Greene Collection.

and movements, to avoid an unforeseen attack on the part of Cornwallis.

For this purpose he divided his forces, and sent one portion, under Morgan, to operate on the British left and rear, while he advanced with the main body to a strong post on the frontier of South Carolina, on the Great Pedee, to threaten the right wing of the British army, and, if possible, cut off its communication with Charleston. Cornwallis sent Tarleton against Morgan, and a battle was fought at the Cowpens, in which the American arms were victorious. Cornwallis himself broke up his camp at Winnsborough, and marched northward, in order to cut off Morgan's communication with Greene. He did not succeed in this project, as Morgan, a few hours before Cornwallis reached the Catawba, had crossed it unmolested. Greene thus effected his junction with Morgan, and took the command. Pursued by Cornwallis, he retired to the left bank of the Yadkin, and joined, at Guilford Court-house, the main body of his army. It was the design of Cornwallis to prevent the American army from falling back on Virginia, whence they had the means of obtaining supplies and recruits. Marching up the Yadkin, he moved toward the Dan, but Greene succeeded in retiring, on the 14th of February, into Virginia, whereupon Cornwallis, master of North and South Carolina, established himself at Hillsborough, the center of the Tories, who were so enthusiastic that in the course of a day he obtained seven companies of volunteers. Shortly after this reinforcements arrived, and Greene was in a position to recross the Dan and to follow Cornwallis, who, for want of provisions and for the better protection of the Tories, had left his quarters, and encamped at Allinamce Creek. Greene's army now consisted of about four thousand five hundred men, among whom were sixteen hundred Continentals. He felt strong enough to offer a battle to Cornwallis, who accepted it, and defeated the Americans, on the 15th of March, at Guilford Court-house. Cornwallis, however, gained nothing by this

victory ; he found no provisions in the neighborhood of Guilford, and withdrew his forces to Cross Creek (Fayetteville) ; but being disappointed again in his expectations of obtaining supplies, he fell back on Wilmington, at the mouth of Cape Fear river. Greene, instead of pushing forward, was obliged to discontinue the pursuit of Cornwallis, as the Virginia militia claimed their discharge. He, therefore, was compelled to transfer his operations to South Carolina, and marched, on the 7th of April, toward Camden. A few days before, he was obliged to disband the militia, whose term of service was expired, and who, in spite of all entreaties and remonstrances, refused to serve a day longer. The volunteers who had joined him, dropped off by hundreds, nor was it in the power of persuasion or threats to prevent them. Had they continued with him, Greene would have been able to strike an effective blow against Cornwallis ; now he had to wait for reinforcements from Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. His expectations rested chiefly on Virginia ; but notwithstanding his energetic exertions to assist him, Steuben effected little or nothing.

Before the invasion of Arnold, as detailed in chapter XVI., Steuben was only able to send a detachment of four hundred and fifty-six men to General Greene. After the withdrawal of the enemy to Portsmouth, he endeavored to collect a new force and forward it to the South, but for the reasons we have given above, this was now much more difficult than at any previous time. On the 17th of February, 1781, he informed Greene that a thousand militia were ordered to join him immediately from Botetourt, Montgomery, Pittsylvania, Washington and Henry counties, and that he had strained every nerve to dispatch from Chesterfield a detachment of four to five hundred men. "I can not yet say," he continues, "what we may be able to do, but be assured that no other object shall draw off one moment my attention from succoring you. The others are but secondary objects ; they must and shall be considered in that light." Steuben applied for this purpose

to Jefferson, and agreed with him that the militia of Rockbridge, Augusta, Rockingham and Shenandoah counties, would be the most speedy and effectual reinforcements for General Greene; but as there were no other troops to supply their places, and as they refused to march, the governor and Steuben were forced to abandon the project out of regard to the safety of the State. Steuben communicated at the same time with General Smallwood and Governor Gist, in order to ascertain what reinforcements he could expect from Maryland and Delaware for the southern army.

"General Greene's situation," he says, in a letter from Richmond, on the 12th of February, 1781, to Smallwood, "notwithstanding his last success, is very disagreeable, and calls for the immediate exertion of this State and Maryland. I must beg you, my dear general, to push your State to raise and send on a reinforcement to the South without delay."*

On the 25th of February Steuben succeeded in getting off the detachment, under Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, while four hundred, rank and file, marched from Chesterfield via Petersburg and Taylor's Ferry. "My plan is," he concludes a letter to Greene, on the 27th of February, 1781,† "to send off the third detachment of infantry on the 1st of April, the fourth detachment on the 15th of April, and the fifth on the 1st of May. With the latter I intend to join you myself, and to leave Colonel Davies to send off the others in the same order. The object of supporting you has taken a very great part of my attention, and I can only lament that my success falls so far short of my zeal."

Instead of the five hundred recruits, however, whom he expected to find at the rendezvous towards the end of March, 1781, and to send forward on the 1st of April to Greene, only seven had come in, and even of these, two deserted. General Mühlenberg did not fare much better. He had expected to receive one hundred and four men as the contingent from

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

† Greene's MS. Papers.

New Kent for service within the State, but only nine arrived, thus proving that not only were the people disinclined for service out of the State, but even for the defense of their own homes. Steuben was consequently unable to fulfill his promise, both in this and subsequent cases. The slowness with which the militia assembled, and the difficulty to keep them together, rendered it impossible to collect the troops necessary for the defense of Virginia, and therefore it was out of the question to weaken it still more by sending detachments to the South. The militia, under Colonels Green and Campbell, thus remained the only reinforcements which were sent, through Steuben's exertions, to the southern army.

CHAPTER XIX.

MÜHLENBERG WATCHING PORTSMOUTH.—HIS INVOLUNTARY INACTIVITY.—GENERAL WANT OF NECESSARIES IN THE AMERICAN CAMP.—ARNOLD KEEPS QUIET.—THREE FRENCH SHIPS IN THE BAY TAKEN FOR THE WHOLE FRENCH FLEET.—THE MISTAKE DISCOVERED.—STEBEN PREPARES FOR AN ATTACK AGAINST PORTSMOUTH.—THE COMMANDER OF THE FRENCH SHIPS REFUSES TO ASSIST HIM.—WASHINGTON INDUCES THE FRENCH ADMIRAL TO SET SAIL FOR CHESAPEAKE BAY.—ROCHAMBEAU DETACHES TROOPS THERE.—A DECISIVE STROKE AGAINST PORTSMOUTH PREPARED.—HOPE OF TAKING ARNOLD PRISONER.—WASHINGTON SENDS LAFAYETTE TO VIRGINIA.—REASONS WHY.—INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO LAFAYETTE.—HIS LETTER TO STEBEN.—LAFAYETTE EXPECTS TO CAPTURE ARNOLD.—THE STATE DOES NOTHING TOWARDS FURTHERING THE OBJECTS OF THE EXPEDITION.—STEBEN'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH JEFFERSON AND NELSON.—STEBEN AND LAFAYETTE.—PARALLEL OF WASHINGTON IRVING BETWEEN THEM INCORRECT.—INSTEAD OF THE FRENCH, AN ENGLISH FLEET ARRIVES.—ON ACCOUNT OF ITS ARRIVAL, LAFAYETTE, WHO HAD JUST LEFT THE STATE, RETURNS.—GENERAL PHILLIPS ARRIVES AT PORTSMOUTH, AND TAKES THE CHIEF COMMAND IN VIRGINIA.—REJECTION OF STEBEN'S PLAN FOR THE EXPULSION OF THE ENEMY FROM THE STATE.—WANT OF HORSES AND ARMS.—STEBEN IN CHESTERFIELD.—HE DESIRES TO JOIN GREENE.—HIS LETTER TO GREENE.—GREENE'S NOBLE ANSWER.—STEBEN FOR THE PRESENT REMAINS IN VIRGINIA.

TO return to the operations in Virginia, where we left General Mühlenberg watching Arnold in Portsmouth. On account of the scarcity of provisions, want of arms and supplies, and the general destitution which prevailed in camp as well as in the whole State, Mühlenberg was unable to attack the enemy, still less to strike a decisive blow. He spent the greater part of February in inactivity, and although thoroughly disgusted with this state of things, had no power to mend his condition. He had two thousand men, but it must not be forgotten that they were militia, and as ill provided as the recruits at Chesterfield, whose condition has been described in the previous chapter. Among his whole force he counted about three hundred bayonets and only two brass six pounders. He, therefore, could not think of a regular siege of the strongly fortified place, and the only thing left to him was to

skirmish with the enemy as often as possible, and thus to accustom his troops to action. Arnold, on the other side, was very cautious, and remained at Portsmouth. He expected reinforcements, and did not want to fight, when his presence alone was sufficient to engage the whole military power of the State, and to prevent the dispatch of reinforcements and provisions to the southern army. Jefferson, at the beginning of February had intrusted to Mühlenberg the execution of a plan for the seizure of Arnold, and his delivery into the hands of the governor; but owing to the extraordinary precautions which Arnold took for his own security, the project failed.*

Thus matters stood when, on the 16th of February, three French vessels arrived at the mouth of James river, one of sixty-four guns and two frigates. Colonel Dabney, who commanded the lower posts, took them for the whole French fleet and reported thus to Nelson. "What you expected," writes the latter on the 16th of February, to Steuben, "has taken place. I give you joy with all my soul. Now is our time; not a moment ought to be lost!"

The mistake was, however, soon discovered. The ships came from Rhode Island, where a storm had given a temporary superiority to the French, who had hitherto been blockaded by the British fleet, and were under the command of Mr. De Tilly, who was on a cruise between New York and Charleston. Steuben immediately sent Captain Duponceau on board, to inform the French commander of his situation; and expecting a coöperation on his part against Portsmouth, at once made all the necessary preparations, both for this enterprise and for the security of the French vessels in case of danger. For the first project he ordered General Gregory to assemble all the force in his power on the other side of the Dismal Swamp, and hold them in readiness to second Steuben whenever he should be ready. A line of expresses was established between his post and Suffolk, by means of which he could

* Bowen's Life of Steuben, p. 59.

have given him the necessary advice in less than twenty-four hours.

General Mühlenberg advanced with about one thousand men to within sixteen miles of Portsmouth, leaving the posts at Cooper's Mill and Suffolk properly guarded to cover his retreat. General Nelson had orders to hold himself in readiness to march at the first notice. General Weedon formed a corps of eight hundred militia at Fredericksburg, with orders to march toward Williamsburg in case of an attack on Portsmouth. This corps was to have marched to Newport News, and if the French vessels had been obliged to retire to York river, it was to have covered the battery erected there for their defense. Six or seven armed merchant vessels in James river were to have joined the French vessels and assisted Steuben's operations; all the boats that could be found were collected at Sandy Point to transport the troops; eight eighteen pounders and two mortars were got in readiness. Such were Steuben's preparations, when Mr. De Tilly informed him that he was not to remain in the bay, that his orders were to cruise between Charleston and New York, and that he should sail the moment the wind would permit him.

The appearance of those vessels had much alarmed the enemy in Portsmouth and encouraged the Virginia militia. General Mühlenberg advanced near Portsmouth, surprised a picquet, made one sergeant and twelve men prisoners, killed two yagers, and took a wagon and eight horses. He remained within a mile and a half of the town, all next day, but the enemy kept close in their works. The departure of the French vessels, however, destroyed all hopes of succeeding in an attack on Portsmouth.* Mr. De Tilly alleged as a reason for not coöperating with Steuben, that the size of his ships rendered it unsafe for him to attempt to go up Elizabeth river, where Arnold had drawn up his vessels; but this was a flimsy

* MS. letter of Steuben to Greene, from Chesterfield Court-house, on the 22d of February, 1781, in the Greene Papers.

excuse, as by stationing himself at the mouth of Elizabeth river, De Tilly would have cut off Arnold's retreat and forced him to surrender.*

While Steuben and Mühlenberg were subjected to this disappointment, Washington, most anxious to seize the traitor Arnold, had prevailed on the French admiral to promise the coöperation of his whole fleet in the attack against Portsmouth. Accordingly, Admiral Destouches resolved to sail for the Chesapeake in order to block up Arnold in the bay and prevent his receiving succor. Count Rochambeau, the commander of the French troops, sent a corps of eleven hundred and twenty infantry under Baron De Vioménil, on board the French fleet, to carry out more effectually Washington's plan.

Every thing warranted the hope of decided success. At head-quarters they considered Arnold already as a doomed man, and to judge from the importance which was attached to his capture, it would almost appear that the expedition was undertaken more with the view of taking personal revenge against Arnold, than with the more important and real object of relieving Greene and saving the whole South by the defeat of the enemy in Virginia. It is strange, that, even in the reflecting and comprehensive mind of Washington, so much stress should be laid on making a prisoner the detested leader of the British forces—a project that was nothing but a romantic fancy. In like manner, in the beginning of 1778, Washington had formed a plan to abduct Sir Henry Clinton from New York, and only the shrewd suggestions of Alexander Hamilton prevented the attempted execution of the plan.†

Steuben, after having forwarded Colonel Campbell, with four hundred men, to the southern army, had no Continentals left, and only militia under his orders. "Convinced," writes Washington to him on the 20th of February, 1781, from New

* Life of General Peter Mühlenberg, by Henry A. Mühlenberg, p. 230.

† Washington Irving's Life of Washington, iii., 392, 393.

Windsor,* "that a naval operation alone will probably be ineffectual, and that militia would be unequal to the reduction of Arnold in his works, I have detached a corps of twelve hundred men from this army, chiefly consisting of the light infantry, and of course commanded by the Marquis De La Fayette, which will, I hope, arrive at the Head of Elk about the 6th of March, to embark there and proceed down the bay to Hampton Roads or the point of operation. This corps will carry with it some heavy artillery, but if you can procure any in addition, it will be of great importance. I am to desire you will make such arrangements with respect to the militia and supplies, and will take such a position as you judge will be most conducive to the success of the enterprise. The Marquis De La Fayette will open a correspondence with you for this purpose."

In the instructions given to La Fayette in regard to the enterprise against Portsmouth, Washington says:† "When you arrive at your destination you must act as your own judgment and the circumstances shall direct. You will open a correspondence with Baron Steuben, who now commands in Virginia, informing him of your approach, and requesting him to have a sufficient body of militia ready to act in conjunction with your detachment. It will be advisable for him to procure persons in whom he can confide, well acquainted with the country at Portsmouth and in the vicinity; some who are capable of giving you a military idea of it, and others to serve as guides. You should give the earliest attention to acquiring a knowledge of the different rivers, but particularly the James river, that you may know what harbors can best afford shelter and security to the coöperating squadron in case of blockade by a superior force. You are to do no act whatever, with Arnold, that directly or by implication may screen him from the punishment due to his treason and desertion,

* Washington's Writings, by J. Sparks, vii., p. 421.

† Ibidem, p. 419.

which, if he should fall into your hands, you will execute in the most summary way."

Lafayette could scarcely wait to reach Virginia; his sole aim and purpose, the object of his most ardent desires, was the capture of Arnold, who, he constantly dreaded, would evade the snares in which he hoped to catch him. "Nothing will be wanting," he wrote from Morristown, on the 24th of February, 1781, to Steuben,* "to hurry the detachment, which you will find to be an excellent body of troops. I hope that the French ships will strictly blockade Mr. Arnold, and as your position will no doubt exclude the possibility of his taking any advantage by land, I hope we may, before long, give a good account of him. Should he by chance make any proposition, no communication ought to be held with him that might countenance any pretension to his being a prisoner of war."

"The article of my letter of the 24th inst.," he continues on the 26th of February, in Philadelphia,† "relating to any terms Arnold might propose, is the more important as it is the more positively expressed in my instructions."

On the 3d of March, when he arrived at the Head of Elk, he wrote to Mühlenberg:‡ "In all cases I am to request you that no communication be held with Arnold that may in any way give him the least claim to the advantages of a prisoner of war."

It can easily be imagined that Steuben, who had done every thing in his power to defend Virginia, and since his arrival in the State had suffered under the most embarrassing difficulties, was looking with uneasiness upon the sudden intrusion of Lafayette, just at the moment when he had the agreeable prospect of taking Portsmouth. "To-morrow," he writes on the 3d of March, 1781, to Greene,§ "I set out for Williamsburg to finish my preparations for the arrival of the

* Gates MS. Papers, vol. xix., p. 12.

† Ibid., p. 16.

‡ Ibid., p. 13.

§ Greene MS. Papers.

marquis and the fleet. I have communicated to him the plan of operation I should have followed had the fleet been here to assist me. I think the same plan, with very little alterations, should be now adopted. I flatter myself that a marquis and minus six hundred troops that are coming, it would have been in my power to have delivered to you Mr. Arnold, but this honor is reserved for another. But do not think, my dear general, that this idea, however mortifying, will in the least relax my zeal in the affair; on the contrary, I hope the marquis will find every thing prepared for his arrival."

The State of Virginia was unable to furnish the articles which were required for the expedition against Portsmouth. They had no money and no credit; the only thing they could do was to issue impress warrants for horses, boats and provisions. Even Steuben asked the governor in vain for surgeons, with instruments and bandages for the troops. The Executive promised to provide every thing that was wanted, but put Steuben off from day to day. There was no powder even to be had. In Mühlenberg's camp the whole ammunition amounted to eight rounds a man and provision for four days. But what was worse than all, the reinforcements which the State had promised did not arrive, yet it was on the strength of the promise, and on a belief in the energetic coöperation of the State, that Steuben had represented to Lafayette "the facility of taking the fortifications of Portsmouth, sword in hand."

"On my arrival yesterday afternoon," writes Lafayette to Washington, from Yorktown, on the 15th of March,* "I found that Baron De Steuben had been very active in making preparations, and agreeably to what he tells me, we shall have five thousand militia ready to operate. This, with the Continental detachment, is equal to the business, and we might very well do without any land force from Newport. In your first letter

* Revolutionary Correspondence, by J. Sparks, iii., 264.

to the baron, I wish, my dear general, you would write to him that I have been much satisfied with his preparations. I want to please him, and harmony shall be my first object."

The preparations which Steuben had made for the attack on Portsmouth are detailed in his letter to General Greene, on the 16th of March, as follows: "Four eighteen-pound cannon, two thirteen-inch mortars, eight field pieces, seven or eight thousand pounds of powder, with shells and balls sufficient; four troops of cavalry, each thirty, one hundred and twenty; nine regiments four hundred each, three thousand six hundred men; five hundred riflemen, six hundred militia from Carolina and Princess Ann counties: in all four thousand eight hundred and twenty militia." Unfortunately, however, the greater part of these supplies, both of men and arms, existed only on paper, and Steuben was again forced to complain to the government about the unfulfillment of its promises, as will be seen from the following letter to Governor Jefferson, dated the 9th of March, 1781:*

"I have received a letter from General Mühlenberg, dated the 7th instant, informing me that the reinforcements which were to have joined him on the 5th, had not then arrived, and consequently he was prevented from detaching the eight hundred men destined to join General Gregory, and to secure the passage of the Great Bridge. At the same instant arrived twelve men, being all of the one hundred and four who were ordered from New Kent. They are unarmed and demand my orders. I am extremely sorry to declare that I shall give neither arms nor orders. On the assurance I received from government by Colonel Walker, I had the weakness to write General Washington and Marquis Lafayette that every thing was ready for the expedition. My credulity, however, is punished at the expense of my honor, and the only excuse I have is, my confidence in government. The quarter-master writes me, that he has implored the assistance of government in pro-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

curing stores for the expedition. In fact, if the powers of government are inadequate to the furnishing what is indispensably necessary, the expedition must fail. In this situation I suspend giving any orders till I receive your Excellency's answer to this, which answer I will lay before the marquis and the commander of the French fleet, that they may not engage too far in an enterprise for which there is no prospect of carrying it through."

These apprehensions and hopes are confirmed in a letter of Steubens', dated the 10th of March, to General Nelson. "An event is approaching," he says,* "which will have much influence on the operations of the next campaign. Your indisposition at this time is particularly unfortunate, as it deprives me of your counsel and assistance at a time I am in the greatest want of them. You are better acquainted than I am with the strength and weakness of this State, and you have the confidence of the people. Judge then how much I regret your absence. I am in want of every thing, and government have not the power to assist me, in consequence of which I am disappointed in the most essential arrangements. Even the militia, ordered out for this expedition, refuse to come. . . . Here we have a pleasing prospect before us. We may, I think, be certain that a fleet will come to coöperate with us, and in that case the grand traitor can not escape. If we, through neglect, fail in this, it will have a bad effect on the rest of our operations this campaign."

Irving, in the fourth volume of his *Life of Washington*,† in order to prove that "the youthful marquis was not so sanguine as the veteran baron," quotes Lafayette's letter, dated the 7th of March, 1781, to Washington, according to which Steuben declared the taking of Portsmouth, sword in hand, a very easy affair. But he does not mention under what conditions and suppositions Steuben thought thus. The above letters, which are by no means sanguine, fully explain the

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

† Page 435.

grounds on which Steuben's opinion was formed, and on this account deserve particular consideration.

The French fleet left Newport on the 8th of March, and its arrival in Chesapeake Bay could reasonably be expected about the middle of March. Lafayette reached the camp of Mühlenberg, near Suffolk, on the 19th of March. This general had been very active in the meantime. He held the actual command of the troops in the field, while Steuben was occupied in making preparations for the arrival of the French fleet, and gained many advantages over Arnold, by cutting off foraging parties, driving in his outposts, and even taking his post at Great Bridge. Surrounded on the land side by Mühlenberg, Arnold could not expect to keep the place, if he did not soon receive relief. Every thing was ready to effect the capture of the place, should the French fleet arrive and lend the expected assistance by sea.

At last, on the 20th of March, a large fleet was seen in the bay. The hopes of all parties were excited in the highest degree. The Americans were jubilant at the idea that Arnold could not escape, and that the British must suffer a decided defeat. But their joy was short, and was soon turned into bitter disappointment. On the 23d it was discovered that the fleet which had arrived was the British squadron under Arbuthnot, which had sailed two days after the departure of the French from Newport, that about twenty leagues off the Capes it fell in with the French fleet and engaged it for an hour and a half, and that Admiral Destouches, though not beaten, had decided to return to Newport, while the British, considerably damaged, steered off and anchored first in Lynnhaven Bay, and then opposite Portsmouth, to repair their damages and send their wounded to the hospital. This indecisive engagement on the part of the British amounted to a complete victory, as Arnold and Portsmouth were saved. Thus the Americans were once again disappointed in their hopes of a successful expedition.

Lafayette, whose troops had not advanced farther than Annapolis, returned by water to the Head of Elk, and prepared to join the main army on the banks of the Hudson. It would be impossible to understand this movement on his part, were it not for the reason, that in consequence of the failure of the arrival of the French fleet, he presumed his task at an end. With true French ardor for flourish he expected to capture Arnold, and withdrew when he found that the glory at which he aimed could not be won. The critical state of affairs in the South should have prevented Lafayette from drawing off his troops to the northward, the more so as the force of the enemy was lessened in the North by the detachment under Phillips, which arrived in Portsmouth while Lafayette was still in Williamsburg.*

Thus Steuben, who, notwithstanding Lafayette's presence, had not been superseded in the command, was again left alone. Arnold, however, was soon relieved by General Phillips, who, with two thousand men, reached Portsmouth on the 26th of March, and being the senior general took the command. His object appeared to be to join Lord Cornwallis; but in the first instance he remained quiet at Portsmouth with a force of about three thousand five hundred men.

"Nothing will hinder," wrote Steuben on the 23d of March to the board of war, "the enemy to penetrate further into the country; they will even be obliged to do so for subsistence. Virginia asks assistance, and a great part of the people expect it. I am very apprehensive that the invasion will stop all succor from this State to the southern army. The magazines will be exhausted, and all this merits the consideration of Congress and of our allies."†

Steuben's force was still so small that he could scarcely take the precautions indispensable for the security of the State. His first care was to save those articles which at so much

* Greene's letter to Steuben, dated the 3d of April, 1781.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

trouble and expense had been collected for the expedition against Portsmouth. On this occasion the State assisted him with great energy. Steuben's next task was to prevent, if possible, the enemy from making incursions into the country, and from forming a junction with Cornwallis. On the 27th of March he directed Mühlenberg to collect the whole of his force at one point, and to recall the two regiments which, under Colonel Parker, were detached to the Great Bridge. No time was to be lost, for if the enemy were, in the meantime, to send their new troops, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to execute this project. Colonel Parker, however, by making night marches, and crossing a considerable portion of the Dismal Swamp on logs, succeeded in effecting a junction with Mühlenberg, who now removed to his old camp near Scott's, leaving two regiments at Cooper's Mills and a battalion at the Chackatuck. "I am now," says Mühlenberg, on the 3d of April, in a letter to Steuben,* "in my opinion, in the best position this place affords, either to prevent them making incursions into the country, or to keep pace with them, should they move up James river, which I am inclined to think they will attempt. Report says, that Arnold is to march by land, whilst the fleet, with part of the troops on board, moves up the river." But the wholesale desertion of the militia forced Mühlenberg to retire still further and higher up the country, as the enemy would have broken him up if he had continued within their reach. Shortly previous to this, and just before the departure of Lafayette, Steuben had formed a project for effectually delivering the State from the enemy, and laid it before the Executive, Lord Cornwallis being then in the environs of Hillsborough, N. C. Steuben proposed to the government to march with the whole of the militia, and by forced marches cross the Roanoke, and in conjunction with General Greene engage the forces under his lordship before the enemy in Virginia could have time to form any plan. This

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. vii.

maneuver he flattered himself would at least drive Cornwallis from North Carolina, and probably, by obliging General Phillips to follow Steuben with all his forces, have removed the seat of war from Virginia.

Steuben submitted this plan to Lafayette, General Weedon, and Colonel Gouvion, who approved it. On his way to Richmond he met Lieutenant Colonel Morris, who came directly from General Greene, and informed him that Cornwallis had already begun to retire to Cross Creek, and that General Greene wanted a reinforcement to enable him to pursue the British with vigor. This served to strengthen Steuben's opinion, and as he had then upwards of four thousand militia together, he confined his requisition to two thousand men, whom he only required for thirty or forty days. The State government, which, according to General Weedon, "had not an idea beyond local security,"* answered that, although the proposition seemed to them to be founded on very probable principles, yet, as the number of arms that such a detachment would necessarily carry with them was greater than the number that would remain in the State, it would be a measure unjustifiable in the present circumstances of affairs, the enemy having lately received a great reinforcement; that although the militia at present in service would be unable to resist the whole force of the enemy in any quarter, yet, being strangers to their certain intentions, the militia would be able to repel the incursions of detachments, which otherwise would be rendered utterly impracticable for the want of arms.

Steuben, therefore, had to remain in Virginia. He repaired to Chesterfield Court-house, in order to accelerate the departure of the new levies destined for the southward. "My situation," he says, in a report to Washington, dated on the 15th of April, 1781,† "is not the most agreeable, as I am obliged to undertake the defense against three thousand regular

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

† Revolutionary Correspondence, by J. Sparks, iii., 291-293.

troops, with nothing to oppose to them but militia, whose numbers decrease every day. Those who have served since the beginning of the invasion have discharged themselves, and are not yet replaced by others, in consequence of which General Mühlenberg is left on the south side of the river with only seven hundred men, and General Weedon on the north side with about six hundred men. If the enemy have any intention to penetrate the country, the opposition which we can make will avail little.

“A very great evil resulting from this invasion is, that it stops the recruiting for the army. So long as a county has any militia in the field, so long that county is prevented from drafting; and as most of the counties have had part of their militia either here or with General Greene, little or nothing has yet been done in the business. Only fifty-two have yet come in, and of these some have already deserted. Some who came as substitutes have received twenty-five and thirty thousand pounds for eighteen months.

“I am much at a loss what to do for arms, when the recruits do come in. I had reckoned on those by M. De Tilly; and I must entreat your Excellency to order them on by land, as we have not the least prospect of a single musket any other way. We shall also be much distressed for ammunition. General Greene presses me for a supply, while I can scarcely find enough to supply the militia. The marquis has sent one hundred thousand cartridges to Fredericksburg; these I will take care to forward to General Greene. Your Excellency has, I presume, been informed that the lead mines have given out. This article is not now to be had here. If the eastern States do not send us a supply we shall be sadly at a loss. Powder is also scarce. A powder mill near this was blown up some time since, supposed by an emissary of the enemy. I imagine Maryland would furnish some, on application of the board of war.

“Another important and very difficult object is remount

ing the cavalry. The Assembly have passed a law limiting the price of horses for the cavalry at five thousand pounds—a price inadequate to the purchase of the meanest horse. Very indifferent horses, which have been impressed, have been valued at from twenty to thirty thousand pounds, and upwards.* Nothing, therefore, can possibly be done till the meeting of the Assembly. The southern army will require, at least, three hundred cavalry horses for next campaign. I suppose thirty guineas to have been the old price of such horses. Allowing now forty guineas, the whole will amount to twelve thousand guineas. The price must be limited, or the Continent will not be able to pay the expense of remounting two regiments of cavalry.

“I beg your Excellency’s directions for my guide in making a proper representation to the Assembly, which meets on the 10th of next month. Swords will also be much wanted for the cavalry. I have ordered six hundred to be made at Mr. Hunter’s works, but dare not reckon on them in time. Cartridge-boxes are an article the State can not furnish. If possible, two thousand should be sent immediately from Philadelphia.

“The little success I have had in creating the line of this State, and in furnishing the necessary supplies for the southern army, induced me to request General Greene to call me to the army.”

Stenben communicates his troubles and disappointments in a more confidential manner to his friend General Greene, than he would have done in his official correspondence with the general-in-chief. Greene appears to have fully appreciated his embarrassing situation, and his letters are full of sympathy for Stenben’s sufferings, and a vain, though sincere desire, to alleviate them. Greene’s letters do credit alike to his head and heart, and are a convincing proof of the ability and fine feeling of that noble man.

* Paper money, of course.

"If I preferred," says Steuben, in a letter from Chesterfield Court-house, on the 2d of April, 1781,* "my own inclinations to the public interest, I should immediately set out to join you; my desire to act under your immediate directions, and the disgust I have from my situation here, are motives equally forcible to urge my departure hence. I, however, think it my duty to remain here till I am to bring my first detachment with me, which I intend shall amount to five hundred infantry and sixty to eighty cavalry, and for this I am now exerting my utmost."

"I see and feel," writes Greene, on the 3d of April, from his camp on the Deep River,† "for your disagreeable situation, and any thing that is in my power to grant you, you may command. But if you leave Virginia all things will run into confusion, and I am so far from thinking that you are disgraced by your command in Virginia, that everybody allows you to have acquired great credit, and though it is not of that splendid kind, it is nevertheless very honorable, and is founded upon the same line of conduct from which General Washington has justly acquired so much honor—I mean that of guarding against misfortune. My greatest expectations of support are from Virginia, drawn forth under your regulations and arrangements. If you leave them, State policy and partial views will counteract all the support we may expect from that quarter, and we shall all fall together to the southward. Nothing in my power shall be wanting to do justice to your reputation, and I feel my obligations to you for your exertions. Should you continue to wish to join the army, you shall most readily have my consent, for I am greatly in want of your aid here as well as there; but it is my opinion that you can be more extensively useful there than here."

"However, my dear baron," continues Greene on the 6th of April, "when you consider the critical and disagreeable situation I am in, the little prospect I have of acquiring glory,

* Steuben MS. Papers.

† Greene MS. Papers.

and the almost certain disgrace that will accompany my maneuvers, from the nature and constitution of our army, and from the many difficulties I have to combat, and compare your situation with mine, you may think yourself happy that you are not in as perplexing a state as I am. I wish both our prospects were better, but mine, of all men, is the most disagreeable. Let us labor, and faint not ; happily we may get through the thorny path in due time, and by ways and means not very clear to either at present."

This noble appeal to Steuben's ambition and sense of duty, had the desired effect ; he remained in Virginia.

CHAPTER XX.

DARK PROSPECTS IN VIRGINIA.—STEBEN ALMOST DESPAIRS AS TO AN IMPROVEMENT.—LAFAYETTE APPOINTED TO THE CHIEF COMMAND IN VIRGINIA.—HE ARRIVES IN RICHMOND ON THE 29TH OF APRIL.—TILL THEN STEBEN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.—HIS DISPOSITIONS AT THE INVASION OF PHILLIPS.—THE LATTER ASCENDS THE JAMES RIVER, LANDS ON SANDY POINT, AND GOES AS FAR AS PETERSBURG.—STEBEN, EVERYWHERE HAMPERED, CAN NOT DO MUCH.—THE MILITIA DOES NOT ARRIVE.—STEBEN, HOWEVER, OPPOSES PHILLIPS' ADVANCE.—STEBEN'S REPORT.—JEFFERSON'S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.—PHILLIPS' AND ARNOLD'S PLUNDERING INROADS TOWARDS RICHMOND.—LAFAYETTE PUTS A STOP TO THEM.—PHILLIPS RETIRES.—CORNWALLIS MARCHES FROM WILMINGTON INTO VIRGINIA, AND FORMS A JUNCTION WITH PHILLIPS AT PETERSBURG.—LAFAYETTE GOES TO WILTON.—STEBEN ON THE CHICKAHOMINY ACCELERATES THE LEVY OF THE RECRUITS.—HIS LETTER TO GREENE ABOUT HIS POSITION IN VIRGINIA.—HE WANTS TO JOIN GREENE.—THE LATTER CONSENTS TO HIS WISH.—POINT OF FORK THE GENERAL RENDEZVOUS.—FIFTEEN HUNDRED RECRUITS ORDERED TO ASSEMBLE THERE.—STEBEN FINDS ONLY THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY.—HE PROVIDES THEM WITH ARMS.—HE TRANSPORTS THE MAGAZINES TO THE POINT OF FORK.—THE STATE DOES NOTHING FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS INHABITANTS AGAINST THE DEVASTATIONS OF THE ENEMY.—IT HAS NO CREDIT.—CLAIBORNE'S SAD BUT TRUE REPORT.—NEGLECT IN RECRUITING.—GENERAL DESERTION.—STEBEN HAS ONLY FIVE HUNDRED MEN UNDER HIM.—HE INTENDS TO JOIN GREENE WITH THEM.—HIS REASONS FOR THIS PLAN EXPLAINED IN A LETTER TO LAFAYETTE.—HE ASKS GREENE BY WHAT ROAD HE WISHES HIM TO MARCH TO THE SOUTH.—GREENE'S ANSWER DOES NOT ARRIVE.—IT IS INTERCEPTED ON THE WAY.—STEBEN SECURES, IN THE MEANTIME, THE MAGAZINES AS WELL AS POSSIBLE.

IN the meantime it became every day more apparent that the whole South must be abandoned to the enemy, and Greene's army sacrificed, if he were not speedily reinforced. The clouds hanging over Virginia were growing darker and darker; and even Steben seems to have become somewhat discouraged. On the 11th of April he wrote to General Hand, then adjutant general of the army, as follows: "I wish it was in my power to give you a pleasing account of affairs in this part of the continent; but indeed every thing is gloomy, very little in our favor, and appearances entirely against us. However, we must do and suffer; and if by any means we may

obtain the prize we fight for, the price can scarcely be too great.”*

The apprehended junction of Phillips with Cornwallis proved the danger of delay, and determined Washington to order Lafayette, on the 6th of April, 1781, to march to the South, and put himself under the orders of General Greene, who appointed him to the chief command in Virginia.

Notwithstanding his forced marches, and every possible exertion, it took Lafayette fully three weeks to reach Richmond, where he arrived on the 29th of April. Steuben, therefore, continued to hold the command in the State, and if not crowned with success, he at least had the satisfaction to prove on the occasion of Phillips' invasion, that even the militia could be disciplined into soldiers, and, when properly led, make an honorable stand against the English regulars. Immediately after the arrival of Phillips in Virginia, Steuben made the following disposition of his forces:†

“Should the enemy penetrate into the country, the whole militia will turn out, receive all the spare arms and be embodied in battalions, regiments, or detachments, as General Mühlenberg thinks proper. Should the enemy dislodge General Mühlenberg from Broadwater, his retreat will be Petersburg, whence his movements must be such as to enable him to keep the upper country. Should the enemy direct his march toward North Carolina, General Mühlenberg's corps will still endeavor to keep their right flank at the same time; the troops on the other side of the river will follow the enemy and march in the rear. In case the enemy should move up James river so far as Richmond, General Mühlenberg's first movements will still be to Petersburg, and from thence the further movements of the enemy will regulate and determine his movements.

“The corps under General Nelson will consist of eight

* Mühlenberg's Life, by H. A. Mühlenberg, Philadelphia, 1849, pp. 285 and 246.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiv.

hundred men infantry, and as many horses as can be collected, should the enemy land below. . . . * river. This corps must cross said river and govern his retreat and movements as those of the enemy may make it necessary. But as soon as the enemy lands at the south side, General Nelson's corps must endeavor to cross James river at the most convenient place, in order to follow their march in the rear. Should the enemy come up by the way of York river, General Nelson's corps must act according to circumstances in order to annoy the enemy. As the fort at Hood's is not in a state of defense, and our force in the field not sufficient to make the necessary resistance so low down the river, the stores and arms from Prince George Court-house are directed to be carried to Petersburg."

General Phillips, after having fortified himself at Portsmouth, on the 16th of April ascended James river. He embarked his men in twenty-five flat-boats, each of which carried one hundred men. Mühlenberg, agreeably to Steuben's orders, had previously removed all the stores on the right bank of the river, from the lower parts of the State to Prince George Court-house; but even this place was too near James river to be secure as a *dépôt*. Steuben, therefore, thought it prudent to remove them still further into the country beyond Richmond. At the same time Colonel Innes had packed the public stores on the left side of the river, and held them in readiness for removal at a minute's warning. On the 18th of April the British fleet came opposite the mouth of Pagaa's Creek. Mühlenberg, in order to keep ahead of the enemy and to advise Steuben of their movements, on the 19th broke up his camp at Broadwater, and marched via Wall's Bridge to Cabin Point, while the enemy proceeded on the 20th to Jamestown, and the next day landed at Sandy Point. Steuben had fixed the rendezvous of the cavalry at Petersburg, and ordered the other troops to retire before any superior force toward Rich-

* Left blank in the original. Probably the Chickahominy.

mond. He was at this time at Chesterfield Court house, and engaged in forming a corps of cavalry, and in removing, with the assistance of Davies, the stores from Powhattan Court-house to Cumberland old Court-house and the Point of Fork. On the 23d the enemy arrived at Westover, where two hundred armed and three hundred unarmed militia were unable to offer any effective resistance. Thus the enemy was able to commit considerable depredations. The number of the militia in the field being too small to offer battle, Steuben ordered his officers to avoid as much as possible the risk of a general action, which would inevitably have led to a defeat. He, therefore, thought it best to harass the enemy by small detachments, which could easily retreat, when beaten, to some place of rendezvous. "The militia," writes Steuben, on the 21st of April, 1781, from Chesterfield Court-house, to Washington and the board of war,* "come in very slowly. Arms will be wanted for them and swords for the artillery that might assemble. The battery at Hood's is not half finished; every thing is in the same confusion as when Arnold came up the river. There is not a single company of regular troops in the State, and the militia are too inexperienced to hope for the least resistance from them."

* On the 24th of April the enemy reached City Point at the entrance of the Appomatox into James river, about twelve miles from Petersburg. Steuben had left Chesterfield Court-house on the 22d, from which place he had directed the removal of the stores and the movements of the troops, and went down to Petersburg, where he took the command of the American forces. As some doubts are entertained† whether Steuben was present at the ensuing engagements, we think it best to insert here the report which Steuben made to Washington and Greene, about the affair near Petersburg, and which proves that he and not Mühlenberg commanded the Americans on that occasion.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

† Mühlenberg's Life, p. 247.

"On the 24th," he writes on the road from Petersburg to Chesterfield Court-house, ten miles from Petersburg, on the 25th of April,* "I reconnoitered the enemy's fleet, then lying off Westover, and consisting of thirteen topsail vessels and twenty-three flat-bottomed boats full of men. The whole number of troops on board I judged to be about two thousand five hundred; a Hessian sergeant who deserted to us made them three thousand. The fleet of the enemy soon came to sail and stood up the river toward City Point, which continued to keep me in doubt on which side they would debark. I, therefore, ordered the militia under command of General Mühlenberg to retire to the vicinity of Blandford. The same evening the enemy landed all their force at City Point, which fully evinced that their first object was Petersburg. Being obliged to send large detachments to the neck of land between Appomatox and James rivers, I had not more than one thousand men left to oppose the enemy's advance. In this critical situation there were many reasons against risking a total defeat—the loss of arms was a principal one; and on the other hand to retire without some show of resistance, would have intimidated the inhabitants and encouraged the enemy to further incursions. This last consideration determined me to defend the place as far as our inferiority in numbers would permit. I made choice of Blandford as the place of defense, and the bridge of Pocahontas as our retreat; the troops were disposed accordingly and passed the night under arms.

"The morning of the 25th I was informed that the enemy was within three miles of our advanced posts, and that eleven flat-bottomed boats, with troops, were at the same time moving up Appomatox river. Towards noon the enemy came in sight, formed themselves and displayed to their left; but it was near three o'clock before the firing commenced, which continued from post to post till past five o'clock, when the superior number of the enemy and a want of ammunition obliged

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii., and Greene Papers.

me to order the retreat, and the bridge to be taken up, which was executed in the greatest order, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy's cannon and musketry. The troops with the same good order retreated to this place, where they are just encamped.

"I am not yet able to ascertain our loss, but believe it not great. I do not think the enemy took a single prisoner. The enemy's loss I am also unable to form any judgment of.

"General Mühlenberg merits my particular acknowledgments for the good disposition which he made, and the great gallantry with which he executed it. Indeed the gallant conduct of all the officers, and the particular good behavior of the men, must, I am persuaded, have attracted the admiration of the enemy. I have the pleasure to say that our troops disputed the ground with the enemy inch by inch, and the maneuvers were executed with the greatest exactness."

Jefferson, on the 26th of April, congratulated Steuben on "this initiation of our militia into the business of war," and found Steuben's opinion justified, that the more the militia were employed in a small way, the more contented they would remain, and the more they would improve. In his letter to Washington, on the 9th of May, 1781,* he said that, "The enemy was received by Steuben"—mind, not by Mühlenberg!—"with a body of militia, somewhat under one thousand, who, though the enemy were two thousand three hundred strong, disputed the ground very handsomely two hours, during which time the enemy gained one mile only, and that by inches."

"I am happy," says Greene, on the 14th of May, 1781, in reply to Steuben's report,† "that you came to so judicious a determination of not hazarding a general action, and yet not permitting the enemy to advance without considerable opposition. Your report of the good conduct of General Mühlenberg, and the troops under his command, affords me great

* Revolutionary Correspondence, iii., p. 308.

† Greene MS. Papers.

pleasure, and claims my entire approbation. This spirited opposition will have a most happy effect upon their future operations."

Phillips, after having destroyed the vessels lying in the river at Petersburg, and burned the tobacco warehouses, proceeded to Chesterfield Court-house, where he continued his work of devastation. Arnold pursued a similar course near Warwick, and having set fire to all the tobacco magazines, soon after joined Phillips in Manchester, opposite Richmond. It was their chief design to capture this latter place, because it was of importance as the capital of the State, and the key to the strategical operations in the interior of Virginia. Steuben alone was too weak to keep the city against the attack of the united forces of Arnold and Phillips. All depended upon the arrival of Lafayette, who might be expected at any moment. Fortunately he arrived in time, and as he was soon joined by about two thousand militia, the enemy did not dare to cross the river, which was at that time without a bridge. Lafayette took up a position at a point above the falls of James river, at which all the boats had been collected, and assumed the chief command of the American forces in Virginia, while Phillips, on the 2d of May, slowly descended the river, and halted opposite Cobham, where his movements were closely watched by Lafayette.

On the 5th of May, Phillips, while still below Burwell's Ferry, was informed, by a dispatch from Lord Cornwallis, that he was on his march to Virginia, and that he intended to form a junction with him at or near Petersburg. Lord Cornwallis, after having arrived at Wilmington, N. C., at once understood that little or nothing could be done against the enemy from this remote place, and that in the Carolinas and Georgia no decisive blow could be struck. He therefore eagerly seized the advantage which Phillips' arrival in Virginia opened to him, and resolved to march across North Carolina, and, after having joined Phillips, to effect a junction with Clinton. He remained

only eighteen days in Wilmington, to rest his army, and on the 24th of April commenced his march northward. It was one of the most daring and noble enterprises during the whole war, and deserves the admiration of both friend and enemy. When the orders of Cornwallis reached Phillips, the former was in Halifax, some seventy miles from Petersburg. Phillips ascended the river again, and landed his forces at City Point, whence he marched towards Petersburg. Lafayette, who had received the same news of the approach of Cornwallis, tried to prevent a junction; but he came too late, and on the 9th of May Phillips entered Petersburg unmolested. This British general died on the 13th, and Arnold had the temporary command, when, a week after, Cornwallis arrived in Petersburg, and took the command of all the British forces in Virginia. Lafayette, thus defeated in his design, recrossed James river, and established himself at Wilton, some twenty miles below Richmond, on the north side of that stream; but Lord Cornwallis, on the 24th, followed him, crossed the river at Westover, and, being reinforced by the arrival of two British regiments and two Anspach battalions, drove Lafayette towards the back country.

The first object of Cornwallis was, of course, to beat Lafayette; his next, to destroy such of the enemy's stores as might be within his reach after the American army had been either defeated or obliged to retire.*

It is not the purpose of this work to follow in detail the movements of Lafayette, except so far as they were connected with Steuben, who remained with him as long as there was any probability of coming to action. While Phillips lay in the river, Steuben commanded the militia, and formed the rear of the American forces on the upper part of the Chickahominy, at New Kent Court-house and Bottom Bridge; but when the approach of Cornwallis became certain, and when his operations carried the American forces too far from their

* Stedman, *History of the American War*, ii., 430.

rendezvous, he exclusively devoted his time to accelerate by his presence the levy of the recruits for the South, to protect the stores, and regulate their supply on and near James river, beyond Richmond.

"When the marquis arrived," says Steuben, in a letter to Greene, dated Carter's Ferry, on the 15th of May, 1781,* "I looked on myself discharged from attending the operations in the field, the more especially as he had three brigadiers under him. I therefore again turned my attention to collecting and equipping the recruits, and, with the marquis's consent, fixed the general rendezvous at Albemarle barracks. We have as yet only four hundred and thirty recruits assembled, unarmed, unequipped, and without clothes, nor do I expect above four hundred more. All the south side of James river, and those counties on the north side, which lay near the coast or river, are not obliged to draft their levies so long as they have any militia in the field. If, therefore, the enemy continues here, near two thirds of the State will not furnish any recruits. In fact, if, with our greatest efforts, we get a thousand men from Virginia, it will be the utmost.

"Notwithstanding this, my care to keep together and equip the few we have got, has not failed to draw on me the censure of many of the great men here, who pretend that these recruits ought to be sent immediately into the field, and relieve so many of the militia; other wise men ridicule the distance from the enemy to which I have sent them, while their respective plantations are exposed.

"I am sorry to say that the desertion that prevails among the recruits equals that of the Virginia troops with you. I despair, my dear general, of ever seeing a Virginia line exist. Every thing seems to oppose it; with all the trouble I can take I find it impossible to assemble either officers or men, and even when a few are got together, I hear of nothing but of furloughs for the officers, and of the desertion of the men.

* Greene MS. Papers.

The few recruits we have are formed into a regiment, under Colonel Gaskins. About one hundred and fifty of them are armed. I shall order them in a couple of days to the fork of the river, which will, in some measure, gratify the people by protecting their magazines, which are all assembled at that place, and they may, at the same time, be disciplined and equipped there. I shall also send some officers to Albemarle barracks, to receive the recruits that may be sent in from the other rendezvous, to equip them and send them on to join the regiment at the Fork.

“Having completed these arrangements, I shall join the marquis till I receive your orders, and I must give you notice, that, from the many difficulties which daily occur, and of which I have mentioned only a small part, my presence in this State has become entirely useless. I shall, with great pleasure, fly to put myself under your more immediate command, and I beseech you, my dear general, to call me as soon as possible, for never was a man more disgusted than I am at the conduct and proceedings in this quarter.”

A few days after the date of this letter, Steuben received one from General Greene, of the 1st of May, in which he anticipated Steuben's desire to join him, and gave him the following directions :*

“The Marquis De Lafayette writes me that he is ordered to Richmond with his detachment, agreeable to my application. This will afford me an opportunity of indulging your wishes in joining the army. And it is my wish that you should march with all the Virginia drafts that are fit to take the field as soon as you can. General Wayne, I am told, is on the march for this army with the Pennsylvania line. You will please to write him to follow as soon as possible. Our situation requires immediate support. I beg you to get the best state of the stores you can, and bring with you, and write to the board of war our deplorable condition respecting

* Greene MS. Papers.

arms. Unless a new supply can be had, or larger armories established for their repairs, we can not keep the field. I beg you to take every possible measure to improve both. Bring forward also the cavalry with you that is fit for duty, ours being much broken down, and the enemy having more than two to our one, and should we meet with another defeat, and the enemy have a superior body of horse, nothing less than total ruin must follow. You will please to furnish the marquis with the best information you can respecting the state of things in Virginia. I find myself so beset with difficulties that I need the counsel and assistance of an officer educated in the Prussian school, and I persuade myself I shall have in you both the friend and the general I want."

Steuben immediately communicated this letter to Governor Jefferson and La Fayette at an interview in the council chamber at Richmond, and as the barracks at Chesterfield Courthouse had been burnt by the enemy, and as the situation was no longer proper for the rendezvous of the troops, he mentioned to the governor the necessity of fixing on some place less exposed, where he might collect the recruits, equip and form them; and with the consent of La Fayette, Albemarle barracks was agreed on for the place. As the governor had said that those counties who had militia in the field would not proceed to draft, Steuben asked him what would be the number of the recruits of those counties that were not so circumstanced? "About fifteen hundred men," answered Jefferson, in the presence of La Fayette. All that had been collected at that time were three hundred men at Manchester, badly armed and worse clothed. Steuben determined, therefore, that they should march immediately to Albemarle barracks, to be clothed and equipped for the field; that the other recruits should join them as soon as they came in, and that afterward they might join General Greene or the marquis, as circumstances might require. Orders were accordingly given to them to march by way of Carter's Ferry. The day after, Steu-

ben received a letter from Colonel Davies, in which he represented that Albemarle barracks was a very improper place on many accounts; that a great difficulty would occur in transporting provisions there; that there was no wood near it, and that the barracks were nearly destroyed. He pointed out the fork of James river as the most proper place. "Many articles for the equipment of the troops, were," he said, "already there;" and he promised to make every necessary arrangement for the reception of the troops at that place. On this letter, Steuben joined Lafayette at Wilton, and he having no objection, the Point of Fork was determined on. The marquis desired him to repair there to hasten the equipment of the fifteen hundred recruits whom they expected, and who were to join either General Greene or Lafayette.

On his arrival at the Fork, Steuben found, however, that not more than five hundred and forty men had yet come in, and of these a great number were unfit for the service. They were without arms and clothing, and badly equipped, and every day diminished in number by desertion and sickness. It was with difficulty that they were provided with arms, which had just arrived from Philadelphia.

While Steuben was thus occupied, Lord Cornwallis crossed James river, and Lafayette retreated up the country.

The principal part of the Continental stores was then on the south side of the river, at Prince Edward, Charlotte and Halifax Court-houses; those of the State were dispersed everywhere, and a great part of them, by order of the government, were deposited at the Point of Fork. The retreat of Lafayette induced Steuben to represent to the agent and to the commissioner of the State the necessity of removing them higher up into the mountains. He told them that the troops were by no means destined to guard the stores, but that he should remove them as circumstances might direct. The greater part of the stores was accordingly removed, and those which, by the negligence of their own officers fell into the hands of the enemy, were very inconsiderable.

In general, all the preparations for the protection of the State against the enemy continued as insufficient as ever. All the departments were in disorder, which increased to the highest degree when the Executive and Legislature, at the approach of Cornwallis, moved hurriedly from Richmond to Charlottesville. The enemy seemed more determined to destroy property than to fight. The forces which were left to protect the stores were so inefficient and careless, that at the first appearance of the enemy they would have been lost. At Prince Edward's Court-house, for instance, all the officers and inspectors superintending the stores, laboratories, etc., were absent when Steuben sent an officer to look at them. The guards there were without an officer, and only a few militia present under the command of a tavern keeper. For want of wagons the stores there could scarcely be removed, and upwards of fifteen hundred arms were unfit for service. Only two men had been employed by the State for the repair of arms since January, and there was no hope of any abatement of this shameful neglect.

The government had to furnish arms and wagons, horses and drivers, and all the necessary means for the defense of the State; but it was impossible to get any material assistance from the powerless commonwealth. The officers, who pledged their personal credit for meeting the present exigencies, lost the confidence of the people when they could not pay on account of the failure of the State, and instead of the support which they expected from the public, they received only execrations for their sacrifices. The noble Claiborne, deputy quarter-master for the State, who, as he justly remarked of himself, had made it his study and practice to promote the public interest, tried in vain to protect the State against the evil consequences of this carelessness. "It gives me much concern," he writes to Steuben, from Richmond, on the 18th of May,* "to assure you, that what I have repeated to you a long time

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

since has really come to pass. For want of material from the merchants, and security at our posts contiguous to navigable rivers, all the manufactories that I had established are so unfixed and broken up that I get little or nothing from them. I have never been able to get any leather worth mentioning from the commissioner of hides in this State. Private trade is broken up, and I am without money. I have made every trial in my power to procure horses and every thing else, by certificates, and employing gentlemen of interest and influence; but they assure me that there is such a general dissatisfaction and suspicion among the people, that they are determined not to suffer themselves to be deceived any longer by being connected with contracts on public account. I can assure you, sir, that faith in general among the people towards the public is totally lost, and that nothing is to be had, unless necessity obliges them to it, without cash, or some personal private obligation is rendered to them."

Nevertheless it was evident that if the military stores, which Davies had been laboring to collect for many months, were not at once transported beyond Carter's Ferry, they would have been lost, and the whole wealth of the State could never have replaced them; nay, the only dependence for General Greene's army would have been almost totally cut off. The loss of these stores would have proved the loss of the whole country.

"Faults in war," remarks Steuben on this occasion, "seldom go unpunished, and this State now feels the effects of its indolence. With a formidable enemy in the heart of their country, they are destitute of arms, or any of the resources necessary for their defense."

The same improvidence prevailed in regard to the recruits. Of the three thousand expected in February from Virginia, only five hundred had come in on the 18th of May, and that was only two days before Cornwallis' junction with Arnold! "Captain Reed informs me," writes Davies, on the 24th of May,

to Steuben,* "that he has received but seven soldiers, two of whom have deserted; that it is uncertain when the draft in the neighboring counties will take place, and that indeed he does not know from what counties the men are to come who are to rendezvous there. Major Posey writes from Stanton, that of deserters and others he has collected twenty-one; that no draft has yet taken place in any of the back counties, neither could he inform me when it would, as the people are much averse to it, and in Augusta and Rockbridge have prevented it by force. He says he has a deserter or two delivered to him every five or six days, and expects to send a company of them down in a short time."

Steuben had formed his five hundred men in a battalion, under Colonel Gaskins, which he disciplined and equipped with the utmost dispatch. He, at the same time, sent expresses to all the rendezvous to forward immediately all the recruits they had. He consulted with Lafayette and determined to join Greene with what recruits he had, expecting to be able to equip them towards the end of May. "It is certain, my dear marquis," he writes from Point of Fork, on the 20th of May, 1781,† "that if General Greene does not receive other reinforcements than mine, the handful of men whom I can take with me, he will not be very formidable. I have but five hundred and fifty men collected, and no hopes that their number will be increased, unless I defer my departure for a fortnight; but if Lawson could join me, if perhaps North Carolina could make an effort, our force would probably be a little more respectable. But be it as it may, I am of opinion that my five hundred and fifty men, and even if I had a thousand, joined to those under your orders, would never prevent Lord Cornwallis from going wherever he pleases; but the five hundred men who pass James river with me, will probably oblige him to send a detachment after me, or at least to observe me. By such a detachment his force against us would be dimin-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

† Ibidem, vol. xii.

ished, and his plan, I dare say, a little deranged. The letter of General Greene to Lawson, by which he summons him to the South, is of the 12th instant. I, therefore, do not doubt that at that time he was already informed of the maneuver of Cornwallis. But suppose even that it was not the case, as long as we can carry on the war in the Carolinas, the South is not conquered. This is my opinion, and I confess, that if it depended upon me, I would not postpone my departure for the South for twenty-four hours, and that I regret extremely that I can not collect all the necessaries as quick as I wish. I have arms, but no cartridge-boxes. I expect to-day a little ammunition and a few blankets, shoes and shirts. That's all I can expect from the State. Thus I hope to be able to march hence within five or six days. I propose to pass the Roanoke at two places. The troops will probably cross at Taylor's Ferry, and the baggage a little higher up. I am so fully convinced that my appearance on the other side of James river will annoy Lord Cornwallis, that I am most impatient to get away."

On the 26th of May, Steuben informed Greene, from Albemarle Court-house, of his approaching march for the South. "In obedience to your orders," he says,* "I have been here since the 21st, assembling the recruits and preparing them for the march. About five hundred are now together, and to-morrow I expect about sixty more. This, I believe, will be all I shall be able to bring with me, except about thirty of Armand's corps, whom I am endeavoring to equip. The arms from Philadelphia I expect here to-day. But they are without cartridge-boxes. I have, however, some old ones, and some hopes to receive some from Fredericksburg. The confusion into which every thing has been thrown in this State, makes it extremely difficult for me to collect those articles which are necessary; but be assured, my dear general, that nothing shall be left undone to hasten my march. I shall not wait for coats, I only desire shoes, overalls, shirts and blankets. Not-

* Greene MS. Papers.

withstanding this, I shall be happy if I get off from here the 4th or 5th of June. . . . I must beg you to determine by what route I shall join you."

Steuben proposed to employ his time in better securing the military stores of the State, until his men were in readiness to commence their march. He hoped to receive, in the meantime, another letter from Greene, as this general, when he wrote his last, on the 1st of May, was ignorant of Cornwallis' moving towards Virginia, and of his subsequent conjunction with Arnold, and as since that maneuver the aspect of affairs had much changed in this State.

But no new orders from Greene arrived; they were intercepted by the enemy.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE STATE'S MAGAZINES AT THE POINT OF FORK.—STEBEN'S MEASURES FOR SAVING THEM.—HIS LETTER TO LAFAYETTE.—STEBEN COMPLAINS OF HIS ISOLATED POSITION, AND OF THE DESPERATE CONDITION OF HIS MEN.—MOVEMENTS OF CORNWALLIS AND LAFAYETTE.—THE LATTER JOINED BY WAYNE.—THE FORMER SENDS TARLETON AGAINST CHARLOTTEVILLE, AND SIMCOE AGAINST STEBEN, WHO HAS ONLY FIVE HUNDRED MEN UNDER HIM.—MAJOR CALL'S INFUNCT REPORT TO STEBEN ABOUT THE DESTINATION OF THE ENEMY.—STEBEN TRANSPORTS STORES AND BAGGAGE TO THE RIGHT BANK OF THE RIVER.—HIS MEN NOT RELIABLE.—SIMCOE, ON HIS ARRIVAL AT THE POINT, FINDS THE MAGAZINES ON THE OTHER BANK OF THE RIVER.—STEBEN HASTENS HIS RETREAT.—SIMCOE'S STRATAGEM.—A PART OF THE STORES FALLS INTO THE HANDS OF SIMCOE.—STEBEN'S LETTERS TO GOVERNOR NASH AND LAFAYETTE.—HIS MOTIVES FOR HIS RETREAT TO WILLIS' CREEK.—IS STRONGLY ASSAILED FOR HIS RETREAT.—SIMCOE'S AND LEE'S ACCOUNT.—THE LOSS GREATLY EXAGGERATED.—STATEMENTS OF LAFAYETTE, H. LEE, AND LANGBORNE.—DAVIES' LETTER.—STEBEN'S MEASURES FOR SECURING THE MAGAZINES IN THE INTERIOR OF THE STATE.—HE MARCHES TO COLE'S FERRY AND SUMMONS THE MILITIA.—HIS PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE, AND REQUISITION FROM GOVERNOR NASH.—STEBEN RECEIVES AT ELIZABETH COURT-HOUSE THE FIRST INDIRECT NEWS FROM GREENE.—GREENE'S LETTERS INTERCEPTED BY THE ENEMY.—GREENE DIRECTS STEBEN TO JOIN LAFAYETTE AGAINST CORNWALLIS.—STEBEN'S CHARACTERISTIC LETTER TO CAPTAIN KIRKPATRICK.—STEBEN MARCHES BACK TO JAMES RIVER TO JOIN LAFAYETTE.—LAFAYETTE'S LETTER OF THE 13TH OF JUNE.—CORNWALLIS IN RICHMOND.—STEBEN EFFECTS HIS JUNCTION WITH LAFAYETTE ON THE 19TH OF JUNE.—CORNWALLIS EVACUATES RICHMOND AND GOES DOWN TO THE COAST.—AFFAIR NEAR JAMESTOWN.—LAFAYETTE ALMOST ANNIHILATED.—CORNWALLIS FORTIFIES HIMSELF, FIRST IN PORTSMOUTH, AFTERWARDS IN YORKTOWN AND GLOUCESTER.—WASHINGTON AND THE FRENCH ARMY AND FLEET ARRIVE FROM THE NORTH.—CORNWALLIS BESIEGED.—STEBEN, AFTER HIS JUNCTION WITH LAFAYETTE, SICK.—GOES INTO THE COUNTRY NEAR CHARLOTTEVILLE.—GREENE ORDERS HIM TO MARCH FOR THE SOUTH.—STEBEN'S ANSWER OF THE 13TH OF AUGUST.—STEBEN REMAINS IN VIRGINIA.—HE GOES TO WILLIAMSBURG.—HIS LETTER TO GREENE.—HIS HAPPIEST TIME IN AMERICA.—OPERATIONS BEFORE YORKTOWN.—STEBEN RECEIVES THE COMMAND OF A DIVISION.—IS THE ONLY AMERICAN OFFICER EVER PRESENT AT A REGULAR SIEGE.—HE OPENS THE SECOND PARALLEL.—WAYNE HIS BRIGADIER.—ANECDOTES.—DISPUTE BETWEEN STEBEN AND LAFAYETTE.—STEBEN COMMANDS IN THE TRENCHES WHEN CORNWALLIS OFFERS TO CAPITULATE.—ANECDOTE OF CAPTAIN DE KALE.—DESCRIPTION OF THE CAPITULATION BY AN EYE WITNESS.—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

THE greater part of the stores of the State, with the artillery, was still at the Fork, where they were by no means safe, considering the superiority of the enemy. Steben ordered all the boats to be sent up from Richmond to the Fork, to secure the communication across the river. On the

29th of May he took up a position at the Fork, and covered the removal of the stores. "Here I am," writes Steuben on the 3d of June, 1781, to Lafayette,* "with five hundred and fifty men in a desert, without shoes, shirts, and, what is still worse, without cartridge-boxes. I write everywhere, send expresses to all parts of the world, but I receive no answer. If I did not expect Lawson, with a reinforcement, I would go to Charlottesville to sing a jeremiad to my sovereign masters. Please let me have news from you. I am here as I would be in Kamtschatka; I do not know where you are nor what has become of Cornwallis."

To Mr. Cary, Speaker of the State Senate, he wrote on the same day detailing his troubles, and complaining loudly of the desperate condition of his men:

"The object of the present," he says,† "is to acquaint you of the condition of the men now collected here. Most of them arrived destitute of every article of clothing. On my orders all the shoes, shirts and other things in the public stores were distributed among them. It is painful to me to see the number of sick men increasing every day, although this is only the natural consequence of their being exposed to the wet without even the most necessary clothing. Frequent desertions are another consequence of this circumstance. The soldier who would be willing to lose his life in battle, objects to being sacrificed to misery and destitution.

"As concerns the particular articles of clothing, I expected to find here shirts, shoes, overalls, linen, jackets or hunting shirts, and blankets, all of which I was the more sure to be provided with as they are to be manufactured in the State. I would never have believed that during the whole month of June the entire State of Virginia could not furnish those objects for five hundred men, being the sixth part of the supply voted by the Assembly in the month of November. Colonel Gaskin's battalion has been provided with arms sent

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

† Ibidem.

from Philadelphia; but there is not a single cartridge-box in store. General Greene has repeatedly insisted, with me, on being provided with those articles in our statement of last November, and I mentioned it several times to government as absolutely indispensable. Saddles for cavalry and cartridge-boxes for infantry should always be the first things to be cared for, as they need more time to be made. And notwithstanding this there is not a single one ready in the whole State; nay, I doubt whether they have ever been ordered.

“I sincerely request you, sir, to lay this before the honorable Assembly. It is disagreeable to dwell on such a state of things; but it is a matter of importance for me to be justified in the eyes of that estimable body and before the people of this State, lest the delay before these troops can take the field be charged to my negligence. Think of this poor body of men camping in the woods, perishing without seeing the enemy, without even being drilled, as they are destitute of shirts and shoes!

“I beg most fervently to ask you, sir, whom I may address, to have this melancholy state of things mended?”

While Steuben was thus engaged, Cornwallis had pursued Lafayette, and finding that he could not prevent the latter's junction with Wayne, he directed his attention to the more attainable object of breaking up the Virginia Assembly at Charlottesville, and of striking a blow at Steuben, whom he knew to be at the Point of Fork. To obtain the first object he sent Tarleton with two hundred and fifty men to Charlottesville; but only seven members were taken. At the same time Simcoe, with some five hundred men, was detached against Steuben, and Cornwallis, with the main body, followed him; while Tarleton, having left Charlottesville, went down the Rivanna to coöperate with Simcoe, if occasion should require. This combined movement, which made Steuben's position very dangerous, was kept so secret that he heard nothing of it till the 2d of June; and when he received intelligence that the enemy

were at Goochland Court-house, moving up the river, he supposed that Lord Cornwallis and the whole British army were marching against him. This news, however, was not positive. Steuben, therefore, only repeated his orders for removing the remainder of the stores and collecting all the boats on both rivers above and below his position, in order to cross, should there be occasion. At five o'clock in the morning of the 4th of June, Major Call, of Washington's corps, arrived, and informed Steuben that the enemy had divided his forces into two parties, one of which had taken the route by Louisa Court-house, and the other by Goochland Court-house; that he had seen both columns on their march; with difficulty had escaped being taken. This report removed every doubt of their intention. Steuben, therefore, gave immediate orders for transporting the baggage of the troops across the river, placed a piequet of eighty men on the point opposite which he expected Lord Cornwallis would soon appear in order to engage Steuben's attention, while the other party crossed the north branch a little above, in order to catch him between the two rivers. Steuben then marched the battalion on the road, by which the party who, he expected, would cross above, must come, and waited there till the whole of the baggage had crossed. He left a piequet of fifty men on the road, and crossed the remainder of the battalion. On the same day General Lawson arrived and informed Steuben that he had two hundred and fifty militia, whereof fifteen were horsemen, who were on the other side of the river. Steuben ordered them to join the recruits, who were at that time reduced to four hundred and twenty men. On the same evening Colonel Davies arrived to secure the State stores, in which Steuben gave him every assistance in his power. He unloaded the wagons of the regiments and sent them to bring away the stores; but this business was very illy executed by the State officers.

On the morning of the 4th of June, Steuben sent Lieuten-

ant Verdier of Armand's corps with four dragoons, up the road on the Point of Fork, to give intelligence of the enemy's approach ; but himself and party fell into their hands. About ten o'clock he received intelligence that the enemy were within four miles of the Point of Fork, on which he sent Mr. Fairlie, one of his aids, to call in the picquet. He executed the order ; but was himself taken prisoner.

About noon, while on the bank of the river, Steuben perceived the approach of the enemy. He afterward learned that it was Simeoe with between four and five hundred horse and foot, that Tarleton was above him within supporting distance, and that Lord Cornwallis was on the other side of the river about six or seven miles below him ; although, in fact, Cornwallis was much further off.

As an instance of the reliance that could have been placed in the men whom he had under his command, Steuben mentions that when the enemy first arrived, they fired only one shot from a three pounder they had with them, and that a picquet of fifty men he had posted at the landing, left their posts, and that it was with much persuasion and many threats they were brought back again. Contrary to Steuben's order a number of canoes were still left in the north fork, and consequently fell into the enemy's hands, and besides that, both rivers were at many places fordable. Steuben, therefore, determined to retire toward Willis' Creek, which he did as soon as it was dark.

When Simeoe arrived at the Point of Fork, he found that not only the stores and boats were secured, but that Steuben's whole force had crossed the river, with the exception of some thirty men who, waiting the return of some of the boats, were taken prisoners. Thus the principal object of the British expedition was frustrated by Steuben's foresight.

The appearance of Simeoe, however, whose troops Steuben, cut off as he was from any communication with the neighborhood, had taken for the van of Cornwallis, accelerated his

march to the South. Simcoe, in order to make him believe that the main British army under Cornwallis was directed against him, lighted numerous watch-fires on the surrounding hills, and by this stratagem confirmed Steuben in his mistake. A striking proof of the fact that it was not the arrival of Simcoe which induced Steuben to retreat from the Point of Fork, is furnished by some letters which he wrote at this time.

"I was informed by Major Call, yesterday morning," writes Steuben to Lafayette, from the south side of James river, one mile above the Fork, on the 5th of June, 1781,* "that he had seen, himself, a party of cavalry at Goochland Court-house, in the morning, and another large party at Louisa Court-house, in the afternoon; the latter, of at least one thousand men; that both parties seem to direct their march this way. The northern branch being fordable in several places, my position became critical, and I therefore changed my situation. This I executed immediately and came here, first crossing the baggage and a quantity of State stores which were at Fork Point. I have since heard nothing of the party which were at Louisa; those at Goochland remained there yesterday. General Lawson has joined me with three hundred militia, and we expect about four hundred more to day or tomorrow. I had ordered all the boats below this place to be brought up; but the current was too strong to permit it. I intend to move from here, as soon as the weather clears up, and take a position at the mouth of Willis' Creek, where I shall collect every boat on the river, and from there I have a communication everywhere."

On the same day he informed Governor Nash, of North Carolina, that in the present situation of affairs he found it expedient to march directly to that State.

Steuben, therefore, in his retreat was not surprised by Simcoe. It is true, nevertheless, as stated, that seeing a whole row of watch-fires upon the left bank of the river, he hastened

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

his retreat, and abandoned such of his stores as were not transportable. Considering, however, that Steuben had taken for granted the approaching of a hostile body under Tarleton against his left wing, and that the advancing of Cornwallis towards the James river was probably intended to act in connection with this movement; bearing also in mind that Steuben had no cavalry, and only five hundred raw recruits, who had never seen the enemy—under such circumstances, and in such a situation as we have left Steuben, we can not only comprehend, but, moreover, we must find it quite natural that he preferred sacrificing a part of his stores to that of his men, and that he, in consequence, retreated.

Notwithstanding, Steuben has been assailed outrageously on account of his retreat, and particularly by the government of the State. The joy of his numerous enemies became apparent when they discovered one assailable point in him. In the following chapter we must once more return to this matter. In order to view Steuben's conduct strategically, we propose to examine what his gallant and, at this time, successful adversary, the British Lieutenant Colonel Simeoe, says while speaking of his triumph. All the absurd and insipid talk of the Virginia Solons appears in its proper light when we read in Simeoe's *Military Journal* the following :†

“Lieutenant Colonel Simeoe, who, from his childhood had been taught to consider the military as the most extensive and profound of sciences, had no apprehension from the talents of such men as had been educated in different professions, and whom accident had placed at the head of armies; and he had always asserted it as a principle, that from the superiority of the king's troops, and of the officers who led them, if he should ever have a command in which he should be superior in one species of troops, whether cavalry or infantry, he would be totally unconcerned for the event of any action he might have with the enemy. Baron Steuben had no cavalry, yet in

* Simeoe's *Military Journal*, p. 218-220.

the present situation there was great room for anxiety, since the immediate ground of encampment was not favorable for the exertions of his few, but well trained, well officered, and invincible body of cavalry, and the enemy were led by a Prussian officer. The very military instructions of his king were capable of forming better officers than any other theory could possibly do, or probably could be effected by the experience of ten campaigns under incompetent masters. In the exercise also which he had given the rebel army, the Baron Steuben had shown himself an able officer, and that he knew well how to adapt the science of war to the people whom he was to instruct, and to the country in which he was to act. He had passed the Fluvanna, but he had done this in consequence of his orders to join General Greene's army. An express sent to countermand this order, Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe knew had been taken a few days before by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, and it was fair to suppose that he might now have further intelligence; that he might be perfectly acquainted with the number of his opponents, and might possibly determine to attack Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, as well as the detachment which the intercepted letter mentioned that he was preparing to meet. Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe was, therefore, apprehensive lest Baron Steuben, having secured his stores, which were of great value, over a broad and unfordable river, and being in possession of all the boats, should repass his troops in the night, higher up the river, and fall on him, so that if the British troops should be beaten, they would have no retreat, being shut up between two rivers, while those of the Americans, should they be repulsed, were preserved from the pursuit of the cavalry by the thick woods, which came to their encampment; and from that of the infantry, by the fatigues they had undergone in a march of nearly forty miles the preceding morning. These ideas occupied the mind of Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, and he would have quitted his camp had he not thought the troops too much fatigued to search for a more

favorable position, which was not to be attained for some miles, and partly, had he not hoped that Steuben would believe him to be the advance of Earl Cornwallis' army, particularly as the light troops had no soldiers among them clothed like the seventy-first regiment, in red. That regiment and the Queen's Rangers occupied the road with rail fletches and other defenses."

Simcoe's statement is confirmed by Henry Lee, who, in his *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States*, thus describes Steuben's and Simcoe's movements:*

"Cornwallis, with the main body, followed on the route of Simcoe. The former officer conducted his march with the utmost secrecy; and by detaining as prisoners all whom he overtook, he concealed his advance from the baron. Although unapprised of the intended attack upon his own post, Steuben became acquainted with the movement of Tarleton. In consequence of this information he engaged with diligence in removing our stores, of every sort, to the southern banks of the Fluvanna; which being done he passed the river with his corps, securing all the boats on the south side. Simcoe reached the Point of Fork about the conclusion of the baron's passage over the river, and captured a few of our troops waiting the return of some of the boats. Chagrined at this disappointment, the British commander determined to recover by stratagem what he had lost by his enemy's foresight. He encamped on the heights opposite to our camp, and by the number of his fires suggested to the baron the probability that the whole British army was only divided from him by the river. Thus impressed, and knowing that the corps of Tarleton were on his left, Steuben believed himself to be in imminent danger, and decided on saving his corps by the sacrifice of his stores. During the night the baron drew off, and marching diligently, placed himself thirty miles from his foe."

* Page 294.

Another reproach cast on Steuben in connection with this retreat has reference to the loss of the stores, and is equally unjust. We have two different statements: one on the part of Simcoe which, adopted by the State of Virginia and Stedman, says: "There were destroyed at the Point of Fork two thousand five hundred stand of arms, a large quantity of gunpowder, case shot, etc.; several casks of saltpeter, sulphur, and brimstone, and upwards of sixty hogsheads of rum and brandy, several chests of carpenters' tools, and upwards of four hundred intrenching tools, with casks of flints, sail cloth and wagons, and a great variety of small stores necessary for the equipment of cavalry and infantry: such linen and necessaries, as would be of immediate service, were divided among the captors. There were taken off a thirteen-inch mortar, five brass eight-inch howitzers, and four long brass nine pounders, mounted afterward at Yorktown: all French pieces, and in excellent order."

Lafayette,* however, relates that no important harm was done on this occasion (*quelques effets peu importants sont détruits*); Lee mentions† that most of the arms found were muskets out of repair; Steuben himself, in a report to Greene, says, that only a few articles fell into the hands of the enemy through the negligence of the commissaries and storekeepers. But even admitting that Steuben underrates his loss, we have already seen that before the arrival of the enemy, the principal part of the stores had been safely removed. It was impossible to save all, and Steuben succeeded in saving as much as possible. That the buildings and laboratories at the Fork were destroyed by the enemy was a matter of course and a consequence of his superiority in number. Colonel William Langborn writes, that the enemy got hold of only twenty barrels of powder, and except a few canoes, did not get a single boat,

* *Mémoires du General Lafayette*, tome i., Paris, 1838, pp. 272 and 478.

† Lee's *Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States*. Foreo's edition, 8vo, ii., 294.

as they were all sunk by the order of Steuben. The clothier stores and manufactories were, by the energy of the indefatigable Davies, removed to Stanton, from which place he writes to Steuben, on the 23d of June, as follows:* . . . "The Assembly were at first much mortified at the losses we had sustained by the rapid incursions of the enemy, and in their discontent were really clamorous; they moderate in their vexation, as they have since found that the mischief done by the enemy was inconsiderable compared with the plunder of the inhabitants, of whom we expect to recover a great deal."

After having effected his retreat to Willis' Creek, Steuben sent back an officer to observe the movements of the enemy, who reported that on the morning of the 6th the enemy had constructed two rafts, each capable of transporting from eighty to one hundred men, and that they had thrown a bridge across the North Fork, by which they communicated with their forces opposite Elk island.

"I could not see," says Steuben in a memorial, referring to this subject,† "what could hinder the enemy from detaching a sufficient party to disperse my force and render themselves masters of the stores at Prince Edward, Charlotte and Halifax Court-houses. I thought it to be absurd making a bravado with a small number of bad troops against such a force, while the marquis, being near one hundred miles off, could make no diversion on that side. I therefore gave orders for dispersing the stores in such a manner that only part could fall into the enemy's hands on any route they could take, and sent off three officers successively to acquaint the marquis of my situation. I wrote circular letters to the county lieutenants to call out their militia, and leaving General Lawson at Charlotte Court-house, I marched the recruits to Cole's Ferry, on the Stanton."

Steuben reached Charlotte Court-house on the 9th of June, and Cole's Ferry on the 10th. Here he halted on his march

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

† Ibidem, vol. xiii.

South in order to hear further from General Greene, whose last letter was dated on the 1st of May, or till he should receive orders from Lafayette. As it did not appear that the enemy proposed to follow him immediately, he left the militia at Charlotte Court-house and ordered it to be employed in the defense of the State. At the same time he directed General Lawson to secure the stores, to remove those nearest James river to Albemarle old Court-house, and to disperse those which were further in the country, at different places in a parallel line with the river, so that if the enemy marched by one route to the South, they would only be able to destroy or take what they found precisely in their way. In a circular addressed to the county lieutenants, he appointed Prince Edward, Cumberland, and Amelia Court-houses, as the places of rendezvous for the militia, by which he expected to increase his forces, and endeavored to convince them of the necessity of calling out every man that could possibly be armed. "Let me intreat you," he said,* "in the most earnest manner, immediately to get together every man in your county, who can possibly be armed, and in doing this permit me to hint to you the necessity of your own and your officers' exertions in persuading those people to bring out their arms, who do not usually bring them out, and it will depend much on the officer to convince them how highly criminal such negligence will be in our present distress. If we succeed in collecting such a body of militia as can offer resistance to the enemy, I have not the least doubt that we shall not only preserve this part of the State from their depredation, but that in a short time they will be driven back to their shipping, and probably convinced of the impossibility of conquering a country defended by freemen."

To be better secured against any attempt of the enemy to pass through the southern part of the State, Steuben requested Governor Nash of North Carolina to reinforce him with as

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

many of the armed militia from the counties bordering Virginia, as possible, and to engage as many horses as he could procure, for the superiority of the enemy in cavalry had been extremely prejudicial to Steuben.

When he made these dispositions he was still without news from General Greene, and as late as the 9th of June he informed him, from Charlotte Court-house, that he was on his march to join him, with about five hundred and fifty recruits and a number of stores, while he left General Lawson behind him with six hundred militia to prevent the enemy from ravaging the country in small parties. On the 12th of June Steuben received intelligence from General Sumner, that he was ordered to march with the Carolina line to Virginia and join him. This order enabled Steuben to form an adequate opinion of Greene's position and intentions, and having ascertained that Greene's force was sufficient for his task, and that his troops were more numerous than he could support, he resolved to return to James river and coöperate with Lafayette. His course soon after proved to be the right one, as Greene's letters of the 14th and 23d of May, and some of Lafayette's, to join the latter against Cornwallis, had been intercepted by the enemy.

At this time Steuben wrote the following letter to Captain Kirkpatrick, who had communicated to him the censure of the North Carolina gentlemen, of his intended march southward: "It is the fate of a general in this country," he says,* "to have his actions criticised by every person without a knowledge of either his reasons or orders. I am happy that my conduct can bear scrutiny. I have halted here two days waiting for General Greene's orders, in the meantime endeavoring to collect a sufficient body of militia to cover this side of James river, and promising, if they turned out with spirit, I would venture to remain in the State and join my small force to theirs. My reasons for marching southward

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii. Letter of June 12, 1781.

(as I find a general must give reasons to every citizen for his conduct), were positive orders from General Greene, my own hopes that my moving this way would alarm Cornwallis and induce him to detach a part of his army in my pursuit, which would be of more essential advantage to the marquis than if five times the number of my recruits would join him.”*

Steuben arrived at Prince Edward Court-house on the 13th of June, and having ordered General Sumner to join him with all the men he could collect, armed or not, and having requested Governor Nash to reinforce him with all the militia that he could arm, on the borders of Virginia, he sent a detachment of the militia towards Carter's Ferry, while he proposed with the balance, to take a position opposite the Seven islands in James river, where he hoped to assemble all the militia that would come in.

While on his march to James river, Steuben received Lafayette's order to join him without delay. Lafayette had retired before Cornwallis as far as Raccoon Ford, on the Rapahannoe; but on the 7th of June he was reinforced by General Wayne, with eight hundred Pennsylvanians, and by a rapid night march he was able to protect the stores along the Rivanna against an attack of the British. Cornwallis therefore gave up the pursuit and returned to Richmond. On his march he was closely followed by Lafayette, who, from Mechumek Creek, Albemarle county, on the 13th of June wrote as follows to Steuben:

“I request you, my dear sir, that you will immediately return this way, and with the Continentals and militia under your command, hasten to form a junction with us. I am afraid General Greene's letter requesting you to remain with us has not yet got to hand, but unless you have received orders subsequent to General Greene's march against Ninety-six and Augusta, I can assure you his desire was then to form a junction.

* Gates MS. Papers, vol. xix., p. 44.

"Should the enemy cross the James river, which I do not believe they will do, and which none of them have yet attempted, it must be with a view to reconquer Carolina. In this case you would be in their way, and I should request every obstruction to be put in their way, as I shall myself follow them as expeditiously as possible. But, on the contrary, should they make the conquest of this State their main object, our united force is not too much to resist them. No news from the northward; it is reported General Washington is coming to Virginia with French and American troops, but I had no letter from him."

Steuben made long and fatiguing marches to answer Lafayette's order. As early as the 16th of June he crossed Carter's Ferry, and marching across Goochland county, on the 19th effected, in Hanover county, some twenty-five miles north-west from Richmond, his junction with Lafayette. This junction induced Cornwallis to evacuate Richmond and to retire to the lower country. On the 25th he arrived in Williamsburg, where he received an order from Clinton to send a part of his troops to New York, the British general-in-chief, from Washington's feints and sham dispositions, believing that the latter place was menaced. The decrease of his force would have weakened Cornwallis too much to allow him to continue in Williamsburg. He therefore, in conformity with his instructions from the ministry, to establish at some place in the Chesapeake a permanent post to serve as a central point for naval and military operations, resolved to establish himself in Portsmouth. Crossing James river at Jamestown, Cornwallis allured Lafayette into an action, which, only for the bravery of Wayne, and for the inability of Cornwallis to pursue his advantage on account of the night, would have resulted in the annihilation of the whole army.

The troops for New York were already embarked when Cornwallis received counter orders, and Clinton's permission to disembark and keep them in Virginia. He at the same time

was directed to establish a defensive post for the protection of the ships-of-the-line at a favorable point on the south side of the river. Cornwallis, finding that Portsmouth would not answer the purpose, evacuated that place and fortified himself at Yorktown and Gloucester, where his whole force was concentrated on the 22d of August, 1781.

In the meantime Washington took care to keep Clinton under the belief that he intended an attack against New York. From the end of June he made all apparent preparations calculated to fortify Clinton's illusions, and while the latter prepared himself for a protracted siege, Washington with his whole army and the French clandestinely left the Hudson, and before Clinton even suspected their departure for the South, they were in Virginia in the immediate neighborhood of Cornwallis. Every thing worked well in this enterprise. The French fleet arrived in time in Chesapeake Bay, and from the 25th of September, Cornwallis was closely surrounded by the American and French forces. A retreat was impossible, and Cornwallis, expecting reinforcements from Clinton, strengthened his fortifications as much as possible against the combined operations of the Americo-French army, which, on the 28th of September, marched from Williamsburg toward Yorktown, and on the 1st of October began to invest the latter place. The first parallel was opened in the night of the 6th of October, and on the 19th Cornwallis capitulated with his whole force.

The foregoing sketch of the principal features of this eventful campaign was necessary to lead the reader to Yorktown, where Steuben resumed active duty.

A few days after his junction with Lafayette he received Greene's positive orders to act with the Virginia recruits under the marquis. Thus no change took place in the dispositions of Lafayette; but Steuben, immediately after his arrival at headquarters, fell sick, and with a body worn by the disease of the country, and a mind harassed and chagrined, retired to a coun-

try seat near Charlotteville, where, fortunate in the society of two or three respectable gentlemen, he remained till the beginning of September. Here it was that at the end of July he received General Greene's order of the 18th of July, to join him as soon as he could be spared from that quarter, even if he should not be able to bring a single man with him. "I have received," answered Steuben, on the 13th of August, 1781,* "your favor of the 19th of July, in which I am ordered to join you. If it had pleased God, my dear general, that this order had reached me a few months sooner, I should have escaped a great deal of pain and chagrin; but what I have to say on that subject shall rest till I have the pleasure to see you. My duty and inclination would have engaged me to set out immediately on the receipt of your letter, had not my ill state of health prevented me. An eruption of blood, which has covered my whole body, obliged me to retire to a country house. It is near Mr. Walker's, whom you saw at Philadelphia, a member of Congress, and his father, who is my physician. The heat of the season, uneasiness of my mind, and a thousand other things have so used me up that I can not yet sustain the fatigues of a journey. I shall, however, prepare to take up my line of march the last of this month, and hope to join you before your operations begin.

"I can say nothing to you on our affairs, either political or military; a sick man, you know, looks on things worse than they really are. I have the consolation to hope I shall soon be with the general I esteem and the friend for whom I have the strongest affection."

Steuben's health improved toward the end of August. He was just about to set out to join Greene, when he heard the news of the arrival of the French fleet, and received a letter from Lafayette, who intreated Steuben to come to his support, without which he was afraid of incurring blame or of being involved in ruin.†

* Greene MS. Papers.

† Gates MS. Papers, xix., p. 66.

The following letters are given in full, as they strikingly illustrate this important epoch, and are of a special interest.

"In the moment," writes Steuben to Greene, from King Williams county, the 9th of September, 1781,* "of my departure to join you I received the glorious news of the arrival of the French fleet. The whole country is flying to arms. I had reason to apprehend that my departure at such a time as this would have been made to operate against me, by persons who seek to destroy the reputation of every honest man. You are, without doubt, informed, my dear general, of the trouble and vexation to which I have been exposed in this State. The greatest sacrifice I can make to the public interest, is to suspend my endeavors for redress until the present scene is finished. To have quitted the State before that period, would have armed my enemies against me. Two days before the arrival of the fleet, the marquis wrote me to hasten to his assistance; but your orders and my wishes to join you, made me decide for the southward. I beg you, my dear general, to permit my assisting this expedition which is preparing. Considering how small the number of your troops is, I think my presence may be dispensed with for some time; nevertheless if you judge it necessary, and should you think the motives which induce me to stay, insufficient, the moment I receive your commands I shall begin my journey. To-morrow I shall join the marquis. I shall give him every assistance in my power."

Lafayette was then in Williamsburg, from which place Steuben, on the 19th of September, wrote to Greene as follows:†

"Two days after joining the marquis I had the pleasure of seeing General Washington and Count Rochambeau. Every thing is preparing for our grand enterprise, and, as far as we have gone, fortune seems to have seconded all our endeavors. The Count De Grasse's fleet has formed a junction with that of Mr. Barras before the face of Graves and Hood; two British

* Greene MS. Papers.

† Ibidem.

frigates were taken by our brave allies, after which the enemy's fleet disappeared. Cornwallis is fortifying himself like a brave general who must fall; but I think he will fall with honor. The day before yesterday General Washington and Count Rochambeau went on board the admiral; we expect their return to-day. Our troops, and those of our allies from the North, are expected every hour. They embarked at Baltimore on the 15th instant. As soon as they arrive, our operations will commence. This, my dear general, is the decisive moment—the happiest time I have spent in America. Every advantage appears to declare in favor of the righteous cause. Young Colonel Laurens called to see me yesterday; he is just back from France, and brings with him every thing which will be necessary to finish the war. The court of France has answered the emperor on his proposition of a mediation, that they can enter into no negotiation without the consent of their allies; and as the haughty Briton will not consider this ally as an independent State, the negotiation is broken off. I trust the success of this campaign will render our enemies more tractable.”

When the operations against Yorktown commenced, Steuben asked Washington for a regular command, and Washington, with great pleasure, gave him the combined division of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. It numbered, in all, two thousand three hundred and nine men, of whom one thousand three hundred and forty-six were from Wayne's brigade, and nine hundred and fifty-three from the brigade of Gist. On the 3d of October, 1781, according to a report made at that time, Wayne had only seven hundred and thirty men, and Gist four hundred and forty-five, fit for service; no less than six hundred and seventeen were sick.* Steuben was the only American officer who had ever taken part in a regular siege, and he had acted also at the celebrated siege of Schweidnitz, as aid-de-camp of Frederick the Great. His services were,

* Steuben MS. Papers, Sprague.

therefore, the more important, as the staff of Washington had to consult and act in common with the staff of the French army, and as Steuben, as an expert in both the theory and practice of the art of sieges, was also able, in this particular, where his brother officers had no experience, to maintain most decidedly and energetically the honor of the American arms.

"I am happy," writes William Davies, from Richmond, on the 6th of October, 1781,* "that you are still in Virginia, and I sincerely congratulate you on the pleasing prospects before us. You had long expressed your opinion of the necessity of more attention and assistance toward us from the northward; and I doubt not that your representations in our favor have had an influence in procuring the aid we have received."

Of Steuben's activity during the siege, very little mention has been made. We only know that, on the 11th of October, he opened with his division the second parallel, and finished the same the next morning,† after having advanced, during the night, within three hundred and sixty yards of the enemy's batteries. On this, as on other occasions, Wayne was with Steuben. "The fact is fixed in my memory," relates North, "by a circumstance that happened at the time. A shell, thrown from the enemy, fell near them. The baron threw himself into the trench. Wayne, in the jeopardy and hurry of the moment, fell on him. The baron, turning his eyes, saw it was his brigadier. 'I always knew you were brave, general,' said he, 'but I did not know that you were so perfect in every point of duty; you cover your general's retreat in the best manner possible.'"

"Baron De Viomenil," says Steuben,‡ "commanded in the trenches on the 10th of October. At four o'clock in the evening he sent Count Deuxponts to tell me that he had observed, while

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

† John C. Hamilton: *History of the Republic of the United States*, New York, vol. ii., 267.

‡ Steuben MS. Papers, Sprague.

visiting the trenches, that my division was extremely weak, and as it was probable the enemy might make a sortie that night, he wished to reinforce my left wing from five to eight hundred men, if I should think it necessary. In presence of General Wayne I answered Count Deuxponts that I did not think that I wanted any reinforcements, and that if the enemy were to attack me, I should answer for being able to hold the battery until the Baron De Viomenil could arrive to support me, and further, that in case he was attacked, he might rely on me to support him with eight hundred men in two columns. When Count Deuxponts had gone away, Wayne remarked that I had only one thousand men in my entire division. 'No doubt of it,' I replied; 'that is my calculation, too, but if it should so happen, I should, on my own responsibility, leave two hundred men to defend the battery, and with the remaining eight hundred men attack forthwith in two columns.' I added that if I was guilty of a certain amount of gasconade with regard to the number of men, it was for the honor of his country, whereupon Wayne took me by the hand, and addressing himself to the officers present, said: 'Now, gentlemen, it is our duty to make good the exaggeration of Baron Steuben, and to support him just as if he had double the number of troops that he has.'"

Steuben was so fortunate as to receive the first overtures of Lord Cornwallis, during his tour in the trenches. "At the relieving hour, next morning," relates North, "the Marquis De Lafayette approached with his division; the baron refused to be relieved, assigning as a reason the etiquette in Europe; that the offer to capitulate had been made during his guard, and that it was a point of honor, of which he would not deprive his troops, to remain in the trenches till the capitulation was signed, or hostilities recommenced. The dispute was referred by Lafayette to the commander-in-chief; but Steuben remained until the British flag was struck.

The capture of Cornwallis closed the campaign.

As there is not much known about the particulars of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, we think ourselves justified in giving the few facts which we have gleaned from the sources within our reach, although they have no direct bearing upon the conduct of Steuben.

Thus at the storming of one of the redoubts of Yorktown by the French, on the 14th of October, the first French officer who, at the head of the royal grenadiers of the German regiment of Deuxponts, entered the works, was Captain Henry De Kalb, a cousin of the American general who fell at Camden. Captain De Kalb had lost one of his shoes in climbing the parapet; he nevertheless kept on, and, entering the fort, made a British officer prisoner.*

We have found in a manuscript diary of an Anspach sergeant, John Conrad Doehla, the following description of the closing scenes at Yorktown:†

“The 19th of October was a day most unfortunate for England, when the heretofore so renowned and valorous general, Lord Cornwallis, was compelled to surrender, with all his troops and ships, to the allied French and American armies, under the command of General Washington and of the Count De Rochambeau. It was on the morning of this day that I mounted, for the last time, the engineer guard. At noon precisely all the guards and posts were withdrawn; only one military guard, consisting of a sergeant and sixteen men, was, for an hour or two longer, on duty.

“The capitulation and the terms for the surrender were then agreed upon. The French and Americans immediately occupied all our works in the line, and all the magazines and stores. We were left in full possession of all our equipage and apparel—nothing belonging to us was taken, or even touched; we were treated with fairness and respect, as prescribed by the usages of war. To speak out plainly, we were

* Schiller's *Leben und Werke von Emil Pallaske*. Berlin, 1858, i, 364.

† The German original is in the possession of the author.

rather satisfied that the end of this siege had come at last, escaping therefrom on unexpectedly favorable terms, while we had been always of opinion that we should be taken by assault. Had it lasted a few days longer, a general storm was unavoidable—the French grenadiers were already preparing for it.

“The troops under the command of the brave general, Lord Cornwallis, and of General O’Hara of the horse guard, were the following: 1, the third regiment; 2, the light infantry, consisting of three battalions, composed of detachments of all other regiments—they were all fine men, and had suffered particularly during the siege; 3, the forty-third regiment, also fine soldiers; 4, the seventeenth regiment, which had suffered a good deal; 5, the twenty-third regiment, also weak in men; 6, the eightieth regiment, still pretty strong; 7, the seventy-sixth regiment, or the ‘Green Scotch,’ a very strong corps; 8, the seventy-first regiment, ‘White Scotch,’ not strong; 9, a body of South Carolinian militiamen, called ‘Volunteers;’ 10, the ‘Royal American Rangers,’ consisting of six companies; 11, a regiment of light horse, or English light dragoons, numbering from five to six hundred men; 12, two companies of English artillery, each of sixty men, including the engineers; 13, a number of English ‘pioneers,’ or carpenters and bridge-builders; 14, the marines and seamen, including all men belonging to the naval service. These may be set down at fourteen hundred men.

“The German troops made prisoners of war were: 1, the Hessian regiment ‘Prince Royal,’ once strong, but now a great sufferer from death and desertion; 2, the regiment ‘Von Bose,’ the weakest of all, having suffered the heaviest losses from the bomb shells and cannon balls of the enemy; 3, the corps of artillery belonging to these two regiments; 4, the Anspach regiment, Colonel Von Voit; and, lastly, the Bayreuthian regiment, Colonel Von Seybothen, both numbering about nine hundred men, and having had about forty killed

and wounded, besides losing fifty deserters. There was also a body of artillery attached to these regiments, and at Gloucester Point stood a small body of Hessian and Anspachian Yagers. The trophies conquered by the enemy from these four German regiments consisted of eighteen beautiful standards and eight cannon.

“By the capitulation, it was agreed with Lord Cornwallis that he should send two ships with a secret cargo to New York, unmolested and without search. In these were concealed many of the light infantry, of the horse guard, rangers, Tories of the country, besides a number of marines and seamen; above all, however, the French and American deserters who had joined us during the siege. Lord Cornwallis himself, and Colonel Tarleton, embarked on board these ships after the surrender of the fortress, and sailed on the following day for New York.

“It was on the afternoon of the 19th of October, between the hours of four and five o'clock, that all our troops, with arms and baggage, standards covered but drums beating, marched out of the lines and of the whole camp. Brigadier O'Hara commanded at the surrender. We marched on the road to Williamsburg in platoons, arms shouldered, through the whole army of the enemy, the band playing. The whole united army of the French and Americans was marched up by regiments in parade. In front of each regiment were their generals and staff officers. The French, who formed the right wing, had sometimes richly dressed ‘heiducks’ (fancy servants) in their suite, who, being very tall and handsome men, presented quite a dazzling appearance in their gold and silver-laced liveries. All the French generals, Count De Rochambeau, Marquis De Lafayette, Count De Deuxponts, and Prince De Lucerne, wore glittering stars and badges of military orders.

“On the right wing of each French regiment was gorgeously paraded a rich standard of white silk, with three golden

fleurs de lis embroidered on it. Beyond these standards stood the drummers and fifers, and in front of them the band, which played delightfully. It must be confessed that the French troops, altogether, looked very well; they were all tall, handsome men. They all wore white gaiters; a part of them were clad in red, some also in green; most of them, however, were in white regimentals. The German, or Alsacian regiments had blue regimentals.

“The left wing of the line through which we had to march was formed of the Americans; in front of them their generals, Washington, Gates, Steuben, and Wayne. They were paraded in three lines, the first composed of the regulars, who had also a band, playing moderately well. They looked passable, but the militia from Virginia and Maryland, forming the second and third lines, were but a ragged set of fellows, and very ill-looking.

“We, now prisoners of war, stared with amazement at all these troops, parading there in lines three ranks deep. We were quite astonished at the immense number of our besiegers, perceiving well that, compared with such a formidable army, we were little more than a mere guard, and that they were strong enough to have eaten us up to the last man.

“The lines of both armies extended nearly two miles in length. Think only of an army of forty thousand men, although drawn up in two lines three ranks deep, what space it must cover! Our small number quite puzzled the enemy; they had believed we were much stronger.

“After having passed through the lines of the armies, we turned at the right upon a large plain field or flat, where a squadron of French hussars had formed a circle. One regiment after the other had to march into this circle, to lay down muskets and all other arms. When our colonel, Baron Seybothen, had marched his regiment into the circle, he had us drawn up in a line, stepped in front of it, and commanded first, ‘Present arms!’ and then, ‘Lay down arms!’ ‘Put off swords and car

tridge boxes!" while tears ran down his cheeks; most of us were weeping like him.

"All the officers of the English army were allowed to keep their swords, the English as well as the Germans. This was done for military honor's sake, at the instance of the French, with whom this is the custom. All the generals and superior officers of the enemy were present in the circle. They showed much interest towards the capitulating troops, and above all they seemed pleased by the good condition and discipline of our two regiments.

"When all was over, we had to march again through the two lines of the allied armies to return to our camp, but this was done in utter silence, and without further incumbrance, as the poor equipage which we carried in our knapsacks was all we possessed. All the courage and spirit, which at other times animate a corps of soldiers, were extinguished, the more so as on this our return march the American part of our conquerors jeered at us very insultingly.

"We were again quartered in our lines and tents, enjoying, however, full liberty to walk anywhere in the lines, as well as in the city. And I must say that the French behaved very well towards us. They were altogether kind and obliging. But the Americans, with the exception of their officers, were strictly forbidden to come within our lines, or even to enter the city. The French grenadiers, who occupied all our lines, did not allow any of the American militia to approach us, fearing, as they were at all times much addicted to plunder, they might not forget to rob us also, or to make mischief, as was their custom.

"During the 20th of October we remained in our camp in order to recover a little from the hardships and many sleepless nights which we had gone through during the siege, and to be better prepared for the march before us.

"The French officers and seamen visited to-day the conquered English vessels, hoisted the French flag, and took the

English colors down. The Americans, on their side, planted a high standard in Yorktown, upon the 'water battery.' There are thirteen stripes in their flag, a symbol of the thirteen States forming the free North American 'United States.' A part of the French and American troops left also to-day for Williamsburg.

"The 21st of October, a Sunday, was the day when we left Yorktown, and commenced the march into captivity."

After the capture of Yorktown, the superior officers of the allied army vied with each other in acts of civility and attention to the captive Britons. Lord Cornwallis and his family were particularly distinguished. Entertainments were given in succession by all the major generals, with the exception of Baron Steuben. He alone withheld an invitation, not from a wish to be particular, nor that his heart was closed to the attentions due to misfortune. His soul was superior to prejudice, and, as a soldier, he tenderly sympathized in their fate; while poverty denied the means of displaying that liberality toward them which had been shown by others. Such was his situation when, calling on Colonel Walter Stewart and informing him of his intention to entertain the British commander-in-chief, he requested that he would advance him a sum of money as the price of his favorite charger. "'Tis a good beast," said the baron, "and has proved a faithful servant through all the dangers of the war; but, though painful to my heart, we must part." Colonel Stewart, to prevent a step that he knew must be attended with great loss, and still greater inconvenience, immediately tendered his purse, recommending, should the sum it contained prove insufficient, the sale or pledge of his watch. "My dear friend," said the baron, "'t is already sold. Poor North was sick and wanted necessities. He is a brave fellow, and possesses the best of hearts. The trifle it brought is set apart for his use. My horse must go—so no more, I beseech you, to turn me from my purpose. I am a major general in the service of the United States, and my private

convenience must not be put in the scale with the duty which my rank calls upon me imperiously to perform.”*

The capture of Lord Cornwallis closed the campaign, and the allied armies returned to the Hudson. Among the American generals, whom the commander-in-chief particularly named in the orders issued the day after the capitulation, was Steuben, with Generals Lincoln, Knox, Lafayette, and Duportail.

* Alexander Garden: *Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War in America*. Charleston, 1822, p. 342.

CHAPTER XXII.

STEBEN'S RELATIONS WITH THE STATE OF VIRGINIA AND LAFAYETTE.—THE LOSS OF THE MAGAZINES AT THE POINT OF FORK MADE A PRETEXT FOR AN ATTACK AGAINST HIM.—HIS ENERGY AND HONESTY MADE HIM MANY ENEMIES.—RESOLUTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE AGAINST STEBEN.—TERNANT AND WALKER WRITE TO HIM ABOUT THE SUSPICION RAISED AGAINST HIM.—WASHINGTON THINKS AN INQUIRY THE BEST WAY OF REFUTING THE CHARGES AGAINST STEBEN.—GREENE'S LETTER.—EVEN LAFAYETTE IN FAVOR OF STEBEN.—THE LATTER WRITES TO HARRISON AND NELSON TO GET HIS CONDUCT IN VIRGINIA OFFICIALLY EXAMINED.—NOTHING IS DONE.—STEBEN'S RELATIONS TO LAFAYETTE.—LAFAYETTE INTRIGUED AGAINST STEBEN WHEN HE COMMENCED TO DISCIPLINE THE ARMY.—PROBABLE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM.—LAFAYETTE, FOR POLITICAL MOTIVES, APPOINTED AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN VIRGINIA.—STEBEN OBEYS HIS ORDERS WITHOUT DISPUTE.—LAFAYETTE'S SELF-GLORIFICATION.—LAFAYETTE OF GREAT POLITICAL BUT NOT OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES.—HIS CONDUCT IN AMERICA AND IN EUROPE.—HE IS THE COUNTERFEIT WASHINGTON.—HIS RELATIONS TO NAPOLEON, THE RESTORATION, AND LOUIS PHILIP.—STEBEN OWES EVERY THING TO HIS PERSONAL VALUE, AND WORES HIS WAY STEP BY STEP.—HIS SACRIFICES FOR THE AMERICAN CAUSE COMPARED WITH THOSE OF LAFAYETTE.—THE MERITS OF BOTH MEN IN REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.

BEFORE following Steben to the North, it is necessary to examine the nature of the relations in which he stood to the government of Virginia, as well as to the Marquis De Lafayette, while commanding and acting in that State.

It is chiefly on account of the misconceptions as to these relations that, regardless of the merits of the case, Steben has often been assailed and condemned. For the true appreciation of the matter, a thorough knowledge of the facts is indispensable, and we consider it to be an act of justice, due as well to history as to Steben, to detail them here, uninfluenced by party bias or personal prepossession; the more so, as not a word of defense has been spoken in favor of Steben, and as even those who appreciate his services take all these charges against him for granted.

We have seen, in the preceding chapters, how the exaggerated loss of the stores at the Point of Fork was taken for

a pretext by the enemies of Steuben to assail and vilify him. It is a high though indirect testimony to the value and ability of the man, that, for more than six months, they could not find any vulnerable point on which to attack him, and that they were forced either to calumniate him behind his back, or when he was on the point of quitting the State.

It was inevitable that the disinterested energy with which Steuben performed his duty in Virginia should make him many enemies there, and that the State authorities should likewise become greatly irritated against him. The preceding chapters contain the convincing proof of either the inability or of the unwillingness on the part of the government to provide for the defense of the State, while Steuben exerted himself to the utmost to save as much as possible. But his fault was that he called things by their right names, and that, when he did not find the same sense of duty in others, he never withheld his censure. As he was a foreigner, people very often resented his just reproaches as an insult. Lafayette, who caught at every thing that he supposed could exalt himself, against his will bestows the loudest praise on Steuben, in writing, on the 23d of May, 1781, to Alexander Hamilton,* that he is glad that Steuben goes, as the hatred of the Virginians to him was truly hurtful to the service. Steuben himself knew perfectly well this state of feeling and of public prejudice, and for this reason, almost from the moment of his entering on his duties in Virginia, wished to join Greene.

Steuben himself enumerates nine reasons for the irritation of the Virginia government against himself, namely, that he insisted most earnestly on the completion of the Virginia line, according to the plan fixed by Congress; that he remonstrated against the bad rules and habits of the militia; that he was utterly dissatisfied with the behavior of the so-called volunteers; that he did not consent to the scandalous plundering of an English flag-ship, on which occasion the militia officers acted with such

* Alexander Hamilton's Works, i., 263.

flagrant disregard of all subordination, and in such open violation of the law of nations and the honor of the country, that they even intercepted Steuben's letters, and treated him as a suspicious character ; that he wanted, in the hour of need, some three hundred recruits, to do service in the line instead of in the militia ; that he loudly disapproved of the negligence and waste manifested in the different departments. Thus, for example, the best artillery was under the direction of a colonel whom Steuben had never seen, as he was traveling as surveyor in the upper country. The head of the corps of engineers was an old, habitually drunken fellow. The department of war was managed by a bankrupt Scotch merchant, who was always in the company of abandoned women, and who had neither knowledge nor application. The quarter-master general was at the same time prison warden, and a good-for-nothing fellow. Being compelled to derive his resources from such men, Steuben got an insight into their vileness and depravity, and complained of their unfitness. All this created enemies against him with the government and with the followers of these men. That he complained of the want of repair of the arms, of which, for instance, six thousand were made unserviceable by throwing them in disorder into a salt-house and other wet places ; that he reproached the government, it had not provided a single saddle and cartridge-box during the whole campaign, notwithstanding Steuben's repeated applications from the time he entered the State, and finally that he had a quarrel with the governor at the time of the expedition against Portsmouth, when the latter answered him that he could not furnish any lead or balls, as the veins in the mines had been lost, while Steuben proved that the government was unwilling to comply with his request, as with due diligence and care sufficient lead could be obtained.

Nothing could be said against this ; but in all such cases the naked truth always hurts, and therefore Steuben's frankness met with a very bad reception. Steuben by his zeal in

the discharge of his duties provoked the petty vengeance lurking against him ; but during the whole winter no occasion furnished itself to give vent to it.

Steuben's retreat from the Point of Fork however furnished the welcome pretext for an open attack. The State Assembly passed a resolution requesting Lafayette to require an explanation from the officers under his command, relative to the loss of the stores at the Point. "I am sorry to see," writes Ternant, on the 4th of July, 1781, to Steuben,* "that you have enemies in Virginia, and even men whom I would never have expected to be such ; but as they know my attachment for you they do not make me any confidential communication."

"I saw Ternant," writes B. Walker, on the 13th of August, 1781, to Steuben,† "this morning, and explained fully the affair of the stores being lost, as I did also to General Varnum. They both saw the affair in quite another light to what it had been represented. In fact, from the clamor they have made about this affair, many people, I believe, imagined it included all the stores which the enemy have taken or destroyed in Virginia."

"Baron Steuben," writes Washington, on the 6th of October, 1781, to Greene,‡ "from the warmth of his temper, has got disagreeably involved with the State, and an inquiry into part of his conduct must one day take place, both for his own honor and their satisfaction."

Notwithstanding his endeavors to get this inquiry made, it never took place. Steuben, however, took all the necessary steps which might enable him to justify his course. He wrote to Greene and Lafayette, who both expressed their approbation of his operations since he had been in Virginia. "Your letter," answers Greene, on the 17th of September, 1781,§ "of the 13th of August, gives me most sensible pain. I am sorry that a mind so zealous and intent in promoting the

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

† Ibidem.

‡ Washington's Writings, viii., p. 175.

§ Greene MS. Letters.

public good should be subject to chagrin and mortification for its well meant endeavors. But let me beg of you, my dear baron, not to feel too sensibly the illiberal attacks of a misguided populace. Merit is often veiled for a time, and the best intentions subject to partial censure, and this more frequently in republican governments than any others. But it rarely ever happens that a man of worth is long without his reward ; for though society may mistake for a time, men are generally willing to retract and approve when properly informed. And I am so confident of the propriety of your conduct and the justice of the people, that I have not the least doubt you will see this verified in your case."

Lafayette, soon after his dispute with Steuben, in the trenches of Yorktown, could not avoid confirming Greene's testimony.

"I have been honored," said he in his letter of the 26th of October, 1781,* "with your letter of this date, inclosing one from General Greene. The high terms in which he speaks, particularly on the object you allude to, are certainly sufficient for your satisfaction, so that I would think it needless for me to add any thing to an opinion for which I have the highest veneration. . . . I will, therefore, only speak of what can be supposed to have come under my immediate cognizance.

"In the beginning of the campaign I considered you and the new levies as belonging to the Carolina army. The letters in which General Greene and myself were positive for your joining me have been intercepted by the enemy. Lord Cornwallis' intention (as I have since still more particularly ascertained) was to manuever me from a junction with Wayne. His endeavors were vain, but his movements towards our stores threw me, for a little time, at a pretty great distance from the enemy. The account you received was given by Major Call, whom I had requested to watch in that quarter

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

the motions of Lord Cornwallis. Your movements at that moment must have been directed by the intelligence you received, and what you conceived to be General Greene's intentions. I was happy in your reunion with me, and I think it determined Lord Cornwallis to a speedy evacuation of Richmond. Let me add that during all the time we served together I have been so well satisfied with your assistance, that I was only sorry your health forced you to leave the army, where your experience and exertions were so useful. Should I have forgotten any thing that might add to your satisfaction I will spare no pains to convince you of the sentiments I profess for you."

Nothing, however, was done in the matter, by the State, which Steuben wished to get settled before his departure for the North. "As my duty," he wrote from Williamsburg on the 1st of November, 1781, to Governor Nelson,* "at present calls me northward, I can not quit this State without asking your Excellency to inform me, by an official letter, if government have any complaint against me since I have had the honor of serving in Virginia, that if there should be any I may justify myself before my departure. A reputation acquired during twenty-seven years' service authorizes me in this point of delicacy."

Steuben received no answer to this letter, and as he wanted an opportunity to justify himself, not only to the State of Virginia but to the world in general, he finally applied to General Harrison for a definite reply. "I could but be," said he on the 13th of December, 1781,† "exceedingly hurt by the implied censure passed on me by the resolve of the Assembly. The State of Virginia had before honored me with a particular mark of esteem, and conscious that I had exerted my utmost to deserve it, I was unwilling to leave the State before I had fully justified my conduct. I accordingly wrote to Governor Nelson, desiring him to acquaint me with the nature of any

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

† Ibidem.

complaint the State may have against me, but never received an answer. I must, therefore, repeat the same request to you, sir. Colonel Davies, General Lawson and Colonel Meade will be my witnesses as to the propriety of my conduct at the Point of Fork."

"The resolutions of the last Assembly," answered Speaker Harrison on the 28th of December, 1781,* "respecting the loss of the stores at the Point of Fork, were sent to the Marquis De Lafayette, who informed the present Assembly, by letter, that he had been too much engaged to enter on the inquiry, for which he begged their excuse. There the matter rests, and I dare say will not be again taken up."

It was, therefore, not the fault of Steuben when the matter thus rested. It is only another proof of its not having been near so dangerous as they had tried to make it. They were glad to have found a plausible pretext in the inactivity of Lafayette for letting the accusation drop.

As regards Lafayette, we remember that in February, 1781, when Washington expected the capture of Portsmouth, he was appointed, over the head of Steuben, to the chief command in Virginia. Up to that time they had little to do with each other. Except a letter which Lafayette wrote on the 12th of March, 1778, during the Conway cabal, to Steuben on the noble character of Washington, the Steuben Papers and Lafayette's Memoirs contain no written evidence of a friendly intercourse between them. But a few months later Lafayette, with the Generals Lee and Mifflin, is at the head of the officers who intrigue against Steuben's reforms in the army, and who succeed in overthrowing the hardly-commenced new order of things. Why Lafayette sided with this clique is not quite apparent, as, according to his seniority, he stood above Steuben. A positive interest is not likely to have instigated him, as he, as well as every other intelligent officer, was bound to acknowledge the evil consequences of the existing disorder.

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

It therefore seems that Lafayette either was afraid of Steuben's growing influence, and saw in him a dangerous competitor, or that in his catching at popularity, which never quitted him until his death, he made common cause with the other officers.

Occasional remarks of Steuben's aides, as Walker and North, show that they, as well as their general, thought very indifferently of Lafayette's military abilities. Steuben himself here and there says that he did not like Lafayette, and that he was often shocked at the young man's unbounded vanity and his thirst for glory, which went so far as to claim for its own satisfaction the merits and deeds of others. If we consider, in addition to this, the difference in the age, and consequently in the views, of the two men, the one being a plain, matter-of-fact Prussian soldier, the other a thorough, young and aspiring Frenchman, we will easily understand the want of mutual attraction between them. Besides these individual differences of character, taste, and objects in life, there were political considerations, which giving Lafayette greater prominence, tended to alienate them from each other even more than nature had done, and accorded to the one especially a preëminent importance, while it threw the other undeservedly into the background.

When it was an ascertained fact that the French fleet was to coöperate with the American forces against Portsmouth, Washington acted very wisely in giving the chief command of them to Lafayette. His appointment was a compliment paid to a powerful ally, on whose good will, just in that emergency, so much depended, and he, of course, could not care for hurting the feelings of another, however meritorious officer, whose brevet of major general was of more recent date, and who had no political influence. "There was a necessity," says Washington,* "for sending a general officer with the detachment hence; and political considerations, as it was to be a combined operation depending upon critical circumstances

* Washington's Writings, viii, 17.

with the French land and sea force, pointed to the Marquis De Lafayette." It was of course not at all desirable for Steuben to leave the stage just at the moment when the last act was being played, and after he had, with indefatigable energy and endless trouble, prepared every thing for a successful result. He was, on the other hand, too good an officer not to obey at once, and submit, without complaint, to the orders of the commander-in-chief. Thus he formed an honorable exception to the general rule in the American army, where the insubordination of the superior officers prevailed; where even colonels (for instance Neuville) refused to obey a major general; where newly-appointed major generals, like Smallwood, preferred to retire rather than put themselves, notwithstanding the express orders of the general-in-chief, under the command of their senior officer. Steuben never complained to Washington, and only in his private letters to Greene alluded to the mortification of his being superseded in the command, but he says, at the same time, that he would not in the least relax his zeal. In this respect, also, he showed himself a model of an old soldier, and the worthy disciple of the greatest commander of his age.

It was, therefore, not so much on account of his appointment, as on account of the manner in which Lafayette exercised the powers conferred on him, that misunderstandings and differences between him and Steuben did away with the good feeling which subsisted between them at the beginning. Lafayette was too young and inexperienced, and too greedy for glory and show, to possess the necessary coolness and impartiality essential to the due performance of his functions, and inborn with great generals like Washington and Greene. He supposed himself to be alone competent to perform the task intrusted to him, and imagined that he gave convincing proof of his own ability by criticising and finding fault with every thing that others had done.

Thus he writes a few days after he had arrived in Vir-

guia,* that the enemy's works had not been reconnoitered by Steuben, and that he thought it necessary to see with his own eyes; but he could not yet appreciate the reasons which had prevented Steuben from examining the works, and at the end Lafayette himself did not execute his purpose. On the other hand he did nothing, and as all the necessary arrangements had been previously made by Steuben, in which even Lafayette did not propose any alteration, his silence must be taken for approval, and his duties were, therefore, confined to those of a mere looker on. To Hamilton he wrote, on the 23d of May, 1781:† “It became my duty to arrange the departments, which I found in the greatest confusion and relaxation;” and to the general-in-chief he reported, that no departments existed at the time of his arrival, and that he had to establish them. Aside from the contradiction contained in his own words, the young marquis forgot that all that could be done was already done, that the departments were organized by Steuben and his assistants, that he depended entirely on him for information and advice, and that at the same time he wrote to Steuben in the politest terms to assist him, as without him he would not be able to perform his duties. In fact, all he did was to change the officers with questionable judgment. Lafayette possessed, in a high degree, the talent of coloring and grouping, or, as the French say, arranging facts. When Steuben left him to join Greene, he wrote to Washington: “The baron is to leave me with the Virginia troops; Phillips, with his whole force joined with Arnold, is opposite to me; Cornwallis in full march from Hillsborough; it is too much, my dear general, three armies against the little force under my command.” All these facts were true in one sense, but they were not so in the sense that the marquis wished them to be understood. “My entering this State,”‡ wrote Lafayette, on

* Revolutionary Correspondence, iii., 265.

† Alexander Hamilton's Works, i., 263.

‡ Revolutionary Correspondence, iii., 360.

the 29th of July, 1781, to Washington, "was happily marked by a service to the capital; Cornwallis had the disgrace of a retreat:" the same Cornwallis who had driven Lafayette more than two hundred miles before him in rapid retreat, and afterward, for quite other reasons than the formidableness of Lafayette, retired to the lower country.

We will give one more instance of the boastful and arrogant character of the French lieutenant, suddenly sprung into a general officer. As Lafayette was under the impression that the theater of war would be transferred from Virginia to New York, he asked a command under Washington. "The war in this State," he says, "would then become a plundering one, and great manœuvres would be out of the question. A prudent officer would do our business here, and the baron is so to the utmost; should the enemy remain quiet in this State, Steuben might do very well."* This self-sufficiency is really admirable, and gives a better clue to Lafayette's character than all his memoirs taken together. There is nothing extraordinary in Lafayette having conceived the idea that his experience as a subordinate officer in the French army, and as a dangler in drawing-rooms and saloons, was superior to that of a man who had spent his entire life in active military service, and had won considerable distinction on hard fought fields under the ablest and most distinguished captains of any country or age. But it is extraordinary that the American people should accord him any such superiority, or that they should fail to see that, while politically Lafayette's accession to the American cause was of vast importance, in a military point of view a great many foreign officers were immeasurably superior to the marquis. His subsequent career, and his visit to the United States, contributed considerably to increase the popular enthusiasm and regard for him. Enveloped in a certain romantic mist, he is remembered in this country as one of the greatest heroes of our modern times. But history is no Fourth of July

* Revolutionary Correspondence, iii., 360.

oration ; and duty and justice to Lafayette's cotemporaries who labored with him, require that his position in the American and French Revolutions should be presented calmly and impartially.

In the first place, the part taken by Lafayette in the war of independence must be regarded in two separate points of view, namely, the political and the military. So far as the first is concerned, it is impossible to form too high an estimate of his importance ; indeed it may be said, that were it not for him the alliance with France would not have been concluded, and that in the crisis of the war, when every thing depended on prompt and sufficient aid in arms and money, the United States were chiefly indebted to his negotiations for their final success. In consequence of his family connections and his relations with the court of France, Lafayette was the most prominent representative of that brilliant host of French noblemen who, influenced by veterans like Von Kalb, in their hatred of England, and their new-fangled enthusiasm for Rousseau's imaginary ideal of a republic, aided in bringing about the participation of France in the American war. Lafayette owes his historical prominence and his honorable place in the records of history to this noble enthusiasm and energetic activity, while his deeds, both as an American general and a participator in the French Revolution and the events which followed it, are not only undeserving of particular mention, but are rather calculated to detract from than add to his renown.

Lafayette was a young lieutenant of nineteen years of age when he came to America and offered his services to Congress. That he had no military experience, and could have had none, is perfectly manifest. So far as military capacity was concerned, the most obscure French captain was more valuable and preferable to him ; but he belonged to one of the first families of France. From the first, Congress saw the great political value to be derived indirectly from engaging Lafayette. It acted like a sharp and calculating man of business when it conferred

on him the highest military rank. The resolution of the 31st of July, 1777, points out so clearly the motives of Congress, that further comment is unnecessary.

“ *Whereas*, The Marquis De Lafayette, out of his great zeal to the cause of liberty, in which the United States are engaged, has left his family and connections, and, at his own expense, come over to offer his service to the United States, without pension or particular allowance, and is anxious to risk his life in our cause :

“ *Resolved*, That his services be accepted, and that, *in consideration of his zeal, illustrious family and connections, he have the rank of major general in the army of the United States.*”*

Congress had calculated rightly. This resolution tended mainly to win France for the American cause. “ As soon as Paris,” says Count Ségur,† “rang with reports of the first battles, in which Lafayette and his companions in arms had raised the reputation of the French name, the court itself became proud of his achievements, and he became the great object of envy to our young men. Thus public opinion declaring itself more exclusively in favor of war, rendered it inevitable, and drew after it, as a matter of course, a government which had not strength enough to resist the impulse.”

If Lafayette had been the subject of some small German prince, he would not have been worth one iota more than one hundred others, or any more considered. His advantage and his good fortune consisted in the fact, that by his birth he belonged to the highest nobility of the country which was one of the arbiters of Europe and the rival of England.

The above resolution, however, accurately described Lafayette’s position, and we have seen that Washington also regarded him as an instrument to effect an alliance between the two countries. The admiration and respect which the young

* Journals of Congress (Dunlap’s edition), vol. iii., p. 303.

† Memoirs of the Count De Ségur, i., 111.

marquis felt for the American commander-in-chief was responded to by the latter with a heartfelt friendship, which contributed, in no small degree, to bind Lafayette more closely to the United States. Whenever it was possible, Washington placed Lafayette at the head of enterprises, which if they were not of any decisive importance, yet promised brilliant results. The young Frenchman discharged the duties intrusted to him neither better nor worse than an average general officer. His operations manifest neither great genius nor a great want of judgment. His chief merit consisted in the address with which he got himself out of difficulties.

If Lafayette were really what he is here considered to have been, he had abundant opportunities after his return to France to fulfill the promises of his youth. When the French Revolution commenced, his consequence and reputation were exceedingly high. He was one of the few who took part in the movement, whose name was generally known and respected. Seldom has fortune been more profuse in her richest favors to any man than she was to Lafayette. The empire of the world was at his feet—all parties offered it to him. He had only to accept, and hold the proffered scepter. He did not possess that constant aversion for power, and that forcible conscientiousness with which Washington indignantly refused the offer of a kingdom. He might have done so, but he did not dare it. Petty views and considerations, ambition and intrigues, prevented his ever taking a decided step, or performing any great deed. He is, on a small scale, the Pompey of modern history; that same pusillanimous man, great in small things and small in great things, who for a while seemed great, because Cæsar had not yet made his appearance. But the original Pompey, at least for some time, occupied a place by the side of Cæsar, while Lafayette was laughed at by Napoleon. Lafayette's ambition was not that of a great character, but that of narrow-minded vanity. He, therefore, did not use the open and great means of courage, but the hidden tricks of intrigue.

One day he moved the declaration of the rights of man, and proclaimed war against despotism to be a sacred duty; the next day he intrigued with the court against the Duke of Orleans, and the day after he took the field against the Revolution with which he fraternized two days before. He allowed himself to be bent and swayed by the impression of the moment, allowing circumstances to direct him instead of his directing circumstances. He broke with every one, and finally had no party to support him.

It is therefore an ignorance of historical truth which induces many to mistake Lafayette's weakness for moderation, and it is certainly an unmerited honor to consider him, as he is here often styled, the French Washington. Apart from the consideration, that in France a Washington is as impossible as a Napoleon in the United States, Lafayette is one of those weak aristocratic characters who are ready to make any sacrifice while it is so considered and estimated, and who are even capable of great sacrifices as long as outward honor and glory are to be reaped from it; but who are immediately the enemies of the cause for which they have volunteered their services, the moment that their enthusiasm and self-devotion are regarded as a matter of course. His boundless vanity allowed him to see in all things nobody but himself. He sided therefore with the Revolution only as long as it seemed to promise satisfaction to his heartless egotism, and became its declared enemy the moment he ceased to play the first part. He copied in France the simplicity of American manners and pretensions without possessing it; he copied Washington, even as to his white horse, without having one particle of his character or talents. He was the Don Quixote of the American republic in Europe; the pretender to heroism, without being in any respect a hero. He was nothing but a counterfeit Washington; and when he would play the real, sage, well-informed and far-seeing Washington before the Legislative Assembly of France, he forgot that Washington addressed Congress from

the camp, while he, in the hour of supreme danger, abandoned his forces, and when the Assembly disapproved his conduct, stole away over the frontiers of his country.

If there is any fact that shows the character of Lafayette in its true light, and the good luck that invariably followed him, it is this ignominious flight in which he was taken prisoner, by the Austrians, who had declared war to the knife against the same principles for which Lafayette had taken up arms, and been elevated to the rank of commanding general. Had he, by order of a court martial, been shot for treason, he would have deserved his fate. He did not deserve a martyrdom cheaply obtained by an imprisonment in an Austrian jail. In this case the question is not whether the Convention was right or wrong: the only question was, whether the general it appointed had to obey its orders or not. Nobody compelled Lafayette to accept the command of a republican army; but after having once accepted it, he acted shamefully in leaving it for only personal reasons. Napoleon called him a simpleton in politics ("*niais en politique*"), and proved by his acts that that was his real opinion of him. He persecuted and hunted down the prominent generals of the republic, while he put himself out of his way to procure the release of Lafayette, and as if he wanted to make him ridiculous, offered him the appointment of ambassador to the United States. When Napoleon had fallen, Lafayette revenged himself at a small expense by giving him a few kicks. Under the Bourbons he played the rôle of a conspirer behind the scenes, and as the tutor and protector of young students and soldiers, gained again an insignificant popularity. When the Bourbons were driven to flight, Lafayette, "*en cheveux blancs*," assisted the financial and industrial aristocracy, as if he was anxious to play to the last act the part of Voltaire's Candide, in establishing the citizen king, whom he called "*la meilleure république*."

Steuben's position in the American army is the exact opposite to that of Lafayette. He owed every thing to himself,

and his nationality was more an obstacle than an advantage to him. He had to work his way step by step, and to contend for years against distrust, detraction, and animosities, before he could establish himself firmly. Washington himself, although he recognized at once to the fullest extent the value of Steuben's reforms, put him on the same level with the mass of adventurers who at that time were flocking into the country, and were besieging Congress to grant them place and rank. His brothers in arms were hostile to him, particularly at the beginning, and frequently made his efforts for discipline in the troops and creating an efficient inspectorship of the army, a reproach, as evidence of his thirst for power and inordinate ambition. By degrees he succeeded in doing away with these prejudices and obtaining that position to which his merit entitled him. His activity in service, from the beginning to the end, was a personal sacrifice. A sense of duty, the conviction, perhaps, that his services were indispensable, and the hope daily increasing that the American arms would be successful, alone animated him to perform his task cheerfully. There was no officer in the American army who had to contend with so many enmities and slights, and who, notwithstanding, never relaxed his zeal. Steuben's first consideration was the common welfare. His own interest was quite a secondary matter.

In regard to Lafayette's generosity, it must be universally conceded that he acted in the most high-minded and unselfish manner, and spent enormous sums for the good of the cause of independence. But it must also be conceded that Steuben made equally large, if not larger sacrifices, in proportion to his means. If Congress had not accepted his services, he would have been reduced to absolute mendicancy, since in the autumn of his life he had given up an honorable position, and a certain and adequate income for an uncertainty, and in the hope of serving what he believed to be a good cause. Lafayette, when he returned to his country, found his fortune and

his home, where he was honored and rewarded, but Steuben abandoned both interest and capital, and lost his home, when he entered the American army. The amount of the sacrifice is not to be considered so much as the character of him who made it, and the spirit in which it was made; and in this respect, also, Steuben, if he be compared with Lafayette, will stand in no inferior position.

It may be objected that these remarks about Lafayette are beside the question; but we consider it our duty to touch upon the most remarkable events of his life, as they constitute the only true index to his political character, and as his exploits have been often made the standard by which those of Steuben have been measured.

The greatest honor that can be done to a man of historical eminence, is to criticise him justly by the light of his time, and not by writing his apotheosis. It is not our intention, by the above remarks, to elevate Steuben by detracting from Lafayette. We believe that, in a political sense, the services of the latter were more important than those of any other foreigner in the American army. But we do design to correct the impression that Lafayette's military share in the war of independence is entitled to greater prominence and praise than that of Steuben. Both men served the cause of the republic with energy and zeal, and if Lafayette's relations with the court of France and social position in that country rendered his coöperation of high political value, Steuben's actual services in the camp and the field, and in Washington's councils, were of equal, if not of more material value.

CHAPTER XXIII.

STEBEN RETURNS WITH THE ARMY TO THE NORTH.—HE RESUMES HIS OFFICE AS INSPECTOR GENERAL.—HIS NEW PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSPECTORSHIP ADOPTED BY CONGRESS.—THIS PLAN CONTAINS STEUBEN'S ORIGINAL IDEAS, SET FORTH FROM THE BEGINNING IN 1778.—ITS TENOR.—STEBEN'S PARADES AND MANEUVERS EXCITE THE ADMIRATION OF THE FRENCH OFFICERS.—HIS HOSPITALITY.—STATE OF THE ARMY.—NOTHING IS DONE FOR SUPPLYING ITS WANTS.—EXTREME MISERY.—STEBEN HIMSELF GREATLY EMBARRASSED.—HIS DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF THE SOLDIERS.—HIS OPINIONS ABOUT AN ATTACK OF NEW YORK, WHICH, HOWEVER, IS NOT EFFECTED.—INSPECTION OF THE TROOPS.—A MONTHLY RETURN.—WASHINGTON'S GENERAL ORDERS.—THE ABSOLUTE WANT OF PROVISIONING THE TROOPS.—POVERTY OF THE OFFICERS.—STEBEN CAN NOT GET TEN DOLLARS ON CREDIT.—WALKER'S LETTER ABOUT THE DISSATISFACTION OF THE ARMY.—STEBEN ASKS WHAT IS DUE TO HIM.—HE GOES TO PHILADELPHIA.—HIS LETTER TO CONGRESS.—RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS OF THE 30TH OF DECEMBER, 1782.—LETTERS OF GATES AND HOWE.—STEBEN RETURNS TO HEAD-QUARTERS.

STEBEN returned with the army to the North, continually employed in perfecting its discipline. He found it, however, necessary to simplify his system. As the officers were all furnished with the printed ordinance, and knew their duties, the only question was to watch for their execution.

"When the department of the inspection was first instituted," wrote he in the beginning of January, 1782, to Washington,* "the principal object was the introduction of a uniform discipline throughout the different armies of the United States. This introduction of a system in an army where none had before existed, would at all times be difficult; in our army it was practically so, and required the utmost pains of a number of officers appointed to assist in that business. By their zeal and attention the business has been effected. The system is introduced, and the officers become so well acquainted with it as to require little further instruction in the several branches

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

of their duty. All, therefore, that is now requisite is a general inspection of the whole, to see that the discipline established is kept up, and that no part of the army deviates in any respect from the rules laid down.

“I would, therefore, propose that in future the officers of the department be limited to an inspector general and two inspectors, one for the northern and one for the southern army; the general duty of their office to be to muster the troops monthly, and to inspect every thing relative to their equipment. They will, at the same time, see that the service is carried on agreeably to the regulations in the respective armies in which they serve. This is only the general plan of what I would propose. Should it meet the approbation of your Excellency, a more particular plan might be made out, in which the duties of the inspectors will be more distinctly defined.”

Washington supported Steuben's plan, whereupon it was approved by Congress on the 10th of January, 1782, and executed with perfect success. It contains all the original ideas which Steuben had elaborated and partly reduced to practice in the camp of Valley Forge, when the jealousy of the native officers, to their own injury, interrupted his work. It had thus required more than four years before the army understood that unity in the discipline, inspection, and formation of the troops, could only be reached by a simplified organization of the general inspectorship. When Steuben, in 1778, required one single inspector general, subject only to the orders of Congress, the board of war, and the commander-in-chief, the demands which he made in the interest of the service were construed as selfish ambition. In remarkable want of judgment, his opponents went so far as to subordinate the general inspectorship to the good, or rather bad will of a newly-made colonel or general. Finally, after four years' experience, the original plan of Steuben was adopted, who thus proved, beyond cavil, that he was right in all he proposed. If this plan had taken place in 1778, the inspection would have effected more

and done greater benefit to the army. From this time Steuben was inspector general of the armies of the United States, while Colonel Stewart acted as inspector of the northern, and Lieutenant Colonel Ternant as inspector of the southern army.

The following resolution repealed all former resolutions relative to the inspector's department, and gave to the latter the following form, powers, and privileges, viz.:

"There shall be an inspector general of the armies of the United States, to be appointed by Congress from the general officers, and to be allowed one secretary, in addition to the aides which he has in the line of the army. The secretary shall be taken from the line, and be entitled to the pay and emoluments of an aid-de-camp. There shall be one inspector for each separate army, to be taken from the field officers of the line of the army, to be allowed thirty dollars per month, in addition to his pay and emoluments in the line.

"The inspector general, or inspector of a separate army, shall, once in every month, in such time, place, and mode, as the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army, shall direct, review and muster the troops of every denomination in service, at which review they shall inspect the number and condition of the men and horses, the discipline of the troops, the state of their arms, accouterments, ammunition, clothing, and camp equipage, and make returns thereof to the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army, noting the deficiencies, neglects, and abuses; and, if possible, the manner in which they happened, and, at the same time, pointing out the alterations and amendments they may think necessary in any branch of the military system, duplicates of which returns shall be transmitted by the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army, to the Secretary at War.

"At the end of every review, the commanding officer of the corps reviewed shall exercise his corps in the manual and

evolutions, before the inspector, so as to enable him to inspect and report the discipline of the troops, agreeably to the foregoing paragraph. And when the inspector general, or inspector of a separate army, finds it necessary to have any particular evolutions or maneuvers performed, either by one or several corps, he shall furnish a plan of such evolutions to the commanding officer of the army, who will approve or amend them, and order them executed, as he may think proper.

“At every review the commanding officers of companies and corps shall produce to the inspector returns of their respective companies and corps, and such other papers and vouchers, relative to the enlistment of men, as he shall judge necessary; three muster rolls shall also be made out by the commanding officer of each troop or company, and signed by him, one of which shall be returned to him certified by the inspector, one shall be certified and delivered to the regimental pay-master, to be fixed to the pay roll, and the other shall be retained by the inspector.

“The inspector general, or inspector of a separate army, shall, as soon as possible after every muster, transmit an abstract of the muster of the whole army in which he is serving, to the commanding officer, who shall transmit a duplicate thereof to the Secretary at War.

“As soon as possible after every review the inspector shall report to the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army, all such soldiers who, from inability or other causes, it may be necessary to discharge or transfer to the invalids; and no discharge shall in future be valid unless signed by the commander-in-chief, or officer commanding the army where such discharge is given.

“The inspector general, or inspector of a separate army, shall be authorized to call on the quarter-master general, clothier general, and field commissary of military stores, or their deputies, for returns of the articles which have been issued from and returned to their several departments by each

corps, that the inspectors may see whether every article so delivered has been regularly and satisfactorily accounted for or charged to the corps, agreeably to the established regulations.

“The inspector general, or inspector of a separate army, shall be authorized and required to visit the military hospitals of the United States from time to time, to examine the general state of them and the treatment of the patients, which he shall report to the officer commanding the army; and the director, deputy director, or superintending surgeon of any hospital shall furnish them with such returns as they may find necessary for the better execution of their office.

“The inspector general shall himself, previous to the opening and at the close of every campaign, or as often as the commander-in-chief shall think fit to order, visit every part of the army, to see that uniformity prevails throughout the armies of the United States.

“The inspector general, and inspectors of a separate army, in the execution of their offices, shall be subject only to the orders of Congress, the Secretary at War, commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army. And that the inspectors may attend the better to the duties of their offices, they shall be exempt from all other duties, except when the commander-in-chief, or commanding officer of a separate army, shall think proper to order otherwise.

“All returns in the inspector's department are to be made agreeably to the forms which shall be delivered the inspector general.

“Each inspector of a separate army will be allowed to take an officer from the line of captains, to assist him in the duties of his office, who shall be allowed ten dollars per month, in addition to his pay in the line.

“*Resolved*, That Major General Baron Steuben be, and hereby is, continued inspector general of the armies of these United States, and vested with power to appoint all officers

necessary to carry the foregoing plan into execution, they being first approved by the commander-in-chief."

Steuben was at this time at or near the head-quarters of Washington. As many French officers who were his old acquaintances, visited his post, he had much pride in showing them the discipline and military expertness which the American troops had attained under his instructions. Many parades were ordered, and the adroitness, and, above all, the silence, with which the maneuvers were performed, were remarked with astonishment by the officers of the French army. This last particular excited the more surprise, as the French troops were noisy in their marches and evolutions. "Noise?" exclaimed the baron to General Montmorency, who was remarking upon this point; "I do not know where the noise should come from, when even my brigadiers dare not open their mouths but to repeat my orders." On a subsequent occasion, when a violent storm had caused a grand exhibition to be postponed, Steuben was asked by one of the French generals, who had retired with him to his marquee, what maneuvers he had intended to perform. On being told, the officer mentioned an addition of some difficulty which he had seen practiced by the Prussians in Silesia. "But we do not expect you to equal the veteran army of the King of Prussia. All in good time." "The time shall be next week," said Steuben, after his guests had retired; "I will save the gentlemen who have not been in Silesia the trouble of going any further than Verplanck's Point for instruction." The order for the review was brought, and one of his aides wrote as Steuben dictated. The appointed day came, and, amid a large concourse of officers, the proposed evolutions were performed with great precision.*

"Alas! when I think of that day," says North, "and look to that eminence on which General Washington's marquee was pitched, in front of which stood that great man, firm in the

* North, l. c., and Bowen in Steuben's Life, pp. 46 and 47, in Sparks's American Biography, vol. ix., series i.

consciousness of virtue, surrounded by French nobles and the chiefs of his own army, my heart sinks at the view! Who, but how few of all that brilliant host is left; those few now tottering on the confines of the grave! The baron's tent, that day, was filled and more than filled with Frenchmen. 'I am glad,' said he, 'to pay some part of the dinner debt we owe our allies.' At the siege of York, or rather immediately afterward, he sold such part of his camp equipage, brought from Europe, as was of silver, that he might give a feast. 'I can stand it no longer,' said he; 'we are continually dining with those people and can not give a piece of *bratwurst* in return; they shall have one grand dinner, if I eat my soup with a wooden spoon hereafter.'"

The whole year, however, passed without an important event. The American army was encamped in the neighborhood of Newburg, on the Hudson, and in the Jerseys, in order to be ready for operations against New York, which, however, never took place. The public mind felt confident of the conclusion of the peace, and little or nothing was done to make new sacrifices or even to fulfill old engagements. Thus the army was kept incomplete, their wants were neglected, their pay withheld, and nothing done to answer the exigencies of the present. Steuben felt the bad consequences of this neglect, as well for himself as for his department and the whole army. On the 1st of March, 1782, the United States owed him \$6,850 in specie, and being unable to draw bills of exchange at a loss of from thirty-eight to forty per cent., or to borrow money any longer, he requested the commander-in-chief to support his demands for the payment of what was due to him.

"Without troubling your Excellency," said he, in a letter of the 1st of March, 1782, to Washington,* "with a tedious detail of the hardships attending my situation, I pray you to consider the peculiarity of my employment compared to that of other officers. The arrangements which are going to take place

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

for furnishing the army with provisions, forage, etc., will not be of advantage to me, and I am bound to travel from one part of the country to the other, to live at double expenses in taverns, in which I have to pay ready money not only for my personal expenses, but also for the entertainment of my aides-de-camp and horses necessary to perform our journeys. I would be happy if the pay allowed by Congress were equal to such expenses. I do not want to lay up any part of my pay, I ask no addition to it, but I declare it to be totally out of my power, if my appointments, as well those of January and February, as those occurring in future, are not regularly paid me. With regard to the arrearage, I shall be satisfied to leave in the public funds \$6,000, provided I am paid the remaining \$850, which are indispensably necessary to enable me to discharge my expenses here and provide myself with the necessary equipage for the ensuing campaign."

At the special intercession of the commander-in-chief and other personal friends, Steuben obtained these \$850, and \$500 besides, on account of his pay for January and February, which was all that he had received since he was in service.

In the army general discontent prevailed, and it is not to be wondered at that the spirit of exasperation and distrust among the officers, and that of mutiny among the soldiers, manifested itself more impatiently, if we read statements like those made by Steuben on the 25th of May, 1782, to the Minister of War, General Lincoln.

"Yesterday," says he,* "our army was the third day without provisions; the horses of the officers will a fortnight have been without forage. Every department is without money and without credit; that of the quarter-master general appears to be stopped in all its branches. Our army could not make a day's march, as we are without the necessary means or provisions. Officers and soldiers are discontented in the highest degree. The last arrangement, by which the rations

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

have been withdrawn in reality, without the least compensation in cash, has redoubled their clamors. You have doubtless heard of the premeditated mutiny of the Connecticut line; it was discovered a day previous to that on which it was to be put in execution. The ringleader was punished with death. A few days after, the sergeants of the Massachusetts line presented a memorial to the commander-in-chief demanding their pay. Wherever I go I hear complaints which make me dread the most fatal consequences. The officers of the staff of the army, from whom both servants and servants' rations have been taken, will all resign. The judge advocate, as also several others, have already sent in their resignations. It is certain the distresses of our country have arrived at the highest possible degree. The officers can not stand it any longer; shall we absolutely drive them to despair?

"What I have related is not properly in my department, and I believe it is only a duplicate of what you will hear from the commander-in-chief; but I conceive it my duty to represent to you the calamities of the army, and to express my apprehensions for their consequences."

Under these circumstances it was fortunate that the enemy did not know the embarrassments and the want of exertions in the American army, as he probably would have availed himself of the general lethargy and struck an unexpected blow. Thus the British confined themselves to observe Washington, and made no move out of the old channel in which they hitherto had conducted the war. Besides, their force was too inconsiderable to make any impression. On the American side, however, the state of public affairs was such as not to promise any decided exertions.

Washington, at the beginning of 1782, meditated an attack against New York, and among others, asked Steuben for his opinion about his plan. It clearly elucidates the situation of both armies, and therefore may be appropriately inserted here.*

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

"Before I can give an answer to the questions which your Excellency has proposed to my consideration, I conceive it will be necessary to take a comparative view of the troops which the enemy have actually in the field on the continent, and those which we may have the probability of bringing into action the next campaign. In the first instance the force the enemy may have at Quebec and Halifax is not comprehended, and in the latter I will not pretend to estimate the number of militia which may be able to collect in case of necessity. The balance will then stand as follows:

BRITISH TROOPS.

Regulars at New York,	9,000
Militia,	3,000
Garrison at Charleston,	3,000
" " Savannah,	700
						<hr/> 15,700

ALLIED ARMY.

Northern Continental Army,	10,000
French troops,	4,000
Southern Army,	2,000
						<hr/> 16,000

"This balance above will be sufficient to prove that superiority of numbers can not be the motive with us to undertake a vigorous offensive campaign, much less to undertake the siege of places fortified by nature as well as by art, such as New York and Charleston.

"The three propositions simply tend to the enterprise against New York. The first presupposes the enemy's force in that garrison to be such as I have stated, that they retain possession of the harbor, and have a naval superiority on the coast; the second that they have the above force by land, keep possession of the harbor, but lose the superiority at sea; in either of which cases any attempt against the garrison appears to me absolutely impracticable, even though our numbers were doubled by the militia.

“The position of the enemy is on three islands. Whenever we attack one the other two must be kept in check. If, then, the besieged should consist of twelve thousand men, and the besiegers of twenty-four thousand, the latter must be divided into three parts, each consisting of eight thousand men. The points of attack are the passage at Kingsbridge, the Heights of Brooklyn, and the works on Staten Island. The shortest line of communication between them is from twenty to twenty-four miles, with a river between each. How, then, is the one to support the other in case of a superior attack, which the enemy may easily make, as they possess every possible advantage by water? And even supposing we should obtain possession of either island, what position should we take to cover our flanks from the enemy’s force by water? but if we should be unfortunate enough to have any one division defeated, what retreat is left while the enemy keep possession of the water?

“These reasons alone prove to me sufficiently the impropriety of such an undertaking so long as the enemy keep possession of the port, and the river by which the islands are surrounded.

“As soon as a superior fleet shall have blocked up the harbor without, our principal object, I conceive, will be Long Island, in which case the greater part of our strength will be necessarily employed in carrying the works at Brooklyn, either by storm or regular approaches, and to erect batteries to bombard the city and the fleet in the bay. But even then it will be necessary that our frigates should be in possession of the Sound, and that batteries should be erected on our flanks commanding the river.

“The last proposition supposes that we were in possession of the harbor and had the superiority at sea. In this case we should be highly reprehensible if we did not make the attempt; yet even then I would propose that we should have the most pointed assurances that the fleet destined for this service

should remain long enough to effect a coöperation on the occasion. It would also be necessary to make an exact estimate of the number of troops and the means which we possess to make the attempt.

“If the enemy should abandon the southern States and collect their whole force at New York, it would amount to sixteen thousand men; and by recalling our troops thence we should amount to nearly the same number. If they retain possession of Charleston and Savannah, General Greene must also remain there, and then we shall be in the same proportion of fourteen thousand to fourteen thousand.

“It would be no less difficult than hazardous to attack the enemy in their present position, with less than double this number, or twenty-eight thousand men. If the States of Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Jersey, could send four thousand men as rank and file, into the regular army, it would amount to fourteen thousand men (Continental troops), four thousand French and ten thousand militia; with this, and no less than this, I conceive we might attempt the enterprise.

“But independent of the troops we should make an exact estimate of the artillery, engineer, quarter master’s and commissary departments, that we may not find ourselves embarrassed with the difficulties that always arise from the want of means necessary for the several branches of the army.

“Thus, sir, have I given you my opinion on the subject which you did me the honor to submit to my consideration, though I can not help expressing to your Excellency, my fears, that the suppositions on which the questions depend, will never be realized. The late unfortunate defeat of the French fleet in the West Indies, the improbability of collecting a force sufficient to carry on the siege, and the difficulty, I had almost said the impossibility, of supporting them, afford but too just grounds for this suggestion.

“However, though our particular situation makes it haz-

ardous to undertake an operation which calls for more force and greater resources than we at present possess; yet I am not of opinion that we should permit the campaign to waste away without improving those advantages which are within our reach. The army should move down and take some advantageous position at or near the White Plains; and if our force will admit that the two York regiments, with Hazen's, should be added to the two Hampshire regiments who are now stationed on the northern frontier, and march under the command of Hazen, toward St. John's in Canada, by the road lately laid out by the . . . or which other way may appear most proper: if this diversion should be attended with no other advantages it would at least prevent the incursions of the savages, a circumstance of the greatest importance.

"Should it, therefore, be advisable to recall the French troops from Virginia, I should conceive the army would be formidable enough to move down and take an advantageous post at or near White Plains; and if by the addition of recruits or militia, our situation would admit of a diversion with the two York regiments under Hazen, added to those of Hampshire, toward the garrison of St. John's in Canada, I am persuaded it would be attended with the most salutary consequences."

But even these diversions were not made. Steuben continued to review and inspect the army, and to make his monthly reports to the commander-in-chief and to the Secretary at War.

We select at random a report which we find in Steuben's carefully-written and revised inspection book. It contains all the returns kept in the same way from April, 1782, till 1784, and furnishes a striking proof of the progress of the order and discipline in the army, as well as the final success of Steuben's exertions. We give in the Appendix copies of all the returns for the northern army. Furnishing as they do an exact account never before published of the numbers and efficiency of the army, they seem to us worthy of preservation.

General Strength of the different Corps, composing the Northern Army—as taken from the Regimental Returns accompanying the Inspection of June, 1782.

INFANTRY REGIMENTS AND CORPS.	Colonels.	Lt. Col's.	Commods.	Lieut. Col's.	Major's.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant Major's.	Quartermaster's.	Drum-majors.	Fife-majors.	Sergeants.	Drummers and Fife's.	Rank and File.				
																				Sick & Absent.	Total.			
1st Massachusetts, ..	1	1	1	9	10	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	17	6	38			
2d ditto.....	1	1	1	9	12	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	50	15	18	38			
3d ditto.....	1	1	1	9	11	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28	18	11	38			
4th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	12	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	34	18	11	37			
5th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	11	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	32	17	14	37			
6th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	13	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	28	18	10	38			
7th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	13	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	29	14	4	38			
8th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	13	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	30	18	16	37			
9th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	12	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	27	18	5	38			
10th ditto.....	1	1	1	9	11	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	40	15	8	37			
TOTAL,	7	3	7	13	20	118	56	10	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	8305	168	101	3782			
Rhode Island,.....	1	2	8	12	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	34	17	17	536			
1st Connecticut, ...	1	1	2	8	12	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	32	18	16	37			
2d ditto.....	1	1	1	9	12	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	36	17	4	37			
3d ditto.....	1	1	1	9	13	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	17	20	36			
4th ditto.....	1	1	1	8	13	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	40	19	22	37			
5th ditto.....	1	1	2	9	12	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	35	17	11	37			
TOTAL,	3	2	3	7	43	62	20	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	181	88	73	1832			
1st New York,.....	1	1	1	9	12	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	19	13	500			
2d ditto.....	1	1	1	9	13	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	36	21	7	531			
TOTAL,	2	2	2	18	25	15	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	74	40	20	1031			
1st New Jersey,	1	1	1	9	13	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	30	19	7	380			
2d ditto.....	1	1	1	9	13	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	36	16	12	376			
TOTAL,	2	2	2	18	26	12	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	66	35	19	756			
ARTILLERY.	Colonels.	Lieut. Col's.	Comd's.	Major's.	Captains.	1st Lieutenants.	2d Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quartermasters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant Major's.	Quartermaster's.	Drum-majors.	Fife-majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drummers and Fife's.	Matrosses.	Sick & Absent.	Total.
Massachusetts, ...	1	1	1	10	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	17	35	22	21	20	315	17	533
New York,	1	1	1	10	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	18	21	12	25	18	290	7	545
Artificers,				1	1	1	3										17				57			57
TOTAL, ...	2	2	2	21	19	21	32	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	32	56	34	46	38	602	14	798

How much Washington was satisfied with the progress of the inspection, is evident from the following general order:*

“HEAD-QUARTERS, NEWBURG, *June 18th, 1782.*

“The general informs the army he had great occasion to be satisfied at the review of the second Connecticut brigade; and yesterday, especially, with the soldier-like, veteran appearance of the men and the exactness with which the firings were performed, he felt a particular pleasure in observing the cleanliness and steadiness of the second regiment under arms; the activity and emulation displayed by the detachment of artillery during the late review deserve encouragement and applause.

“The review of this army by brigade being now completed, the commander-in-chief is happy in having this opportunity to present his thanks to Major General Baron De Steuben for the indefatigable assiduity and singular attention, exhibited in the late inspection and review, and for his eminent service in promoting the discipline of the army on all occasions; and at the same time to express his approbation of the present laudable disposition and pride of corps which seem to be diffused throughout the army; from the spirit of emulation and a consideration of the amazing contrast between the past and present appearance of the troops, the general anticipates the happiest consequences. But being persuaded that appearance alone is not sufficient to establish the reputation and insure the success of our arms, and that frequent and repeated exercise is absolutely necessary to constitute the perfection of discipline, he requests in the most pointed terms that the commanding officers of division and brigade, will punctually exercise the troops alternately every other day in brigade and by detail. In the course of these exercises the officers are permitted to vary the manœuvres as time, circum-

* MS. General Orders from the 1st of June to the 10th of August, 1782, in the Steuben Papers (Utica).

stances and inclination may prompt, provided they do not deviate from the established principles."

It was, however, not Steuben's fault that the business of the inspection did not go on as well as he himself wished. There were impediments in his way which he could not remove, and first of all the want of the most indispensable means prevented the perfection of that order and exactness at which he aimed from the first day on which he performed the duties of his office.

"The more," wrote he, on the 2d of June, 1782, to the Secretary at War,* "I am convinced of the necessity that a state of the army should be regularly laid before you, the greater was my surprise yesterday at finding that the returns for the month of March were still deposited at head-quarters for want of cash to defray the expenses of forwarding them to Philadelphia. The blank muster rolls for the New Hampshire regiments have been detained here two months at the quartermaster general's office, for the same reason. It is in vain, sir, it is absurd, to talk of order, of discipline and arrangements, in our present situation; musters and inspections are totally useless unless a fund is established to defray the necessary expenses of the different departments of the army. For my part, I do not hope to see the troops in a situation to do honor to themselves, or service to their country, while we are deprived of means of laying their wants before those who alone have the force of supplying them. This, sir, is only a duplicate of what I had the honor to mention to you in person, and I now take the liberty to report it officially, that you may have an occasion to procure the truth of it."

Such, indeed, was the poverty of the officers in consequence of not receiving their pay, that when Congress ordered that no letters were free except "public business" was written on them, and that when several regimental returns not being

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

superscribed as above, arrived at Newburg, they could not be taken out of the post office. The adjutant general would not pay six cents postage, the other adjutants could not, and thus the Minister at War received only returns of a part of the army. "Several heads of departments," says William North, from whom we quote these facts,* "had letters in the same way, which they could not touch, so that it was thought probable that Congress would amend their act."

To send Major Barber and Captain Popham to Saratoga for the inspection of the troops, Steuben had to pay the money out of his own pocket. When Colonel Stewart was about to review the regiment of Colonel Hazen at Lancaster, the Minister at War declared that it was not worth the while to take a round about way. "It is my opinion," remarks Steuben, very justly, "that omitting the inspection of only one regiment for one month, can cause more expenses to the United States than the inspection of the whole army for a year can cost."

"If my life, if my honor had depended on it," writes Steuben at this time, "I would not have been able to raise ten dollars on credit. The certificate for \$6,000, which I held from the United States, I offered in vain for one tenth of its nominal value. There is no resource whatever left to me. I have already lost six horses since I am in service, chiefly for want of forage; the two best were stolen, as, while in West Point, I had to send them twenty miles from that place to find pasturage for them; besides that, for want of bolts and bars for my house, my silver and linen were stolen, so that I am reduced in every thing."†

In the meantime the dissatisfaction among officers and soldiers in the army respecting the arrearages of their pay, and their future prospects, had increased to an alarming degree, which grew still worse when the troops took winter quar-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

† Ibidem, vol. xiv., in Memorial to Congress.

ters in the neighborhood of Newburg, and had more leisure to think of and converse upon their really miserable situation.

"The army," wrote Walker from Newburg, on the 20th of November, 1782, to Steuben,* "are not so quiet a people as you imagine, and as soon as they have settled in their huts, I fear they will be less so. A very dangerous spirit seemed to be rising, but the prudent have turned it a better way than it was going. The officers of the lines have already appointed a committee to memorialize and to receive communications of other lines. I fancy it will end in a memorial of the whole army to Congress."

The general officers were in no better condition than the privates. They received no pay, and starvation and misery were staring them in the face; but they adopted other means to get their claims acknowledged and settled. As to Steuben, we have seen that at the opening of the campaign he had received \$850 on account, and his pay for January and February. This money was spent during the subsequent four months. In June, 1782, he applied again to Congress, representing to the Secretaries of War and Finance the absolute necessity, arising from his peculiar situation in the army, to have his ordinary expenses defrayed.

"While other officers," said Steuben, in his memorial of June, 1782,† "were stationed within their respective divisions, brigades and corps, and could avail themselves of their ordinary supplies, the nature of my duty kept me in constant motion from one division of the army, and even from one army to another, necessarily subjecting me to all the expenses incident to traveling. I ever have been, and ever will be, disposed to draw an equal lot with those truly brave men whose sufferings have long since called aloud for speedy redress; with them have I frequently wanted not only the conveniences but even the necessaries of life, and if my duty confined me to

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

† Ibidem.

camp or quarters, would not conceive myself entitled to any extraordinary privilege. Hitherto I have never made a requisition of any kind to Congress, and I entreat your Excellency to be persuaded that it is with singular pain I am compelled to make one at this time ; but the duty I owe to my own feelings, as well as the respect I entertain to that august body, required that I should be thus explicit with them."

But, although receiving encouragement that proper attention would be paid to his situation, Steuben's expectations were again disappointed, as Congress did nothing. Even the eighty-four dollars per month, which were granted to him in 1779 as extra pay to defray his traveling expenses, were overlooked in the new plan of inspectorship, and therefore not paid to him. Thus Steuben stood without any provision for his services as inspector general beyond his allowances as major general.* He, therefore, concluded to go himself to Philadelphia, reviewing the New York and Jersey lines on his route, and on the 7th of July, for the purpose of better sustaining his claims, put the following questions to Washington :†

"Is the department of inspector general necessary in the army, or is it not ? Has this department been conducted during the course of five years agreeably to your wishes, and have the consequences resulting from my exertions as chief of the department answered your expectations ?"

To which queries the commander-in-chief replied :

"I give it as my clear opinion that it has been of the utmost utility, and continues to be of the greatest importance, for reasons too obvious to need enumeration, but more especially for having established one uniform system of maneuvers and regulations in an army composed of the troops of thirteen

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix., letter of Timothy Pickering of June 25th, 1782.

† Washington's Writings, vol. viii., 315 and 316, and Steuben MS. Papers, vol. viii.

States (each having its local prejudices), and subject to constant interruptions and deviations from the frequent changes and dissolutions it has undergone. It is equally just to declare that the department, under your auspices, has been conducted with an intelligence, activity and zeal, not less beneficial to the public than honorary to yourself, and that I have had abundant reason to be satisfied with your abilities and attention to the duties of your office during the four years you have been in the service."

But Congress again did nothing, and months passed away before Steuben took up the matter again.

"Your services," wrote North, on the 29th of October, 1782, to Steuben,* "to my ungrateful country, have been treated with a neglect shocking to every man of sensibility. The army whom you have formed alone feel how much America is indebted to you, and their honest cheeks glow with indignation at the ingratitude of their countrymen. The army, the United States, know what you have done, your intimate friends only know what you have suffered, since you took upon you the herculean task of forming the American armies. It is now five years since you undertook this last work. How well you have succeeded the present state of the army will declare; but unfortunately for our honor, your reward only consists in the consciousness of having acted a great and good part. The war, my dear general, is perhaps drawing towards a close. It has happily been successful, and you doubtless have acquired a lasting honor by the part you had in it. But honor alone will never compensate for your sacrifices in Europe, nor your sacrifices in America; a reward of another kind is due. Justice to yourself and to your friends points out the necessity of your endeavoring to procure it."

Steuben, however, did not want a reward. He only expected to get what he had a right to ask. At last he could bear the procrastination no longer, and on the 4th of December,

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

1782, appealed, in the following noble letter, to E. Boudinot, president of Congress :*

“Sir, it is now five years since I was first honored with a major general’s commission, in the service of the United States. Having given up respectable commands and affluent circumstances in Europe to become useful to this country, it would be doubly mortifying to me to find my endeavors ineffectual.

“The journals of Congress will show that this is the first application I make to their honorable body concerning my private affairs. They will at the same time manifest, that while I attended my duty, I wholly neglected my private concerns. I feel this satisfaction, that if I ever partook of the honor, I likewise shared in the inconveniences, toils and dangers to which the army was exposed.

“My private resources being exhausted, I entreat your Excellency will recommend to Congress their directing a committee to examine into my situation, and report to them the reasonableness of my demands. I shall be happy to evince to their committee, that the internal administration of the regiments and corps, with the institution of which I was intrusted, has been productive of the most beneficial savings to the public, in men, arms, ammunition, accouterments and camp equipage. The testimonials of the commander-in-chief and commanders of the separate armies, as well as of the generals and other officers of the army, will place this assertion beyond all doubt.

“To address this letter to you, at a time when our army is honored with the approbation of allied troops, remarkable for their order and discipline, is to me a singular happiness. Encouraged by their suffrage, I dare assure you that your enemies can not oppose to you an infantry equal to your own, unless it be superior in numbers. You have officers whose military knowledge equals their courage, and soldiers who can

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

execute every possible command. With such an army you will boldly look for a peace glorious to your country and promising happiness to your posterity.

"When I drew my sword in the defense of these States I did it with a determination that death only should force me to lay it down before Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of America, and I still persist in the same resolution. Your own feelings, sir, and those of Congress, may enable you to judge of those of an old soldier who finds himself obliged to mention facts of such a nature as those I have been laying before you. Congress will do me the justice to believe that, in doing justice to the zeal and capacity of the officers, and the docility of the soldiers of the federal army, to speak of myself is a task highly painful and disagreeable to me."

Congress, on the 30th of December, 1782, resolved, that to enable Steuben to take the field another campaign, and for his present support, \$2,400 should be paid to him, and that he should be allowed \$300 per month, in lieu of his extra pay, and subsistence and forage for himself and family.*

"The committee, consisting of Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Clarke and Mr. Carroll, to whom was referred a letter of the 5th, from Major General the Baron De Steuben, having conferred with him thereupon, submit to the consideration of Congress the following facts, resulting from the communication made to them, supported by the testimonials of the commander-in-chief and many other principal officers of the army :

"First. That the Baron De Steuben was in Europe possessed of respectable military rank, and different posts of honor and emolument, which he relinquished to come to America and offer his services at a critical period of the war, and without any previous stipulation.

"Secondly. That on his arrival he actually engaged in the army, in a very disinterested manner, and without com-

* Resolutions of Congress, viii., 51 and 52.

pensions similar to those which had been made to several other foreign officers.

“Thirdly. That under singular difficulties and embarrassments in the department in which he has been employed, he has rendered very important and substantial services, by introducing into the army a regular formation and exact discipline, and by establishing a spirit of order and economy in the interior administration of the regiments; which, besides other advantages, have been productive of immense savings to the United States; that in the commands in which he has been employed, he has, upon all occasions, conducted himself like a brave and experienced officer: the committee are therefore of an opinion that the sacrifices and services of the Baron De Steuben justly entitle him to the distinguished notice of Congress, and to a generous compensation, whenever the situation of public affairs will admit; the committee further report that the Baron De Steuben has considerable arrearages of pay due to him from these States on a liquidated account, and that having exhausted his resources in past expenses, it is now indispensable that a sum of money should be paid him for his present support, and to enable him to take the field another campaign, and propose that the sum of \$2,400 be paid to him for that purpose, and charged to his account aforesaid; whereupon,

“*Resolved*, That the foregoing proposal of the committee be referred to the superintendent of finance to take order.

“The committee further observing, that from the nature of the department in which the Baron De Steuben is employed, he is under the necessity of making frequent journeys, by which he incurs an additional expense, and is often deprived of the allowance of forage to which he is entitled; thereupon,

“*Resolved*, That the Baron De Steuben be allowed \$300 per month, in lieu of his extra pay, and of subsistence and forage for himself and family, including wagon as well as saddle horses, and that these allowances hereafter cease.”

While Steuben was arranging his affairs at Philadelphia, the army had taken up their winter quarters at New Windsor. In this connection we give the letter of General Gates, who had just arrived in camp, after having lost sight of the progress of the army since the last three years. For this reason his letter is the more interesting.

"Lieutenant Colonel Howard," writes Gates on the 22d of November, 1782, to Steuben,* "does me the favor to be the bearer of this letter. I am happy in so good an opportunity to present you with my most affectionate regards.

"Saturday after you left camp, the left wing of the army marched for their winter quarters, and on Sunday they were followed by the right. From the time of our arrival on this side of the mountains we have been constantly employed in hutting, and making every preparation necessary to keep us warm and healthy through the severity of the approaching season. I think another week will complete the business. Our men are become so adroit and perfect in the art of hutting, that I think they will be more comfortable and better lodged in the quarters they build for themselves than in those any city in the continent would afford them. This mode of covering an army for the winter is new in the art of war, and I wish, for the good of mankind, that the princes and generals of Europe may not adopt it, for then adieu to those respites from carnage which hitherto the winter has so generally given to European armies.

"We have just heard that the enemy are preparing for a large embarkation—it may be the whole are going—to the West Indies. I am fully of opinion that is what they ought to do, as here they have little to gain; there they have every thing to lose. That commerce which is their great resource must be ruined, should Jamaica fall. I therefore believe they will abandon all here to save it. If I am right in my conjecture, the warfare between us and Britain finishes with the

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

year; but believe me, my dear baron, my great respect for you will not end with the war. The astonishment with which I beheld the order, regularity, and attention, which you have taught the American army, and the obedience, exactness, and true spirit of military discipline which you have infused into them, does you the highest honor. Gratitude obliges me to make you this declaration. The generosity of the governing powers, both civil and military, will, I trust, be actuated by the same generous principle, and by proclaiming to the world your merits and their obligation, convince mankind that the republics of America have at least the virtue to be grateful."

About the same time General Robert Howe wrote a letter to Steuben, which confirms Gates' statements about Steuben's popularity in the army, while it shows its condition in a more favorable light than we have viewed it. We give it here in full:

"I have waited, my dear baron," writes Howe on the 30th of November, 1782,* "a long while, in hopes that some event would have happened worthy of your notice, but there has been such a barrenness of incident, and it is likely to continue, that I will no longer deny myself the pleasure of writing to a man I so truly and warmly esteem, were it only to ask what you are doing in Philadelphia. You promised me at parting that I should hear from you upon your arrival, but either the pleasures or vexations you have been involved in have induced you to postpone fulfilling it. I am too deeply interested in your happiness not earnestly to hope that my disappointment has been owing to the former cause rather than to the latter. But, in either case, I charge you to let me hear from you; if the first, the information will make me happy; if the second, it will induce every sensibility in my mind, and call from me every consolation which can result from affectionate sympathy.

"Your children—for so I call our army—have been labor-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

ing night and day to build their huts, and a wilderness is already changed into a city. Were I writing to a man less acquainted with our troops than you are, I should perhaps expatiate upon their endurance of fatigue, their patience under the greatest sufferings, the faithful services rendered their country, without reward and almost without the hope of it; their resignation to cruel and repeated disappointments without a murmur, with ten thousand other virtues with which you know them to be endowed, and therefore now not to be told of. . . . I can not conclude this letter without conveying to you what I am sure your attachment to the army will render pleasing to you, that is, that they universally think and speak of you with love, pleasure, gratitude, and applause; and you will, I am persuaded, hear very shortly from them."

Steuben, however, did not return to head-quarters until in March, 1783.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE YEAR 1783 AS DEVOID OF REMARKABLE EVENTS AS THE PRECEDING.—PEACE CERTAIN.—IT IS ANNOUNCED TO THE ARMY.—THE LATTER DISSOLVED.—CLAIMS OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.—LETTER OF RICHARD PETERS.—STEBEN'S ADVICE ASKED AT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY.—HIS PROPOSALS FOR THE DISCHARGE OF THE SOLDIERS, ABOUT A PEACE ESTABLISHMENT, AND A MILITARY ACADEMY.—LINCOLN'S ANSWER.—CLOSING SCENES OF THE WAR.—ADDRESS OF THE OFFICERS OF THE TWO NEW YORK REGIMENTS TO STEUBEN.—STEBEN'S LAST OFFICIAL MISSION TO CANADA.—WASHINGTON'S INSTRUCTIONS.—WANT OF SUCCESS OF HIS DEMANDS ON GENERAL HALDIMAND.—STEBEN'S REPORT.—HE GOES TO PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK.—WASHINGTON'S LETTER ON THE DAY OF HIS RESIGNATION.—STEBEN'S ANSWER.—OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF WAR VACANT.—KNOX PREFERRED TO STEUBEN.—REASONS WHY.—STEBEN RESIGNS THE INSPECTORSHIP.—CONGRESS ACCEPTS IT, AND VOTES HIM A GOLD-HILTED SWORD.—ITS DESCRIPTION.

THE year 1783 passed over more quietly than its predecessor. The conclusion of peace was already certain at its beginning. In March, the intelligence that the preliminaries had been signed reached the camp, and as early as the 19th of April the cessation of hostilities was proclaimed to the army. From this date begins its disbandment—a difficult business, considering the just claims of the soldiers, and the inability of Congress to send them home satisfied.

“Our means,” writes Richard Peters on the 23d of April, 1783, to Steuben,* “are small, though our wishes are favorable and sincere. Our circumstances afford an odd contrast to those we have heretofore experienced. The difficulty which heretofore oppressed us was how to raise an army; the one which now embarrasses us is how to dissolve it. Every thing that Congress can do for our deserving soldiers will be done, but an empty purse is a bar to the execution of the best plans.”

Steuben was often consulted by the commander-in-chief, as

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

well as the Minister at War, about the business connected with the disbandment of the army, and about the arrangements to be made for the defense of the country after the conclusion of peace. As to the former object, he wrote on the 26th of April, 1783, to Washington :*

“Before the dismissal of the men engaged for the war, it will be necessary that each of them should receive a printed discharge, signed by the commander-in-chief. If they leave the army without being regularly discharged, the consequence will be that those who have been engaged for a longer time will take this moment to leave the army also, and entering into the class of citizens with them, it will not be known who are entitled to their dismission and who are deserters. Moreover, a discharge signed by the commander-in-chief will give a dignity flattering to soldiers who have served their country with fidelity. It would have a good effect if the soldiers, by their discharges, were authorized to apprehend and deliver to their respective governments those who have left the army without a legal discharge. The certificate of the retiring officers ought to be printed on parchment, if possible, signed by the commander-in-chief, and sealed with his arms ; they will, in the most honorable terms, express the value of their services.

“The dismissal of the troops must be executed with the greatest dignity possible, for which purpose I submit to your Excellency whether a board should not assemble, to be composed of a brigadier general, a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and a major of each line, at which board the inspector general could preside. The certificates of the officers and the discharge of the soldiers to be signed and filled in such a manner that nothing would remain for the board but to insert the name, rank, and date of the person discharged. The names of the officers and soldiers so dismissed to be entered by the board in a book, which, in memory of those brave citizens

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

who have fought for the independence of their country, should be preserved in the archives of Congress. The troops to be discharged in lines, beginning with New Hampshire. The board dismissing those enlisted for the Continent, might be assembled at the Temple, the general of the line, the field and staff officers of the regiment, and the officers of the company who are to be discharged, will be present. The troops to be marched to the temple in regiments or battalions, formed for inspection. Each non-commissioned officer and soldier will be examined as to his pretensions, and if any doubt should arise as to the term of his engagement, the necessary inquiries may be made, as at this moment every person will be present who can be supposed to give information in the matter.

“*The Discharging.*—When a battalion is finished, the inspecting general, or inspector, will divide them into companies, and divide the officers who are to command them. This formation will exist on the march, and until they arrive at the rendezvous in their respective States, where they will be finally discharged. Those who remain will be formed in battalions and companies, for the present, until the new battalions are composed. As soon as the troops of a line are discharged, the senior officer will, with the general's order, conduct them to the place assigned for their final dissolution. If the soldiers could be made sensible that this plan for their dismissal was adopted that they might return to their States with that honor and dignity which their service merits, and that the least disorder, excess, or want of subordination, would be more disgraceful on this than on any other occasion, and would . . . the merits of their past service, it would, in all probability, have the best consequence.”

This prudent advice, though approved by the commander-in-chief, could not, however, be realized, on account of the hurry with which the army, for fear of disturbance, was dissolved. The troops dispersed without control or order, and without any ceremony. A great many bitter remarks of

Steuben, in regard to this matter, will be found in the Appendix.

Washington further asked Steuben's opinion on a final peace establishment, while General Lincoln, the Minister at War, requested his sentiments on the establishment of a military academy and manufactory.

"I had the honor," wrote Steuben on the 15th of April, 1783, to Washington,* "yesterday, of receiving your letter requesting my sentiments on a final establishment. I am sorry that my knowledge of our frontiers and of the sea coast will not permit me to answer your Excellency's wishes. I am firmly of opinion that whatever troops may be kept up, that they should be entirely Continental, forming a division or brigade, from which division or brigade the . . . post may be garrisoned by battalions or companies. By such a formation the order and regularity which has been introduced into our service would, in a great measure, be preserved. The pay for the non-commissioned officers and privates for the peace establishment ought, in my opinion, be less than the pay of those grades are at present. It is but reasonable that troops on a peace establishment should receive less than in time of actual war, and if these emoluments should be paid regularly, a small sum would suffice to answer all their real wants, and some imaginary ones. I am also of opinion that no rations should be furnished to troops on a peace establishment, but the money at which they are valued . . . for the troops, provided they are paid weekly. In the present movement there are other establishments which deserve to be attended to—the establishment of military academies and manufactories; those, as well as the other matters, are, in my opinion, of sufficient consequence to require the deliberation of a committee of Congress and the general officers of the army."

And on the 21st of April he continues: "I have the honor

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xii.

to inclose to your Excellency my thoughts on a peace establishment for our interior defenses. How far my plan is adapted to the circumstances of the United States, and whether it will agree with the principles of our government, I am not able to determine. This I am certain of, that we have need of a regular force for the protection of our frontiers; that our militia ought to be on a regular establishment; and that the establishment of military schools and manufactories will be the best means for providing for our security in future; and that a system of this nature will make us more respectable with the powers of Europe than if we should keep fifty thousand men in pay.”*

In his letter of the 16th of April, 1783, transmitting his plan of a military academy to Lincoln, Steuben says, among other things:

“Want of time prevented me from detailing the different objects I had in view, which I wished the more as I wanted to answer all and any objections and doubts which might be raised as to my statements. The calculation, however, is very just, the expense taken at the highest, and the result at a very moderate rate. The appointments and salaries in all the classes are such, that England, Germany and France will furnish acceptable teachers. The ideas which you communicated to me served me as a direction in regard to the number. Several objects require a more detailed explanation. I, therefore, should like to be present when the plan will be taken into consideration.”

“I have been honored,” answered Lincoln, on the 24th of April, 1783,† “with your favor of the 16th inst., covering a system for the military academy.

“I am exceedingly obliged by your attention to this subject; and for your well-digested and judicious arguments, please to accept my most cordial thanks.

* Steuben's views on this subject will be found in the Appendix.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

"I am fully convinced as to what is the interest of the United States, but I can not be so certain what line of conduct they will pursue. However, the committee have under consideration your observations. If I differ from them in my report, it will not be because I think them ill calculated to promote the general interest, but from a full conviction that so necessary and extensive a plan can not be carried in Congress. I hope you will be heard before your plan is rejected.

"If the very best measure can not be obtained, we must at present be content with the next best."

"I have received your plans," wrote R. Peters, to whom Steuben had just given his opinion about the line of conduct to be pursued towards prisoners of war, on the 6th of May, 1783, "and given them to the committee on peace establishment. You know how much I value all your military opinions, and therefore I need not tell you that I find much to . . . in the . . . ;* but if I were to go into the details my answer would be wordy, and possibly not well grounded. All of them will not be adopted, but they will furnish a very respectable part of any building we may erect."

Steuben's plan for the establishment of a military academy and manufactory, which he made at the request of the Secretary at War is one of the most interesting of all the drafts he made at this time. How far it served as a basis for the military school at West Point (established in 1803), we are not able to judge, but it will easily be seen, by competent judges, from the following particulars. Steuben's leading idea in regard to the school was the creation of an institution similar to the Prussian *cadet houses*, as, for instance, Potsdam and Berlin, in which young men are educated for officers. He says :†

"1. The establishment shall consist of a military academy and a military manufactory, the direction and government

* The blanks are occasioned by the defects of the original MS.

† Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

of which shall be committed to a director general, the four senior officers of the establishment, and two professors of the academy, who shall be called the council of directors.

“2. The superior and inferior officers, the professors and masters of the academy shall be appointed by Congress.

“3. Commissioners appointed by Congress shall yearly examine the administration of the establishment, to whom the council of directors shall expose their accounts, and give every information, respecting the establishment, which may be required of them.

“4. One hundred and twenty young gentlemen, under the denomination of volunteer cadets, shall be educated every three years, eighty of whom shall be destined for the infantry, twenty for the cavalry, and twenty for the engineers and artillery.

“5. No person shall be received as a volunteer cadet under the age of fourteen years, nor without having received what is called a grammar-school education.

“6. No cadet shall be obliged to enter into the army against his inclination, but shall be at liberty to choose what career he pleases.

“7. Each cadet shall pay for his board, clothing and instruction, three hundred dollars per annum.

“8. If a cadet leaves the academy before his three years expire, he shall be deprived of a certificate and the benefits thereof.

“9. Each cadet shall be instructed in the following sciences and arts:—Natural and experimental philosophy, eloquence and the *belles lettres*, civil law and the law of nations, history and geography, mathematics, civil architecture, drawing, the French language, horsemanship, fencing, dancing, and music.

“Independent of the above, those cadets designed for the artillery and engineers, will receive particular instructions from the officers of this corps.

"10. The cadets shall live in a convenient house; they will eat at four different tables, which will be cleanly and equally served, and at each of which an officer will preside in rotation. They will be uniformly habited, and subject to the rules of the academy. The clothing (except linen), and subsistence will be furnished by the establishment.

"11. There will be five professors, for each of whom a convenient house will be constructed, and land annexed sufficient for a yard and garden. They will also receive the pay and emoluments mentioned in the list of appointments.

"Professors: one of mathematics, one of history and geography, one of the law of nations and civil law, one of natural and experimental philosophy, one of eloquence and the *belles lettres*.

"12. There will be seven masters of arts, who will have convenient houses and gardens, with the pay and emoluments noted in the list of appointments.

"Masters: one of architecture, one of drawing, one of the French language, one of riding, one of dancing, one of fencing, one of music.

"The rules and statutes for the academy shall be formed by the first council of directors, or by persons named by Congress, whose sanction shall be necessary to their existing as a permanent ordinance.

"Congress will recommend the passing a law by which no person shall be employed as an officer in the army, who has not served as an officer in the late war, or received his education at one of the military academies, and can produce a certificate, signed by the director general, of his capacity.

"The rank of each cadet will be shown by the date of his certificate, and if an army should be formed, the first class would serve as captains, the second as lieutenants, and the third as ensigns."

The manufactory connected with the above school consisted, according to Steuben's plan, of six hundred men em-

ployed in the different branches; viz., of seven master artificers, twenty artificers of the first class, one hundred and fifty artificers of the second class, twenty-six common tradesmen, three hundred and ninety-six common workingmen. The manufactories in which they had to work, were: 1st. A manufactory of cannon powder which was to furnish one thousand barrels per annum, at \$16 a barrel; 2d. A manufactory of iron to cast four hundred tons of ore into cannon, mortars, howitzers, shells and shot; 3d. A manufactory of bar iron to furnish one hundred tons, each ton at \$50; 4th. A manufactory of carriages to furnish one hundred and twenty carriages a year at \$100 a piece; 5th. A manufactory of fire-arms to furnish three thousand four hundred muskets at \$6 a piece, five hundred carabines at \$4, and five hundred pair of pistols at \$4; 6th. A manufactory of white arms to furnish three thousand swords for the cavalry at \$2, three thousand four hundred bayonets at \$1 a piece, five hundred lances and five hundred hatchets; 7th. A manufactory of leather, to furnish three thousand seven hundred cartridge boxes at \$2 a piece, three thousand scabbards for swords, three hundred bridles, three hundred saddles and three hundred halters; 8th. A brass foundry to cast annually eight field-pieces, six pounders; eight field-pieces, three pounders; eight howitzers of eight inches, and eight howitzers of five and a half inches; 9th. A complete laboratory for the artillery.

Steuben computed the costs and expenses of both establishments at \$142,636 per year. Deducting from them the articles manufactured, at \$95,950, and the tuition fee received from one hundred and twenty cadets at \$300 per head, at \$36,000; a balance was left of \$10,686, to be charged to the United States.

“Among the annual salaries we quote: director general to receive \$2,832; each assistant teacher \$1,488, in all, \$8,784; five professors, \$6,721; five masters of arts and tutors, \$3,264; hospital department, \$4,212; eighty infantry cadets, \$21,384;

twenty cavalry cadets, \$5,124; twenty artillery and engineer cadets, \$5,472."

It was just at this time that the order of the Cincinnati was formed, in the establishment of which Steuben took a very prominent part. As we shall have to refer to it in another chapter, we relate here the last incidents of the war, and Steuben's participation in the memorable events which ended the year 1783.

His position in the army just about to dissolve, is best characterized by the following letter which the officers of the two New York regiments, on the 9th of June, 1783, addressed to Steuben, before they left their quarters. It reads as follows :*

"The objects for which we took upon us the profession of arms being accomplished, we are now about to retire from the field and return to the class of private citizens.

"But before we separate for ever, permit us, the officers of the two New York regiments, to express our feelings toward you on this occasion.

"The essential and distinguished services you have rendered this country, must inspire the breast of every citizen of America with sentiments of gratitude and esteem. But we, sir, feel sentiments of another nature. Your unremitted exertions on all occasions to alleviate the distress of the army, and the manner in which you have shared them with us, have given you more than a common title to the character of our friend—as our military parent we have long considered you. Ignorant as we were of the profession we had undertaken, it is to your abilities and unwearied assiduity we are indebted for that military reputation we finally attained. We therefore feel ourselves bound to you by the strongest ties of affection, and we now take leave of you with that regret which such sentiments must occasion. Wishing you long to enjoy in health and happiness those rewards which your services have

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

merited, and which a grateful people can not fail to bestow. We have the honor to remain yours," etc.

The last duty which Steuben performed in the service of the United States, was a mission which he undertook by order of the commander-in-chief to Canada. Washington selected him as the most proper person to claim from General Haldimand, the governor of that province, the delivery of the posts on the frontier territory ceded to the United States. This mission, although it afterward proved unsuccessful, was the more honorable as it required at the same time a sound military and political judgment. The following instructions were given by Washington to Steuben, on the 12th of July, 1783 :*

"In consequence of powers in me invested for that purpose, I do hereby authorize and desire you to proceed with such dispatch as you shall find convenient, into Canada, and there concert with General Haldimand, or other British commander-in-chief in that province, all such measures as you shall find necessary for receiving possession of the posts now under his command within the territory of the United States, and at present occupied by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and from which his said majesty's troops are to be withdrawn, agreeably to the seventh article of the provisional treaty between his said majesty and the United States of America.

"In accomplishing this negotiation you will obtain, if possible, from General Haldimand his assurances and orders for the immediate possession, by the United States, of the posts in question, or at least a cession of them at an early day. But if this can not be done, you will endeavor to procure from him positive and definitive assurances, that he will as soon as possible give information of the time that shall be fixed on for the evacuation of those posts, and that the troops of his Britannic Majesty shall not be drawn therefrom until sufficient previous notice shall be given of that event, that the troops of the

* Washington's Writings, viii., pp. 462-464.

United States may be ready to occupy the fortresses as soon as they shall be abandoned by those of his Britannic Majesty.

“You will propose to General Haldimand, an exchange of such artillery and stores now in the posts, as you shall think proper, and which you shall judge will be of benefit to the United States, agreeing with the British commander-in-chief, that an equal number of cannon, and an equal quantity and kind of stores, to what he may consent to exchange, shall be replaced to his Britannic Majesty by the United States, at such time and place as shall be fixed on, by you, for the purpose.

“Having formed your arrangements with General Haldimand, you will be pleased to proceed in such manner as you shall think best, to visit the several posts and fortresses on the frontier territory of the United States, as far as Detroit; view their different situation, strength, and circumstances; and, forming your judgment of their relative position, and probable advantage to the United States, you will report the same to me, with your opinion of such of them as you shall think it most expedient for the United States to retain and occupy. In passing Lake Champlain you will critically observe the width of the waters at the northern extremity, and the nature of the ground adjoining; with a view to determine whether there is any spot south of the forty-fifth degree of north latitude, and near our extreme boundary, on which it will be convenient, should Congress judge it expedient, to erect fortifications, which would command the entrance from Canada into that lake.

“At Detroit you will find a very considerable settlement, consisting mostly of French people from Canada. To these you will please to intimate in the fullest manner the good disposition of Congress and the inhabitants of the United States for their welfare and protection, expressing at the same time to them our expectations of finding the like disposition in them toward us, and the post which we may establish there, and any future settlement which may be formed in their neigh-

borhood by the subjects of the United States. . As the advanced season, or other unforeseen accidents, may render it difficult to get a detachment of American troops to that place before it may be convenient for the British garrison to be withdrawn from that post, you will do well to engage, in this case, some one or more of the respectable and well-disposed inhabitants of the district to provide a company of militia (if there be any) or others, at the expense of the United States, to take charge of the works and buildings of the fortress, assuring them such reasonable pay as shall be deemed adequate to their service, or as you may condition for. You will also make particular inquiry whether the farmers or merchants of Detroit are able or willing to supply an American garrison at that post with provisions and other necessities, and upon what terms."

Washington himself at the same time visited the northern and north-western part of the State of New York, as far as the Mohawk river and the eastern banks of the Susquehanna, in order eventually to assist Steuben, and to facilitate the operations which would be necessary for occupying as soon as evacuated by British troops, the posts ceded by the treaty of peace.*

In compliance with his instructions, Steuben at once proceeded to Canada, and arrived at Chamblee on the 2d of August, whence he sent Major North to announce his arrival to General Haldimand. According to the latter's appointment, they met at Sorel, on the 8th, where Steuben opened the business on which he was sent.

"To the first proposition which I had in charge to make," reports he to Washington, on the 23d of August, 1783,† "General Haldimand replied that he had not received any orders for making the least arrangement for the evacuation of a single post; that he had only received orders to cease hostilities; those he had strictly complied with, not only by restraining the

* Washington's Writings, vol. viii., 469.

† Correspondence of the Revolution, iv., 41, 42.

British troops, but also the savages, from committing the least hostile act ; but that, until he should receive positive orders for that purpose, he would not evacuate an inch of ground. I informed him that I was not instructed to insist on an immediate evacuation of the posts in question, but that I was ordered to demand a safe conduct to, and a liberty of visiting the posts on our frontiers, and now occupied by the British, that I might judge of the arrangements necessary to be made for securing the interests of the United States. To this he answered that the precaution was premature ; that the peace was not yet signed ; that he was only authorized to cease hostilities ; and that, in this point of view, he could not permit that I should visit a single post occupied by the British. Neither would he agree that any kind of negotiation should take place between the United States and the Indians, if in his power to prevent it, and that the door of communication should, on his part, be shut, until he received positive orders from his court to open it. My last proposal was that he should enter into an agreement to advise Congress of the evacuation of the posts, three months previous to their abandonment. This, for the reason before mentioned, he refused, declaring that until the definitive treaty should be signed, he would not enter into any kind of agreement or negotiation whatever.

“I esteem myself very unfortunate that I could not succeed in the business with which I was charged, and am only consoled by the idea that your Excellency will believe that every thing which was in my power to do was done to answer the wishes of your Excellency and of Congress.”

Not having any thing to hope from a continuance of the negotiations, Steuben left St. John's on the 13th of August ; arrived at Saratoga on the 21st of August, and having restored his weakened health, returned to head-quarters, where he resumed his old duties till the army was finally disbanded. Congress, on the 18th of October, 1783, discharged all officers and soldiers from service, and retained only those who had enlisted

for a definite time, till the new peace establishment was organized. On the recommendation of Steuben, Major William North was appointed inspector of the troops who were under the command of General Knox. Steuben at this time left headquarters by order of the general-in-chief, and went to Philadelphia, where he dissolved the posts still outstanding, gave orders for the sick and invalid soldiers, and emptied the hospitals. The performance of these duties kept him until the latter part of November, when he returned to headquarters.

The British soon after evacuated New York, and on the 25th of November, 1783, Washington, with his staff officers, entered the city. Steuben was among them, and took part in all the festivities attendant on the occasion, and from that time to the 4th of December, when the commander-in-chief left New York to proceed to Annapolis, Maryland, to resign his command into the hands of Congress.

Washington, even an hour before retiring to private life, remembered Steuben's merits and devoted service to the great cause which was now triumphant. He honored him with a testimonial more flattering than any he ever gave to the other officers of the revolutionary army, thus recanting his former harsh judgment which confounded Steuben with the crowd of foreign adventurers who offered their services in the first years of the war. This was his last letter while in the service of his country, and in this respect, too, is an interesting historical document. It reads as follows :*

“ANNAPOLIS, *December 23, 1783.*

“MY DEAR BARON,—

“Although I have taken frequent opportunities, both in public and in private, of acknowledging your great zeal, attention and abilities, in performing the duties of your office, yet I wish to make use of this last moment of my public life, to signify, in the strongest terms, my entire approbation of your conduct, and to express my sense of the obligations the

* Washington's Writings, vol. viii., p. 503.

public is under to you, for your faithful and meritorious services.

"I beg you will be convinced, my dear sir, that I should rejoice if it could ever be in my power to serve you more essentially than by expressions of regard and affection; but, in the meantime, I am persuaded you will not be displeased with this farewell token of my sincere friendship and esteem for you.

"This is the last letter I shall write while I continue in the service of my country. The hour of my resignation is fixed at twelve to-day, after which I shall become a private citizen, on the banks of the Potomac, where I shall be glad to embrace you, and testify the great esteem and consideration with which I am, my dear baron," etc.

Steuben answered :*

"The letter of the 23d of December, which I have had the honor of receiving from your Excellency, is the most honorable testimony which my serving could have received. My first wish was to approve myself to your Excellency, and in having obtained your esteem my happiness is complete. The confidence your Excellency was pleased to place in my integrity and abilities gained me that of the army and of the United States. Your approbation will secure it.

"A stranger to the language and customs of the country, I had nothing to offer in my favor but a little experience and a great good will to serve the United States. If my endeavors have succeeded, I owe it to your Excellency's protection, and it is a sufficient reward for me to know that I have been useful in your Excellency's operations, which always tended to the good of our country.

"After having studied the principles of the military art under Frederick the Great, and put them in practice under Washington, after having deposited my sword under the same

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

trophies of victory with you, and finally after having received this last public testimony of your esteem, there remains nothing for me to desire.

“Accept my sincere thanks, my dear general, for the unequivocal proofs of your friendship, which I have received since I had first the honor to be under your orders, and believe that I join my prayers to those of America for the preservation of your life, and for the increase of your felicity.”

On the 12th of November, 1783, the office of Secretary of War had become vacant, in consequence of General Lincoln's resignation, and the attention of the majority of Congress for this office was now concentrated on Steuben and General Knox. The only objection made against the former was that he was a foreigner, and that a foreigner could not be trusted with a post of such importance. This objection, absurd as it was, settled the question, and while nobody disputed Steuben's superior knowledge in his science, and in the administration of the army, Knox, the native candidate, got the appointment. Steuben did not conceal his indignation at being compelled to yield to such a stupid pretext. “The man,” said he, in a letter upon this subject, “who had abandoned all his appointments, and the brightest prospects in Europe, to devote his services to the United States, who had served them with zeal and fidelity during a war of seven years as critical as trying; the man who had got possessions in Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey—with what effrontery could he be called a foreigner! As to the importance of this ministerial office, the man who had organized the whole American army in the midst of the war; the man who solely had established and put in execution the principles of strict military rules: this man can not be intrusted with the administration of a corps of four hundred men in time of peace! What fine reasoning! But, in fact, Mr. Knox had engaged the delegates of Massachusetts to secure to him this place. His own State could not provide him with a post worthy of his ambition, and

therefore the Confederation had to give him a suitable appointment. Without disputing his knowledge in the art of artillery, I dare to assert, that on my arrival at the army, it had no idea of maneuvering with a single field-piece, and that I was the first who taught them to make use of their cannons in the attack and retreat.”*

Steuben gave in his resignation on the 24th of March, 1784, which Congress accepted on the 15th of April. To smooth his exasperated feelings, Congress promised soon to settle his claims against the United States, and resolved,† “That the thanks of the United States, in Congress assembled, be given to Baron Steuben for the great zeal and abilities he has discovered in the discharge of the several duties of his office; that a gold-hilted sword be presented to him, as a mark of the high sense Congress entertain of his character and services; and that the superintendent of finance take order for procuring the same.”

This sword was presented to Steuben three years afterwards, on the 4th of January, 1787, with the following letter from General Knox :

“WAR OFFICE, *January 4, 1787.*

“SIR,—The United States, in Congress assembled, by their act of the 15th of April, 1784, expressed their high sense of your military talents, services, and character, and as an honorable evidence thereof they directed that a gold-hilted sword should be presented to you. It is with great satisfaction I embrace the occasion of presenting you with the invaluable memorial of their sentiments and your eminent merits.

“Were it possible to enhance the honor conferred by the sovereign authority, it would be derived from the consideration that their applause was reciprocated by the late illustrious commander-in-chief, and the whole army,”

To which letter Steuben, on the 5th of January, returned the following polite answer :

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xi.

† Res. of Congress, vol. ix., p. 128.

"I have been honored with your letter, and Captain Stagg has delivered me the sword which the United States were pleased to order by their act of the 15th of April, 1784.

"Permit me, sir, to request that you would express to Congress the high sentiments of respect and acknowledgment with which I receive this distinguished mark of their regard.

"To a soldier such sentiments are ever dear, and that this is accompanied with the approbation of our late commander-in-chief, of yourself, and the army in general, will always be my greatest glory.

"Accept, sir, my sincere thanks for the very flattering manner in which you have communicated this present, and believe me," etc.

In the New York *Daily Advertiser* of the 11th of January, 1787, from which we quote the above letters, the following description of the sword is given :

"It was made in London, under the direction of Colonel Smith, and executed by the first workmen in that kingdom. The small medallions on each side of the top of the hilt, present an eagle perched on a bunch of arrows, with a wreath of laurel in her bill, and wings extended ready to rise. The modest genius of America fills the front medallion on the hilt, dressed in a flowing robe, ornamented with the new constellation, holding an olive branch in her right arm, and a dagger in her left hand, and the fair field of liberty flourishing in the background. It is answered on the opposite side with the full figure of Minerva, in martial dress, robed and ornamented with the same stars; the bird of wisdom is seated near; her left hand being extended, presents the olive branch, while the right is properly supported by the spear; this figure is martial and gay—the other is mild, and modestly embraces the olive branch, but holds the dagger with firmness. The bow of the hilt presents drums, colors, halberts, etc., etc. The sword and Blue Book* fill the two lower ones—two eagles,

* "The baron's excellent regulations for our army, commonly called the Blue Book."—*Editors of the Advertiser.*

seated on knots of colors, surrounded with stars, and holding a sprig of an olive branch in the bill, with extended wings, are emblems of peace and protection, under the sword and Blue Book (which our country can not too strictly attend to). The two opposite medallions are filled with trophies of war, and the following inscription, modestly placed out of view under the shield: ‘The United States to Major General Baron Steuben, 15th April, 1784, for military merit.’ ”

CHAPTER XXV.

TREATMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY OFFICERS ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES.—INGRATITUDE OF REPUBLICS.—MONARCHIES MORE GRATEFUL.—THE UNITED STATES FORFEIT THEIR WORD.—THEY REFUSE TO DO JUSTICE TO THEIR OFFICERS.—WAY IN WHICH THEY WERE TREATED.—RESOLUTION OF THE 26TH OF APRIL, 1778, GRANTING HALF PAY FOR LIFE, REPEALED BY RESOLUTION OF THE 15TH OF MAY, GRANTING HALF PAY FOR ONLY SEVEN YEARS.—UNJUST JEALOUSY OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE OFFICERS.—FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINTS AGAINST THEM.—WASHINGTON TRIES TO COMPROMISE IN FAVOR OF THE OFFICERS.—HIS ENDEAVORS PARTLY CROWNED WITH SUCCESS IN OCTOBER, 1780.—EX-PARTE REPEAL OF THE OLD LAW BY NEW CONGRESS.—MEAN ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THIS BREACH OF PROMISE.—MEMORIAL OF THE OFFICERS OF DECEMBER, 1782.—THE NEWBURG ADDRESSES.—WASHINGTON INTERFERES.—FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE OFFICERS' CLAIMS.—STEBEN'S SITUATION AT THE END OF THE WAR.—HE IS MORE HELPLESS THAN HIS BROTHERS IN ARMS.—HISTORY OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONGRESS FOR GETTING HIS CLAIMS SETTLED.—THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE ENTERED THE SERVICE OF CONGRESS.—RESOLUTIONS OF THE 30TH OF DECEMBER, 1782.—STEBEN IN RESIGNING WANTS A FINAL SETTLEMENT.—NO RESOLUTION ARRIVED AT.—SPECIFICATION OF HIS CLAIMS.—CONGRESS GOES TO TRENTON.—STEBEN'S DEMANDS UNFAVORABLY LOOKED UPON.—HIS MOTIVES SUSPECTED.—THE VALIDITY OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH CONGRESS QUESTIONED.—A COMMITTEE APPOINTED FOR EXAMINING STEBEN'S CLAIMS.—IT PROPOSES TO PAY HIM SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AS REWARD FOR HIS SERVICES.—STEBEN DOES NOT WANT A REWARD BUT JUSTICE.—HAMILTON'S LETTER TO WASHINGTON.—STEBEN'S PERSONAL FRIENDS PRONOUNCE IN FAVOR OF HIS CLAIM.—HE PRINTS A PAMPHLET AND DISTRIBUTES IT AMONG THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF SATISFYING STEBEN.—WASHINGTON AGREES WITH HAMILTON.—A NEW COMMITTEE APPOINTED.—IT MEETS WITH UNFORESSEEN DIFFICULTIES.—IT DOES NOT ARRIVE AT A CONCLUSION.—STEBEN'S DESTITUTION.—ARMSTRONG'S LETTER.—THE FIRST CONGRESS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION RESUMES THE MATTER.—ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THEN SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, REPORTS FAVORABLY.—NEW COMMITTEE IN FAVOR OF STEBEN.—ITS PROPOSALS ACCEPTED.—STEBEN GETS AN ANNUITY OF TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS.—SPEECH OF MR. PAGE.—IMPORTANCE OF THIS ACT.

REPUBLICS are accused of ingratitude toward those who have done them good service, more often than any other government; comparisons are drawn between the absolutist and free forms of political society, in order to show that kings and princes are the more grateful in recompensing their faithful servants.

Although it can not be denied that the sovereign power,

when vested in an individual, has a greater personal interest to prove its gratitude to those who served its ends, than a government which only temporarily represents the people, we nevertheless, can not admit that this reproach is justified.

The very nature of government excludes gratitude. There are too many in office, or desirous of office, who claim its full attention, and do not allow it to indulge in feelings of acknowledgment; the dead are forgotten, and those out of office necessarily overlooked. The people at large have a short memory, they are directed by the impulse of the moment, and control each other in the instinct of their narrow-minded interests. Here and there a brilliant exception—as in this country, for instance, the honors bestowed upon Washington—confirms the general rule, and all the hard sufferings, all the glorious deeds of great men would soon be forgotten, were it not the pious task of the historian to preserve them for the benefit of future generations.

The United States, far from being grateful, have been particularly forgetful in regard to their great men. In no country of the world do they make so pompous a display of them and remember so little what they have done. As an example, Nathaniel Greene, after Washington, the greatest in the revolutionary war, a man who had almost no equals in a great period, and contributed so largely to the establishment of the national independence, is forgotten; the spot where his ashes repose is not known. Alexander Hamilton, the great legislator and statesman, one of the eminent founders of the Constitution of the United States, is hardly spoken of but by professional men; the people at large do not know him; while in other countries, which at least honor their deceased heroes, public places would be adorned with his statues, school-rooms decorated with his busts, and private houses ornamented with his portraits. It really appears that in this country the enthusiastic veneration of Washington excludes any recollection of the services of his compeers.

But be this as it may, we do not require gratitude on the part of a government; all we can ask, and what we have a right to ask, is justice and the strict fulfillment of its obligations, governments having their duties as well as their rights, the due performance of the one being the best title to the other; but even in this respect the United States failed in their dealings with the revolutionary officers.

A striking illustration of this fact is afforded by the eight years' negotiation which Steuben had with Congress for the settlement of his claims. It is our unpleasant office to give the history of these proceedings, which have been often employed to cast a reproach on the character and disinterestedness of Steuben. In order to be just and to make them clearly understood and considered in the spirit of their time, we must, before entering into the particulars of Steuben's demands, refer to the treatment which the revolutionary officers in general experienced on the part of the United States.

The pay of the American army was originally so small that it offered to those that had families dependent upon them, an inadequate support. And so early as 1778, Washington, perceiving the ill effects that must arise from the mistaken policy of Congress toward the army, addressed the president of Congress in the first of a series of most able letters, which extend through the five following years.

Accordingly Congress resolved, on the 21st of April, 1778, that provision should be made for the officers of the army after the close of the war. Five days afterward, a proposition was carried that half pay be granted to them for life, to commence at the end of the war; the next day it was resolved, that the United States should have the right to redeem the half pay for life by giving to the officer entitled, four years' half pay, and on the 15th of May Congress substituted for the whole scheme a provision of half pay for seven years.

It was soon found that the resolution of the 15th of May was wholly inadequate, and Washington again pressed the

subject upon the attention of Congress. On the 11th of August, 1779, eight States against four voted that the half pay granted by the resolve of the 15th of May, be extended so as to continue for life; and on the 17th it was further resolved, that this extension be deemed suspended, and that it be recommended to the States that had not already adopted measures for that purpose, to make an adequate provision for the officers enlisted for the war, who should remain in service till the establishment of peace. Pennsylvania had already voted to her officers half pay for life, but no other State followed her example, or heeded the recommendations of Congress.

In the autumn of 1780, Washington again applied to Congress, and on the 21st of October a resolution was passed that half pay for life should be granted to such officers as should remain in service till the end of the war.

From this time the officers remained in the service, relying upon this resolution in the belief that the public faith would be kept with them. But the resolution of Congress of 1780 was supplanted by the Congress of the Confederation, whose members could not be brought to see that the resolution of the 21st of October, 1780, was a compact with the officers, obligatory upon every succeeding Congress. On the contrary, it was maintained that the resolve, having passed before the Articles of Confederation were signed, could not bind Congress under the Confederation, as that instrument required the votes of nine States for an appropriation of money.

Nothing, therefore, was done, and the officers of the Continental army fearing it would be disbanded before their claims would be settled, destitute of money and of credit, oppressed with debts and with the sufferings of their families at home, presented, in December, 1782, a memorial to Congress, in which they offered to commute the half pay for life granted to them by the resolution of October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or for a reasonable sum in gross. The committee, chosen from among the officers themselves,

to advocate their claims, waited upon Congress until March, 1783, when they wrote to their constituents that nothing had been done. On the 10th of March, the famous Newburg letter made its appearance in the army. It was written with great ability and skill, and called upon the officers of the army at Newburg to meet together to consider the late letter from their committee at Philadelphia. Although it was anonymous, it is well known it was written by John Armstrong, a major in the army.

The crisis called forth all Washington's conciliatory tact and firmness. He issued an order at once forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper, and directing the officers to assemble on the 18th of March, to hear a report of their committee at Philadelphia, and to determine what course should be pursued for the future. The senior officer in rank was directed to preside and to report the result of the meeting to the commander-in-chief.

On the next day after the issuing of this order, a second anonymous letter appeared from the same writer. In this paper he affected to consider the order of Washington as a sanction of the whole proceeding which the writer had proposed. Washington saw at once the necessity of being present at the meeting; and by his influence, aided by Putnam, Knox, Brooks and Howard, resolutions were adopted in which the officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all attempts to seduce them from their allegiance, referred the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration of Congress.

The effect of these resolutions was the passage by Congress of certain resolves, on the 22d of March, 1783, commuting the half pay for life to five years' full pay at the close of the war, to be received at the option of Congress, in money, or in such securities as were given to other creditors of the United States. In July the accounts of the army were ordered to be adjusted, and after the disbanding of the army in October, 1783, the

officers passed in the whole mass of the creditors of the Confederation.*

Steuben's position was quite different from that of his brother officers when he retired to private life. Old, fatigued, and without resources, in a foreign country, he stood helpless and alone. He knew none of the civil occupations by which others succeeded in gaining an honorable existence; he had nothing to rely on but his past services to assure him a livelihood during his declining years. He expected that Congress at once would do justice to his claims; but when American officers were treated in so mean and miserly a way, a foreigner had still less reason to hope that his claims, however just, would be acknowledged.

It took Steuben no less than seven years to arrive at a final settlement with Congress.

As stated above, in chapter V., Steuben, in February, 1778, when asked by Congress on what conditions he would enter the service of the United States, declared to a committee sent to him for this purpose, that he had come to offer his services as a volunteer, and asked neither rank nor pay; that if the United States failed in their revolution, or if he did not give satisfaction in his operations, he asked nothing; but that, leaving to their generosity any other reward of his services, if at the end of the war they should meet the approbation of the commander-in-chief, and if the great object of independence should finally be accomplished, he expected not only a reimbursement of all his expenses incurred in coming to America, but also an indemnification for the emoluments which he was obliged to renounce in order to devote his services to the United States.

Congress thanked Steuben for this generous and disinterested tender of his talents, and directed him to join the army without delay, whereupon he set out for the camp.

* George Ticknor Curtis: History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, i., 158.

During the whole war he fulfilled, as we have seen, his engagements like a good general and a man of honor. The independence of the United States was acknowledged by a peace with Great Britain, as advantageous as glorious to the United States, for which it now remained to fulfill, among others, their engagements with Steuben. As long as the war lasted they seemed to have been conscious of their obligations. In December, 1782, Steuben made an application to Congress to have his accounts liquidated and to obtain some further assurances for the accomplishment of the engagement on the part of the United States towards him. As stated in chapter XXIII., a committee was appointed for this purpose, consisting of Messrs. A. Hamilton, Clark and Carroll, on the 30th of December, 1782.*

They made their report, in which the amount of the compensation was left blank. But a verbal proposal was agitated in Congress, to pay Steuben a gross sum of ten thousand guineas, in full discharge of all claims and demands whatever. The payment of the revenue which he had sacrificed, and for the indemnification of which he had stipulated, he feared might be regarded as a pension, and in that light be disagreeable to the country. He therefore resolved to limit his claim to a gross sum, payable in Europe in such reasonable installments as to obviate any difficulties on the part of the United States in paying it. The sum which he fixed amounted to £10,000. The resolution of Congress on this subject was deferred, because it was suggested that the public finances were utterly deranged, and that Congress would be embarrassed by a number of foreign officers then at Philadelphia, who might be induced to increase their demands, on such generous treatment being given to Steuben. Always retaining the fullest confidence in Congress, he acquiesced in the reasons given and rejoined the army.

On the 24th day of March, 1784, when Steuben sent in his

* Congressional Debates, viii., 51.

resignation, he repeated his request for a final arrangement of his business. Mr. E. Gerry then proposed that the sum of \$40,000 should be given, as an indemnification and satisfaction of all his claims, but that the \$9,000 for his commutation should be included therein. The resolve of Congress, of April 15, 1784, then sitting at Annapolis, shows a promise of ample justice, and ordered that till the most speedy and efficacious means of satisfying his demands were procured, in the meantime the sum of \$10,000 should be advanced to him on account. This sum was indeed paid to him, but at different periods and with irregularity and loss, and was deducted from his pay and commutation as major general. It was, however, objected by some that Steuben's demands were exorbitant; that his avarice was insatiable, and that he was not to be satisfied with any fixed sums, however large. In closely examining his claims they do not at all appear indefinite. They are, on the contrary, fixed to a certain specific sum, which is by no means exorbitant. According to the stipulations which he made in entering the service, he asked :*

1st. The reimbursement of his expenses in coming to America, at 620 louisdors:	
In dollars,	\$2,815.80
Interest thereon for ten years at 7 per cent.,	1,971.08
2d. The payment of a loan, made 1778, at Gérard & Beaumarchais' agent, to defray his camp equipage, horses, etc., 1,400 louisdors,	6,358.32
Interest thereon for nine years, at 7 per cent.,	4,005.72
3d. Indemnification for a yearly revenue of 580 louisdors,	52,683.32
	<hr/> \$67,834.24

* Steuben made at different times, different statements, setting forth his claims. Their principal item, however, viz., the indemnification for his yearly revenue of five hundred and eighty louisdors, is in all the same, and other apparent inconsistencies are caused by the difference of the accumulated interest. We have chosen the account which in 1787 he laid before Congress. Deducting from its net amount the unsettled items, 3 and 4, it is even less than the result of the Secretary of Treasury's account, of 1790. This gentleman arrives at a balance of \$7,396. $\frac{7}{8}$ in Steuben's favor, while he himself asks only \$998.24.

Brought over,	\$67,834.24
4th. The above-named revenue of 580 louisders since his resignation, in March, 1783 to September, 1787, being four and a half years, without interest,	11,853.72
	<hr/>
Total,	\$79,687. ⁸ / ₁₀
Received on account :	
Traveling expenses in 1779, 150 louisders, . . .	\$681.24
Interest thereon, eight years, at 7 per cent., . .	381.48
Commutation as major general,	9,090.00
A gratification of	7,000.00—17,152.72
	<hr/>
Balance due,	\$62,535. ³² / ₁₀₀

Thus it is evident that the sum of ten thousand pounds sterling, which Steuben had fixed on as full compensation for every thing, was not exorbitant, but fell short of what was in justice due to him. When he had decided to limit his claim to the sum before mentioned, he consulted with several members of Congress, who all thought the proposition reasonable, and promised to support it. From Annapolis Congress soon after moved to Trenton, and Steuben again presented himself to them for a final decision on his demands.

It was at this period that the nature of the affair began to change its face. Hitherto Steuben had been treated with a degree of respect, but now the language was changed, and some of the members of Congress not only acted in open opposition to his claims, but even did not refrain from suggestions injurious to his character as a man of honor. They denied the validity of the engagements on which Steuben founded his claim, they depreciated his services, and suggested that the sacrifice of a revenue in Europe was not proved, but that, like other needy adventurers, he had come over to seek employ in this country; some even insinuated that he was paid by the court of France for his services in America, and from these suggestions or impressions, a system of opposition was formed against his demands.

However mortifying these proceedings were to Steuben, it was some consolation that they were supported by a very small minority in Congress, sufficient, however, to defeat the intentions of a respectable minority, who at all times were disposed to do him justice.

In the month of January, 1785, Congress removed to New York. A majority of them then pressed for a decision on the affair, and another committee was appointed to examine his pretensions. The opposition denied the existence of the engagement at York, but agreed that Steuben merited a reward. The sum of twenty thousand dollars was proposed, then a less sum, and finally they passed the following resolution: "That in full consideration of the Baron De Steuben having relinquished different posts of honor and emoluments in Europe, and rendered the most essential services to the United States, he be allowed and paid out of the Treasury of the United States the sum of seven thousand dollars, in addition to former grants."

It appeared evident by this act, that no contract or engagement was recognized; the grant is expressed to be as a reward for his services and sacrifices.

"The poor baron," writes Alexander Hamilton, on the 23d of November, 1785, to Washington,* "is still soliciting Congress, and has every prospect of indigence before him. He has his imprudences, but, upon the whole, he has rendered valuable services, and his merits, and the reputation of the country alike demand that he should not be left to suffer want. If there could be any mode by which your influence could be employed in his favor, by writing to your friends in Congress, or otherwise, the baron and his friends would be under great obligations to you."

In consequence of this formal attempt to evade the contract, it became Steuben's duty to prove that it existed. At the time he laid his terms before the committee, it certainly

* Correspondence of the American Revolution, by J. Sparks, iv., 122.

did not enter his head to execute a written agreement before a notary public; in making stipulations with a sovereign he had not conceived it necessary; he had, therefore, nothing in writing to show. The Journals of Congress were searched, but nothing was to be found. All that could be done was to appeal to the individuals with whom he had treated. He accordingly wrote to Dr. Witherspoon, chairman of the committee, Mr. Gerry, then member of Congress, Mr. Peters, the secretary of the board of war, to Mr. Duer, member of Congress and of the board of war. These gentlemen, without hesitation, certified to the facts which passed at the time, and these certificates corroborated all that Steuben had advanced on the subject. In answer to the other objections and to the suggestions which had been thrown out, Steuben collected a number of letters and papers tending to show that he was not a needy adventurer as had been insinuated, nor the pensioner of France in the service of America.

Steuben, from an unwillingness to trust wholly to his own judgment in a matter which so immediately interested him, concluded to take the advice of some friends, on whose sense of justice he could rely. With this view he submitted the statement of facts, and the certificates accompanying it, to John Jay, Chancellor Livingston, Alexander Hamilton, James Duane and Mr. Duer, requesting them to favor him with their impartial opinion of the merits of his pretensions. These gentlemen, after deliberate consideration of the papers laid before them, unanimously declared it to be their sentiment, that the transactions vouched by the certificates produced to them, amounted, in substance, to a contract binding in good faith on the United States.

Steuben then printed a few copies of this state of facts, with the several letters and papers annexed, and gave a copy to each member of Congress for their information, and presented a memorial to Congress insisting on the justice of his cause.

"I send you," writes A. Hamilton to Washington, on the 30th of October, 1787,* "at the request of the Baron De Steuben, a printed pamphlet containing the grounds of an application lately made to Congress.

"He tells me there is some reference to you, the object of which he does not himself seem clearly to understand; but imagines it may be in your power to be of service to him. There are public considerations that induce me to be somewhat anxious for his success. He is fortified with materials which, in Europe, could not fail to establish the belief of the contract he alleges. The documents of service he possesses are of a nature to convey an exalted idea of them. The compensations he has received, though considerable, if compared with those which have been received by American officers, will, according to European ideas, be very scanty in application to a stranger who is acknowledged to have rendered essential services. Our reputation abroad is not, at present, too high. To dismiss an old soldier, empty and hungry, to seek the bounty of those on whom he has no claims, and to complain of unkind returns and violated engagements, will certainly not tend to raise it. I confess, too, there is something in my feelings which would incline me, in this case, to go further than might be strictly necessary, rather than drive a man, at the baron's time of life, who has been a faithful servant, to extremities. And this is unavoidable if he does not succeed in his present attempt. What he asks would, all calculations made, terminate in this—an allowance of his five hundred and fifty guineas a year. He only wishes a recognition of the contract. He knows, that until affairs mend, no money can be produced. I do not know how far it may be in your power to do him any good; but I shall be mistaken if the considerations I have mentioned do not appear to your Excellency to have some weight."

"I thank you," answers Washington, on the 10th of No-

* Correspondence of the American Revolution, by J. Sparks, iv., 189.

vember, 1787,* "for the pamphlet contained in your letter of the 30th ultimo.

"Application has been made to me by Mr. Secretary Thompson (by order of Congress), for a copy of a report of a committee which was appointed to confer with Baron Steuben on his first arrival in this country, forwarded to me by Mr. President Laurens. This I have accordingly sent. It throws no other light on the subject, than such as is derived from the disinterested conduct of the baron. No terms are made by him, nor will he accept of any thing but with general approbation. I have, however, in my letter inclosing the report to the Secretary, taken occasion to express an unequivocal wish that Congress would reward the baron for services, sacrifices, and merits, to his entire satisfaction. It is the only way in which I could bring my sentiments before that honorable body, as it has been an established rule with me to ask nothing from it."

Another committee was appointed, and every effort made to throw obstacles in the way. It was even suggested that the certificate of Dr. Witherspoon was not genuine; the doctor was called before the committee and the question put to him, whether the committee, which had treated with Steuben and of which he had been chairman, had made a contract with him, when the doctor very justly answered, that they had no such authority, that they were appointed only to hear Steuben's terms and report to Congress. This answer was considered sufficient to show that no contract was made, and that consequently none existed. It was further objected, that there were several members of the committee, and that the certificate of one only was produced. Steuben wrote to the others, and their testimony also was brought forward. They then called on Steuben to prove that what he had asserted, with respect to his revenue in Europe, was true. He told them that he had already satisfied Congress on that subject; that the let-

* Washington's Writings, by J. Sparks, ix., 275 and 276.

ters he brought over from Dr. Franklin, announced the rank and dignity he held in Europe ; and that for the honor of the United States he would produce no further proof on this occasion.

Before any thing decisive was done, some of the members of the committee left Congress ; another committee was afterward appointed, but they also broke up without doing any thing, and thus the matter was referred from committee to committee, and from one Congress to another. At last a report was brought in and entered on the journals ; a majority, however, disapproved it, and it was again committed. Another report was then made, more favorable to Steuben's pretensions ; no question, however, was taken on it ; it was not entered on the journals. Finally, Steuben proposed that the validity of his agreement should be submitted to any three chief justices of the United States. Nothing, however, was determined, but the matter left undecided, when Congress broke up in November, 1788.

About the unfortunate situation in which Steuben found himself involved at that time, General J. Armstrong thus writes on the 30th of May, 1788, to General Gates :* “ The baron passed the winter at the same lodging-house with me. To this he has come at last. The *Louvre* is dismantled and deserted, and he is once more upon the justice and generosity of the public. But the public has neither, and he has only to choose between starving here and begging in Europe. This is calamitous to him and disgraceful to us. He is now with North.”

As a matter of course, the different sums which Steuben had received since the peace, having been paid to him in small amounts at distant periods, the payments had always been anticipated by his wants, and had not prevented his being obliged to have recourse to his friends for fresh loans to support his

* Gates MS. Papers, xix., 238.

current expenses. Nevertheless, Steuben found himself drained of every resource.

The matter stood thus when the first Congress, under the new Constitution, assembled. On the 25th of September, 1789, the House referred another memorial of Steuben, in which he reiterated in substance the above-quoted facts, to the Secretary of the Treasury, who, on the 6th of April, 1790, laid his report before the House, and after due and careful examination of all the vouchers, letters and documents, arrived at the following conclusion :

“The statement made by the memorialist of what passed in the conference at York, is authenticated by such strong, direct, and collateral evidence, as ought, in the opinion of the Secretary, to secure full credit to the existence of the fact. Waiving the regard due to the memorialist’s own assertion, it is not supposable that if his representation had been ill-founded it could have obtained the sanction of so many disinterested persons, agents in, or witnesses to the transactions. Notwithstanding this, it may be inferred, as well from the written report of the committee as from other circumstances, that the idea of a precise contract did not generally prevail. It is probable that, as the indemnity and reward for the sacrifices and services of the baron were by him made to depend on the success of a national revolution, the mention of them was viewed rather as a suggestion of expectations than as a stipulation of terms. This might the more easily have happened, as it is presumable that the situation of affairs at the time must have disposed Congress to consider an officer who had had the opportunities of the memorialist as a valuable acquisition to the service, and to regard a compliance with the expectations intimated by him, in the event of success, as too much a matter of course to need a stipulation.

“This view of the affair appears to the Secretary to afford a satisfactory solution of any difficulties which might result from seemingly discordant circumstances, and to place

all the parts of the transaction in a simple and consistent light.

“Upon the whole, therefore, as it can not with propriety be questioned that a conversation of the kind stated by the baron did take place at the conference at York; as the services rendered by him to the United States are acknowledged to have been of a very signal and very meritorious nature; as the expectations alleged to have been signified by him in the conference are, all of them, reasonable in themselves, being nothing more than that his necessary expenses, while in the service of the United States, should be defrayed by them, and that, in case they should establish their independence, and he should be successful in his endeavors to serve them, then he should receive an indemnification for the income he had relinquished in coming to this country, and to such marks of the generosity of the government as its justice should dictate. The Secretary is of opinion that, whether the transaction relied upon by the baron be deemed to have the force of a contract or not, it will be most consistent with the dignity and equity of the United States to admit it as the basis of a final adjustment of his claims.

“Should this opinion appear well founded, it will remain to designate the rule by which the necessary expenses of the memorialist are to be adjusted. Taking it for granted that his actual expenses will not be deemed a proper one, there occurs to the Secretary no better criterion than the current allowances annexed to the stations he filled. This excludes the half pay or commutation. It is presumed that the current allowances to the officers of the American army in general, were regulated wholly with a view to their respective situations, and the half pay granted as a future reward. According to this principle, the Secretary has caused an account to be stated, in which the memorialist is credited with his emoluments as major general and inspector general (exclusive of half pay or commutation), and with an annuity of five hundred

and eighty guineas, being the amount of the income stated to have been relinquished by him, from the time he left Europe to the last of December, 1789, with interest at six per cent. per annum, and is charged with all the moneys, under whatever denomination, received by him from the United States, with interest at the like rate; upon which statement there is a balance in his favor of *seven thousand three hundred and ninety-six dollars and seventy-four ninetieths*. In addition to this, he would be entitled for the remainder of life to the yearly sum of five hundred and eighty guineas, as a continuation of the indemnity for the income relinquished; and to such reward as the government, in its discretion, should think fit to allow, for which purpose a moderate grant of land, if deemed expedient, would suffice.

“The Secretary begs leave further to state, that there is good ground to believe that the above-mentioned balance will be short of a sufficient sum to discharge the debts now owing by the memorialist, and contracted partly to enable him to come to this country, and partly for his subsistence here; and in the last place to observe, that the memorialist, who, being a foreigner, voluntarily came to offer his services to the United States, in a critical and perilous moment, and who, from the circumstance of his having been a foreigner, is less likely to participate in the collateral rewards which, in numerous instances, await those who have distinguished themselves in the American Revolution (while he can not, like many other foreign officers, look for rewards elsewhere), gives a peculiarity to his case which strengthens his own pretensions. That it appears unequivocally that his services have been of a nature peculiarly valuable and interesting to the American cause, and such as furnish weighty considerations, as well public as personal, for rescuing him from the indigence in which he is now involved, and from the still greater extremities with which he is threatened. A settlement, on the principles suggested in this report, will terminate all the claims of the memorialist on

the United States, in a manner equally satisfactory to him and honorable to them.”*

It was on the strength of this able report of Alexander Hamilton that the House, on the 19th of April, 1790, appointed a committee to report a bill of resolutions in conformity with the views of the Secretary of the Treasury. It consisted of Messrs. Gerry, Wadsworth, Vining, Lawrence, and Smith of South Carolina, and as early as the 30th of April presented a bill for finally adjusting Steuben's claims. They proposed to allow to him “the pay and other emoluments of major general and inspector general, specified in several acts of Congress relating to him, from the 10th of March, 1778, to the 15th of April, 1784; an annuity for life of two thousand seven hundred and six dollars, to commence on the 1st day of October, 1777; and . . . thousand acres of land in the western territory of the United States, to be located in such manner as shall be hereafter prescribed by law, provided that the foregoing allowances shall not be construed to include either half pay or the commutation for half pay.”

On this motion, Mr. Page made the following remarks, which is believed to be the only speech reported on this subject :

“MR. SPEAKER,—I am against the motion for striking out the \$2,706, and inserting \$1,500, because it is incompatible with the preceding clauses of the bill, which state the sum (\$2,706) as justly due to the baron, according to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, and because it is derogatory to the honor and veracity of the members of the committee of Congress, on whose testimony the baron's claim is founded.

“Some gentlemen lay great stress on the want of proof respecting what is called the contract with Baron Steuben; but, sir, I think we have had all the proof the nature of the

* American State Papers, vol. Claims, Washington, 1834, fol. No. 5, pp. 11-16.

case will admit of, and, for my part, I should want no other than Mr. Lee's letter to the baron.

"Sir, this illustrious veteran offered his services on such generous terms, and served us so essentially, that I shall blush for Congress should the ideas of some gentlemen now prevail. It is unworthy of Congress, after having so long enjoyed the benefit of those services, now to be thus scrutinizing the terms on which he offered them, and speaking of them as of little importance. I weigh them not with the dollars proposed—they are far beyond any sum which we can give.

"And if the worthy member from North Carolina (Mr Bloodworth), who moved the motion, wishes to abandon the principles of the bill, and instead of paying to the baron the debt there stated as due to him, means to give him a sum by way of compensation for his services and his economy, I would advise him to withdraw his motion; for, if we depart from the principles of the bill, they who value this great man's services as I do, will vote to give him much more than the bill proposes. If I should be at liberty to propose a compensation for the sacrifices he made by coming to America and serving in her war, and to recompense him for his great services, I am sure I shall propose a much larger sum than has yet been talked of.

"Sir, had the baron stipulated to receive but two per cent. on the articles under his direction, or, I may say, on what he saved, he would be entitled to much more than is now proposed to be given him. The economy he introduced into the army was the occasion of an immense saving. Who can say now what was saved in arms, accouterments, and ammunition, and by the reduction of baggage and forage? I have been told that officers, who had loaded a wagon with their baggage, were soon reduced to a single pack-horse.

"Some gentlemen have made light of the discipline which has been attributed to the baron, and told us of the affairs of Bunker's Hill, Trenton, Princeton, and Germantown. It was true, those were brilliant actions; but the member from South

Carolina (Mr. Smith) and the member from Delaware had replied fully to this observation. They well observed, that brilliant as those actions were, valor-without discipline is often vain, and may lead only to destruction; that the commander-in-chief did wonders without the baron, and (they might have added) he was wonderful in resources, and 'in himself a host.' But we should not now consider what the commander-in-chief did before he had the baron's assistance, but what he did with his assistance, and what use he made of his services, and to this, as far as relates to the baron, he has repeatedly and generously borne ample testimony.

"Sir, the baron, as adjutant general and director general, was peculiarly adapted to the purpose of the American army. Having served twenty-two years in the Prussian army, which Americans had been taught to believe was the best disciplined in the world, his discipline was more readily embraced, and more confidence reposed in it than would have been the case had almost any man, of any other nation, undertaken that great task. The praise now given to the baron is no disparagement, therefore, to other officers. The commander-in-chief stood in need of an adjutant like him, from the peculiar situation of our army, and has acknowledged his services; therefore it does not become us to speak of them as unimportant.

"Sir, the importance of those services would have been displayed to your view by many officers now in this House, had they not, from that delicacy peculiar to American officers, who, having laid by the name and dress of soldiers, and mixed with their fellow-citizens in civil life, refrained from appearing to be more knowing in military matters than the other members of this House. I say, were it not for this delicacy, we should have had a full display of the baron's services. One officer, indeed (Colonel Bland), from the honest warmth of his heart, has not refrained from saying a few words in support of the baron's claim. But, sir, I have asked officers, and some of them now in this House, whether I had misunderstood

or overrated the baron's claim, and I have been constantly told that I did not. Though I had not the honor of being in the army, I was well informed by my correspondents there of many important circumstances; and on inquiring what were the effects produced by the new adjutant and director general (the Baron Steuben), I was told that they were visible in many economical arrangements, in dispositions of corps, in manœuvring, in marches, in encampments, and particularly in more silent and rapid movements and preparations for action. I was told that when the Marquis De La Fayette, with a detachment under his command, was in danger of being cut off on his return to the army, and the commander-in-chief was determined to support that invaluable officer, the whole army was under arms and ready to march in less than fifteen minutes from the time the signal was given.

"Sir, the effect of this discipline was seen in the marches of our army; they passed rivers in less time than the best troops in Europe could. Those excellent French troops which served with them in the campaign of 1781, were inferior to them in this respect. The superiority of our troops, as to rapidity of movement, was seen in the attack on the two redoubts of Yorktown, in Virginia.

"Sir, I will affirm, that if the clause be stricken out, a larger sum ought to be inserted. We have been asked, what will our officers say to this vote in favor of the baron? I will venture to say, sir, they will be pleased with it. They acknowledge the obligations they were under to that great man; they view his circumstances in the same light as that gallant officer does, who is now the Secretary, and who drew the report on which the bill before you is founded, and which does honor to his heart.

"Sir, if any report deserves to be received without scrutiny, it is the one on which your bill is founded. I hope, therefore, we shall not depart from that report, in so material a point as is proposed by the motion now before you."

After sundry considerations the House, in their session of the 10th of May, 1790, finally struck out the land donation and preserved only a yearly annuity of \$2,000. The Senate, in their session of the 27th, passed the bill of the House with an amendment, adding \$500 after the words \$2,000, so that the "Act for finally adjusting and satisfying the claims of Frederick William De Steuben" reads as follows, viz.:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That in order to make full and adequate compensation to Frederick William De Steuben, for the sacrifices and eminent services made and rendered to the United States during the late war, there be paid to the said Frederick William De Steuben an annuity of \$2,500 during life, to commence on the 1st day of January last, to be paid in quarterly payments at the Treasury of the United States; which said annuity shall be considered in full discharge of all claims and demands whatever, of the said Frederick William De Steuben, against the United States.

"FREDERICK AUGUSTUS MÜHLENBERG,

"Speaker of the House of Representatives.

"JOHN ADAMS,

"Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

"Approved, June 4th, 1790.

"GEORGE WASHINGTON,

"President of the United States."

These are the proceedings which, being misrepresented in favor of the United States, are the cause that Steuben has often been regarded with a certain prejudice. It has been said that he had no claims either to the gratitude or the esteem of the American people, because he had devoted himself to their cause merely out of personal interest. His honorable poverty was considered as a crime; he was called a vagabond, and, to prove his egotism, compared with the

wealthy Marquis De Lafayette. The resolves of Congress, who finally, at least, came to a sense of their duty, prove the injustice of such an unfounded accusation, though very positively stated. Was it the fault of Steuben that Congress neglected, for almost eight years, to comply with what they had formally promised; that they bartered for a penny and refused to acknowledge their own agents; and that they finally yielded to the repeated representations of men like Washington and Hamilton? We would come nearer to the truth if the accusation were applied to Congress; and it is not too much to say that without the noble and energetic intercession of Hamilton, Steuben would perhaps have died in the poor house. The representatives of the United States, far from being grateful towards Steuben, only reluctantly fulfilled an agreement from which their country derived all the profit.

In this private matter we can observe the same difference of feeling and party division as in the great political questions of the day. Almost the same men who objected to the political and economical reasons which Hamilton urged in so able and statesmanlike a manner for the funding of the public debt, were against the acknowledgment of Steuben's claims; they considered it as an extravagance to be just and to pay what they owed. Fortunately these times have passed away. The mere word of repudiation is discredited in the whole civilized world, and the United States, by their late rich donations to the descendants of the revolutionary officers and soldiers, have more than satisfactorily demonstrated that they disapprove of the former policy of Congress towards the men who were the chief instruments in achieving the independence of their country.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE ORDER OF THE CININNATI.—ITS ORIGIN.—GENERAL KNOX THE ALLEGED AUTHOR OF THE IDEA.—REASONS AGAINST THIS SUPPOSITION.—SHARE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICERS IN ESTABLISHING THE ORDER.—PROCEEDINGS AT THE FIRST MEETING ON THE 13TH OF MAY, 1783.—PRINCIPLES OF THE ORDER AND DESCRIPTION OF ITS DECORATIONS.—ATTACKS AGAINST THE CININNATI.—PAMPHLETS OF JUDGE AEDANUS BURKE AND COUNT MIREBEAU.—STEBEN PERSONALLY ASSAILED.—CRITICISM UPON THESE PAMPHLETS.—GREENE'S LETTER.—STEBEN'S RELATIONS TO THE ORDER.—HE CHARACTERIZES IT IN A LETTER TO COUNT LUZERNE.—INTERESTING LETTER OF DE L'ENFANT TO WASHINGTON AND STEBEN.—FAVORABLE RECEPTION OF THE ORDER IN FRANCE.—KNOX WITHDRAWS AND PUTS ALL BLAME ON STEBEN.—NEW ENGLAND DECLARES ITSELF AGAINST THE ORDER.—NORTH'S LETTER ABOUT KNOX.—FAIRLIE'S LETTER.—WASHINGTON TRIES TO REHABILITATE THE CININNATI IN THE PUBLIC OPINION BY SACRIFICING THE HEREDITARY PRINCIPLE.—HIS AMENDMENTS ADOPTED, BUT NOT CARRIED OUT.—STEBEN VICE PRESIDENT FROM 1786 TO 1790.—CEREMONIES AT THE INITIATION OF HONORARY MEMBERS.—STEBEN, AS PRESIDENT OF THE CININNATI, ADDRESSES WASHINGTON.—HIS SPEECH IN 1790.—SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE CININNATI UP TO THE PRESENT TIME.

WE have seen, in the preceding chapters, how unfairly Congress dealt with the just claims of the officers before the disbandment of the army; how these same officers, who for eight long years had well served their country, were compelled to resort to threats of violence in order to get payment of the sums due to them; how the people, afraid of meeting their engagements and paying money, took part against the officers, and how, isolated and abandoned, these poor men stood at the conclusion of peace.

The long-existing ties which, in consequence of the common hardships and the dangers of a long and protracted war, had united these old companions in arms, were now more closely cemented by the treatment which the officers experienced from their ungrateful country. They had a very sad and desperate future before them, when, helpless and totally devoid of means, they retired to civil life. It is to this wretched prospect, as well as to the feelings of mutual de-

pendence engendered by long association, and of regret at approaching separation, and perhaps somewhat to the suspicions natural to men whose patience had been so severely tried, that we may attribute the suggestion of an association among the officers to continue after their disbandment, and preserve a unity of feeling and interest, with the memory of their mutual labors and sufferings.

It is said that the idea had been suggested by General Knox, but there is no positive proof that it was so. On the contrary, it appears improbable to us, as Knox, if he had first proposed the idea to the army, would have stronger upheld it when it was assailed by the different States and the people. We think, however, we are not far from the truth in supposing that, corresponding with the establishment of similar institutions, the plan, although at first very indistinct, originated simultaneously in the minds of many of the officers, and that, in discussing it, by degrees it gained its definite shape and characteristic form. In this way the majority of all the officers represented will have probably contributed to the constitution of the society. But we do not think we mistake the spirit which prompted some of the foreign officers, in attributing to them the authorship of all those articles in the constitution which refer to the exterior apparel, to the medal and ribbon. We know that Major De L'Enfant, a French officer, prepared the design of the order, and that the society adopted his ideas respecting it, and the manner of its being worn by the members, while, on the other hand, there existed no order in this country during the colonial times, so that the idea of establishing one could not have originated in an American mind; moreover, the foreign officers considered an order of great value, and as a conspicuous proof of their participation in such a glorious war. Steuben, the old court marshal, has, probably, more than anybody else, eminently figured in its establishment, as the constant wearing of his order "*De La Fidélité*,"

proves that he was by no means indifferent to such distinction.*

But be this as it may, considering the prominent share that Steuben took in the foundation of the society, we expect to be justified in giving here the following brief sketch of its history, which we have borrowed from the original records of that time:†

"At the cantonment of the American army on Hudson's river, on the 10th of May, 1783, proposals for establishing a society upon principles therein mentioned, whose members shall be the officers of the American army, having been communicated to the several regiments of the respective lines, they appointed an officer from each, who, in conjunction with the general officers, should take the same into consideration at their meeting this day, at which the Honorable Major General Baron De Steuben, the senior officer present, was pleased to preside. At this meeting the subject was referred to a com-

* Since the above was written, we have found an interesting essay in the "Publications of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania," Philadelphia, 1858, vol. vi., p. 15, ff, written by Alexander Johnston, in which, corroborating our opinion, he says, pp. 61 to 63:

"In an article in the *North American Review* for October, 1853, Sargent expressed the belief that the idea of the society was first suggested by Knox, and that the Baron De Steuben probably had at least been consulted in the inception of the scheme. He has since been favored with the perusal of the original rough draft of the society in the hand-writing of Knox, dated at West Point, on the 15th of April, 1783. . . . But it seems more than probable that the first defined suggestion of the assumption of a distinct order came from Steuben, or some other foreigner."

We shall hereafter, especially at the end of this chapter, quote from this valuable article.

† "The Institution of the Society of the Cincinnati, Formed by the Officers of the American Army of the Revolution, for the laudable purposes therein mentioned, at the Cantonment on the Banks of the Hudson River, May, 1783; Together with some of the Proceedings of the General Society and of the New York State Society; also, A List of the Officers and Members of the New York State Society, from its organization to the year 1851. Printed by order and for the use of the members of the New York Society. J. M. Elliott, Printer, 133 Water street, New York, 1851."

We are indebted to the Honorable Hamilton Fish for this valuable pamphlet.

mittee, consisting of Major General Knox, Brigadier General Hand, and Captain Shaw, whose report, presented to the meeting of the 13th of May, 1783, at General Stenben's headquarters (Verplanck's house), was unanimously accepted, and commences as follows :

"It having pleased the Supreme Governor of the universe, in the disposition of human affairs, to cause the separation of the colonies of North America from the dominion of Great Britain, and, after a bloody conflict of eight years, to establish them free, independent, and sovereign States, cemented by alliances, founded on reciprocal advantages, with some of the greatest princes and powers of the earth :

"To perpetuate, therefore, as well the remembrance of this vast event, as the mutual friendships which have been formed under the pressure of common danger, and in many instances cemented by the blood of the parties, the officers of the American army do hereby, in the most solemn manner, associate, constitute, and combine themselves into one society of friends, to endure as long as they shall endure, or any of their eldest male posterity, and in failure thereof, the collateral branches, who may be judged worthy of becoming its supporters and members.

"The officers of the American army having generally been taken from the citizens of America, possess high veneration for the character of that illustrious Roman, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, and being resolved to follow his example by returning to their citizenship, they think they may, with propriety, denominate themselves 'The Society of the Cincinnati.'

"The following principles shall be immutable, and form the basis of the Society of the Cincinnati :

"An incessant attention to preserve inviolate those exalted rights and liberties of human nature for which they have fought and bled, and without which the high rank of a rational being is a curse instead of a blessing.

"An unalterable determination to promote and cherish, be-

tween the respective States, that union and national honor so essentially necessary to their happiness and the future dignity of the American empire.

“To render permanent the cordial affection subsisting among the officers; this spirit will dictate brotherly kindness in all things, and particularly extend to the most substantial acts of beneficence, according to the ability of the society, towards those officers and their families who, unfortunately, may be under the necessity of receiving it.”

A series of rules are then given for the government of the order, whose officers are to consist of a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and assistant treasurer, to be chosen at each of its meetings, which are to be held triennially. It is divided into State societies, to be governed in a like manner, and possessing power for their own regulation. The triennial meeting of the society is to consist of its officers and of a delegation of not more than five from each State.

All the officers of the American army, as well those who have resigned with honor after three years' service in the capacity of officers, or who have been deranged by the resolutions of Congress, upon the several reforms of the army, as those who shall have continued to the end of the war, have the right to become parties to this institution, provided they sign the general rules within six months, and subscribe one month's pay to form a fund, the interest of which shall be devoted to the relief of the unfortunate. As a testimony of affection to the memory of such officers as have died in the service, the same right is extended to their eldest male representatives, and to such French officers of the rank of colonel as have served in the revolutionary war. Honorary members, also are eligible, for their own lives only, in the proportion of one to four.

A decoration is prescribed, which, as adopted, consists of a bald eagle of gold, displayed, suspended by a deep blue ribbon, edged with white, descriptive of the union of France

and America; the eagle grasping in its talons golden olive branches, the leaves in green enamel, which are continued round the figure so as to form a wreath above its head, to which the clasp is attached. On the breast of the eagle Cincinnati is represented as receiving a sword from three Roman senators, with various appropriate figures in the background; around the whole is the legend, "*Omnia reliquit servare rempublicam.*" On the reverse is seen Fame crowning Cincinnati with a wreath, and the motto, "*Esto perpetua.*"

Thus was formed the Cincinnati, with General Washington as president, General Knox as secretary, and General McDougal as treasurer. Noble in its aims, illustrious in its origin, and charitable in its operations, but necessarily exclusive, it excited the hostility of those who envied the fame of its members, of those who expected impossible social equality to result from the Revolution, and of parties whose absence from the country prevented their understanding its character. As usual in such cases, the assailants were more active than the defenders, and succeeded in producing a strong feeling against the society, both in America and Europe.

The most important public attack against the Cincinnati, published in the United States, was made by Judge Aedanus Burke, in South Carolina. Even the title* of his remarks shows that, as a revolutionary pamphlet, they are too insipid, too tedious, while, considered as an exposition and refutation, they are too superficial, and not at all exhausting. On this attack is based the well-known pamphlet of Mirabeau,† which,

* "Considerations on the Society or Order of Cincinnati, lately instituted by the Major Generals, Brigadier Generals, and other Officers of the American Army, Proving that it creates a race of hereditary Patricians or Nobility, Interspersed with Remarks on its consequences to the freedom and happiness of the Republic. Addressed to the People of South Carolina and their Representatives. By Cassius. (Supposed to be written by Aedanus Burke, Esq., one of the chief justices of the State of South Carolina.) 'Blow ye the trumpet in Zion.'—*The Bible*. Philadelphia. Printed and Sold by Robert Bell, in Third street. Price one sixth of a dollar. MDCCLXXXIII."

† "Considerations on the Order of Cincinnati. Translated from the

probably, more on account of its author than of its contents, enjoyed a large circulation and great reputation.

Mirabeau almost literally translates Burke's statements, and enlarges them here and there with some ideas of his own. They both agree in making Steuben "Grand Master" of the order, under the more humble title of president; nay, Burke goes as far as to throw all the odium of his objections, instead of on Washington and the other officers and members of the society, exclusively on Steuben, as a *foreigner*.

"I have the honor to inform Baron Steuben," says he, "that though an order of peerage may do well under the petty princes of Germany, yet, in America, it is incompatible with our freedom." Burke, as well as Mirabeau, arraigns the society for intending to establish a hereditary nobility.

"The institution of the order of Cincinnati," they say, "is the creation of an actual patriciate and of a military nobility, which will, ere long, become a civil nobility, and an aristocracy the more dangerous, because, being hereditary, it will perpetually increase in the course of time, and will gather strength from the very prejudices which it will engender, because, originating neither in the Constitution nor the law, the law has provided no means to control it, and it will incessantly overbear the Constitution, of which it forms no part, till the time shall come when, by repeated attempts made, sometimes clandestinely and sometimes openly, it will at length have incorporated itself into the Constitution; or when, after having for a long time sapped its foundations, it will in the end overturn and utterly destroy it."

It is true that the new institution was in obvious contradiction to the character of the time and this republic, which is based on the democratic principles; and it also can not be denied that the apprehension manifested by individuals and States, contained a great deal of common sense and truth, but

French of the Count De Mirabeau. London, printed for J. Johnson, St. Paul's Church Yard. MDCCLXXXV."

it is thoroughly erroneous that the new institution could ever have been able to create a hereditary nobility.

If we venture to criticise these denunciations in a few words, it is but just, before all, not to forget that they were uttered previous to the great French Revolution; at a time, therefore, where there existed only one form of nobility, and no idea of the possibility of its existence in any other form; where this ruling aristocracy, although degenerated and looked upon with contempt on the part of the intelligent, middle classes, nevertheless was the representative of the force and intelligence of the people to the rest of the world.

In the first instance, the parallel is false which Mirabeau and Burke have drawn between the condition of things in Europe and that in America, and by which both presumed to prove from the origin of the patrician institution and the feudal prerogatives in the old country, that by the order of the Cincinnati an analogous class of privileged nobles could endanger the social equality of American citizens.

Hereditary nobility was unknown to the European continent before the decline and fall of the Carolingian dynasty, and in England before the Norman conquest; it originated with the entailment of the family estates. Thus the hereditary estates are the true basis of nobility; they alone endow it with vitality and influence. The so-called court nobility, and nobility granted by royal diploma, both of a later date, are only exuberances of the true or feudal nobility; and it is self-evident that they can only flourish where there is a court or sovereign power which can create and support them. In the United States, however, where there are neither entailed estates nor courts, all the citizens have the same constitutional rights, and there is a total absence of every fundamental condition upon which such a state of things could be founded. The origin of fiefs or entailed estates were wars and conquests against other warlike people, and in consequence thereof the

necessity to have at any time a well armed force ready to resist the attacks of a dangerous or unsubdued enemy.

Innocent times these, when it was *naïvely* presumed that it depended only on the honest or dishonest character of some individuals, to found an aristocracy after the European pattern !

An established nobility can be as little extinguished by the mere abolition of titles, as a new nobility can be created by the mere grant of such distinctive appellations. A real nobility must be absolutely founded upon a basis of real and permanent power and influence, which are mostly derived from the possession of landed estate, as for instance in England. Titles and honorary offices, without this basis are nothing more than empty distinctions ; they may be the outward signs, but they can never form the essential strength of a nobility. Do the half million of generals, commodores, colonels or captains, who are to be found in every corner of the United States, give any idea of the military or naval strength of the country, or are they perhaps to be feared as titled aristocrats ?

There is another error to be refuted : that nobility must necessarily be hereditary and repose upon the law of primogeniture, in order to become influential. It is true, that by that means at certain times it has extended and defended its power ; but also without such accidental prerogatives it can be a great power. The South of the United States, whence the resistance against the Cincinnati mainly came, has seen springing up among them, in the course of scarcely two generations, and without any exterior distinction or hereditary privileges, the cotton planters, who, despite of their recent origin, vie with the oldest and proudest aristocracy of birth in Europe in exclusiveness, egotism and pride of race. New England, which raised the loudest protests against the Cincinnati, possesses the aristocracy of her manufacturing and *merchant princes*, who acknowledge no earthly thing besides their interest and success in life.

If the officers who founded the Cincinnati order had remained in active service, if the United States army, instead of being almost altogether disbanded, had been increased, there would have been some possibility of the order becoming dangerous, because in that case a central point for their purposes would have been in existence; but poor and penniless as they were for the most part, dispersed through the whole country, and without any other influence than such as their personal worthiness and merits could exercise; these officers had no basis, no connection for any action or united exertion, even if they had had the most aristocratic designs.

This outcry against the dangerous character of such an association, divested of cant and verbiage, was nothing more than the bad conscience of that selfish fraction of the people which had treated its defenders so basely and ungratefully, and was now afraid of their revenging the deceptions which had been practiced upon them.

"The uproar that is raised against the Cincinnati," writes Nathaniel Greene on the 22d of April, 1784, to Washington,* "makes me more anxious to be at the meeting than I ever expected to feel. It was uninteresting to me before. Assuming honors hurts my delicacy, but persecution banishes the influence. The subject is important, and it may be equally dangerous to recede or push forward; but I am decided in my opinion not to abolish the order from the prevailing clamors against it. If this is done away, the whole tide of abuse will run against the commutation. The public in New England seem to want something to quarrel with the officers about. Remove one thing and they will soon find another. It is in the temper of the people, not in the matters complained of. . . . I am confident the tranquillity of the public can only be preserved by the continuance of the order."

Washington, however, was of a contrary opinion. By recommending the Cincinnati to abandon the hereditary princi-

* Washington's Writings, ix., 496.

ple in their constitution, he silenced the menacing storm, and saved perhaps the United States from a dangerous crisis.

The Steuben papers contain a great many documents and letters which are connected with or refer to the Cincinnati. Almost all the invitations to join the order were written by Steuben, as for instance those addressed to the Chevalier De La Luzerne, Generals Greene, Gates, Sullivan, Weedon, Wayne, and others. We, however, quote only those letters which claim a more general importance as throwing light upon the character and history of the society.

Major Generals Heath, Steuben and Knox had been appointed, on the 13th of May, 1783, by the meeting of the officers, to present the commander-in-chief with a copy of the institution of the society, and to request him that he should honor them by placing his name at the head of the file.

On the 18th of May Steuben requested Heath to appoint the time for putting this resolution into execution, whereupon Heath, on the same day, answered that the plan should be presented to his Excellency, the commander-in-chief, on Tuesday next at one o'clock. Thus Washington became a member and the first president of the society on the 20th of May, 1783.*

Steuben himself, in an invitation, on the 24th of May, 1783, to the Chevalier De La Luzerne, thus characterizes it:†

“The design of this institution, which is founded on the principles of patriotism and gratitude, is to perpetuate the memory of an epoch so glorious to America as the present, and the effectual assistance this country has received from her generous ally. The American officers will consider themselves honored by being permitted to erect, with their own, the names of those celebrated characters who have shown their attachment to the rights of the human species in general, and of the American in particular.”

At the same time that the society was vehemently assailed

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x

† Ibidem.

here, it found a very favorable reception at the French court. Major De l'Enfant, whom Washington, in a letter to Rochambeau, dated the 29th of October, 1783, had charged to execute the order of the society in France, informs Steuben, writing from Paris on the 25th of December, 1783, in the following words, of the results of his mission :*

"It is with the greatest satisfaction that I acquaint you of the success of the Cincinnati in France. The difficulties have been removed which could have been opposed to the admission of the order into France, where they are accustomed to tolerate no foreign order. His majesty, desirous of giving to the Americans a proof of the friendship which he wishes to maintain with them, in his council has permitted his officers to wear this badge with the other orders of his kingdom. I have written to General Washington, and inclose a copy of my letter to him. I should like to get it translated and published in the newspapers; I think it would produce a good effect.

"Here in France they are more ambitious to obtain the order of the Cincinnati than to be decorated with the cross of St. Louis, and daily I receive applications for it. The eagles are in good train; try to push the subscriptions in Philadelphia. I have made my arrangements, but for carrying them into execution we require funds."

To these lines there was added an extract from a letter to Washington, which may be translated as follows:

"As it was necessary for attaining the object of my voyage, I proceeded to Paris with all possible dispatch, and handed at once your letters to Counts Rochambeau, D'Estaing, De Grasse, and to the Marquis General De Lafayette. At the same time I paid my visits to all those officers who, residing in Paris, by their service and their place in the French army, could be considered as Cincinnati. It is with the greatest satisfaction that at this moment I am the primitive

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

organ of their gratitude, and it is not less flattering to me to be able to inform your Excellency of the success of my mission, and of the high appreciation which the French nation entertains towards the American army for thus honoring an illustrious part of their own army with such flattering distinction. One single conversation with the French officers would at once convince you how thoroughly they appreciate, at the bottom of their hearts, those brotherly sentiments which make them take so powerful an interest in the happiness of America. This institution, which they consider as a monument erected to republican virtues, as the fundamental basis of a cordial union between the different States, as a new tie which assures the duration of that reciprocal friendship which France has devoted to America, can not be looked upon in too advantageous a light.

“The permission which this illustrious monarch, the most Christian king, has already given to his subjects to wear in his dominions the order of the Society of the Cincinnati, is not only a strong mark of his deference, but also an unmistakable proof of the sentiments of his majesty towards America.”

But while the French officers were ambitious of the honor to be admitted as members of the society; while, for instance, the Chevalier Du Bouchet, at Auxerre, who had been present at the surrender of Burgoyne and of Cornwallis, in a letter of the 17th of February, 1784, considers it as one of the greatest distinctions of his life to be received as a member of the Cincinnati; while the French army intendant, Tarlé, argues that he is entitled to the honors of the order, at the same time here, in the United States, the reaction against the society had reached its culminating point. Some of the most prominent members, to give no offense, even withdrew from it; others laid aside its insignia, and others proposed its modification. We find in the Steuben papers a letter, very interesting in this respect, written by General Knox, at Boston, to

Steuben, on the 21st of February, 1784, which we quote in full :

“ We had a meeting of the society in this town on the 10th instant, at which General Lincoln presided. A committee was chosen to attend the meeting of the society in May next, at Philadelphia, which appears the place most proper for the occasion. R. Putnam, Colonel Hall, Major Sargent and myself, are of the committee ; probably only two will attend. Your society, Mr. Baron, has occasioned a great deal of jealousy among the good people of New England, who say it is altogether an outlandish creation formed by foreign influence. It is still heightened by a letter from one of our ministers abroad, who intimates that it was formed in Europe to overthrow our happy institutions. Burke’s pamphlet has also had its full operation. You see how much you have to answer for by the introduction of your European institutions. I contend, to the utmost of my power, that you only had your share in the matter, and no more ; but it will have no effect. Burke’s allusion has fixed it, and you must support the credit of having created a race of hereditary nobility. Our friend Heath says : ‘ I forewarned you of all that will happen ! ’ He did not attend the meeting. The Legislature of this State are, however, decided that the scheme shall not be carried into execution in this commonwealth, and in order to frustrate the measure, the Assembly have chosen a joint committee of both Houses to ‘ inquire into any associations or combinations to introduce undue distinction into the community, which may have a tendency to create a race of hereditary nobility, contrary to the Confederation of the United States, and to the spirit of the constitution of this commonwealth.’ The committee have not yet reported the result of their inquiries ; when they do, I will inform you. You must have observed, my dear friend, how possible it is for the best intentions to be misconstrued and misrepresented. Let me know how it is relished in Pennsylvania and to the southward.”

"Knox and Jackson," writes William North, a little later, to Stenben, "avoid the badge of the Cincinnati as they would the devil. They smile and smile, and still are"*

In order to preserve the society and to allay the popular prejudice, Washington proposed, at its first meeting in 1784, to abolish the hereditary features of its constitution. "On Tuesday, the 4th instant," writes James Fairlie, who, with William S. Smith, Nicholas Fish, and Philip Courtland, appeared as delegate from New York, at the beginning of May, 1784, from Philadelphia, to Benjamin Walker,† "the deputies in town from the different State societies met at the City Tavern, eleven States being represented. There are now twelve States represented, Rhode Island being the only one which is not. The commander-in-chief, on the first meeting, resigned his office as president general, his term having expired agreeably to the constitution. He was, nevertheless, elected president of the meeting, which he will hold till we break up, which will not be these ten days, having much to do. There are a vast many petitions from France to become members, all of which, I fancy, will be referred to the country from which they come, as it seems to be the disposition of many members that there shall be a charter sent to that part of the society in France, giving them power similar to those the different State societies now enjoy.

"One of the first pieces of business we went on was to appoint a committee, consisting of a member from each State, to revise, correct, and amend the constitution. The general objections seem to be hereditary succession, funds, honorary members, attention to the general union of the States, and holding general meetings. I hope, in amending it, we may not make ourselves look ridiculous, or totally destroy the society. It is the opinion of some that every thing but the charitable part and the badge, should be abolished.

"A rage for popularity will influence many to reduce the

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

† Ibidem, Utica.

society to be little or nothing ; and that kind of people tell us frightful stories about the flame that is likely to break out in the country concerning the Cincinnati. Some that were but a little time ago the greatest sticklers for it, indeed with whom the idea of forming such a society first originated, have experienced a revolution in sentiment. Trimmers, trimmers, trimmers !

“The amendments debated yesterday,” continues Fairlie, a little later,* “passed the meeting. The alterations are, no hereditary succession, no more honorary members ; the funds to be put into the hands of government ; no treasurer general. In fact, whatever General Washington dictated, was done ; every one esteemed him as a *sine qua non* of the society. I imagine Gates will be vice president and Sullivan secretary.” “It seems, therefore,” continues Benjamin Walker, to whom this letter was addressed, “that our allies alone have saved the society ; they say at once, that we have made many sacrifices to the people, and now make the last we have, by dissolving the society entirely.”

Before, however, Washington’s recommendation was acted upon by the State chapters, a more reasonable turn of public opinion made the change unnecessary, so that a general meeting, on the 7th of May, 1800, unanimously adopted the report of the committee appointed to examine the records of the society, which read as follows :

“That the institution of the society of the Cincinnati remain as it was originally proposed and adopted by the officers of the American army, at their cantonments on the banks of the Hudson river, in 1783.”

Steuben was vice president of the New York State Society of the Cincinnati, from 1785 to 1786, and its president from 1786 till 1790.

The New York Society was not so easily frightened as the New England Society ; nay, exasperated by the unjust oppo-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

sition with which it met, it availed itself of every opportunity to parade with great ostentation, and to show that it was not intimidated. Steuben especially liked to give vent to his hatred against those anonymous writers of the day, who, concealing their own insignificance behind the toga of a "Brutus," "Cassius," "Vox Populi," "Publicola," "Scipio," and others, lived during the war snug at home, while the men whom they now assailed were fighting the battles of their country.

We found in the above-quoted essay of Johnston the following interesting account of a ceremony which took place at the initiation of newly elected members:

"On this occasion they determined to initiate the honorary members who had been newly elected, by the ceremony of a formal investiture. The assembly room at the City Tavern was the scene of the solemnity. The outside of the house was decorated with festoons and crowns of laurel; opposite the door of entrance, on a dais tapestried with blue cloth, was elevated a great chair of state, covered with light blue satin fringed with white; at the back of this was a staff supported by two hands united, holding up the cap of Liberty, which was again grasped by the eagle of the order, bearing on a white fillet the motto, 'We will defend it.' At each extremity of the room amphitheaters were erected for the spectators.

"A deputation, consisting of four members, dressed in their uniforms and wearing their eagles, first waited on the governor of the State and the president of Congress, with the congratulations of the society for the American independence. After their return with the report, that had been received with all the attention due to the dignity of their order, the ceremony commenced.

"The foreign members, and such as belonged to the other societies, had already taken their seats on the left of the chair. The kettle drums and trumpets, an important part of the performance, were stationed in the gallery over the door, and the amphitheaters were filled with spectators, when the standard-

bearer, Captain Guyon, in full Continental uniform, wearing his order, and escorted by four members, also in full dress, entered the hall and took his position in front of the dais. He held in his hand the standard of the society. It was wrought in silk, displaying the eagle upon thirteen alternate stripes of white and blue. The escort returned, and, led by the masters of ceremony, the procession then entered the hall. First came the members, two-and-two, followed by the secretary, Captain Pemberton, carrying the original institution of the society; then came the treasurer, General Van Courtlandt, and his deputy, Major Platt, bearing two satin cushions, on the first of which were displayed the eagles, and on the second the diplomas for the elected members. These were followed by the vice president, General Schuyler, and the president, Major General Baron De Steuben, who brought up the rear. At his entrance the standard saluted, and the kettle drums and trumpets gave a flourish, which continued until passing through the avenue now formed by the members opening to the right and left, he mounted the steps and took his seat upon the chair of state.

“When this was done, Colonel Hamilton, soldier, orator and statesman, pronounced the inaugural address; after which the ceremony of investiture commenced.

“The recipient was conducted by one of the masters of ceremony to the first step before the chair of the president, and the standard-bearer approached. After expressing a desire to be received into the society, and promising a strict observance of its rules and statutes, he grasped the standard with his left hand, while with his right he signed his name to the institution. The president then took one of the eagles from the cushion held by the treasurer, and invested the recipient in the following words: ‘Receive this mark as a recompense for your merit, and in remembrance of our glorious independence.’ Next handing him a diploma, he said: ‘This will show your title as a member of our society. Imitate the il-

lustrious hero, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus, whom we have chosen for our patron : like him be the defender of your country and a good citizen.* Another flourish of drums and trumpets completed the ceremony, and the new member was introduced to the Cincinnati at large, who arose in a body to salute him. This was succeeded by a brilliant festival, which, amidst salvos of artillery, terminated the day."

On the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence which succeeded the organization of the federal government, 1789, a committee of the society of the Cincinnati waited on Washington, in the morning, and its chairman, Steuben, addressed him, saying :*

"The Society of the Cincinnati of the State of New York have instructed this delegation to present to you, sir, the sentiments of the profoundest respect. In common with all good citizens of the United States of America, they join their ardent wishes for the preservation of your life, health and prosperity. In particular they feel the highest satisfaction in contemplating the illustrious chief of our armies, by the unanimous vote of an independent people, elected to the highest station that a dignified and enlightened country can bestow. Under your conduct, sir, this band of soldiers was led to glory and to conquest, and we feel confident that under your administration our country will speedily arrive at an enviable state of prosperity and happiness."

The chief answered: "I beg you, gentlemen, to return my most affectionate regards to the Society of the Cincinnati of the State of New York, and to assure them that I receive their congratulations, on this auspicious day, with a mind constantly anxious for the honor and welfare of our country, and can only say that the force of my abilities, aided by an integrity of heart, shall be studiously pointed to the support of its dignity and the promotion of its prosperity and happiness."

The society afterwards marched in procession, attended

* R. W. Griswold. The Republican Court, New York, 1855, p. 155.

by Colonel Baumann's artillery and a band of music, to Saint Paul's Church, where, in the presence of the members of Congress and a great concourse of distinguished citizens and strangers, Alexander Hamilton delivered an oration on the life and character of General Nathaniel Greene.

The society afterwards dined at the old City Tavern in Broad street.

Steuben filled the office of president of the New York Cincinnati for four consecutive years till 1790, when he resigned. "I had the honor, gentlemen," said he, on this occasion,* "of presiding in that assembly which laid the foundation of our institution; and the moment I put my hand to that respectable act which was to connect us for purposes most honorable and benevolent, shall always be considered by me as the most precious of my life.

"The clouds which jealousy and ill-founded prejudice have gathered over our society have not intimidated me. Conscious of the purity of our intentions I have steadily pursued the line of my duty in the station to which you were pleased, four years since, to appoint me. Accept my sincere thanks, gentlemen, for the repeated marks of attention and regard with which I have been distinguished, and do me the justice to believe that if my efforts for the good of the society have not had all the success I wished, that at least I have had the consolation, during my presidency, of seeing the tie which binds us retain its strength, and the luster of our eagle remain unsullied.

"The motives which induced me to call this general meeting will be communicated to you. As they regard the respectability of the society they are worthy of your attention; before I explain them, permit me to inform you that my particular situation will prevent my filling this chair the ensuing year, should your partiality honor me by an election to it.

"I have endeavored to place the affairs of the society in

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. xiii.

the best order possible. For this purpose the different pieces relative to our institution, from its commencement to the present time, have been collected and regularly entered in a book by your secretary, who is entitled to our thanks for his care and assiduity; a second book contains the names of all the members belonging to the society of this State, to which I propose to add a third, to contain the names of those only who have received their diploma.

“Gentlemen, the objects which are at present submitted to your consideration, are: 1st. A law to ascertain the number of members which shall be competent to the administration of the affairs of the society; 2d. The settlement of the accounts relative to the funds of the society in the hands of our treasurer; 3d. To make the arrangements for the next general meeting; 4th. To inquire into the situation of the widows and orphans of the deceased members, and afford them such support as may be in our power; 5th. To prevent the intrusion of improper persons into the society, and to expel those, if there should be any such, who have been permitted to join us without a sufficient title. And lastly, I must again recommend to you to take into consideration and determine on the well founded claims of the late officers of the marine of this State.”

Since the subsidence of the prejudices above alluded to, the society has attracted little of the public attention. Devoting itself, among its members, to the cultivation of the social affections, to the relief of the indigent, and the commemoration of its illustrious dead and of their deeds, it has little in common with the spirit of business that surrounds it, and is too often forgotten by those who are entitled to its privileges. Of its thirteen original chapters, six appear to be in operation—those of New York, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland. Of these, that of New York, considered the most prosperous, has scarcely more than one fourth of the number of its original mem-

bers. The two hundred and sixty-eight officers of Pennsylvania who signed the constitution of the society, are at present represented by only sixty of their descendants; the two hundred and thirty officers of New York by seventy-three descendants, and the three hundred and thirty-three officers of Massachusetts by not many more than one hundred. The last veteran, Major Robert Burnett, died on the 29th of November, 1854, at Newburg, on the Hudson. He had lived long enough to see that the predictions of the eccentric Burke, foreseeing a general ruin of the liberties of America, were fallacies, and that John Adams' apprehensions that "the formation of the society was the first step taken to deface the beauty of our temple of liberty" were utterly groundless. The rapid decrease of the Cincinnati has of late attracted the notice of the society, and suggested a modification of the rules of admission, so as to make all persons eligible who are descended from any one who might have been, as well as from one who was, a member.* This ordinance, relative to the succession was adopted by the general meeting on the 7th of May, 1851.

The present president of the New York State Society since 1848, is Hamilton Fish, son of Steuben's sub-inspector, Nicholas Fish, and former Governor and United States Senator of the State of New York. He is at the same time president of the general society, which held its last triennial meeting at Boston, on the 27th of May, 1857. Delegates were present from all the State Societies, except that of South Carolina, and the following officers chosen: President, Hamilton Fish; Vice President, Charles S. Davies of Portland, Maine; Treasurer, Joseph W. Scott of New Jersey; Secretary, Thomas McEwen. At the banquet, which took place on the evening of that day, ex-President Pierce, and other distinguished guests, responded to sentiments offered.

The next general meeting of the Cincinnati will be held at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1860.

* New York Courier and Inquirer, March, 1854.

The public at large know little or nothing about the Cincinnati: they have always been considered as an exotic creation which found no sympathy with the masses. Moreover, the material interests and more important struggles of the day have scarcely time enough to appreciate the high-toned aspirations of a bygone time, which has almost nothing in common with the present.

But if in the course of years even every trace of the existence of the Cincinnati should be extinguished, this society is immortalized in the name of a city which, giant-like, sprung out of the wilderness with a rapidity since become proverbial, and which is now one of the richest commercial emporiums of the United States. When General St. Clair and Colonel Sargent, in 1789, gave the name of their society to the three log-houses at the confluence of the Licking and Ohio, then called Losanteville,* they did not imagine that they were enthroning a queen of the West, and erecting a monument in honor of the Cincinnati, which will probably last longer than the memory of all its members. The daughter does honor to her parents. On the ground which they have cultivated and made independent it flourishes proudly and mightily, the young and vine-crowned *Cincinnati*.

* Alexander Johnston, l. c

CHAPTER XXVII.

STEUBEN IN PRIVATE LIFE FROM 1754 TILL 1790.—THE STATES OF PENNSYLVANIA, VIRGINIA, NEW JERSEY, AND NEW YORK, PRESENT HIM WITH LAND.—HE SETTLES IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK.—HIS DIFFERENT RESIDENCES.—THE LOUVRE.—HE WRITES TREATISES ABOUT MILITARY AFFAIRS, ESPECIALLY THE MILITIA AND A CONTINENTAL LEGION.—WASHINGTON'S OPINION THEREON.—STEUBEN'S SOCIAL STANDING IN NEW YORK.—THE DOCTOR'S MOB.—OTHER ANECDOTES.—THE GERMAN SOCIETY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.—STEUBEN ITS PRESIDENT FOR NINE YEARS.—E. LIVINGSTON'S ORATION.—STEUBEN'S POLITICAL VIEWS.—THE PREROGATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.—PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA.—ELECTION OF GOVERNOR IN NEW YORK.—STEUBEN PRESENT AT WASHINGTON'S INAUGURATION.—STEUBEN CHOSEN REGENT OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.—HIS PLAN FOR AN AMERICAN SETTLEMENT ON THE MISSISSIPPI IN LOUISIANA.—THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR DOES NOT ANSWER.—STEUBEN'S PROPOSALS NOT ACCEPTED.

TO resume our narrative, we have to revert to the time when the disbanded army returned to the peaceful occupations of civil life. While others, who were young enough to devote themselves to other pursuits, soon made up the loss they had experienced in joining the army, Steuben was too old and too little acquainted with business to gain a livelihood in a civil capacity. He was fifty-four years old, the greater part of which he had spent in the field. Feeling that after the conclusion of peace, he was of no more use in America, he proposed to return to Europe, and live there in agreeable retirement, if Congress would pay him a part of his claims, but, as stated in chapter XXVI., the matter was put off from day to day, from year to year; and when in 1790, they finally arrived at a decision, Steuben, on account of his debts, was unable to leave the United States. He, therefore, concluded to cultivate his lands in Oneida county, for which purpose his means were sufficient.

Although he had, for full six years, to battle with Congress, Steuben never lost sight of the public welfare by attending to

his own affairs, and even the time after he had laid aside public station, furnishes ample proof of his disinterested participation in the prosperity and security of the United States. These ten years, from 1784 till his death, naturally divide themselves into two distinct periods, the one ending with the year 1790, when Steuben's just claims were settled and his life secured from penury, the other with his death, during which latter time he lived in easy circumstances, and enjoyed the society of his friends and the regards of the American people.

We propose to describe, in this chapter, the period from 1784 till 1790, As an offset against the tardy way in which the general government did satisfy Steuben's claims, we are bound to mention the liberal rewards of his services by some of the States.

Thus the State of Pennsylvania, even before the conclusion of the peace in March, 1783, had made him a citizen of the commonwealth, and given him, in Westmoreland county, a grant of two thousand acres. Virginia had presented him with fifteen thousand acres, "as a high sense they had of the merit and services of Steuben," to be located between the Muskingum and the Great Miami (in the present State of Ohio). New Jersey, "deeply impressed with a sense of the many and signal services by him rendered to the United States of America during the continuance of the late war, and desirous to testify to the world the grateful sense they entertain of the said services," had given him the life lease of a forfeited estate of John Zabriskie, lying in the county of Bergen, township of New Barbadoes, at the New Bridge, and in the immediate neighborhood of New York; but Steuben, when informed that Zabriskie, in consequence of that confiscation, was left without means, did not accept the gift, and interposed in behalf of Zabriskie.

The cities of Albany and New York, the first on the 23d of July, 1783, the latter on the 11th of October, 1784, honored him with their freedom, and on the 5th of May,

1786,* the State of New York granted him one quarter of a township, equal to sixteen thousand acres, out of the territory recently purchased from the Oneida Indians. The site selected was some twelve miles north of old Fort Schuyler, the present city of Utica, and adjoining the present town of Remsen. It was erected into a separate township, and called after him when Steuben settled there.

Immediately after having resigned his commission, he returned to New York, where he first rented a country house in the middle part of the island. It belonged to Mr. Provost, better known at the time as the "ready-money Provost" (now in the possession of Mrs. Schermerhorn), and was situated in the present Fifty-seventh street, in Jones's Wood. For some reason unknown, it was called the "Louvre" by its proprietor, and Steuben lived there with his old companions in arms. Here he spent the little money left him, with North, Walker, William S. Smith, Fairlie, and others. They, however, very soon went away to establish themselves, and left him in a very solitary situation. Steuben corresponded with his old friends, took part in the politics of the day, and wrote pamphlets about the military affairs and militia of the United

* "An Act for the speedy sale of unappropriated lands within this State, and for other purposes therein mentioned. Passed on the 5th of May, 1786.

"XXXII. *And whereas*, Baron Frederick William Steuben, late a major general in the army of the United States, has rendered very essential service to this State, as one of the United States, by introducing a regular discipline into the army, and a spirit of economy into the interior administration of the regiments, and this Legislature, being willing to afford a public testimony of the just sense they entertain of his services: therefore

"XXXIII. *Be it enacted by the authority aforesaid*, That the said commissioners shall, and they are hereby authorized, to direct letters patent to be prepared for, and granted to the said Baron Frederick William Steuben, in fee simple, one quarter of a township, equal to sixteen thousand acres of land, part of any township which he may choose, out of the townships to be laid out in any of the tracts of land directed to be laid out in pursuance of this act, except in the bound of the said lands purchased of the Oneida Indians, without fee or reward, or paying any consideration for the land granted to him; and having approved of such letters patent, his Excellency, the Governor, shall affix the great seal of the State thereto."

States. One of the first works he undertook after his resignation, was the elaboration of a plan for their land defense. We have no room for this important essay in full ; it will, therefore, suffice to state here, that he proposed that in times of peace the whole American army should consist of one legion of three thousand men, permanent and Continental ; a corps of artillerists, sappers, miners, artificers, etc., of one thousand, permanent and Continental, also ; and seven legions of established militia, consisting of three thousand men each ; so that the whole would amount to twenty-five thousand effectives.

Steuben communicated this plan first to Washington, who, on the 15th of March, 1784,* from Mount Vernon, answered it as follows :

“ I have perused, with attention, the plan which you have formed for establishing a Continental legion, and for training a certain part of the arms-bearing men of the Union, as a militia in times of peace ; and with the small alterations which have been suggested and made, I very much approve of it. It was no displeasing and flattering circumstance to me to find such a coincidence of ideas as appears to run through your plan and the one I had the honor to lay before a committee of Congress in May last. Mine, however, was a hasty production, the consequence of a sudden call and little time for arrangement ; yours, of maturer thought and better digestion. At the same time that I limited the propriety of a Continental militia, I glided almost insensibly into what I thought would, rather than what I conceived ought to be, a proper peace establishment for this country.

“ A peace establishment ought always to have two objects in view : the one present security of posts and of stores, and the public tranquillity ; the other, to be prepared, if the latter is impracticable, to resist with efficacy the sudden attempts of a foreign or domestic enemy. If we have no occasion for troops for the first purposes, and were certain of not wanting

* Washington's Writings, ix., 25.

any for the second, then all expenses, of every nature and kind whatsoever on this score, would be equally nugatory and unjustifiable; but while men have a disposition to wrangle, and to disturb the peace of society, either from ambitious, political or interested motives, common prudence and foresight require such an establishment as is likely to insure to us the blessings of peace, although the undertaking should be attended with difficulty and expense; and I can think of no plan more likely to answer the purpose, than the one you have suggested, which, the principles being established, may be enlarged or diminished at pleasure, according to circumstances. It therefore meets my approbation, and has my best wishes for its success."

Poverty soon compelled Steuben to give up his dismantled and deserted residence, and to surrender the "Louvre." His old friend and aid-de-camp, B. Walker, who had married in the meantime, and taken a house in Maiden Lane, in New York, nearly opposite its junction with Liberty street, invited him to stay with him. When Walker afterwards removed to Courtland street, Steuben engaged rooms in the present Fulton street, at a Dr. Vaché's, and took his dinners at the celebrated boarding-house of the Misses Dabeny, in Wall street, nearly opposite Hanover. Having lived there a year or two, he went to the house of a Dr. Tillory, at the south-east corner of Broadway and Wall street, till he finally, in 1791, took a house opposite Saint Paul's Church, the present 216 Broadway, which he occupied down to his removal to Steuben, in 1794.

Steuben was a great favorite in social circles, and especially among the ladies. He engaged in their amusements, and by his wit and pleasantry the delights of any party where he was were increased. We find his name on the invitation list of Mrs. Jay, during the years 1787 and 1788; he was intimate with Duer, Duane, Livingston, Jay, Varick, Hamilton, Fish and others. He cultivated social intercourse with all the prominent

and fashionable families of the city, while at the same time he was very popular among all classes of the people. H. D. Von Bulow, who was in New York in 1792, and paid a visit to Steuben, says that he was known by everybody as "the baron," and that when "the baron" was spoken of, everybody knew that Steuben was the man. When, at the famous doctors' mob, produced, in 1786 or 1787, by the careless exposure of a subject from the dissecting room of the hospital, he was accidentally wounded, the mob made room to let him pass, and cheered him, while they went on in their work of destruction. President Duer relates an amusing anecdote of Steuben, connected with this affair:

"It became necessary," says he,* "to call out the militia to put down the rioters, and many of the principal citizens repaired to the assistance of the civil authority. Some of them were severely wounded. Mr. Jay received a serious wound in the head, and the Baron De Steuben was struck by a stone, which knocked him down, inflicted a flesh wound upon his forehead, and wrought a sudden change in the compassionate feelings he had previously entertained towards the rabble. At the moment of receiving it he was earnestly remonstrating with Governor Clinton against ordering the militia to fire on the people; but as soon as he was hit, his benevolence deserted him, and, as he fell, he lustily cried out, 'Fire, governor, fire!' He was carried into Mr. Duer's house, and there being no surgeon at hand, Lady Kitty Duer stanchd his wound and bound up his head. After his departure, Governor Clinton provoked the laughter of the company by recalling these circumstances."

Though never perfectly master of the English language, he understood and spoke it with tolerable correctness. He would sometimes, and as a matter of jest, miscall names, and blend or adopt words similar in sound, dissimilar in meaning.

* Rufus W. Griswold. *The Republican Court*, New York, 1854, quarto, p. 102.

Once when dining with General Washington,* Mrs. Washington asked him what amusements he had. "I read, and I play chess, my lady," said the baron; "and yesterday I was invited to go a fishing. It was understood to be a very fine amusement. I sat in the boat two hours, though it was very warm, and caught two fish." "Of what kind, baron?" asked the lady. "Indeed, I do not recollect perfectly, but one of them was a whale." "A whale, baron, in the North river!" "Yes, on my word, a very fine whale, as that gentleman informed me. Did you not tell me it was a whale, major?" "An eel, baron!" "I beg your pardon, my lady, but the gentleman certainly called it a whale. But it is of little consequence. I shall abandon the trade, notwithstanding the fine amusement it affords."

Among the Germans of the city of New York Steuben occupied a most prominent position. They looked on him with pride, and held him in high veneration. He took part in their associations and benevolent institutions. When, on the 23d of August, 1784, the German Society, for the benevolent purpose of assisting poor Germans and their descendants, was founded, Steuben was not in town; but immediately after his return he joined it, and at once became its most influential member. On the 7th of February, 1785, Dr. Kuntze moved that the society express their thanks to Steuben for the honor he conferred on them in becoming a member, and on the 3d of October, 1785, he was unanimously elected president, which place he occupied until his death. This society, which still flourishes and numbers about one thousand members, was in its beginning represented and sustained by revolutionary officers, as, for instance, Colonels Henry Emanuel Lutterloh, its first president, and Frederick Von Weissenfels. Frederick A. Mühlenberg and General Peter Mühlenberg, on the motion of Steuben, were made honorary members; and many distinguished Americans, as Mayor Duane, Gouverneur Morris, Edward Livingston, Ste-

* Thacher & Bowen, p. 83.

phen Van Renssalaer, Peter Schuyler, Horatio Gates, and other distinguished men, afterwards became members. The emigration, which then was in its infancy, did not require much attention of the society. Here and there a ship arrived with Germans, "bound to labor," on whose behalf they interfered, as, for instance, in 1792, when the board of directors met at Steuben's house, to protect the Germans, who, under the most disadvantageous terms, had been engaged by the Genesee land association. It appears from the minutes of the board, that the arrival of two ships with emigrants at almost the same time was a very extraordinary event. Thus the society had more ample occasion for charitable purposes at home, and for cherishing kind feelings of benevolence and friendship among its members. On the anniversary of the society, which, on motion of Edward Livingston, was celebrated on the 11th of August, being the day of German independence, in consequence of Herman's victory over Varus, a German and English oration was delivered, and a dinner taken. Edward Livingston was the English speaker in 1789, and, in his appreciation of the German character, said at the end of his speech:

"The next is one whom here I fear to name, and scarce dare venture to describe, lest I offend that virtue which, not obtrusive, shares the voice of fame. But vain the purpose to conceal it! When German worth is the theme, can we omit the name of *Steuben*? or when we speak of services like his, will admiration bind itself to forms? No! regardless of the feelings it may excite, the voice of truth proclaims him the creator of our force, who, from a chaos of disorder, raised our military fame. Unhappily the voice of gratitude has not been heard; our country yet, my friends, is not unjust. It was but lost amid the din of acclamation; and that voice, though *small and still*, shall soon be heard, and teach our country to reward his merit."

After Steuben's death the society, in his honor, held a funeral service in the German Reformed Church, in Nassau

street, and wore crape for six weeks. At the same time it published a eulogy on him, which was signed by D. Grimm, vice president, and William Wilmerding, secretary.

In his political views Steuben was a decided Federalist, and as such took part in the political events of the day. We found among his papers a treatise about the national debt of the United States, several articles about the prerogatives of the President, and a historical review of the duties of the supreme executive officer in ancient and modern republics. All these essays belong—to characterize them in one word—to the political school of Alexander Hamilton, and show, in a great measure, Steuben's learning and sound judgment in political matters.

When, before the adoption of the present Constitution, in a circle of his friends, the question of the form of government was discussed, and it was not yet decided whether the President was to be vested only with the authority of the highest civil officer, or with the more princely privileges of the Dutch Stadtholder, one of the party, addressing himself to Steuben, asked whether Prince Henry, of Prussia, would be willing to accept an invitation, and whether he would make a good President? Steuben answered, "As far as I know the prince he would never think of crossing the ocean to be your master. I wrote to him a good while ago what kind of fellows you are; he would not have the patience to stay three days among you."

When Mr. Jay, then Chief Justice of the United States, in 1792, was nominated for governor of the State of New York, by the Federal Republicans in opposition to Governor George Clinton, Steuben attended the public meeting called to recommend Mr. Jay to the suffrages of the people. He was complimented by placing his name *first* on the list of those who signed the address on that occasion, which was published the next day. Chancellor Livingston had previously joined the anti-Federalists, and of course was ready to

employ his splendid talents and the great influence of his family in support of Governor Clinton. He published an answer to the address, alluding to the signers as mere interested partisans, and to Steuben as a "pensioner" of the general government, in a manner not very agreeable nor suitable to his position and character. Steuben sent immediately to General Armstrong, with whom he was connected by the ties of mutual esteem and friendship, with a view to ascertain who the general thought was the author. The latter said at once there could be no doubt of his being the chancellor. "Then, my friend, I rely on you for an answer." Armstrong readily assented. The next day "Timothy Tickler's" first letter was published, assuming the chancellor to be the author, and addressed to him by his official title. The chancellor then, under his signature of "Aristides," published a letter addressed to Mr. Jay, as Chief Justice, etc., assuming him to be the author of Tickler's letter. Mr. Jay forthwith, in the calm, judicious and dignified manner by which all the acts, public and private, of that able, wise, and virtuous patriot were distinguished, conclusively disclaimed the imputation.*

At the inauguration of Washington, on the 30th. of April, 1789, Steuben was conspicuous in the group on the platform when Washington took the oath of his office. A few days after he attended a ball which was given at the City Assembly Rooms in honor of this event, and on the 4th of July Steuben waited on the President to pay him his respects in the name of the Society of the Cincinnati, and delivered a complimentary address.†

On the 13th of April, 1787, the Legislature of the State of New York appointed Steuben one of the regents of the State University. The regents, numbering twenty-two, "are authorized and required to visit and inspect all the colleges

* Communicated by John W. Mulligan, Esq.

† Rufus W. Griswold, the Republican Court, pp. 140, 154, 177.

and academies in the State, examine into the condition and system of education and discipline therein, and make an annual report of the state of the same to the Legislature.”*

During the whole year 1788, when his prospect of getting his claims settled was very bad, and when, during a political interregnum, his future was entirely uncertain, Steuben was occupied with a plan which, if carried out, would have exerted a decisive influence on the political formation of this continent, and, by its consequences, greatly accelerated the westward movement and expansion of the United States. He proposed to plant a colony within the dominions of the King of Spain, on the Mississippi, partly agricultural, partly military, in order to secure the King of Spain against any invasion of his neighbors, and to grant to the American settlers on the western Alleghanies a free outlet for their produce.

The plan of this interesting project reads as follows:

“1st. Baron Steuben engages to plant a colony of farmers and artificers, not exceeding in number four thousand two hundred persons, within the Spanish province of Louisiana.

“2d. For this purpose a concession of two hundred thousand acres of land, in such place as, in military view and relation to the principles of the project, may be hereafter agreed upon, is made to the said Baron Steuben and his associates.

“3d. As a further encouragement the Spanish government allows to each person, a farmer or artificer, brought to locate himself in good faith within the said tract, the sum of one hundred Spanish dollars as a bounty.

“4th. Baron Steuben and his associates will, to every such settler, make conveyance in fee of two hundred and thirty acres of good and arable land within the concession aforesaid, free of all expense save such as may arise upon the writing of the deed.

* Laws of New York. Jones and Varick's edition. ii., 143.

“5th. The settlers within the said tract will be drawn from the United States, or other foreign countries, and no person now a Spanish subject will be taken from his present settlement to make a part of this.

“6th. On the part of government it will be agreed that the inhabitants of this tract be allowed to possess and exercise such mode of religious worship as they may think proper, and that no penalty, forfeiture, disqualification, etc., be incurred by any differences in faith or practice from those established within his Catholic Majesty's dominions.

“7th. The laws of the United States relative to the tenure, transfer or descent of property will be granted to the inhabitants of the said tract, and they will be allowed to institute such process, office and courts touching these subjects as may be proper and necessary ; provided only, that this will be done at their own expense and without charge to government ; and provided further, that in all cases when the parties in suit on these subjects signify their consent and desire to have decision according to the Spanish laws, it be granted to them.

“8th. In all other respects the said inhabitants will be entirely, and without qualification, subject to the Spanish laws and usages.

“This part of the colony will be formed into a militia and liable to military service within the province when any exigency of government may require it.

“9th. In addition to this colony the baron will engage to raise a corps of eight hundred men to be formed into four battalions, three of musketry, and one of riflemen. This corps will in all respects be subject to the discipline and service of his Catholic Majesty's troops, save only that in questions of property and religion, the privileges granted to the other part of the colony be extended to this also.

“10th. The power of nominating all officers of the regular corps will be exclusively with the general thereof, and when

approved by the king, commissions will be issued to them accordingly, and vacancies supplied in the same manner.

"11th. The same bounty will be given to soldiers as to the farmers and artificers.

"12th. Such colonists and recruits as may be engaged in Germany, will be paid and provided at the king's expense, from the day of their enlistments or engagements respectively, and for the purpose of safe and easy transportation, it will be agreed between the courts of Madrid and Versailles, that they be allowed a free and unmolested passage from St. Esprit in France to Carthagena in Spain, where they are to be embarked in royal vessels for New Orleans in Louisiana."

Stenben presented this plan to Don Diego Guardaqui, then Spanish minister in Philadelphia, who dispatched it to Madrid; but it does not appear that the court entered into any negotiation about it. Its rejection is too natural when we consider the absolute form of government in Spain. It could not suit them, that one of its colonies should be more free than the rest, and if not the thorough appreciation of the case, at least the instinct of self-preservation taught the Spanish ministry, that admitting American laws even on a small scale, would by and by have opened and subjected the entire colony to the American pioneers, as has been subsequently shown in the instance of Texas.

It is, nevertheless, interesting to examine the motives of Stenben's plan. They show us the statesman and soldier who anticipates the future and tries to found a building on materials loose in themselves, but grand in the hands of a political talent, the execution of which was only delayed and reserved to the succeeding generation. It is at the same time gratifying to observe that Stenben understood perfectly well the secret of the growth of this rising American empire in the self-government of the commonwealth; a principle more antagonistic to the prerogatives of the Spanish autocrat could not be found.

As in the following year Steuben's prospects cleared up and the favorable settlement of his claims became certain, he gave up the idea of removing to the far West, and devoted his whole attention to the cultivation of his own lands in Oneida county.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

STEBEN FROM 1790 TO 1794.—HIS RESIDENCE ON HIS FARM.—ITS SITUATION.—STEBEN'S OCCUPATIONS IN THE COUNTRY.—HIS SECRETARY, JOHN W. MULLIGAN.—STEBEN HAS NO INTERCOURSE WITH HIS FAMILY.—HIS NEPHEWS VON CANITZ.—HE MAKES A SURVEY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF NEW YORK, WHEN WAR WITH ENGLAND IS APPREHENDED.—STEBEN'S PLAN REPRODUCED IN 1807.—MULLIGAN'S LETTER TO WALKER.—STEBEN APPOINTED COMMISSARY FOR THE FORTIFICATION OF THE WESTERN AND NORTHERN FRONTIER.—A WAR AGAINST ENGLAND APPEARS INEVITABLE.—THE GERMAN SOCIETY, UNDER STEBEN, WORKS FOR A DAY ON THE FORTS ON GOVERNOR'S ISLAND.—STEBEN GOES TO THE WEST.—HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES DETAIN HIM TILL THE END OF AUGUST.—HIS LIFE ON THE FARM.—HIS PLANS AND IMPROVEMENTS.—SOCIAL INTERCOURSE WITH HIS NEIGHBORS.—THE FRENCH REVOLUTION THE ALL-ABSORBING SUBJECT OF CONVERSATION.—RETREAT OF THE PRUSSIANS FROM CHAMPAGNE.—ABOLITION OF TITLES OF NOBILITY.—MAPPA.—DUTCH LAND COMPANY.—SIMEON WOODRUFF.—OLD SOLDIERS VISIT STEBEN.—HIS OPINION ABOUT THE MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE YANKEES.—MULLIGAN REALS TO STEBEN AND PLAYS CHESS WITH HIM.—STEBEN SUDDENLY PARALYZED ON THE 25TH OF NOVEMBER, 1794.—HE DIES THREE DAYS AFTERWARDS.—HIS BURIAL IN THE FOREST.—CONTRAST BETWEEN STEBEN AND HIS OLD PRUSSIAN BROTHERS IN ARMS.—WHO IS THE HAPPIEST OF THEM?—VISIT TO STEBEN'S GRAVE.—ITS INSCRIPTION.—ITS SCENERY.—NORTH ERECTS A MONUMENT IN NEW YORK IN HONOR OF STEBEN.—HIS PRESENT CONDITION.—AGITATION AMONG THE GERMANS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ERECTING A STEBEN MONUMENT.—THE PLAN DOES NOT SEEM TO SUCCEED.

CONGRESS having passed, on the 4th of June, 1790, the annuity of Steben, we find him, as early as the 10th, on the way to his farm. The trip which is now made in about twelve hours from New York, then required as many days. Steben stopped at North's in Duaneburg, dined with Philip Schuyler or Stephen Van Rensselaer in Albany, and did not pass an old comrade's door. John Post, an old German from Schenectady, was at that time the only merchant in what is now called Utica. Steben knew him from the war, and made his house his last resting place when he journeyed from New York for his home.

Before 1790 he had only been once or twice on his farm; now he regularly spent some summer months there. The

township* in which it was situated, is in an elevated position, and its soil better adapted to grazing than the raising of grain. A high ridge of land runs east and west through it. Steuben hill and Star hill are the most elevated points in this ridge, the highest land in the county. Their altitude is so great that Indian corn entirely fails to mature there. The visitor is at once impressed with the vastness of the landscape. No land within many miles is as high as where he stands. Westerly and north-westerly the view is almost unbounded. A large section of the Oneida lake is to be seen, and a person well acquainted in central New York, in viewing the location of different highlands, soon becomes satisfied that portions of seven different counties are distinctly seen. In general the surface of the township may be termed stony. Boulders of every size and shape, some of which are of immense proportions, thickly dot the fields.

Steuben kept a regular journal during his sojourns on his farm, in which all his entries are made with the same regularity as his official reports while in active service. Thus we find in his diary that, on the 4th of July, 1790, he gave a dinner and festivity to all the men on his land and in the neighborhood. Thus we follow him through his apprenticeship as a farmer; we see his arrangements, his hopes and disappointments, his contracts for the cultivation of the land, his discontent with his superintendent, Samuel Sizer, his sales to settlers, and his dispositions for the next year. Whenever he found a worthy revolutionary soldier he made him a present of a lot, forty to a hundred acres in extent. In the autumn, he regularly returned to New York, to spend the winter there among his old acquaintances. Although he had no family, he lived happy and satisfied with some of his old companions in arms, his rural neighbors, and such friends as might tend to enliven his retired home.

In 1791 Steuben made the acquaintance of John W. Mulli-

* P. Jones. *Annals of Oneida county*, Rome, 1851.

gan, a young and promising man, whose father had been an active Whig in New York during the Revolution. Mr. Mulligan, after having finished his studies in Columbia College, became Steuben's secretary, and served him with a fidelity and love which won him the friendship and confidence of his protector. Steuben concentrated all the tenderness of his heart on his friends, as he had no family relations, and there are few examples to be found in which the feeling of kindness and good fellowship were so sincerely reciprocated as between Steuben and his friends.

He did not like his relatives in Europe. In November, 1786, his two nephews, sons of his only sister, the Barons De Canitz, visited him, but their conduct was so bad, their morals were so low, that he sent them back in disgust after a year. They had no education at all; one of them had been a lieutenant in a Prussian infantry regiment, and the other ensign; but the oldest soon resigned on account of a low marriage, and the other deserted. We do not find any trace of a single letter to his relatives in Europe; but we find a great many applications, on their part, for money and assistance. These repeated tribulations annoyed Steuben so much, that he gave up all intercourse with his family, and left them no part of his fortune in his will.

In a letter written on the 27th of July, 1790, in regard to his oldest nephew, he says on this subject:* "I am a self-made man; my personal position is the work of my own hands; but I never forgot to help and afford relief to my poorer relatives whenever I could. They, however, took me for a richer man than I am. The reputation of my having acquired immense possessions and a large fortune spread to the extreme ends of Germany, therefore I could not satisfy all demands on the part of my family. The little I could do was partially compared with what I could not do for them, and rather put to my debit than to my credit. They consid-

* Steuben MS. Papers, Sprague.

ered themselves entitled to get all and every thing from me, while I expected nothing from them."

In the fall of 1793, after the return from his farm, Steuben, apprehending that the ill feeling between the United States and England would lead to a war, made a survey of the neighborhood of New York, and, accompanied by his old sub-inspector, Nicholas Fish, examined the ground between Hell-Gate and the Narrows, looking out for the best places to erect forts. He handed the plan, with a memoir, to the corporation of New York, as an acknowledgment of his gratitude to the city. In 1807 this plan was reproduced and used for the purposes for which it was intended.

Mulligan, on the 1st of August, 1807, wrote from New York the following interesting letter in regard to it to Walker:*

"In the present state of our political affairs, the subject of fortifications to defend this city naturally excites considerable attention and anxiety. Various plans are devised and proposed, but that which includes the defense of the Narrows seems to have most advocates. One has been published which I believe to be an entire plagiarism from one framed by our excellent friend, my benefactor, Baron Steuben. In the year 1793, as I believe you are informed, he devoted one or two days to an actual survey at the Narrows, and formed a plan which, with a memoir, he presented to the corporation. After particular search it is not to be found. I hope that he may have left a copy among his plans and papers in your possession. The object of my present application is that you will have the goodness to search, and if you find either the plan or memoir, to send them on, as far as your search may be successful, as soon as you possibly can, to me, by some safe hand. Being a member of the board, I wish to procure it, as we are at present on the look out for a plan for the purpose of meeting the wishes of the citizens, to erect fortifications, without delay, at the

* Steuben MS. Papers, Utica.

Narrows, relying on government for future reimbursements, as their commissioners have not thought it proper, or, rather, within the scope of their instructions, to expend at present any money to fortify that point. Many inducements make me anxious to have this plan, and, notwithstanding the importance of the object it was intended to effect, I confess one of my leading motives is to prevent any person from bearing the credit of what is due to our friend."

But to return to Steuben. By his plan he had touched a subject which very soon assumed practical importance, since, in consequence of sundry violations of the treaty of peace of 1783, the outbreak of a war between the United States and England was thought to be inevitable.

The Legislature of New York, by a law of the 26th of March, 1794, ordered that fortifications should be repaired or erected, at or near the city and port of New York, sufficient to put the said city and port in a proper state of defense. It appointed at the same time, and by the same law, seven gentlemen, viz., Frederick William De Steuben, Peter Gansevoort, jr., William North, Stephen Van Rensselaer, John Taylor, John Verner, and Daniel Hale, as commissioners for the purpose of erecting such fortifications, building and equipping one or more floating batteries, or other vessels of force as to them should appear necessary to the security of the western and northern frontiers of this State.

As the treaty which John Jay concluded with England prevented a war, this law became a dead letter. There prevailed, however, a general excitement in the spring of 1794, and so enthusiastic was the public spirit in the anticipation of war with England, that the citizens of New York, almost as a body, volunteered to assist in the erection of fortifications in the neighborhood of their city. The German Society, for instance, over which Steuben presided, passed, on the 21st of May, 1794, a resolution that all its members, and all the German inhabitants of New York in general, if it were desired,

should work for a day at the forts which had just been commenced on Governor's Island. They assembled, accordingly, early on the morning of the 5th of June, 1794, at the Lutheran school-house in Nassau street, and, led by their president, proceeded, with flying colors and music, through Broadway, down Whitehall, to Governor's Island, where the mayor of the city allotted to them their places, and where they worked until sunset.

A few days after Steuben left the city for his estate in Oneida county, and remained at Albany to attend the first meeting of the commissioners. He was appointed president, and John W. Mulligan was chosen secretary. Soon after his arrival at Steuben he proceeded on his tour to explore the western territory as far as Fort Oswego, including Fort Stanwix, and spent the greater part of the summer in fulfilling his duty.

Steuben, North, and Stephen Van Rensselaer passed down Wood creek from old Fort Stanwix, crossed the Oneida lake up Seneca river, thence into Onondaga lake to Salt Point. There were several hundred Indians assembled in council, some friendly, and others manifested a hostile spirit toward the United States. The commissioners stationed a strong guard around the house in which they held their consultations, and after they had concluded them they obtained information that the hostile Canadian Indians had assembled in great numbers at the mouth of Oswego river for the purpose of making Steuben a prisoner and carrying him to Fort Oswego, then held by the British. Steuben, aware of this ambuscade, went by land to Fort Stanwix. When the boat containing L. Hough, the servant, and the baggage, entered Onondaga lake, some two or three bateaux, loaded with Indians, armed and equipped, inquired of him where Steuben had gone. They seemed to be much surprised at Hough's answer, and surrounded his boat. Hough and his party expected to have to fight, and that they would be seized and carried to the fort. It ap-

peared, however, that Steuben was the only object of their search, and they suffered them to pass.

It was the last service he rendered to his adopted country.

He did not reach his farm until the end of August. The idea of cultivating his lands, of which about sixty acres were then cleared, and of erecting a fine mansion on it, had been a favorite plan of Steuben since he began to enjoy his annuity, and to feel easier in his money affairs. At that time some sixteen families resided on his patent, who had durable leases at from \$10 to \$20 for every one hundred acres of land. He was fond of talking about his farming prospects, about the artificial lake, which he proposed to make by using the water of two fine brooks that flowed through his land; about the fine quality and situation of his land and its settlement. On his little mare Molly he rode through the fields, watched the improvements, and gave directions. In the evening he saw his friends and neighbors, played chess with his companions, read newspapers or spoke of the politics of the day, which just at this time, when the French Revolution had reached its culminating point, and when the revolutionary armies fought victoriously against Prussia and Austria, were particularly interesting. Steuben subscribed to the *Leyden (Holland) Gazette*, a weekly newspaper which, at that period, held the rank of the present *Galvani's Messenger*, and gave the best and quickest information about the events of the day. He followed with special attention the movements of the contending armies and the military operations in general; but it often occurred to him that, taking the standard of his American militia, he underrated the popular strength and overrated the power of the allies, whom he knew only from the Seven Years' War, when their armies were led by great commanders and animated with energy and enthusiasm. Thus, in 1792, he could not understand, and was shocked at the retreat of the Prussians through Champagne. "It is impossible," said he, when he first heard the news; "I never saw the Prussian eagles

give way ; it is a lie on the part of the French ;" and when afterward the intelligence was confirmed, he persisted in his belief that a diplomatic intrigue was at the bottom of the Prussian backward movement. "I must ask Prince Henry," said he, "about the secret reasons of this strange conduct."

During the fine season he had many visitors, travelers from Europe and others, to whom he tendered the hospitalities of his house.

The French Revolution was of course the most prominent subject of their conversation. Once when the abolition of all titles of nobility in France was mentioned by one of the company, and when Steuben was asked to give up his title, and call himself citizen Steuben, he replied, jokingly, that even were he to do so, the title would never die, as all the children who had been or would be christened, "Baron Steuben," would perpetuate it. Old companions in arms used to call on him, and his neighbors came frequently to spend the evenings with him, or he went to see them. "Ah!" said an old man, who had been a captain, and afterwards kept a public house near Utica, "how glad I am to see you, baron, in my house ; but I used to be dreadfully afraid of you!" "How so, captain?" "You halloood and swore, and looked so dreadfully at me once, baron, that I shall never forget it. When I saw you so strict to the officers on my right, I felt very queer ; and when you came up to me, baron, I hardly knew what to do, and I quaked in my shoes." "O *fi done*, captain!" "It was bad, to be sure," said he ; "but you did halloo most tremendously!" Notwithstanding the bodily fear the captain had been put in, his look and actions showed that there was not a man on earth whom he would have been more rejoiced to see at his table.

In the conversations he had with his friends about military matters, Steuben once criticised the genius of the people of the different States for warfare, saying, "Of all the Americans the Yankees are, in my opinion, the best soldiers ; they

are the most intelligent, and in some respects, the best troops in the world. But they always want to know the reasons for the orders given them by their superiors, and are too fond of improving upon the plans of the latter."

Of his neighbors, Mappa was one of his favorite guests. He was a Dutchman, and president of the Holland Genesee Land Company. He had left Holland in consequence of the late movements against the Stadtholder, and being a republican in feeling and sentiments, after the defeat of the republican party, sought a refuge in the United States, to which he did great service by introducing a great many industrious and sober Dutch and German emigrants upon the lands of the Holland Company. Steuben liked him very much, and they met as often as their business would permit.

An old seaman, of the name of Simeon Woodruff, who had circumnavigated the world with Captain Cook, had bought a piece of land from Steuben. On a certain occasion, while on one of his annual winter visits to the city of New York, some of his friends rather jeered him for attempting to settle the mountains up at the head of the Mohawk. Steuben was a little nettled, and at once retorted, "that it was the best land in the world, and he could prove it." The proof was challenged, and it was at once given as follows: "Why, there is Captain Simeon Woodruff, who has sailed around the globe with Captain Cook; and he has bought a farm on my patent and settled on it, and sure, if in all his voyages a better location had been found, he would not have done so." The argument was deemed conclusive.*

Thus the summer and fall passed in agreeable and social intercourse. When the evenings became longer, Steuben employed them in conversing with his young friend Mulligan, in playing chess, or in having Gibbon's Roman History, or Voltaire, or some of his French historical or literary works read aloud. But as winter set in very early that year—as early as

* P. Jones' Annals of Oneida county, p. 445.

November, a deep snow fell—Steuben made all the necessary preparations to return to New York.

He was in the enjoyment of perfect health and the best humor when, on the 25th of November, after passing his evening as usual, he retired at about eleven o'clock. Except Mulligan and his two servants, he was alone. Colonel North had left the farm, a few weeks previous, for Duanesburg. Mulligan slept in the adjoining house. This was built on the top of the hill, north of the sixty acres, which Steuben had selected for the site of the building which he intended to erect as his country mansion. It consisted of two apartments, a kitchen and an adjoining bed-room; and above was a garret occupied by the servants. During the summer of 1794, however, at the east end of the log house he had built a small frame house, consisting of a sitting-room and bed-room adjoining; there was no access from the other but by going out of doors. Steuben slept in the new house, while his companion had his bed-room in the adjoining log house. Early in the morning of November 26th, at about four o'clock, William, Steuben's German servant, woke Mulligan, and told him that the baron was paralyzed and dying. Mulligan at once ran through the snow to his room, and found him in agony. Steuben appeared to have suffered much, and could only articulate a few words, "Don't be alarmed, my son," which were his last. Mulligan sent for Steuben's overseer, who lived half a mile off. When he came, Mulligan sent him immediately for a physician. The nearest doctor was at Whitestown, eighteen miles distant from Steuben's farm. Mulligan directed the overseer at the same time to call on his way at Mr. Mappa's, at Boonesville, who would have been of great service in this emergency, as he was a very experienced man; but unfortunately Mappa was not at home. Thence the overseer had to go to Duanesburg, in order to inform Colonel North of what had happened. Steuben remained apparently sensible during the greater part of the day, although he was often in convulsions. That night he was very

quiet, though the fits sometimes returned. Every possible relief which his situation afforded, was procured to give him ease, until the arrival of the doctor, on Thursday, the 27th of November, at two o'clock, P. M. He administered medicines which gave some relief, but it was only temporary. The stroke was too violent; the case was hopeless. Steuben did not show any signs of consciousness, and died on Friday, the 28th of November, at half past twelve o'clock, P. M., without any struggle or visible pain.

Colonel North came too late to see his old friend alive. On account of the long distance and the bad condition of the roads, he only reached the farm the day after Steuben's death. He approved of the preparations which Mulligan had made for the funeral. Steuben himself had often expressed, in the circle of his friends, that he wished no parade over his remains, and would designate the retired spot where, wrapped in his military cloak, he wished to be buried. The only remark, however, that could be recollected, that had any bearing on the subject, was that he was once heard to say that under a certain hemlock, north of his residence, would be a good place to be buried, without, however, expressing any wish as to his own remains. In the absence of any other expressed wish, that place was selected by North and Mulligan, and his remains there interred. It was about an eighth of a mile north of the house, on a hill in the midst of a wood. They had considerable difficulty in getting the grave dug, as the melting snow penetrated the soil and the last resting place of the old soldier.

Agreeably to his directions, Steuben was buried about noon, on the 30th of November, 1794. His neighbors, about thirty in number, hastened to the farm to pay their last respects to their beloved old townsman. It was a simple and modest cortege which, on a shivering, winter day, accompanied his remains to the grave. No mourning parade or music was there; no crape-covered eagles or colors were to be seen; no cannon fired a military salute; no word was spoken; no

funeral oration delivered. Some handfuls of earth, and the tears of a few manly and sincere friends, were the last tribute paid to the citizen soldier, who, having contributed in no small degree to the attainment of American independence, now found lasting repose in the unbroken stillness of her primeval forests.

What a contrast between him and his brethren in arms, who had commenced their military life at the same time, and fought together on the battle fields of Prague and Kunersdorf, and, like Gandy and others, had risen, after the Seven Years' War, to the highest rank in the Prussian army! Each of them commanded as many troops as all the armies of the United States combined. The command of each was absolute as regards his inferiors, and at their funeral royalty displayed all its splendor and brilliancy, nominally to do honor to the departed general, but in fact to make a boastful manifestation of its strength and power. With the last salute, however, that roared over their grave, they are forgotten; the glory and enjoyment of their deeds belong to the crown under which they served; their name is merely mentioned in the works of some local historians. *Sic transit gloria mundi!*

From the foregoing comparison between Steuben in the new, and those of the same school of war in the old world, it will be obvious that Steuben was more fortunate than they. In spite of all the hardships he had endured, of all the difficulties he had encountered, of all the ingratitude he had met with, he had, nevertheless, chosen the better part. By drawing his sword for the liberty of a continent, he connected himself with one of the greatest events of modern history. His name will never die so long as the memory of the American Revolution lives. It will be handed down to the remotest ages, and how insignificant are all troubles and sorrows, how trifling all privations and disappointments in comparison with the undying fame he won in the annals of the new world!

The place where Steuben was first buried was, in the

beginning of the century, included in the limits of a public highway. Neither the State or the nation moved in the matter when the remains of her adopted son were thus dishonored. The ashes of the man who, after a stirring and eventful life, had well deserved the rest of the grave, had to give way to the wants of a few farmers. There even was no sacrifice required, no money to be spent, if the road had been made a little to the right or left of its present direction, for the land is of no great value in that neighborhood. But the citizens of the county which Steuben had honored as his residence, scarcely knew him; they did not pay the slightest regard to common decency, and thus the petty interests of the living farmers prevailed over the claims of the deceased hero to a quiet resting place. The road cut off about one-third of the grave, but no one thought of removing the remains. As if Indians had dug up the place, for a while the coffin was exposed to storm and rain, and a very credible eye-witness relates that it had once been opened by the neighbors, who could not resist the temptation of getting a piece of Steuben's old military cloak. When Benjamin Walker heard of this sacrilegious violation of the sacred remains of his old friend, he caused them to be removed to a more suitable resting place. He gave one of the Welsh Baptist societies in the vicinity a lease of fifty acres of land, of which the five acres of wood-land were a part, the only rent and consideration to be paid for which is the keeping said five acres substantially fenced for ever, uncleared, and no cattle or other animals suffered to go within its bounds, and the title to be void whenever the lessees shall fail in the performance of these stipulations. Up to the present time the society has sacredly kept its trust, the forest having the most primeval appearance, and the little tiny saplings, as well as the largest beech and maple trees, show that the woodman's ax has not penetrated this quiet spot.*

* *Annals and Recollections of Oneida county*, by P. Jones, 1851, p. 415

When, in 1824, Lafayette visited the United States, the inhabitants of Oneida county collected money for erecting a monument over Steuben's grave. They invited Lafayette to inaugurate the monument, but he refused to accede to their request, excusing himself under some shallow pretext. The good citizens of that county knew very well that Steuben and Lafayette had been brothers in arms in the revolutionary war, but they did not know that they had not been on good terms, and therefore could not imagine that Lafayette, even thirty years after Steuben's death, had not yet forgotten the differences which ought to have been buried with Steuben. The simple grave-stone was therefore laid without Lafayette's presence.

On the 12th of June, 1857, we made a pilgrimage to the old soldier's grave. In Remsen we visited Steuben's last surviving servant, Lemuel Hough, who very minutely described the way to the place. The country through which we passed is mountainous. Our road led over hills, through valleys and fine timber land, fresh with the verdure of spring. The scenery was generally monotonous and entirely removed from the bustle and tumult of the world. The last rough house which we passed was a school-house. Stout and healthy boys came out to meet us, evidently surprised at seeing strange-looking faces in this wilderness. The pretty young girl, however, that kept the school, knew nothing of Steuben's grave. An old man finally directed us. "In that thick wood," said he, "you will find the grave," pointing eastward with his hand. We fastened our horses, and climbing over fences, jumping over ditches, and wading through underbrush, we finally reached the spot. There, on the slope of a little hill, at the foot of which a small, limpid brook runs, the remains of Steuben quietly repose. A column of stones, two or three feet in height, at each corner of the grave, upon which formerly rested a table of limestone, compose his simple monument. It is now becoming more and more dilapidated, and

the foundation having given way, nothing remains but the tablet and a pile of stones, which originally supported it. The tablet is about eight feet by four, and nearly a foot in thickness, and if kept in its place will withstand the ravages of centuries, but if not speedily repaired will fall to pieces from the influence of the weather. It bears the inscription:

MAJOR GENERAL
FREDERICK WILLIAM AUGUSTUS
BARON DE STEUBEN.

It was a good and poetical idea of Walker, to have selected this quiet spot for the resting place of his friend. The tall beech trees, under whose shade he loved to sit in the evening of his life, extend their wide-spread arms over the grave and keep watch over the old hero. Fragrant flowers, with double vigor rising from the moldering vegetation, form a lovely wreath around the tomb. All dispute and trouble, all hatred and envy of daily life, are shut out from this hallowed spot, which, in its simplicity and seclusion, presents a strong contrast with the stirring and prominent career of him whose ashes it contains.

Colonel William North caused a neat mural monument to be erected to Steuben's memory upon the walls of the German Reformed Church, then under the charge of John D. Gross, and situated in Nassau street, between John street and Maiden Lane, in New York city. When a Baptist society subsequently got possession of that church, they courteously allowed the monument to be taken down, and carried to the new church of the Germans in Forsyth street. There we found it, on the right of the pulpit, well preserved and fastened into the wall. Lossing says that when visiting that church, he saw the monument in separate pieces lying amongst rubbish, in a small lumber room of the church. disfigured and mutilated. On inquiring we were informed that the monument was kept in this condition on account of a lawsuit which

then was pending with regard to the property of the congregation in their church. But after that suit had been decided in favor of the German Reformed Church, the first care of its minister, Mr. Abraham Berky, was to put North's monument in its proper place, and it is due to the exertions of this gentleman that the city of New York can boast of this valuable historical monument. The slab, of obelisk form, and the square frame, are of blueish, clouded marble. The lower urn has upon it a representation of the Order of Fidelity. The following is the inscription, from the pen of Colonel North :

SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF
FREDERICK WILLIAM AUGUSTUS BARON STEUBEN,
A GERMAN; KNIGHT OF THE ORDER OF FIDELITY;
AID-DE-CAMP TO FREDERICK THE GREAT, KING OF PRUSSIA;
MAJOR GENERAL AND INSPECTOR GENERAL
IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

Esteemed, respected and supported by Washington,
He gave military skill and discipline
To the citizen soldiers, who,
Fulfilling the decrees of Heaven,
Achieved the independence of the United States.
The highly polished manners of the baron were graced
By the most noble feelings of the heart.
His hand, open as day to melting charity,
Closed only in the grasp of death.

* * * * *

This memorial is inscribed by an American who had the honor to be his aid-de-camp, the happiness to be his friend.

Obiit, 1795.

In December, 1856, the St. Charles Democrat, of Missouri, a German country paper, published an appeal from Mr. Theodore Bruère to the Germans in the United States, for the erection of a monument in honor of Steuben. This appeal went the round of the Americo-German press, and caused a general manifestation of the appreciation in which the Germans in the United States hold Steuben's memory. In conse-

quence of that address committees were appointed at several places to raise funds for a monument. Concerts and theatrical representations were given for the same purpose, and the German "Turner" and militia companies especially seemed to take a great interest in the realization of the plan. But whether it was that the wealthier Germans did not participate in the enthusiasm of their fellow-countrymen, or that the management was not confided to proper hands, the whole matter was gradually dropped, and although there are some five or six thousand dollars collected, there is no present appearance that the project will ever be carried out. This pious duty, however, which the Germans feel that they are bound to perform, is not confined to them alone. It is an obligation devolving as well on Americans as on Germans. Steuben's tomb ought at all events to be renovated and kept in order. A few hundred dollars would suffice to reconstruct the mason work, and put an iron fence around the grave.

CHAPTER XXIX.

STEBEN AND HIS AIDES-DE-CAMP AND SUB-INSPECTORS.—THEIR FRIENDLY INTER-COURSE.—THEIR NAMES.—BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES AND LETTERS OF PETER S. DUPONCEAU, WILLIAM WALKER, JOHN TENANT, LOUIS FLEURY, WILLIAM NORTH, JAMES FAIRLIE, NICHOLAS FISH, AND WILLIAM S. SMITH.

IT would be injustice to the meritorious and brave officers who composed Steuben's suite, not to dedicate a chapter to them, and describe, as fully as possible, considering the scarcity of direct information, their noble deeds, and the share they took in the happy results which crowned their general's efforts. The records of the revolutionary war are remarkably poor in details about the men who occupied secondary positions during that eventful period. It appears that its historians considered it as a more grateful task to write the lives of the most prominent actors, and that, therefore, the names of the "*dei minorum gentium*" are either forgotten or only cursorily mentioned. Yet, nevertheless, we can not duly appreciate the character of the time and of its leaders, unless we have a knowledge of the strata of the people and of the agents without whose active participation no great movement can successfully be carried through. The time, however, we trust, is not very distant when these considerations will more generally prevail, and when the present deficiency will be supplied.

We may safely say, that there scarcely existed a more intimate and friendly relation among officers than that between Steuben and his aides-de-camp and sub-inspectors. It not only comprised their duties in the field and camp, but extended to all their intercourse. Steuben was their friend, adviser, and father, in one person. He devoted his leisure hours to

them, and provided for all their wants, while they did not take a step in their private affairs without consulting him. From Philadelphia he sent to his favorite aid-de-camp, B. Walker, linen and cloth to enable him to visit Washington's head-quarters. To the sick North, when he was compelled to leave him behind in Virginia, he presented his watch and his last gold piece, and regretted that he could do nothing else for him. For Duponceau he bought a new uniform and a few pounds of tobacco, as a small token of kindly consideration. He had friendly nicknames for all of them, as, for instance, "Le Petit Walker, et sa grande femme," "Le paresseux North," and the "Parson Adams" (Duponceau), which he used when he wanted them to be particularly active. When absent, Walker or North was bound to report to him every thing that had happened in their small family, and Steuben himself minutely described, in half-broken English and half French, the adventures which he had met with during his absence. In case of dispute or controversy among them, Steuben was the arbiter, and his sentence was strictly obeyed. There were, perhaps, few men who understood so well as Steuben how to criticise and blame politely his inferiors, and whose orders, as far as his officers were concerned, were so promptly and cheerfully executed. Had we lost all information relating to Steuben's military merit, and were all his deeds forgotten, the mere existence of letters from men like Walker, North, Davies, Fleury, Ternant, De L'Enfant, Fish, and Fairlie, would demonstrate the invaluable worth of a general who was able to raise such talented and gifted disciples.

We propose to sketch in this chapter the most conspicuous of his assistants. Steuben, in one of his papers, gives the number of them as twenty-one. They were—Majors De Romanai, De L'Enfant, and Des Epiniers; Captains Duponceau and De Pontière; Colonels Walker and Fleury; Lieutenant Colonel Ternant; Captains Duval and Fairlie; Major North; Colonel William S. Smith; Lieutenant Colonel N. Fish;

Colonel Meade ; Messrs. Peyton Randolph, and Moore ; Majors Galvan, Villefranche, Barber, and Popham ; and, finally, Lieutenant Colonel De La Laumayauté. Some of these officers were only for a short time in Steuben's suite, as for instance, Romanai, who accompanied him to America, and soon after his arrival was employed in another department ; De Pontière, who, after having joined the army, entered Pulaski's legion as captain of horse ; Des Epiniers, a nephew of Beaumarchais and son of the famous watchmaker, Lépine, who had changed his name to Des Epiniers, to give it an appearance of nobility, and, as soon as December, 1778, asking leave of absence, never reassumed his duties on Steuben's staff ; or Messrs. Peyton Randolph and Moore, who, for a short time, during the Virginia campaign, acted as voluntary aids of Steuben ; and, finally, Galvan, Villefranche, and De La Laumayauté, who served as engineers under Steuben in the trenches of Yorktown. There are only about a dozen left who are deserving a peculiar mention in connection with Steuben, and we shall speak of them according to the date on which they joined his personal staff.

First of all, we shall allude to his first secretary, PETER S. DUPONCEAU. He was born on the 3d of June, 1760, at the town of St. Martin, in the island of Ré, France. At six years his fondness for languages began to develop itself. As there were some English families in the town, he learned English rapidly. At the college of the Benedictine monks at St. John D'Angely he pursued his English studies, and was nicknamed *L'Anglais*. After the death of his father, Duponceanu became abbé ; but, in December, 1775, he left his place, and, with the "Paradise Lost" in one pocket and a clean shirt in another, he took his way on foot to Paris, where he arrived with the firm resolution to depend, from that moment, on his own exertions for his subsistence. In the circles of the French aristocracy the *Anglomania* then prevailed. Duponceanu wrote an English and French vocabulary relating to the chase and racing, with dialogues, for the use of the Duke of Orleans (Egalité) ;

but when he modestly hinted to Mr. De Genlis something about reward, he got the cool but characteristic reply, "*Les princes ne donnent rien.*" He, accordingly, had enough of ministers and courtiers, and turned to men of letters, where his knowledge of the English language was of great use to him. Among the houses which he frequented at Paris was that of Mr. De Beaumarchais. Here, in 1777, he became acquainted with Steuben, who wanted a secretary conversant with the English language. Duponceau exactly answered his purpose, and consequently accompanied him to America.

In his letters which he wrote in 1836 to Robert Walsh and to his grand-daughter, he has left a great many interesting anecdotes about himself, and the manners, habits, and customs of the time. We insert a few of them, trusting that the whole valuable manuscript will soon be printed.

Duponceau was at that time a specimen of the jovial and amiable young Frenchman who loved to frolic and laugh at other men and his own follies. Just before they landed at Portsmouth, on the 1st of December, 1777, he made a bet that he would kiss the first girl they met on shore. His fellow-passengers laughed at him, but Duponceau really did what he had promised. He told a young, bright girl, whom he saw first, that they had come over to fight for American liberty, and that like an old cavalier he had made a vow to ask a kiss from the lady he first met on American soil, as a blessing for their undertaking. The girl so addressed did not refuse the kiss, and Duponceau won his bet.

At Boston Steuben's party lodged at the house of a Mrs. Doane, the widow of a British officer, a respectable lady with two beautiful and amiable daughters of nineteen and sixteen years of age, with the youngest of whom, Sally, Duponceau fell in love. We have seen his diary of that time; it is a small insignificant book, but on each page written during that period we meet the name of Sally, either written in Gothic, or in Latin, or in Greek, or even in Russian letters. "I can remem-

ber but few epochs of my life," says Duponceau, "in which I enjoyed so much happiness as I did during the month that I remained in Boston. I was charmed with the simplicity of manners which at that time reigned in this country. I was seventeen years of age and my mind was open to all pleasurable impressions. Shall I say that the beauty of the fair sex did not a little contribute to it? I interpreted, it is true, as in duty bound, between the baron and the old lady, and transmitted a few compliments from him to the young ladies, but I left my brother beaux to shift for themselves. There they stood and sat like Indians, and could talk only by signs."

As stated in chapter V., Duponceau followed Steuben to Valley Forge and was with him during the whole of the year 1778; but it does not seem that he was very efficient in a military point of view. His short-sightedness prevented him from playing a more active and prominent part in the field. "When our army was encamped at Valley Forge," says he, "the commander-in-chief ordered a sham fight to be executed by two divisions of our troops, one of which was under the command of Baron Steuben. In the capacity of his aide-de-camp I was sent to reconnoiter, with orders to return immediately at full gallop, as soon as the enemy should be in sight. I rode on to the distance of about a quarter of a mile, when I was struck with the sight of what I was afterwards informed to be some red petticoats hanging on a fence to dry, which I took for a body of British soldiers. I had forgotten, it seems, that the contending parties were all Americans, and none of them clothed in scarlet regimentals. Full of my hallucination I returned in haste to the camp, with the news that the enemy was marching upon us. Our division took the road I had indicated, and the sight of the red petticoats was all the result of their movement. It excited, of course, a great deal of merriment to my utter confusion and dismay. The adventure was related the same day, at head-quarters, to General Washington, in my presence, but such was the conduct of that ex-

cellent man that I retired comforted, and my mind relieved from the heavy weight that pressed upon it."

Duponceau, however, did very valuable service as translator and secretary to Steuben. In this capacity he assisted him, when in winter 1778-79 Steuben prepared his system of discipline for the army, and so well did he perform his part in the task assigned to him, that Congress rewarded him with a sum of \$400 in addition to his pay. In spring 1779, he went with Steuben to West Point, where he had to make extracts from the various returns about the number of men, quantity of provisions, clothing, arms, ammunition, etc., and to frame from them the general returns to be laid before the commander-in-chief. When, in winter 1779-80, Steuben was sent to Philadelphia again to urge Congress to adopt more energetic measures for the army, Duponceau accompanied him as secretary, and kept that position till he fell sick and was compelled to go into the country for his recovery. But when in fall 1780, Steuben passing through Philadelphia, went to the southern army, Duponceau asked his permission to join his staff. "Very well," said he, at last, "you shall follow me, and I hope you will either recover your health or die an honorable death." Duponceau shared, for more than six months, all the privations and emergencies of his general; but in June 1781, he became again dangerously ill, and not being able to bear the fatigues of the campaign, returned to Philadelphia. Steuben had provided him with a strong letter of introduction to Congress, in which he requested that body to employ him in some civil capacity, as his health did not permit him to continue in the military service. That letter procured him, besides many friends in and out of Congress, a place as under secretary in the office of Foreign Affairs, under Robert R. Livingston. From that time Duponceau never reëntered the army, but he always remained on very intimate terms with Steuben, and acted as his agent and reporter from the seat of government. They corresponded occasionally, and their friendship continued

till the general's death. His last letter, which we were able to find among the Steuben papers,* is dated from Philadelphia, on the 2d of October, 1782 :

"There was never," says he, "such a scarcity of political or other matters, as at present, which must account for my having been lately so bad a correspondent. When any thing particular occurs that may be worth your knowledge, you may be sure that I shall not fail to inform you at once. I am very sorry that your things can not be sent up to you immediately. I would have taken this affair upon me, but not having received any money from Congress these four months, I am left altogether penniless. Depontière tells me that I have got at least money enough to buy him a cue-ribbon, but I can assure him with great truth that I have not got enough to buy one for myself, though I want one excessively.

"There is such a scarcity of news that even the newspapers contain nothing. The printers have been obliged to write against each other to fill up their gazettes, which, you know, is the last finesse to which they usually have recourse. If this will not do, they will be obliged to print old sermons, or to drop the trade entirely. No money and no credit are trifles with the people of America ; but the want of news is the greatest calamity that can befall them."

From the date of this letter there does not occur in the records of his intercourse with Steuben any thing worthy of particular mention. Soon after the war of the Revolution had terminated, Duponceau retired from office, and became a prominent lawyer at Philadelphia. He died there on the 1st of April, 1844, not quite eighty-four years old, highly respected and venerated for his learning, integrity, and warm attachment to his adopted country. He was much distinguished as a linguist and philologist, and wrote a very valuable disquisition upon the Chinese language. He was for a long time pres-

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

ident of the American Philosophical Society at Philadelphia, and was interred with public honors.*

BENJAMIN WALKER, then captain in the second New York regiment, was the first aid-de-camp whom Steuben, while at Valley Forge, on the 25th of April, 1778, took into his family. He was an Englishman by birth, and had been brought up for the counting-house. "He had not received," says Duponceau, "a brilliant, but a solid education; he was master of the French language, and gifted by nature with a clear head and sound judgment. He was brave, intelligent, honest and true. I enjoyed his friendship to the time of his death. He was beloved and respected by all who knew him, and the baron, particularly, was much attached to him. While I am speaking about this gentleman, I must relate an anecdote, which happened while he was in the family of General Washington. He had long been engaged to a young Quaker lady, who resided in the State of New York, and whom he afterwards married. He once asked the general to give him leave of absence for a few days to go and see her. The general told him that he could not at that time dispense with his services. Walker insisted, begged, and entreated, but all in vain. 'If I don't go,' said he, 'she will die.' 'O no,' said Washington, 'women do not die for such trifles.' 'But, general, what shall I do?' 'What will you do? why, write to her to add another leaf to the book of sufferings.'

"This was related to me by Walker himself. General Washington had a great deal of that dry humor which he knew how to make use of on proper occasions."

We noticed in chapter VI. the occasion on which Walker became attached to Steuben's staff. He was afterward one of his most intimate friends and most effective coöperators, without whose assistance Steuben would scarcely have accomplished so much. He superintended all his correspondence and writing from 1778 to 1782. Steuben dictated to him in French,

* Contributions to American History, Philadelphia, pp. 352 and 353.

and Walker wrote it out in English. Thus almost all the drafts of Steuben's reforms and plans are written in Walker's neat hand-writing. He accompanied his general to all the inspections and reviews, acted as translator in case of need, and often extricated him from difficulties. There is an old anecdote, first narrated by A. Garden, which, however exaggerated it may be, characterizes Steuben's dependence on Walker during the first year of his service in America. After having exhausted his rich store of German and French oaths, he is said to have called Walker to his assistance, vociferating, "*Viens, Walker, mon ami, viens, mon bon ami, sacré, God dam de gancheries of dese badauts je ne puis plus, I can curse dem no more!*" But be this as it may, we know that even in the most difficult matters Steuben relied chiefly on Walker's sound judgment, and that the success of Steuben's reforms is in a great measure due to his indefatigable and able aid-de-camp. In the year 1781-82, Walker joined General Washington's suite, and acted as his aid-de-camp to the close of the war, which fact furnishes the best proof of his merits and value. After the conclusion of peace he was first secretary to the Governor of New York, but soon after established himself as broker in the city of New York. In 1797, when he was appointed agent of the Earl of Bath's great estate in western New York, he removed to old Fort Schuyler, the present city of Utica, where he resided the remainder of his life. As a man of intelligence and refinement he was identified with the early growth and progress of Utica. He died there on the 13th of January, 1818, aged sixty-five years, leaving a natural daughter, who married a French colonel.*

The private correspondence between Steuben and Walker gives an adequate idea of the relations which existed between them. It begins in the winter of 1779-80, when Steuben was in Philadelphia, soliciting Congress to adopt more energetic measures in regard to the army, and when Walker discharged,

* Annals and Recollections of Oneida county, by P. Jones, p. 515.

ad interim, the duties of inspector general. His official letters were always accompanied by a few confidential lines, which show their mutual friendship and intimacy.

"Fish delivered me the linen," writes Walker, on the 3d of February, 1780, from camp,* "you were so kind as to send, for which accept my thanks. You are determined to keep me your debtor in every respect. However, I shall not attempt to say much on this subject, as all I can say or do will fall short of the repeated instances of friendship with which you have honored me. Of this, however, I can with confidence assure you, that I could remain easy under so many obligations from you alone, and that I shall never be more happy than in an opportunity of convincing you of my sincere friendship and high veneration for you."†

"I inclose a letter for you from General Schuyler," says he on another occasion.‡ "His daughter is now in Morris-town. [General Schuyler had given her this letter to Steuben, in which he addressed him as one of the most gallant men in camp, Harrison being considered by him as the other.] I have not yet seen her, though she acknowledges she came recommended to your protection. As all that is left of you in camp, I should not have neglected so fair an opportunity of supplying your absence; but alas! my old hat and coat forbid my associating but with my brethren in affliction."

"I am particularly in want of you, my dear Walker," writes Steuben on the 23d of February, 1780, from Philadelphia;§ "Duponceau is sick, and you know that my ideas, although sometimes good, do not appear good when they are translated word for word. I am in need of a translator of my ideas; in one word, I want a friend like you. I shall probably come to camp, with the Chevalier De La Luzerne, within a fortnight; the exact time, however, is not yet fixed. But as I think I shall be able to persuade you to accompany me back

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ii.

† Ibidem.

‡ Ibidem.

§ Ibidem.

to Philadelphia, and as I flatter myself that you will not refuse my request, I wish you to be ready. You will probably not abandon me, but will go hand in hand with me. I shall send you your hat by the first opportunity; please inform me of your other wants. As soon as I can buy the cloth I shall send you a uniform; treat me in this respect, too, as your friend and agent."

"I want to see you here," continues Steuben, a few days later, "in the course of next week. I board at Mrs. Clark's, in Front street. You will find there a young widow, and a lady from New York with a beautiful waist, a reason the more for you to hasten your departure. I expect you with the impatience of a lover for his mistress, or to speak without figures, with all the sentiments of true friendship."

"Accept, my dear general, my thanks for your kind offer," answers Walker to the first of these letters, on the 10th of March, 1780,* "of procuring me a few necessaries. With respect to the uniform, I shall only want a coat, blue turned up and faced with buff, white lining and plain white buttons, a cockade with a black silk cord and tassels, two or three yards of hair ribbon, a pair of gloves and a sword belt. These, my dear general, are all the articles I stand in need of, and with which I should really be ashamed to trouble you had you not indulged me in the pleasing thought of regarding you in the double capacity of my general and my friend."

Even after having been appointed aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, Walker carried on his correspondence and intercourse with Steuben.

"My correspondence with the French ministers," writes the latter from Schuylkill, near Philadelphia, on the 27th of December, 1782,† "has cost me a great deal of trouble. You know that I am without assistance even for my English correspondence. What shall I do, my friend, if I must make a

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ii.

† Steuben MS. Papers, Sprague, Albany.

new campaign? I do not think that Popham is anxious to join me again; at least I have not had a line from him. Where may I find a Walker? But I do not want to make you too vain, and in earnest, where may I find a man who is able to conduct my correspondence? Try to get me a good assistant. You know what I want. I still expect my North; you know, however, that his power does not consist in his pen, and that he is as lazy as he is amiable. For four weeks I have not got a line from him; please write to him and scold him. Try at the same time to persuade him that he joins me at least towards the end of March. Gibbs told me that the officers of the army were about to write me a letter of gratitude. I should be infinitely flattered by it; tell me the reason which has prevented the execution of the plan; I wish you a happy new year. Do not forget to present my respects to General and Mrs. Washington. Adieu, my friend; never doubt my sincere attachment for you."

We can not give here all the letters which, besides the friendly chat between Steuben and Walker, are of a more general interest; they would occupy too much space. We therefore confine ourselves to the following extracts:*

"I have many thanks to give you, my dear general, for the pleasure I received from your letter of the 27th of December. I had been exceedingly anxious to hear from you, and the several rumors I had heard only served to increase that anxiety. One told me that you lived in the country, another that you had moved to the Indian Queen, one that your affairs were likely to turn out well, another doubted it. I was exceedingly glad, too, to hear that North was again with you. Your situation was too solitary, and wanted his gayety to make it tolerable; but tell him that he has another friend besides his general. When he passed on to you he has forgotten it.

"We are here in the center of dullness. Head-quarters,

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

you know, was always the last place in the world for mirth, and unhappily, there being only two of us, I can not go out to take my share of the little that is circulating abroad. At home the occupations of each day are so much alike from one end of the month to the other that the life is really disgusting. I had two disciples at chess, Mrs. Washington and my colleague, but unhappily one is thinking too much of her home, and the other is making verses during the game. Their progress, therefore, is so little that both are tired of it, and so I have been obliged to learn backgammon, of which I am equally tired. In fact I have only one resource left to prevent my dying of ennui, to seek some neighbors' daughters, *pour passer le temps*. You know, my dear general, how much this is against my conscience, and will judge how hard I must be driven before I could bring myself to seek this expedient to amuse myself. I believe in the army they are not much more gay than we are. It has always been regretted that so little sociability took place between the officers of the different States. An effort is made to bring them more together, and a large room is building where they may assemble every day. The general has said he would attend himself and give out the orders. Gibbs has been a violent opposer of this, and his regiment to this day has not assisted in building it; it will be finished in about three weeks. The army are better hutted than they ever were; some of the officers' rooms are really very decent."

After the conclusion of the peace Walker sought for civil employment, and tried to get the place as secretary to the Governor of the State of New York. His prospects, however, were at first not brilliant. "I have no hopes," writes he to Steuben, on the 14th of February, 1784,* "of getting any thing from the State for myself. The office I sought will be given to Lamb. His influence with the common people and in the Assembly are better claims than I have. Fish is

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

also a candidate for the same place. I had the vanity to suppose that, backed by the strong recommendations of my general, I would be preferred; but these are foolish ideas. I can not serve the views of any party, either with the people or in the Assembly, and therefore it would be absurd to serve me. I have not, however, withdrawn my claim—let it stand! The place Smith was candidate for, is given to Benson. Had he not been in the way, young Lewis Morris was thought to have the best chance, and why? Because his father is chief justice and young Lewis lived with the chancellor.”

Walker, however, finally succeeded and got the place which he desired. “You will have heard,” says he, on the 25th of April, 1784,* in a letter to Steuben, “that I am moving in the humble sphere of private secretary. For this I am obliged to the friendship of the governor, and without it I should have been aground. It is hard, my dear baron, to have spent the best eight years of one’s life in the service of a people who have not gratitude enough to pay even what is justly due. If I had the sum in cost owing me by the public, I could place myself in an independent place of business—but why do I complain? hundreds are worse off.

“When shall I have the pleasure to embrace you? You express a wish to have my picture. If it was a miniature you meant, we have a miniature painter here in New York, as superior to Peale as light to darkness.”

When Walker, soon afterwards, retired and did business in New York as a broker, Steuben lived for a long while with him. They continued on the most friendly footing until Steuben’s death. Walker visited him almost every year on his farm and managed his business. Steuben bequeathed him in his will one half of his property.

JEAN DE TERNANT, a French officer, was in April, 1778, appointed as one of Steuben’s sub-inspectors, and acted under his orders in the main army, till the 25th of September, 1778,

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

when he was made lieutenant colonel and inspector of the troops in South Carolina and Georgia. Taken prisoner at the capture of Charleston in 1780, he was afterwards exchanged, and having temporarily filled the place of Colonel Armand, resumed his duties in the South. After the conclusion of peace he returned to France. Toward the end of 1789, he came back to America as ambassador of revolutionary France, and left again in 1793, when the Convention sent "citizen" Genet as his successor. Ternant was an officer of decided ability, of remarkable accomplishments, and as faithful and energetic in the promotion of American liberty as any native officer. His noble and amiable character gained him the affection of his superiors and inferiors; he was on the most intimate terms with Steuben. We illustrate this by one of his letters, as space will not permit us to copy here their entire correspondence.

When, in consequence of the jealousies of his brother officers, Steuben, in July 1778, had gone to Philadelphia to get the duties of his office defined, Ternant wrote to him on the 11th of August, 1778, from Whiteplains:*

"I visit sometimes the camp of Mars which has been open since the 1st of this month. Davies and Brooks have been nominated by general orders to preside over the exercises, and it is under their auspices that your former apprentices in tactics cover themselves twice a day at least with—dust. I need not tell you that everybody acts just as he thinks proper, that the uniformity is more neglected there than ever before, and that for want of method the soldiers and officers are the more unmercifully fatigued, as no real benefit results from their drill. I hope that you will soon with your wonted success resume the direction of this department, to which you have already given the organization which it wanted so much. I should also wish that you would render to the army the important service of putting the department of *maréchal général de logis*

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

on a good footing. Bad order and confusion are more prevailing there than in any other department. I continue to make observations, complaints and proposals; but hitherto I have been unsuccessful and they even do not think of palliating the evil. I am always disposed to do good; to live, however, longer in this anarchy, and work much but to accomplish little, while there is so much to do if order succeeded to the confusion, I can not longer afford, and, therefore, I am decided to ask General Greene, after his return from Rhode Island, either to put my department on a better footing, or to look after another person to fill my place.

"The council of war in the case of General Lee have finally finished their work. I have read a part of his defense; it is the most stupid piece of literature and dialectics that has ever been written. His statements of facts, as well as the observations and reasoning which he develops from them, do not show an eloquent man nor a good judgment, and still less a consummate officer. As to his refutation of witnesses, it only consists in bad, would-be witty remarks, unintelligible quibbles and mean sarcasms which he tries to make stronger by declamation, so that nobody is spared.

"Good bye, my dear general. Be careful in regard to your health. Continue to enlighten Congress about their military constitution and the establishment of the inspectorship, and do not forget your promise to retain myself, the oldest of your inspectors, for whom it would be very cruel to see another man reap what he has sown."

There are a number of Ternant's letters which give some very interesting and new details about the condition of the southern army, for which we refer the reader to the Appendix, where they are given in full.

LOUIS DE FLEURY, another French sub-inspector of Steuben's, had served in the army since the beginning of the campaign of 1777. He first obtained a captain's commission from Congress, and entered as a volunteer in a corps of riflemen,

in which, by his activity and bravery, he brought himself into notice. He next served as brigade major, first in the infantry and afterwards in the cavalry, in which stations he acquired reputation in the army. Towards the conclusion of the campaign of 1777, he was sent to the important post of Fort Mifflin in the quality of engineer, in which he rendered essential services, and became equally distinguished for his intelligence and valor. In consequence of his good conduct on this and on former occasions he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the army, and received from Congress the gift of a horse, as a testimonial of their sense of his merit at the battle of Brandywine, where a horse was shot under him.* In the winter of 1778 Fleury was employed in the camp at Valley Forge, and having filled the office of aid major in France, Steuben proposed to have him employed as sub-inspector, in which the commander-in-chief readily acquiesced.† We have seen in chapter VI. that Fleury took charge of the Maryland and Delaware divisions at Wilmington. Steuben could scarcely have found a more energetic and effective assistant for teaching the principles and practical duties of his system than Fleury. He continued in his position until the summer of 1778, when, in consequence of the jealousies of the general officers, the inspectorship was practically annihilated. In July, 1778, he was employed as second in command in a corps of light infantry, in the expedition against Rhode Island, and afterwards as commandant of one of Steuben's new battalions of light infantry, in the army under Washington's command. In the assault of Stony Point he commanded the van of the right wing; was the first that entered the main works, and struck the British flag with his own hands. When Rochambeau arrived in 1780, Fleury left the American service and became an officer in the army of the French commander. "In each of these capacities he had

* Washington's Writings, v., 155, and vi., 307-309.

† Ibidem, vol. v., 348.

uniformly," says Washington,* "acquitted himself as an officer of distinguished merit for talents, zeal, activity, prudence and bravery, and acquired more and more the character of a judicious, well-informed, indefatigable and brave officer."

We know from the correspondence of Steuben with the French minister, Gérard, how highly he thought of Fleury's merits and talents, and how warmly he interested himself for his success and reputation. There are in the Steuben papers a few letters of Fleury to Steuben, written in the French camp at Newport, in the summer and fall of 1780. We give here those portions of them which are of general interest :

"This is the third letter, my dear general," says Fleury, on the 3d of August, 1780,† "that one of your old friends has had the honor to write to you; who does not know whether you are still living, or have resolved not to know him any longer. We expect the enemy with confidence. We see in the horizon the English fleet. If they do not come with more than eight thousand men, their arrival this evening will be more desirable than dangerous.

"You are going, I am told, to come nearer to New York. Frighten them, we then shall be more tranquil; but do not place yourself too near to King's Bridge. I should be afraid they would disembark behind you, if a battle must be fought in a position of their choice."

"I thank you, my dear general," continues Fleury, on the 17th of August, 1780, "for your kind letter. I shall always rely on the friendship which you promise me. You have passed the North river and are going to establish yourselves at Dobbs' Ferry. I do not know this position, but it appears to me a little exposed, especially for your upper posts in the east and at Stony Point. You, however, know it much better than I who speak of it from hearsay. If without indiscretion you can give me some knowledge of your army, and of the situation of the enemy, I should be very much obliged to you. If

* Washington's Writings, vi., 307.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. i.

Duponceau should be with you, I request him to trouble himself with this task. We are very quiet here. The fleet of the enemy is still in view, and is blockading us. Mr. De Lafayette has arrived to join us. I wish him much glory; but I have resigned all claims to distinction since I have left you. I am too insignificant. Adieu, my dear general. Be as happy as you deserve to be, and believe me always full of respect and gratitude to you."

"I have little time," writes Fleury, on the 6th of October, 1780, from Newport, "to write to you, but I can not let Mr. De La Luzerne depart without a letter for you. There are no news here. Rodney is in New York. He has been announced to us, but he does not come. Everybody wished it, and as to me, who am perhaps a little too timid, I only waited for him. Our situation, however, is formidable. The fleet lies at anchor from Breton Point to Rose island, on which points batteries are erected. Goat island, which lies within the line formed by the fleet, is also entrenched. We have left Canonicut, of which the nearest point is two thousand and sixty yards from the line of our vessels. At this distance the bombs are not to be dreaded, although they can well reach it. On land we occupy the English lines. Our right is at Easton's Beach, and the left at Tominy hill. If the English come, they will regret it, we are told. I do not dare to have a contrary opinion, and I really believe that an attack from the sea will not be very dangerous; but the coöperation of twenty-one vessels and ten thousand men embarrasses us.

"Your infamous Arnold has abandoned himself to an eternal infamy! What demon impelled him to take this detestable step? Is his wife the cause or only the occasion of the crime? Is — mixed with this horrible affair? Is Smith hanged? Can not André be hanged? I am very curious to hear all the details of this atrocity; be kind enough to give them to me. Arnold is not the only man whom I blame; he who once has made the country suspicious of his virtue is not

the most culpable, when the blind and criminal confidence that is put in him makes him a traitor. That's between you and me."

WILLIAM NORTH, Steuben's other favorite aid-de-camp, was born in 1752, and died in New York on the 3d of January, 1836, at the advanced age of eighty-three years. "He has filled," says the memoir of the Cincinnati, "a distinguished place in the history of his country, not only in the war of independence, but in our subsequent annals. He was a gentleman by birth, education, and early association, and when he took up arms in defense of his country, became the gallant and aspiring officer. He was, in 1777, appointed a captain in Colonel Jackson's regiment of infantry, and fought in the battle of Monmouth. In 1779 he was appointed aid-de-camp to Steuben, and soon became his favorite; aided and assisted the baron in introducing his system of discipline into the Continental army. Major North was with the army in Virginia, and was, with Baron Steuben, present at the surrender of the British army, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, in October, 1781. After the war of the Revolution was ended, and the independence of the United States acknowledged, North retired to private life; but afterwards, induced so accept public employment in support of the institutions which his valor had contributed to found, was several times elected to the Legislature of the State of New York, was Speaker of the Assembly, and, for a short period, one of the Senators of New York in the Congress of the United States. During our troubles with France, in the presidency of the elder Adams, Major North was appointed adjutant general of the army which was raised on that occasion, with the rank of brigadier general."

Steuben loved North like a son for his unreserved devotion, for his jovial and amiable disposition of mind, and for the energy and zeal which he displayed in the performance of his duties. During the war their correspondence was, of course, very small, as they were almost never separated; but we find in the Steuben papers a great many letters, written after

the close of the war by North, which prove the most cordial and intimate relations between the general and his aid. North, after the death of Steuben, erected in his honor not only a stone monument, but a written one, in the eloquent biographical sketch from which we derived so much valuable and interesting information about the character of our hero.

"On the eve of returning to the north from Virginia"—states North in this pamphlet, who is himself the aid-de-camp alluded to—"‘I must go,’ said Steuben to a sick aid-de-camp, ‘I must leave you, my son, but I leave you among a people where we have found the door of every house wide open; where the heart of every female is full of tenderness and virtue. Quit this deleterious spot the instant you are able; there is my sulky, and here is half of what I have—God bless you!—I can do no more.’ Nor could he. A journey of three hundred miles was before him, a single piece of gold in his purse! Are other instances necessary to unfold the texture of his heart? How many have I written on my own!"

After the conclusion of peace, Steuben and North lived some time together in the "Louvre." The farm of which this house formed a part belonged to a Mr. David Provost, who, on account of his constant command of cash, had been styled when living, "Ready Money Provost," to whose memory, on the summit of a hill, a monument was erected. A gentleman observing that, in the event of death, Steuben would be at no loss for a snug place of interment, North replied,* "Then, sir, his disposition must alter with his state, for in life he will never tolerate the idea of laying by ready money."

Steuben's and North's friendship lasted until the death of the former, who made him the heir of one half of his property. For its better illustration, we give here a few extracts of letters written by North between the years 1782 and 1789:

"It is now over three years," writes North on the 29th of October and 6th of November, 1782, from Fishkill Landing,†

* Percy's Anecdotes, ii., 122.

† Steuben MS. Papers, vol. ix.

“since I had first the honor of being attached to you. The numberless acts of friendship I have received would have been ill bestowed, did not my heart feel the obligations, and make your happiness its greatest wish. Permit me, my dear baron, to address you with the freedom of a friend, and, at the same time, with that respect that shall always mark my character towards you. Your services to my ungrateful country have been treated with a neglect shocking to every man of sensibility. Congress, whose eyes ought to be open to see all and whose hand ought to be open to reward all who have well deserved of the country, are unknowing and unknown, except a few men of liberal ideas. It is hard, at the last, to be obliged to ask for one’s right, and the hardship is augmented by a refusal. Congress at large know little of what is due to you for your exertions, so that applying to them as a body, in the first instance, would be to no purpose. . . . You have a friend in Mr. Peters. His advice with respect to your affairs, I am sure, will be for your interest, therefore I hope you will follow it. I think he and all your other friends must advise that you continue *in statu quo* for the present, that is, inspector and major general. If you give up one of these titles you give up a great deal. The probability that the end of the war is near is great. You have borne the burden in the heat of the day; it has been heavy, very heavy; but you must not faint. ‘*Finis coronat opus.*’ Your star will then be brightened for this perseverance. The department of which you are the head is so essential to the well-being of the army, that I hope you will not be permitted to resign it. It is so conspicuous a post, that I never wish to see it filled by another, while there is an American army to profit by your instructions.”

“I hope the pleasure that you will receive from your situation this winter will make up for the fatigues of last campaign. I suppose your home will be mostly at Mr. Peters’. This winter will give your friends an opportunity of exerting themselves effectually for you.”

"What, with a villainous wind," says North, in a letter of the 19th of October, 1784,* "and the foolish parade which has been made with the Don Quixote Lafayette, I have not had a moment's peace. He arrived here on Friday, amidst the acclamations of foolish disbanded officers and the town rabble; seated on a little horse (for the sake of Christ I am sorry it was not an ass) he made his public entry. Yesterday they gave him a dinner, and at night Madame Hayley, and old —, gave him some of the most infamous fire-works I ever saw; but he, like a true Frenchman, told her they were superb. He has done me the honor to notice me. While we were looking at the exhibition, he observed, putting his arm around my neck and whispering, how pleased he was that this attention was paid him by an English woman. But damn the subject! I have kept too long on it already. Monsieur le marquis goes to Rhode Island to receive the honor due him from that State."

"I received your letter, my dear baron, of the 12th of December," writes North from Duanesburg, on the 8th of January, 1789,† "this morning, and have attempted three times to answer it; but I could not please myself, and therefore tore the sheet in pieces. To what it was owing I know not; but I have had the blue devils all this morning. We have just dined on soup and beef-steaks, and I have drawn two glasses of your sherry. Would to God you were here to drink with me! Whether this wish will banish my ill humor, my letter will show, provided I do not tear it in pieces also. I am up by daylight, and set my man and boy to work this morning; they were sent at a distance from hence, and I was obliged to drudge a mile and a half, with a load on my shoulders, through their carelessness. It is not very pleasant to walk through the snow with a load; I did sweat most confoundedly; this made me a little angry. But this was not all. Your letter told me everybody was going to be a great man. I hate everybody who is

* Steuben MS. Papers, vol. x.

† Ibidem, vol. xiii.

greater than myself, except you. I see no chance I have of getting any thing in this scramble. This, perhaps, made me mad. Knox will remain Secretary of War or have an equivalent. His smiles and bows have secured him a place of consequence in the new government. If you come in, you must resolve to see him your equal. Except a very few, I despise and detest the whole human species: would to God I had been an Indian! I should either have been a warrior or a sachem. My wife is the best woman possible; my boy is good, but I am not happy. My father-in-law tells me I am independent. So I am; and so is every fellow with a woolen shirt, who owns a hundred acres of land. I go to Albany with Polly and the boy to-morrow, for the first time since we have lived here. It is business more than pleasure that takes me there. I shall get no office under the new government, because I shall ask for none. I am proud and honest. I know what I am worth, and if other people do not know it without my telling them, they may remain ignorant. Hamilton, Jay, and several others who will have the chief management in this business, know me; but they have their friends and dependents. I shall go to New York, kiss you and Ben; go to Boston, comfort my old mother, and return here to drudge on in getting my living.

“Knox is too firmly footed to be ousted; it would not do. If he is not Secretary of War he will be something higher; however, he has not interest enough to get Jackson the command of the troops, or Doughty the command of the artillery, though this would be easier than the other. Pray who is talked of as Postmaster General? My father-in-law (Duane) has been here and is gone to Albany a month since. I will tell you what we conversed about when we meet.”

JAMES FAIRLIE was born in the city of New York, in 1757 or 1758. His father was the captain of a bark in the Havana trade. At the time the *Asia*, man-of-war, fired upon New York, he was first on the ground with his company at the

Bowling Green, to oppose the enemy. He entered the revolutionary army in the latter part of the year 1775 or early in 1776. He was first commissioned as an ensign in the first New York regiment, then commanded by Colonel (afterward Major General) Macdonough, and, upon the reform of the army, was appointed to the same rank in the regiment then commanded by Colonel (afterward General) Philip Van Courtlandt. He accompanied his regiment to the North, and was present and distinguished himself at the capture of the British army in the year 1777. In 1778 Fairlie was appointed aide-de-camp to Steuben, and acted in that capacity at the battle of Monmouth. Afterward he went with Steuben to Virginia, where he was taken prisoner. After his exchange, he joined the army again at Newburg, and continued in it until the close of the revolutionary war.

After its close he first lived a few years with Steuben, Walker, and North without special employment. He next became claim-agent for the State of New York and then held several offices. He was clerk of the Supreme Court of New York, during his life, several years a member of the Assembly, and one of the delegates that formed the new constitution of 1823. Jefferson gave him the honorary office of commissioner of bankruptcy. During the war of 1812 he was offered the post of adjutant general of the United States, by Madison, which he, however, declined.

Fairlie discharged the duties of the several offices he held with great zeal and ability. He died, seventy-three years old, on the 11th of October, 1830, in the city of New York, and was buried with military honors.

Fairlie married the daughter of Chief Justice Robert Yates in Albany. The eclat that surrounded those of the officers who had distinguished themselves in the Revolution, often enabled them to marry among the first families in the State. This happened with William North, who married a daughter of Mayor Duane, and Colonel Fish, who married

among the descendants of Governor Stuyvesant. Fairlie was so liberal in his disposition, and so addicted to fashionable display, that his friends thought it would be advantageous for him to marry, and promoted his connection with the family of the chief justice.

Mention has already been made of Fairlie as aid of Steuben in Virginia, and as one of the most ardent promoters of the Cincinnati society, the secretary of which he was in 1784. We shall here only refer to his private character. His great ambition was to enliven society by his wit. Steuben liked him very much for his humor, his fidelity, his sincere friendship, and his readiness to assist others. Those of his letters that have been preserved relate almost exclusively to business matters, but Fairlie's amiable disposition and ingenious wit are very highly spoken of by his contemporaries. Washington Irving calls him of facetious memory, and states that when Washington, at the return of peace, was sailing in a boat on the Hudson, he was so overcome by the drollery of a story told by Major Fairlie that he fell back in the boat in a paroxysm of laughter.*

We do not remember to have read any thing more pleasant and witty than one of his letters to Benjamin Walker, in which, by a series of false conclusions, he proves that a lot in Broadway at Albany, was worth double the price of one in Courtland street at New York, as Albany, instead of New York, was soon to become the great commercial metropolis of the United States. He therefore proposed to Walker to change the Albany lot for Walker's lot in Courtland street, adding that he was thereby conferring a great favor on his friend by giving him a chance of a very good speculation. As the wit of the circle that assembled around Steuben, he was popular among all who knew him, and he could say and do a great many things which would have offended, if said or done by others.

When Steuben first settled on his farm in Oneida county,

* Washington's Life, iv., 475.

the first difference arose between him and Fairlie. Steuben made a present to his former aids of a few hundred acres of land. On one occasion North and Fairlie were together, when the latter being highly pleased with a set of Sèvres china in the possession of the former, agreed to exchange the land which Steuben had presented him, for the china. When this came to Steuben's ears, he became not only indignant, but felt his pride much hurt, and in order to punish Fairlie gave double the quantity of land to his aids, and the share which would have fallen to Fairlie, he gave to North in addition. Although the land at that time was of but little value, Fairlie's conduct appeared in Steuben's eyes very disrespectful, and he never forgave him for it to the hour of his death. Fairlie sometimes spoke of this occurrence with regret in his latter days. It appears that on account of this bargain, Steuben did not notice him in his will.

NICHOLAS FISH, born in 1758, and deceased on the 20th of June, 1833, was major of the second New York regiment when Steuben introduced his system of discipline into the army, and was appointed by Washington as one of the first brigade inspectors under Steuben. The latter said of him, that he would have made an excellent officer in the best European army, and liked him very much for his gallantry, and his energy and efficiency in drilling and disciplining the troops. At the forming of the light infantry he was one of the first majors who received a battalion of this new corps, and, while still acting as inspector of brigade, he assisted Steuben in the selection and formation of these troops. From this time we found a letter of Fish to Steuben, written at West Point on the 2d of July, 1780, which, as an evidence of their friendly intercourse, we insert here.

"We have spent," says Fish, "a most active and itinerant life, one day beholding the beauties of Jersey, the next partaking the sweets of Pennsylvania; and then enjoying the agreeable society of our New York friends, have been led to imag-

ine, from a comparison of our situation with that of those at West Point, Fort Schuyler, etc., that we were peculiarly fortunate, they as singularly unhappy.

"I know not whence our aversion to this post took birth; so is the fact, however, that myself with others had formed the most despicable idea of it, and to my agreeable disappointment I find it not only tolerable, but, upon the whole, somewhat pleasant. Our amusements, indeed, are few and rather circumscribed; but we enjoy the constant luxury of beholding one of Nature's most magnificent, tremendous and variegated landscapes. There is so solemn a pomp and grandeur in the most prodigious piles that environ us, that I am constantly impressed with ideas of a *serious* and contemplative mind.

"I would not, however, sir, wish you to imagine that I am so absorbed in contemplation, as to relax in the duties of gratitude and friendship. I would embrace every occasion of evincing this, and should have done myself the pleasure of waiting on the baron when he was at this post, had I known it in season.

"Our troops, sir, you will readily suppose, have had a severe tour since we left Morristown. One regiment has visited Fort Schuyler, one Fort Edward, the other two were posted on the Mohawk river, near Fort Plank. We have received no supply of clothing except shoes. You will, therefore, sir, easily figure out our situation.

"I have appointed Wednesday next for the inspection of the brigade. I should be exceedingly happy to have any instructions the baron may wish to give. I would thank Captain Walker and Mr. Fairlie to send by the bearer a form that I may copy after in my returns. If they will send a return of one of the Pennsylvania regiments I will very carefully preserve the original."

In 1793 it was Fish, as stated in the preceding chapter, who surveyed with Steuben the neighborhood of New York for suitable fortifications.

WILLIAM S. SMITH was one of Steuben's most steadfast friends, but was only for a short time attached to his military staff. We found no particular mention made of the date when he joined Steuben; but it must have been before July, 1781, at which time he was appointed aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief. Smith, after the war, first lived with Steuben, and in the beginning of 1785 went as secretary of legation to England, under John Adams, whose daughter he afterwards married. His correspondence from England and the continent, with Steuben, fills the greater part of volume X. of the Steuben papers; but his letters, besides his friendly talk and the ordinary description of the places and countries he saw, do not contain much of general interest. After his return to America Smith filled high offices in the Cincinnati Society, having been secretary from 1790 till 1793, and vice president in 1794. He became president in 1804, and died as such on the 10th of June, 1816. We give here only two extracts of his letters, one of which shows Smith's feelings toward Steuben, and the other refers to his introduction at the English court, where he met the traitor Arnold.

"It gives me great pain, my dear general and friend," writes he from London, on the 15th of June, 1785, "to find you describing your solitary situation. If my finances would justify my fixing, and I could continue to flatter myself that my society would be pleasing, you should never want a companion in amusement or a sincere friend to accompany you in retirement; but this can not be, unless I should write a sensible love letter and receive a favorable answer."

And on the 5th of July, 1785, he continued:

" . . . I was honored by an introduction to her Majesty the queen. Thus, sir, you see your young friend removed from the elegant simplicity of the Louvre into the gay attracting circles of a court; but do not be uneasy, he will not be captivated by it. . . .

"On the 22d of June I attended a levee at the palace, and

among the rest appeared the traitor Arnold in full British uniform as a general officer. He conversed with but one gentleman, and seemed to exert himself, by putting on a pleasant countenance, to hide the lines of a traitor under the smiles of a courtier. He did not remain long—that is, a great space of time—but it was quite long enough to disgrace the assembly, and, in my view, to place majesty in a despicable point of light.”

Here we must stop, not having been able to collect more materials about Steuben’s aides-de-camp and sub-inspectors.

We are particularly sorry that the sources of information about WILLIAM DAVIES of Virginia, the most efficient of Steuben’s sub-inspectors and assistants, are so scanty. In spite of all our endeavors we could not trace the particulars of his life either before or after the revolutionary war. He has deserved a monument for himself, for he did more than is commonly known, with that unostentatious self-sacrifice which is an attribute of only noble characters.

We hope, however, that the biographical sketches contained in this chapter will be considered sufficient to convey an adequate idea of the value of the individuals mentioned, as well as of their general.

CHAPTER XXX.

STEUBEN'S PERSON AND CHARACTER.—HIS SENSE OF JUSTICE AND BENEVOLENCE.—ANECDOTES.—LIEUTENANT GIBBONS.—LIEUTENANT COLONEL COCHRANE.—MISS SHRAF.—ROBERT MORRIS AND THE EMPTY TREASURY.—STEUBEN NEVER MARRIED.—THE IMPRESSION HE MADE ON HIS CONTEMPORARIES.—HIS FAULTS.—HIS IMPROVIDENCE IN MONEY MATTERS.—BAD CONSEQUENCES RESULTING THEREFROM.—STEUBEN'S MILITARY POSITION AND IMPORTANCE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.—PRUSSIA THE BEST SCHOOL OF WAR DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.—THE TEMPORIZING CHARACTER OF THE LAST YEARS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR MUCH LIKE THE AMERICAN WAR.—STEUBEN'S EXERTIONS IN THE INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.—HIS MODESTY.—HIS POSITION IN THE COUNTRY OF HIS ADOPTION.—HE IS MORE THAN A MERE DRILL SERGEANT.—HE IS THE ABLEST OFFICER ON WASHINGTON'S STAFF.—WASHINGTON THE HEAD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.—STEUBEN ONE OF ITS STRONG ARMS.

STEUBEN'S countenance displayed a combination of energy and benevolence. His head was round, his forehead large, his nose fine, almost aquiline, and a piercing hazel eye gave animation to his face, the upper part of which was remarkably expressive of the strong traits of his character; but his mouth and lips did not correspond with the general manly expression of his countenance. In dressing his hair, he conformed to the singularly slender cue of Frederick the Great, which, with a slight bend of the shoulders, indicated the universal attention by which courtiers and officers compliment their monarch in imitating the minor circumstances of dress and carriage.

His stature was about five feet seven inches; his carriage was very graceful and elevated, without being affected in the slightest degree; his walk was slow and measured. In the latter years of his life he became rather portly.

He was an excellent horseman. Bishop Ashbel Greene, who saw him at the affair of Connecticut Farms, in June, 1780, says of him: "Never before, or since, have I had such an impression of the ancient fabled god of war as when I

looked on the baron ; he seemed to me a perfect personification of Mars. The trappings of his horse, the enormous holsters of his pistols, his large size, and his strikingly martial aspect, all seemed to favor the idea.”*

Steuben was rather haughty in his bearing, which did not in the least diminish his frankness and cordiality in social intercourse, and he was of easy access, benevolent, and full of a high sense of justice. At a review near Morristown, a Lieutenant Gibbons, a brave and good officer, was arrested on the spot, and ordered to the rear, for a fault which, it afterward appeared, another had committed. At a proper moment the commander of the regiment came forward and informed the baron of Mr. Gibbons' innocence, of his worth, and of his acute feelings under his unmerited disgrace. “Desire Lieutenant Gibbons to come to the front, colonel. Sir,” said the baron, addressing the young gentleman, “the fault which was committed by throwing the line into confusion might, in the presence of an enemy, have been fatal ; I arrested you as its supposed author, but I have reason to believe that I was mistaken, and that, in this instance, you were blameless. I ask your pardon ; return to your command ; I would not deal unjustly toward any one, much less toward one whose character as an officer is so respectable.” All this passed with the baron's hat off, the rain pouring on his venerable head ! Do you think there was an officer or soldier who saw it, unmoved by affliction and respect ? Not one.*

At the disbandment of the revolutionary army, when inmates of the same tent or hut for seven long years were separating, “I saw,” says North, “the baron's strong endeavors to throw some ray of sunshine on the gloom, to mix some drops of cordial with the painful draught. To go, they knew not whither ; all recollection of the art of thriving by civil oc-

* The Life of Ashbel Greene, by Joseph H. Jones, New York. Robert Carter & Brothers, 1844. p. 109.

† James Thacher's Military Journal, Boston, 1827, p. 416.

cupations, was lost, or to the youthful never known. To go in silence and alone, and poor and helpless—it was too hard ! To a stern old officer, a Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane, from the Green mountains, who had met danger and difficulty in almost every step from his youth, and upon whose furrowed visage a tear till that moment had never fallen, the good baron said—what could be said to lessen deep distress. ‘For myself,’ said Cochrane, ‘I care not ; I can stand it ; but my wife and daughters are in the garret of that wretched tavern. I know not where to remove, nor have I the means for their removal.’ ‘Come, my friend,’ said the baron, ‘let us go ; I will pay my respects to Mrs. Cochrane and your daughters, if you please.’ I followed to the loft, the lower rooms being all filled with soldiers, with drunkenness, despair, and blasphemy. And when the baron left the poor unhappy cast-aways, he left hope with them, and all he had to give.

“A black man, with wounds unhealed, wept on the wharf, for it was at Newburg where this tragedy was acting. There was a vessel in the stream, bound to the place where he once had friends. He had not a dollar to pay his passage, and he could not walk. Unused to tears, I saw them trickle down this good man’s cheeks as he put into the hands of the black man the last dollar he possessed. The negro hailed the sloop, and cried, ‘God Almighty bless you, master baron !’”*

In his habits Steuben was popular and plain ; maneuvers were his recreations ; he liked agricultural labor, horses, and sporting ; books, and the pleasures of social company, and especially in the domestic circle of his friends, were his favorite amusements. All these qualities, in a man of his station, were apt to exert a great influence on those around him ; they worked by themselves, they captivated everywhere, and, indeed, it seemed that their effect on all those connected with him was very powerful. He never lost his temper, except when greatly provoked by grossness or culpable negligence of

* Thacher, p. 418.

public duty ; in general he had a remarkable control over himself. He was temperate in his habits, but very social, and wherever he was he made every company lively. A great favorite among the ladies, he was in every respect the polite, obliging, and witty gentleman of the old school. Once, at the house of the mother of Chancellor Livingston, he was introduced to a Miss Sheaf, an amiable, handsome, and interesting young lady. "I am very happy," said he, "in the honor of being presented to you, mademoiselle, though I see it is at an infinite risk ; I have from my youth been cautioned to guard myself against *mischief* (Miss Sheaf), but I had no idea that her attractions were so powerful."

There is, perhaps, no revolutionary general about whom so many anecdotes are told as Steuben. Although the following story may be an invention, as Steuben, so far as we know, was never able to employ a cook, it fairly illustrates what his contemporaries thought of his wit and humor, and may therefore find a place here.

At a dinner shortly after the resignation of Mr. Robert Morris, as financier of the United States, the cause of which appeared inexplicable to the company present ; "to me," said Baron Steuben, "there appears no mystery. I will illustrate my sentiments by a simple narrative. When I was about to quit Paris to embark for the United States, the better to insure comfort when in camp, I judged it of importance to engage in my service a cook of celebrity. The American army was posted at Valley Forge when I joined it. Arrived at my quarters, a wagoner presented himself, saying that he was directed to attach himself to my train, and obey my orders. Commissaries arriving furnished a supply of beef and bread, and retired. My cook looked round him for utensils—indispensable, in his opinion, for preparing a meal—and, finding none, in an agony of despair applied to the wagoner for advice. 'We cook our meat,' replied he, 'by hanging it up by a string, and turning it before a good fire till sufficiently roasted.' The

next day, and still another passed, without material change. The commissary made his deposit. My cook showed the strongest indications of uneasiness by shrugs and heavy sighing, but, with the exception of a few oaths, spoke not a word of complaint. His patience, however, was completely exhausted; he requested an audience, and demanded his dismissal. 'Under happier circumstances, mon general,' said he, 'it would be my ambition to serve you, but here I have no chance of showing my talents, and I think myself obliged, in honor, to save your expense, since your wagoner is just as able to turn the string as I am.' Believe me, gentlemen," continued the baron, "the Treasury of America is, at present, just as empty as my kitchen was at Valley Forge, and Mr. Morris wisely retires, thinking it of very little consequence *who turns the string.*"*

Steuben was never married. It seems, however, that he met with a disappointment in early life. While preparing to remove to his farm, the accidental fall of a portrait of a most beautiful young woman, from his cabinet, which was picked up by his companion and shown to him, with the request to be told from whom it was taken, produced a most obvious emotion of strong tenderness, and the pathetic exclamation, "O, she was a matchless woman!" He never afterwards alluded to the subject.

Even the faults of his character, which seemed to throw a shadow over his virtues, were not such as to lower him in the consideration of his contemporaries, but they often caused him many difficulties. He never appreciated the value of money. When he had plenty of it, he gave it away with open hands, regardless of the consequences to himself. "What sums," says North, "however large, could have been sufficient for one who was always looking around for worthy objects, whose wants might be relieved? Never did a review or an inspection pass without rewards in money to soldiers whose arms

* Garden's Anecdotes, p. 344.

were in the highest order. Never was his table unfilled with guests, if furnished with provisions. Officers of rank, men most prominent for knowledge and attention to their duty, were marked for invitation, but the gentlemen of his suite were desired to complete the list with others of inferior grade. 'Poor fellows,' said he, 'they have field officers' stomachs without their rations.'**

"General Washington, who was well acquainted with his liberality, said, on this occasion, to a friend, who repeated it to me,† 'I rejoice that Congress has given to so excellent a patriot an independency by an annuity, for had they bestowed a specific sum, were it ten times the amount, the generous heart of Steuben would keep him poor, and he would, in all probability, die a beggar.'"

All the difficulties which for eight long years he had with Congress—all the humiliations he had to suffer from narrow-minded men—must be attributed to his cavalier contempt for money. Had he been a shrewd business man, an officer who speculated in war like merchants in any staple article, he would have made a close bargain, and secured himself a firm standing, and thrown all the odium of his money negotiations upon Congress, which was, in reality, his debtor to an amount infinitely larger than he ever owed; but, by neglecting this ordinary precaution, he left it in the power of that same Congress to represent him to the popular prejudice as an unprincipled, greedy adventurer, who had devoted himself to the cause of American independence merely out of personal and selfish interest.

A last glance at Steuben's military importance and we have done.

As to his services, he is inferior to none of the revolutionary generals. He had received his military training under Frederick the Great, and had distinguished himself by brilliant exploits as well as by his talent for organization and drill.

* North, l. c.

† Garden's Anecdotes, 345.

He had taken an active part in the Seven Years' War, he had filled a great variety of offices and stations, and collected invaluable experience. He had fought in the bloodiest battles, in which usually more men were killed or wounded than Washington had in most cases under his command. Thus the American struggle must have been light work for him. But it was very important to have a man as commander to whom the battles here were nothing but skirmishes when compared with the Seven Years' War; who knew by experience at Colberg, Schweidnitz, Breslau, Dresden, Torgau and Prague, what strategy could do; who had seen the fortified camp at Burkersdorf and the defeats at Hochkirch and Landshut, and who had been obliged to master in his mind and carry into practice the conceptions of Frederick the Great, Prince Henry of Prussia, and the Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick.

For the successful prosecution of the art of war as it is conducted in the hostile collisions of great and powerful States, a rich experience in the most active struggles is absolutely indispensable. The most important crisis is the pitched battle, the most difficult and troublesome is the organization of the army, to make them behave bravely and resist for a certain time the murderous fire of the batteries, and the fearful impressions of the battle.

At Monmouth Steuben brought the retiring troops, in the midst of a heavy cannonade, to a stand, and it is acknowledged as a special proof of their progress in discipline that they obeyed him as well in the fire as on the parade ground, and fought like veterans. Stony Point was taken by the light infantry which Steuben had formed, and which his sub-inspector Fleury led to the attack. When West Point was seriously threatened, the commander-in-chief sent Steuben there to assist the commandant of that important place with his advice. Greene took the command of the southern army under the express condition that Steuben should organize the Virginia troops and prepare them for battle. Washington wrote on

this occasion to Steuben, that in the general chaos of the South he would be of more service in Virginia than in the North, much as his presence there was needed. In the years 1782 and 1783, according to the testimony of competent judges, the American infantry was equal to the best troops of the time; even the French officers were struck with admiration at the maneuvers executed in their presence by Steuben's soldiers.

All these, and other illustrious deeds, abundantly show how effectual Steuben's exertions proved in this respect. From the time of his engagement to the end of the war, there prevailed an electrifying confidence in final success, which in no small degree was due to the effect produced by Steuben's services in the camp and in the field. This preëminently important part of his activity has usually been too much overlooked in this country, while on the other hand it has always been acknowledged that he has performed conspicuous services as a disciplinarian, organizer and inspector. At the time when, and in an army in which every thing was threatening to dissolve into absolute chaos, he succeeded in bringing order out of the general confusion, in accustoming the soldiers to yield punctilious obedience to orders, in awakening in them the consciousness of their superiority when disciplined and organized. In former wars the American soldiers had fought, single handed, in unorganized bands; but now they had, for the first time, to carry on the war against an army organized after the European fashion.

It was, therefore, a most fortunate circumstance that they were formed and drilled mainly according to the Prussian system. In the eighteenth century the officers of the Prussian army were celebrated as experienced tacticians, as excellent masters in the art of military evolutions, as good instructors and generals in maneuvering; they were therefore invited everywhere as instructors of the European armies. For instance Von Alvensteben went in that capacity to Spain, Count

De La Lippe to Portugal; Von Salis to Naples; Schomburg and Bruce, who had been instructed in Prussia, to England, and a countless number to Russia ever since the time of Peter the Great. In this way the rules of training and drilling, adopted by Frederick William I., may be called the basis of all the military regulations in the world.

The science of war, after the abolition of the "Lands-knechts" and "Condottieri" systems in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was at first cultivated by the Dutch, under the ægis of William, Prince of Orange, in regard to regular service, the elementary principles of tactic and of discipline—the three most important features in standing armies. Then the Swedes, under Gustavus Adolphus, became the masters of the world, and remained so till the reign of Charles XII. Then it was Brandenburg and Prussia which excelled in the strategical art of the Prince of Orange and the Swedes, and improved it in the most commendable way, becoming the first masters in the art of drilling the soldiers and exercising them in regular evolutions. Frederick William I. had inspired the whole body of his officers with that spirit by which it is possible to complete the difficult organization of an army in a very short time. The special reviews which existed at the time that Steuben was an officer in the Prussian army (1747–1763) were so severe and critical, that even the youngest officer necessarily acquired the clearest insight into the condition of the troops, and a thorough knowledge of the best way of improving the discipline.

The Americans therefore were very fortunate in remodeling their army after the best authority, by placing Steuben, a graduate of such a school, at the head of their military organization. Steuben was well aware that the recruiting system hitherto practiced was in no way adapted to the object of the war. He accordingly exerted himself to give to the army a different organization, far superior in its character, and founded on the principles of the militia system. The great value

of Steuben's exertions being directed to this practical branch of the organization—the very groundwork of a good army—will appear more evident, when we consider that the French were little qualified for this kind of service; that General Conway was an intriguer, and personal enemy of Washington, and that the latter, as commander-in-chief, had too many other duties to be able to devote his attention to the discipline of the army. Steuben farther successfully managed to raise the ability of his militia soldiers to a high degree of perfection. He liked, therefore, afterwards to compare himself with the generals, who, in the commencement of the French Revolution, were the chiefs of insurgent armies.* At the same time, like Paoli, Laroche Jacquelin, Schill and Cabrera, he exhibited his eminent talent, even in a foreign country, not only to concentrate his forces by means of a superior organization, but also to direct their attacks against the enemy, in order to secure the best advantage to himself.

The plans of attacks and sieges in the war of independence leave no doubt that the strong positions on the coast, mostly on little peninsulas, their sieges and defenses, and also the long line of defense along the rivers and swamps, formed the most important meshes of the strategical net, which, besides its extensive dimensions, chiefly prevented the English from permanently subduing any considerable portion. The chief requisite has evidently been to occupy said lines with sufficient forces, and always to have strong corps in readiness for blockading the English forts on the shore, in order to render the English incapable of carrying on the war any longer, as Franklin expressed himself very significantly. Now it can not be denied that Steuben, who had studied under Frederick the Great the system of temporizing, from 1759 to 1762, was the very man for that emergency.

* D. Von Bülow. *Der Freistaat von Nord-Amerika in seinem neuesten Zustande*, Berlin, 1797, vol. ii. 84.

It is, moreover, a fact that Steuben, brought up, and honorably distinguished as he was among the most prominent officers of the time, was serviceable as an excellent model of a perfect soldier. Free from intrigue or reserve, he did his duty spontaneously from motives of honorable personal ambition. He needed no other incentive to exert himself with all his energy day and night in the interest of the service. At the same time that he was a frank, open-hearted soldier, he was always ready to uphold his authority, sword in hand. His censure was severe ; he was unrelenting toward the negligent ; but, on the other hand, he was always ready to acknowledge and reward true merit. Such men will disappoint the lazy and inert, but their efficiency is great whenever large bodies of men, accidentally united, are to be drilled to act together in good order.

If there is any trait that shows his noble character in its true light, it is the readiness with which Steuben acknowledges the merits of others and puts them above his own ; the pleasure he feels at every brave deed, and the simplicity and self-abnegation with which he works, steadfastly and unostentatiously, in his difficult department.

"Steuben's merits," says Judge Richard Peters, in a letter to Alexander Garden,* "have never been duly appreciated. Our army was but a meritorious, irregular band, before his creation of discipline. His deportment and personal conduct were particularly under my observation. One fact to prove his usefulness will go further than a thousand words. In the estimates of the War Office we always allowed five thousand muskets beyond the actual numbers of our muster of the whole army. It was, in early times, never sufficient to guard against the waste and misapplication that occurred. In the last inspection returns of the main army, before I left the War Department, Baron Steuben being then inspector general, only *three* muskets were deficient, and those accounted for."

* Garden's Anecdotes, p. 341.

Steuben occupied an exalted position in the country of his adoption, when compared with Lee, Gates, Conway and other intriguers; though foreign born, he remained always attached to this country. He was a most zealous and faithful patriot, although Congress treated him with little consideration. Even after the conclusion of the peace, he did not cease to devote his time to the welfare of the republic. He drew a plan for the establishment of a national military school; he published a pamphlet setting forth his ideas of the creation of a militia; he wrote about the funding system of State debts, and even in the last months of his life, undertook personally to explore the wilderness of the West for convenient places of fortification against any invasion of a foreign enemy. These various branches of his usefulness in public affairs, refute better than any long argument the absurd idea that Steuben was nothing but a drill sergeant, who did not understand the higher branches of the military art. In short, he was in every respect the best and most efficient general after Washington and Greene, and worthy of the friendship and high esteem they both felt toward him.

If Washington must be called the head and soul of the war of the Revolution, Steuben may be considered as one of its strongest arms, as the efficient instrument which served to carry out into practice the projects which Washington conceived. He is, therefore, fully entitled to an honorable and enduring place in the history of the American people.


APPENDIX.

THE author did not think himself entitled to make any alterations or corrections either in the French or in the English documents contained in this Appendix. The letters marked *, are translated from the German and French.



I.

PEDIGREE OF BARON STEUBEN.



II.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

PASSY, *September 4th, 1777.*

SIR,—The gentleman who will have the honor of waiting upon you with this letter is the Baron De Steuben, lieutenant general in the King of Prussia's service, whom he attended in all his campaigns, being his aid-de-camp, quarter-master general, etc. He goes to America with a true zeal for our cause, and a view of engaging in it and rendering it all the service in his power. He is recommended to us by two of the best judges of military merit in this country, Messrs. les Comtes De Vergennes et De St. Germain, who have long been personally acquainted with him, and interest themselves in promoting his voyage from the full persuasion that the knowledge and experience he has acquired by twenty years' study and practice in the Prussian school may be of great use in our armies. I, therefore, can't but recommend him warmly to your Excellency, wishing that our service may be made agreeable to him.

I have the honor to be, etc.,

FRANKLIN.

III.

RODERIQUE MORTALEZ (BEAUMARCHAIS) TO ROBERT MORRIS, FOR CONGRESS.

PARIS, *September, 1777.*

MESSIEURS,—Le témoignage que j'ai l'honneur de vous rendre du mérite et des grands talents militaires de Mr. le baron de Steuben, maréchal de la cour de S. A. S. le prince régnant de Hohenzollern et ci-devant aide-de-camp du roi de Prusse, aide major general de ses armées, ajouterait peu de chose au compte qui vous en est rendu par MM. Deane et Franklin, si le desir de les en instruire moi-même ne m'eut mis à portée de discuter le mérite de cet officier avec les plus grands généraux que nous ayons et si l'hommage néanmoins, que l'on doit à ses connaissances dans l'art de la guerre n'avait pas engagé tous les grands personnages qui vous aiment dans ce pays-ci, de se joindre à moi pour le déterminer à revenir d'Allemagne, où il était retourné après avoir infructueusement entretenu vos députés.

L'art de faire la guerre avec succès étant le fruit du courage combiné avec la prudence, les lumières et l'expérience, un compagnon d'armes du grand Frédéric et qu'il ne l'a pas quitté pendant 22 ans nous paraît à tous un des hommes les plus propres à seconder Mr. de Washington

pour lequel Mr. le baron de Steuben a la plus haute consideration et sous les drapeaux du quel il s'honore de servir la cause de la liberté.

IV.

* STEUBEN TO BARON DE FRANK, AT HECHINGEN.

CAMP OFF NEW WINDSOR, ON THE NORTH RIVER, *July 4, 1779.*

This is, my dear friend, the fifth letter which I address to you from this part of the world. As I have not received a single answer to the present day, I am afraid that my letters have not come to your hand. Two vessels, in which I sent packages for Europe, have been taken by the English; two others, carrying letters to you and another friend of mine, I have not heard from, and I fear, from your silence, that they too have been lost. This letter will be forwarded by Mr. Gérard, the minister of France, and as I have no doubt it will reach you, I will repeat, as nearly as I can, all that I said to you in detail in my former letters.

My first letter to you was written at Boston, about five weeks after my arrival on this continent. It contained the narrative of my voyage, and of all the incidents from which I had to suffer. A better description of a storm will be found in any book than I could give. I will only say that we had two of them, very violent—one in the Mediterranean, off the African coast, the other off the coast of New Caledonia. Each lasted three days; both, and especially the first, damaged so much our frigate that our naval officers became very much disheartened. Add to these trifles, that the forecastle of the ship was three times on fire, that we had seventeen hundredweight of gunpowder on board, and that a mutiny of the crew made it necessary for us to fight, fourteen against eighty-four, in order to secure the chiefs of the rebels; and, also, that it took sixty-six days, in the most dangerous season, to make the passage—and you will imagine that this voyage was one of the hardest ever known.

The more disastrous, however, the passage, the more flattering was my arrival in America. We arrived on the 1st of December, 1777, at Portsmouth, the capital of New Hampshire. Before entering the port, I ordered my secretary to go ashore in a boat, and to inform the commander of the place of my arrival. General Langdon, the commander, came on board himself, to take me and my officers ashore in his boat. While we were landing, we were saluted by the guns from the fortress, and from all the ships in the port. Several thousand of the inhabitants welcomed me in the most flattering manner. Mr. Langdon took us to his house to dine; in the meantime, all the inhabitants of the place

crowded together "to see the elephant," (as the German poet, Gellert, in his fables, says.)

Although exhausted by the hardships of the voyage, I went the next day to examine the fortifications; on the following day I reviewed the troops of the garrison, and on the fourth day I set out for Boston, by land.

The reception at Boston was as flattering to me as that at Portsmouth. I met there the celebrated Mr. Hancock, formerly president of Congress. He communicated to me an order of Congress that every preparation should be made to make me and my suite comfortable on the journey to Yorktown, where the Congress was then in session. Mr. Hancock himself, with great care, made all the necessary arrangements. Carriages, sleighs, and saddle-horses were procured; five negroes were assigned to us as grooms and drivers, also an agent to prepare quarters and procure provisions. As I had left Paris with only one servant and a cook, I engaged two English servants as field equipage for me and my officers. While at Boston I wrote you my first letter, and enclosed in it a letter to the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen.

The arrangements of my equipage detained me more than five weeks in Boston, so that I could not set out for Yorktown before the 14th of January. I was received there with the most distinguished attentions. A house was reserved for my use, and a guard of honor placed before the door. The day after my arrival, Congress inquired, through a committee of three members, the terms on which I proposed to enter the service. My answer was, that I had no wish to make any arrangements or terms; that I wished to make the campaign as a volunteer, desiring neither rank nor pay for myself, and only commissions for the officers of my suite. This was agreed to by Congress, as I had expected. A resolution of thanks, in the most obliging terms, was returned, with an offer of defraying all my expenses. My officers received their commissions, and even my secretary was gratified with the rank and the pay of a captain.

I will here observe, that in the military organization of the States, the highest rank is that of major general. General Washington is the oldest major general, being at the same time invested, in his quality of commander-in-chief, with all the privileges of a general field marshal in Europe. His authority is as unlimited as that of a Stadtholder in Holland can be. The other major generals, whose number does not at present surpass nine, are the commanders of corps, armies, wings and divisions. Major General Gates is commander of the northern army, General Lincoln of the southern army, and General Sullivan of the forces against the Indians. All are under the orders of the commander-in-chief. The second rank is that of a general of brigade. They are the commanders of brigades, like the major generals in European armies.

Upon my arrival in the camp, I was again the object of more honors than I was entitled to. General Washington came several miles to meet me on the road, and accompanied me to my quarters, where I found an officer with twenty-five men as a guard of honor. When I declined this, saying that I wished to be considered merely as a volunteer, the general answered me in the politest words, that "The whole army would be gratified to stand sentinel for such volunteers." He introduced me to Major General Stirling and several other generals. Lieutenant Colonels Ternant and Major Walker were both appointed by Congress as my adjutant generals. On the same day my name was given as watchword. The following day the army was mustered, and General Washington accompanied me to review it. To be brief, if Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, or the greatest field marshal of Europe, had been in my place, he could not have been received with greater marks of honor than I was.

My service as volunteer did not last longer than five weeks, in the course of which I disciplined and drilled the army and introduced several regulations, which were so highly approved that on the 27th of April I was appointed major general, and received the commission as inspector general of all the armies. My pay was fixed to 16,400 francs (about \$3,300); besides that, all the expenses of my service and table are to be provided for by a special agent. Congress has ordered for my personal service twenty-two horses, and for my guard one captain of horse, two lieutenants and forty dragoons. Besides these, my adjutants and officers receive, according to their rank, provisions for men and horses. Two adjutant generals, two adjutant inspectors, receiving their pay from Congress, are placed under my orders; and moreover, Major Des Epiniers, a nephew of the celebrated Beaumarchais, and the Marquis De Brittain, major in this army, are my adjutants.

The more flattering such distinctions must appear, the more sacred are my obligations to make myself worthy of them. As far as my bodily and mental powers avail, I will exert myself incessantly to promote the accomplishment of the desire of a nation which has honored me with such unlimited confidence. No difficulty, no pain, no danger can or shall check my energy or zeal. The sphere of my activity is immense; about the eighth part of the world will be benefited by the success of our cause. Thanks be to God, there is every reason to be confident of it. I should be happy to die for a nation that has placed such confidence in me. Thus far will my exertions have been successful, and I may well say that the confidence of the army in me is increasing every day. At the battle of Monmouth, last year, I commanded on the left wing of the first line, and I was fortunate enough to decide the day to our advantage. And in all the skirmishes of the last and the present campaign, I am happy to say that every

soldier was full of bravery when fighting under my command. Last winter I drew up the ordinance regulating the infantry and cavalry, which was immediately adopted and published.

Congress expressed their satisfaction in a highly complimentary letter, published in all the papers, and made me a present of two fine English horses and a sum of \$4,000. Every one of my adjutants, and even of my secretaries, received a gratification. I passed the winter in Philadelphia. On the 4th of January Congress appointed me a member of the War Department. On the 26th of March I set out to join the army. During my stay at Philadelphia, I became very intimate with Mr. Gérard, the French minister, whose departure for Europe I very much regretted. He honored me with a visit in the camp, where he came expressly for that purpose. He was received with all the honors of an ambassador. On the day after his arrival, I ordered a maneuver with eight regiments of infantry and sixteen guns. After this military display, he, in company with the commander-in-chief, and all the other generals and colonels, more than sixty persons, partook of a dinner in my quarters.

I am now making a tour to inspect all the regiments and to introduce the regulations adopted in my ordinance. Every thing passes on very well. I am now the fifth general in rank; the prospect is indeed bright enough to gratify any ambition, unless, perhaps, a fever or half an ounce of lead interrupt my course. After two or three years' toil and exertion, dear friend, we shall meet, perhaps, in Paris, and settle the point whether we shall live together in Europe or in America. O, dearest friend, why have we thus idled away our time? Two years' labor, in disregard of danger and hardship, may open a fair prospect to a man of energy! Experience has proved it, and I can't forgive myself my former indolence.

What a beautiful, what a happy country this is! Without kings, without prelates, without blood-sucking farmers of the revenue, and without a lazy nobility! Here every one feels happy. Poverty is an unknown evil. It would be too circumstantial to give you a description of the happiness of this people!

Please hand the inclosed packet to the most excellent of princes, and tell him that I could not feel perfectly happy before having given him convincing proofs of my gratitude. My manifold duties, and the insecurity of the sea, have prevented me from doing it until now. Before starting from Philadelphia, however, I have given orders to a certain Mr. Robert Morris, to make a complete collection of all the trees in North America—there are about three hundred and twenty sorts of them—and to send three or four of each sort to the address of Mr. Gérard, at Paris, next fall, who has promised to forward the collections to Strassburg, and to inform his Highness of the matter. A like collec-

tion was forwarded this spring to the King of France, by the same Mr. Robert Morris.

I told you that I could employ Mr. Schleithelm, although it is difficult, without a knowledge of the English language, to succeed in the service. I have become pretty well acquainted with it myself. To confess the truth, however, I must tell you that six foreign officers here give me more trouble than two hundred American ones. Most of the foreigners have already lost all credit, and it becomes from day to day more difficult to engage any foreign officer. A considerable number of German barons and French marquises have left the country, and I always feel uneasy when a baron or a marquis is introduced. We are living in a republic, dear friend—here the baron is not a farthing more valued than Master Jacob or Mister John is, and such a state of things is very unpalatable to the taste of a German or French baron. Our general of artillery was formerly a book-binder at Boston, a worthy man, who understands his business perfectly well, and fulfills his duties very commendably.

The Baron De Kalb and myself are now the only German generals in the American army, and Kalb, who has a yearly income of 30,000 francs, in France, will resign at the end of the present campaign.

To conclude with my plans, I will tell you what I think of the future. Either I shall see the end of the war in the service, or perish by it. I do not think England will be able to play the game for two years longer. After it has been fought out my duty will be to organize the army and militia on the same footing in all the States. After that I shall settle my accounts with Congress. All this can be accomplished by three years' exertion, provided life and health do not fail—perseverance, energy and courage will never fail. And should all this be accomplished, I will meet you in Europe, dear friend, and we shall decide whether we shall in future dine in Paris or in Philadelphia.

V.

JOHN TERNANT TO STEUBEN.

CAMP SUR LES BORDS DU OGOHEECHEE, *November 28, 1778.*

Malgré tous mes efforts et ma diligence, je n'ai pu me rendre à Charleston que le 18 de ce mois. J'avais à peine commencé à me familiariser avec les importants du pays et à songer sérieusement aux travaux de ma mission lorsqu'on reçut la nouvelle de l'invasion de la Georgie pour une partie des troupes de la Floride sous les ordres des Colonels Prescott et Fuser. Nous partîmes la même nuit avec le General Howe pour nous rendre à grandes journées à l'endroit où le danger paraissait le plus imminent et nous arrivâmes hier matin au camp

Américain formé et retranché à la tête d'une défilée où on se proposait d'arrêter les mouvements de l'ennemi. Nous apprîmes le même jour que les Anglais se retiraient et cette nouvelle se confirmait ce matin. Je profite d'un moment de loisir pour vous donner une idée de notre situation, et de la politique civile et militaire des Georgiens, etc. C'est toujours celle des Américains et vous connaissez déjà leur manière de guerroyer dans le nord; mais dans ces contrées méridionales on l'emporte de beaucoup en négligence, lenteur et confusion. Depuis le commencement de la guerre les Floridiens n'ont cessé de faire des invasions dans cet état et de retrécir annuellement ses limites. Ils s'étaient enfin emparés de tout ce qui est au sudouest de la rivière Altamaha, y avaient établi des postes et menaçaient de là le reste de la Georgie d'une invasion certaine, lorsque l'été dernier le Général Howe avec les troupes continentales et le gouverneur de cet état avec ses milices sans aucune préparation se portèrent sur l'ennemi, lui en imposèrent je ne sais comment et le forcèrent, ou pour mieux dire, le décidèrent à se réplier de poste en poste jusqu'à la frontière primitive. L'inclemence et l'insalubrité de ces climats dans les chaleurs caniculaires, les disputes aussi véhémentes que minutieuses sur le commandement suprême entre le jurisconsulte Houston, gouverneur de la Georgie, et le Général Howe, la négligence, la lenteur et l'esprit d'indécision qui caractérise les Américains, furent plus fatales à ces deux armées inimico-alliées que ne l'eut été le feu ou le fer de l'ennemi. . . . Après s'être avancé jusqu'à la rivière St. Mary, avoir éprouvé toutes les misères et les horreurs domestiques de la guerre et avoir perdu la moitié de leur monde sans tirer un coup de canon, ils furent obligés de se retirer et d'abandonner de relief à l'ennemi tout ce qu'il possédait déjà de l'autre côté de la rivière Altamaha. Après cette expédition sans fruit et sans objet certain, tout semblait indiquer la nécessité d'établir des postes et des lignes sur cette rivière, d'en occuper l'embouchure pour se mettre à l'abri de nouvelles entreprises de l'ennemi; on y était de plus intéressé que les provinces les plus fertiles de cet état se trouvaient entre l'Altamaha et la rivière Ogoheechee. . . . Mais les puissants du pays, portant perruques et uniformes en décidèrent contre nous. Sous prétexte de se défendre contre les sauvages on dégarnit la frontière de l'Altamaha et on laissa le pays absolument ouvert aux déprédations du moindre aventurier; et pour ne laisser aux Floridiens aucun objet de crainte on cantonna le peu de troupes réglées qui restaient à l'état dans la ville de Savannah et à Augusta. L'ennemi profita de ce moment favorable et enfin s'avança en 5 jours jusqu'à la rivière Ogoheechee qui n'est qu'à 15 milles de la capitale. Après un succès aussi grand on est assez embarrassé d'imaginer quel peut être le sujet de leur retraite et encore plus quel pourrait être l'objet de leur expédition; s'ils n'avaient en vue que de fourrager ils s'en sont, on ne peut pas mieux, acquittés. Quoiqu'il en

soit, nous n'avons à leur opposer actuellement dans ce camp que 150 hommes tout-au-plus, sans l'espoir de recevoir le moindre renfort avant 7 ou 8 jours. Nos renforts viennent d'Augusta et de la Caroline, qui n'a pas elle-même plus de 12-1400 hommes pour la défense de ses côtés, de sorte que toutes nos ressources épuisées, nous ne pouvons rassembler dans notre camp que 500-600 hommes . . . or jugez de l'importance de mon inspection et de la sécurité précaire de l'état de la Georgie au cas que l'ennemi songe sérieusement à s'en emparer. Le général paraît avoir beaucoup de confiance en moi et je m'efforcerai plus que jamais d'être utile. Aussitôt que nos troupes se trouveront un peu rassemblées je leur donnerai une organisation militaire d'après nos principes.

VI.

CAMP DE PARISBURG, GA., *January 20, 1779.*

Je vois cependant (de votre lettre du 10 Octobre) avec chagrin que l'envie et la méchanceté continuent toujours à vous traverser et à rendre inutiles à la république votre expérience, vos talents et votre bonne volonté. Le seul remède à ce mal est votre présence à Philadelphia. Vous connaissez assez le cœur humain pour en sentir la nécessité et je vois avec plaisir que vous êtes décidés à aller passer une partie de votre quartier d'hiver dans cette capitale. Je me bornerai dans mes lettres à ce qui est relatif à la place que j'occupe.

J'ai attendu pendant longtemps et toujours en vain votre collection de réglemens sur la discipline et la tactique élémentaire. J'avais commencé d'abord à introduire le pas, mais frappé des défauts essentiels que je remarquais tous les jours dans les parties les plus importantes du service, et pressé d'un autre côté par les officiers et le général-en-chef, il a fallu me décider à rédiger les instructions sur les objets principaux en me conformant en tout à vos principes et à vos leçons. Voici la marche que j'ai suivie.

J'ai expliqué d'abord la formation des troupes en général et la manière d'organiser un bataillon, comme devant servir de base à tous les mouvemens de la tactique; j'ai passé de là au service des gardes que j'ai détaillé dans tous ses points; l'ordre de marche et de campement ont ensuite attiré mon attention et j'ai fait en sorte de ne rien laisser à désirer sur ces deux objets; l'exercice et les manœuvres se sont présentés après; j'ai introduit les changemens que vous avez faits dans le maniement des armes, etc. J'ai expliqué la nature, la durée et l'étendue du pas ordinaire et du pas redoublé, j'en ai fait voir l'usage et les modifications dans les différentes marches et conversions élémentaires, les changemens de front, les formations des colonnes, leurs marches, conversions et déploiement, et j'ai terminé par l'ordre de feux.

Ces instructions entièrement redigées d'après vos principes ont été présentées au Général Howe qui vient de nous quitter et ensuite au Général Lincoln, auprès duquel j'ai fait ce que j'ai pu pour en hâter l'exécution ; il en a lu et approuvé une partie et il me promet que dans peu de jours il achèvera de lire le reste et prendre des mesures en conséquence. Il croit apercevoir des difficultés dans la formation des troupes relativement aux régiments et à leurs officiers. Quant à moi je n'en vois nulle, surtout si cette formation n'a lieu que pour l'ordre de campement, de marche et de bataille, car alors si absolument on ne peut faire autrement, l'état major et les officiers de chaque régiment se peuvent charger chacun du soin de leurs hommes sans égard à cette formation, mais on sera toujours forcé de convenir que sans elle tout ce qui a rapport à la discipline intérieure ou à l'économie domestique du militaire devient compliqué, confus et incertain. . . .

Je ferai à cet égard tout ce que je pourrai pour plaire à tout le monde et concilier mon devoir à cette complaisance. C'est très faussement, qu'on vous a représenté les troupes du sud comme étant dans un meilleur ordre que celles du Nord. Je puis vous assurer que le même désordre et la même confusion y règnent, et que j'aurai toujours à lutter contre les mêmes difficultés qui nous ont arrêtés à Valley Forge, jusqu'à ce qu'un plan quelconque relatif à ce département soit adopté et que les devoirs, obligations et les pouvoirs attachés à la place d'inspecteur soient clairement déterminés. . . . A 400 hommes près toute notre armée n'est composée que de recrues et de milices. Je n'ai pas encore pu parvenir à me faire nommer des inspecteurs de brigade. Ils vont être appointés incessamment et pour lors je mettrai et conserverai régulièrement toute la machine en mouvement. Les deux invasions de la Georgie dans un si court espace de temps et les affaires tant heureuses que malheureuses et dérouterantes auxquelles elles ont donné lieu, nous ont toujours tenu en mouvement par monts et par eaux, ou pour mieux dire, par déserts et marais (car on ne voit que cela dans ce pays), et ce n'est que depuis dix jours que nous avons commencé à nous rassembler à Parisburg. Dans toutes nos opérations j'ai taché de soutenir le décorum de votre inspecteur du mieux qu'il m'a été possible. Je laisse au Général Howe de vous parler de ma conduite en Georgie, lorsque vous le verrez à Philadelphia.

Je vous dirai seulement un mot de mon début avec le Général Lincoln. En arrivant à Parisburg j'ai trouvé les troupes nouvellement arrivées de la Caroline, campées d'une manière si irrégulière, quoique d'après les instructions de l'ingénieur-en-chef, que je ne pus m'empêcher, après avoir reconnu les lieux, de faire mon rapport en conséquence au général-en-chef, et de proposer un changement dans le camp et dans la manière de camper. Il fut donc ordonné au D. Qr. Mr. Général de

prendre ses instructions de l'inspecteur, et de fixer et former le camp conformément à son plan ; j'ai présidé moi-même à toute la besogne. J'offris ensuite au général-en-chef pour le mettre à l'abri de toute incertitude dans un temps où il importait de connaître au juste ses ressources, de passer ses troupes en revue, ce qu'il accepta, et il fut ordonné le lendemain aux différents régiments de se tenir prêts pour la revue de l'inspecteur. En général je suis assez content de la manière dont il me traite et j'en augure beaucoup de bien pour l'avenir. Il me tarde bien de recevoir vos instructions et encore plus de commencer à discipliner cette troupe informe qui compose à présent notre armée—l'hiver est le seul temps dans ce pays pour les opérations et les travaux de la guerre, mais ma santé s'accommode si peu de ce climat que l'hiver ne me mets pas même à l'abri des fièvre. Je suis forcé d'avaler soir et matin force quinquina pour m'en garantir, or jugez de ce qu'il m'est réservé pendant l'été.

VII.

CHARLESTON, *January 26, 1779.*

— Mr. Senf (capitaine porteur de cette lettre) fera vous voir les plans de nos camps et de notre affaire à Savannah. Quoique ingénieur de profession, c'est un garçon d'un mérite infini et qui serait d'une grande utilité si l'on savait tirer parti de ses talents ; mais malheureusement dans nos armées Américaines nous n'avons point l'activité nécessaire pour profiter des ressources abondantes de la fortification de campagne, dont cependant nous avons le plus grand besoin. Tout est encore ici dans le plus grand engourdissement ; nous rassemblons nos forces de tous cotés ; 2,000 hommes de recrues et de milice de la Caroline du Nord viennent de quitter Charleston pour se rendre à notre camp. Assez de bésogne pour votre inspecteur. Il est assez difficile de diviner quelles sont les vues de l'ennemi—je suis tenté de croire, qu'ils n'en ont pas de bien décidées et qu'ils font la guerre à peu près comme les enfants voyent *au jour la journée* ; ils auraient sans doute beaucoup à faire, jamais guerriers n'eurent un plus vaste champ ouvert à leurs spéculations ni plus de moyens de les accomplir ; mais je crois que leur ignorance dans les affaires militaires égale leur orgueil et leur hauteur, et je ne m'attends à peu de bien merveilleux de leur part—au reste le temps dévoilera tout.

Francy me marque que vous êtes arrivé à Philadelphia plus mécontent que jamais, quelle peut donc en être la raison ? L'agent du Congrès m'a dit ce matin que le Général Washington était aussi à Philadelphia, que le marquis de Lafayette était allé en France par congé, que notre ami Laurens s'était battu avec le Général Lee, etc. Je

compte que votre présence fera un bien infini à tout ce qui est relatif à l'inspection. Il est grand temps d'en venir à une détermination finale, et je vous conjure par vous, par vos amis et par l'intérêt que vous prenez à la constitution militaire des États Unis de ne point quitter Philadelphia que le Congrès n'ait mis la dernière main à cet ouvrage.

VIII.

CAMP DE PARISBURG, 6 de Mars, 1779.

Malgré mon gout décidé pour la guerre, l'inspection des troupes confédérales du département du sud m'ennuye singulièrement. Je suis à 900 milles de vous, votre dernière lettre m'est parvenue le 10 Octobre. Toutes les instructions relatives à la tactique et à la discipline, dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous rendre compte dans une dernière lettre, ont enfin été données il y a environs un mois, sous la sanction du général, copiées et entendues tant bien que mal par les officiers et exécutées à peu près de même. J'ai un homme employé à en faire une copie exacte et aussitôt qu'elle sera finie j'aurai soin de vous l'envoyer et de vous instruire plus particulièrement de tout ce qui regarde votre aride département du sud. J'avais d'abord demandé des inspecteurs de brigade, mais m'apercevant que l'objet était sur le point d'éprouver des difficultés, vu que je ne voulais point consentir qu'on donne cette place à des capitaines, j'ai pris un biais qui m'a réussi et que j'espère que vous approuverez. J'ai cessé de parler d'inspecteurs de brigade et après avoir représenté au général que les majors de l'armée étaient dans tout le temps chargés et responsables de la discipline des corps, je les ai tous convoqués dans mon quartier pour leur donner et leur expliquer les instructions. Je leur ai ordonné ensuite de rassembler dans leurs tentes les officiers des différents régiments à fin de leur communiquer; de là j'ai exercé tout le corps des officiers avant de rien entreprendre avec le gros de l'armée et dans tout le reste de la bésogne j'ai fait faire journellement à chacun des majors par rotation le service d'inspecteur de brigade tant à l'exercice qu'à la parade. . . . Les malheurs du temps et les mêmes inconvénients qui nous arrêtaient souvent à Valley Forge m'ont empêché d'avancer dans cette entreprise aussi rapidement que je le désirais et qu'il semblait être nécessaire. Je compte cependant dans peu de jours faire exécuter à notre petite armée quelques dispositions de marche, d'attaque et de retraite, où je ferai voir en gros l'usage et l'application des différentes manœuvres que nous avons jusqu'à présent pratiquées séparément. Après cela jecroirai avoir rempli l'objet que j'ai entrepris, si non pleinement au moins autant qu'il était en mon pouvoir; et comme il paraît que le Congrès ne se propose

point de donner à ce département l'organisation que son importance exige, que les climats méridionaux ne s'accordent point du tout avec ma santé je demanderai sérieusement la permission de me retirer.

IX.

CAMP DE STONO SWAMPS, 4 *Juin*, 1779.

J'ai appris avec un plaisir infini que vous êtes occupé sérieusement de la rédaction et de l'impression d'une ordonnance de discipline et de tactique pour l'infanterie. Mais je n'ai pu voir avec la même satisfaction les résolvés informés que vous avez bien voulu m'envoyer sur le département de l'inspecteur—vous aurez sans doute senti encore mieux que moi leurs défauts et leur insuffisance, et ce serait perdre du temps que de vous en parler. J'ai attendu jusqu'à présent votre ordonnance, dans la vue de la mettre en pratique et d'en établir l'exécution sur des fondemens aussi solides que notre armée le comportait; mais le mauvais état de ma santé va enfin me forcer de quitter ce département en dépit de l'ardent désir que j'ai d'introduire moi-même cette ordonnance. Le Général Lincoln vient de recevoir la permission de se retirer, et il m'invite à entreprendre la route de Philadelphie avec lui. Le Général Moultrie lui succède dans le commandement et aussitôt qu'il se sera rendu de Charleston au camp nous partirons.

Notre armée m'a donné des peines infinies et bien peu de satisfaction; des corps de milice des deux Carolines, de la Georgie et de la Virginie en forment les trois quarts. Ces milices se renouvellent et se modifient sans cesse; à peine pouvons nous conserver les mêmes individus un mois sous nos drapeaux, et trop heureux encore lorsqu'ils se succèdent sans interruption. Leurs lois militiennes semblent d'ailleurs n'avoir été faites que pour les soustraire à toute discipline, les peines y sont toutes pécuniaires, les cours martiales qui les infligent doivent être composées de 3 soldats et de 2 officiers et ce n'est qu'après un avertissement de dix jours que l'on peut y traduire un criminel etc., etc. Vous devinerez aisément d'après cela quels peuvent avoir été mes succès avec cette troupe informée à laquelle on prostitua le nom de soldats et de citoyens. Quant à nos troupes confédérales qui forment à peu près le quart de l'armée, elles ne cessent de recevoir des recrues qui ne font guères que de remplir les vides de la désertion—cequi beaucoup retarde le progrès de la discipline et de la tactique dans les corps, mais je ne doute nullement, que la nouvelle ordonnance imprimée et répandue parmi ces troupes n'ait le plus grand succès.

X.

PHILADELPHIA, *August 28th, 1779.*

Colonel Scammell's appointment gives me infinite pleasure, and will no doubt greatly benefit the department. I must beg leave to refer you to my former letters, particularly of March 6th, April 7th, and June 15th, with regard to the state of the troops in the southern department to that period. I was then, and indeed have been ever since, expecting daily to receive the printed regulations you had promised to send me by your honor of the 2d of April; but they had not yet reached either me or General Lincoln, on the 24th of July, when I left Charleston. I have even reasons to believe that a single copy has not yet been forwarded.

The militia of Virginia and North Carolina had quitted the army and were to be relieved by other bodies of militia, which had not yet been drafted when I passed through those States. Above one half of General Gates' troops were still at Petersburg, on the 20th instant. The continental troops I left in South Carolina were but few, although the regiments many; but the Assembly who were to meet in the latter end of July, will, it is hoped, either fill up their confederal battalions by drafts of their militia, or raise new battalions of negroes, according to Lieutenant Laurens' plan, in which case the old regiments will be reduced and organized agreeably to the rules prescribed by the regulations and resolves of Congress, and by that means furnish supernumerary officers for the black levies—in short, whatever may be the measures pursued, as it will take some time to collect the troops, I hope I shall have time enough to return to my station before I am urgently wanted.

I have not made lately any review of the troops, because I could not do it officially without an express order or permission of General Lincoln, which he did not think necessary at that time to give.

XI.

PHILADELPHIA, *September 30, 1779.*

MON CHER GENERAL (Private),—Je viens de lire avec la plus grande satisfaction la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'écrire de New Windsor. L'amitié et l'attachement que vous m'y témoignez, me pénètrent des sentimens de la reconnaissance et de la réciprocité la plus sincère. J'ai songé, plusieurs fois, il est vrai, à me retirer du service des Etats Unis, et mes lettres précédentes ont du vous instruire amplement des raisons qui m'y engageaient. Ma mauvaise santé était une des principales, et une autre non moins forte que celle-là étaient les sacrifices pécuniaires que je me trouvais obligé de faire trop disproportionnés à la modicité de ma fortune—mais l'augmentation de paye que le Congrès vient d'accorder aux

officiers ayant remédié en quelque sorte à ce dernier inconvénient je me suis enfin décidé à pallier les autres de mon mieux par la patience dont vous m'avez donné l'exemple et par toutes les précautions qui seront en mon pouvoir. Je n'aurais d'ailleurs pris une détermination finale qu'après vous avoir consulté et n'être procuré votre consentement. Vous avez eu trop de part à mon entrée dans la carrière militaire pour qu'une rétraite puisse m'être agréable sans votre approbation. Je vous répéterai même à ce sujet ce que vous eutes de la peine à croire dans le tems qu'il ne fallait rien moins que les séduisantes qualités du cœur et de l'esprit qui m'attachèrent à vous des nos premières entrevues, et l'envie d'être utile aux républiques alors naissantes de l'Amérique pour me décider à entreprendre une chose dont je prévoyais l'inconvénient et embrasser un état auquel je m'étais bien promis de ne plus songer. La partie civile que j'avais en vue en quittant l'Europe m'eut sans doute mené plus loin. Mais si j'ai perdu quelque chose de ce côté-là, j'aurai au moins la satisfaction d'avoir rempli avec quelque succès les devoirs de la place que j'ai occupée et surtout d'avoir su mériter votre estime et votre amitié.

Il ne me reste plus qu'une chose à désirer pour me rendre l'inspection aussi agréable qu'elle peut l'être : c'est la réunion des fonctions de Muster-Master à celle d'Inspecteur. Vous vous rappellerez sans doute que j'ai toujours regardé cette réunion comme la pierre angulaire et la seule base solide sur la quelle on puisse élever l'édifice de l'inspection et plus j'y songe plus j'en sens la nécessité. Sans cela l'inspection se réduit à un établissement purement éphémère dont l'objet ne sera jamais bien décidé et perpétuellement envisagé avec un œil de jalousie. Redoublez donc vos efforts mon cher Général pour que cette réunion ait bientôt lieu et que nous soyons enfin décidément quelque chose. Le Congrès y a songé sérieusement depuis quelque temps et je n'ai rien négligé pour prouver à ceux que je connais combien d'avantages il en résulterait pour l'armée et pour le trésor public. Tout le monde m'a paru désirer ce changement et l'affaire pourrait peut-être se terminer sans les dépêches ministérielles qui prennent maintenant tous les soins et l'attention du sénat.

XII.

CHARLESTON, *January 7, 1780.*

I reached this town in the latter end of last month, and immediately communicated to General Lincoln every instruction I had received relative to the inspection. I also expressed my earnest desire of entering as soon as possible upon the duties of my office; but the necessity of an incorporation and arrangement of part of this army, agreeable to the establishment of May, 1778, have forced us to unavoidable delays.

The general is daily employed about the arrangement of the South Carolina line, and notwithstanding the difficulties attending such an operation, I hope he will be able to complete it in a few days, to the satisfaction of everybody. Brigade majors will be appointed immediately after, a review of inspection made, the regulations distributed and explained, and in short my whole time bestowed upon improving the troops in their tactics, discipline and domestic economy. The necessity of securing this capital against foreign and domestic enemies, of preventing depredations abroad, and of supporting the reëstablishment of civil authority and government in Georgia, have obliged the general to divide and station his troops in several places at a great distance from one another, which will be greatly disadvantageous to my operations. The main posts are Fort Moultrie, Charleston, Sheldon, opposite to Port Royal island, seventy miles from Charleston, and Augusta, one hundred and forty miles from both. I shall review, myself, and instruct successively the troops in those places; and not to lose any time, as soon as the brigade majors are appointed I will immediately give them the necessary instructions for disciplining the troops by the time I can review them myself; the returns of every post shall be punctually forwarded to the northward after every inspection.

I must beg also to be acquainted how far my duty and jurisdiction extend with regard to the militia serving in this army, and whether they are to be reviewed as the confederate troops, and returns of them sent. We have not yet received any of our reinforcements—the highest is still one hundred and fifty miles from us; but luckily the enemy seem to be more inclined to a total evacuation of Savannah than to any offensive undertaking. When we are able to penetrate again into Georgia, I hope I shall have it once more in my power, by the troops being collected in one body, to render myself more generally useful to the army.

B. Lincoln, in a letter dated Charleston, January 8th, 1780, says about Ternant: "We parted from Lieutenant Colonel Ternant with reluctance, and are made happy in his return to this department, for his attention and zeal rendered him highly agreeable to us while here, and from our knowledge of his abilities we now promise ourselves from him the most essential services.

XIII.

CHARLESTON, *January 30, 1780.*

Les Anglais viennent enfin de paraître sur les côtes de la Georgie et de la Caroline, mais on ignore encore leur nombre et leur intentions.

. . . . Mais quelle que soit leur destination, la tempête au rapport des matelots les a tellement battus et dispersés que plusieurs auront été forcé de relâcher aux Antilles et qu'il faudra aux autres un temps considérable pour se rassembler et faire une descente. Cela me fait espérer que nous aurons le temps de reparer nos fautes. Nos sommes encore dans le même état où nous étions lors de ma dernière lettre. Nos fortifications sont toujours imparfaites et notre armée très faible et très divisée. Nous avons cependant reçu un renfort de 1500 miliciens de la Caroline du Nord, auxquels on a eu recours pour retablir nos abattis. On leur a mis des haches et des bûches à la main au lieu de mousquets dans un pays, où l'on se flatte tous les jours d'avoir 150.000 negres, et vous pouvez juger par là des progrès qu'ils peuvent faire dans la discipline, etc. Les ressources que nous offre le pays sont abondantes, et si nous savons en faire usage elles suffiront sans doute pour garantir la ville de tout danger jusqu'à l'arrivée des troupes du Nord. On ignore absolument où sont ces troupes et quand on peut espérer de les recevoir.

Je suis bien fâché de n'avoir rien de satisfaisant à vous apprendre sur l'inspection. L'arrangement de la ligne n'est point encore fini et tout ce que j'ai pu faire jusqu'à présent a été de tout préparer pour une revue au commencement de Février. Le general promet tous les jours de mettre la dernière main à la réforme et de nommer des majors de brigade—vous savez que je n'ai d'autre pouvoir que celui de représenter, aussi en fais je un usage journalier.

XIV.

STEBEN TO WALKER.

PHILADELPHIE, 23 *Février*, 1780.

MON CHER WALKER!

Je suis bien persuadé, que ce n'est pas de votre faute, que les retours, que j'ai demandés, ne sont pas entrés plus promptement. Si j'avais encore le feu Prussien, un tel délai aurait épuisé ma patience, mais maintenant je suis si fait à ces négligences, que très souvent je me sens disposé, de devenir négligent moi-même. J'ai reçu vos deux lettres du 13 et du 18. Le Général Washington m'écrivit du 18, que les retours demandés seront envoyés en quelques jours. Je les attends donc avec patience. L'objet des retours dans tous les genres était dans mon opinion la fonction la plus importante des inspecteurs de divisions et de brigades: mais si ces Messieurs changent leur places tous les huit jours, il n'est pas étonnant, que cette fonction est tellement négligée.

Vous avez certainement bien saisi mon intention à l'égard du retour pour les armes et accoutrements, quoique peut-être je ne l'avais pas

assez expliquée. Il ne s'agit non seulement des armes, bajonets, gibernes &, mais le bureau de Guerre doit savoir ce que chaque régiment possède actuellement en armes et effets militaires; sous lequel titre sont compris drapeau, esponton, tambours, fifles, fusils, bajonnettes, gibernes, cartouches, pierres de fusil, &. Ayant ces retours de chaque régiment et les retours sur les mêmes articles des magasins militaires, qui sont avec l'armée, le bureau de Guerre, sachant a quel nombre chaque régiment doit être monté pour la campagne prochaine, peut aisément calculer, combien il faut de chacun de ces articles pour pourvoir l'armée.

Dans votre lettre du 2, vous me dites, qu'à la fin le Département de "Mustre-Mastre" est annexé à celui de l'inspection. Comme je n'ai reçu aucune insinuation sur cet objet, ni du Congrès, ni du bureau de Guerre, et que le général-en-chef n'en fait pas non plus mention dans ses lettres à moi, je vous prie, de me dire, si quelque chose sur cet objet est donnée aux ordres générales, et de m'en envoyer un extrait. Si alors les inspecteurs des divisions et brigades ont quelque demande ou pretention à faire, j'espère qu'ils s'adresseront à moi par écrit, et si leurs demandes sont justes et modérés—surtout dans ce moment, où le mauvais état de nos finances doit affecter tous les bons Citoyens, ils peuvent être persuadés, que c'est avec empressement, que je m'emploierai pour obtenir quelques agréments pour des officiers aussi dignes qu'estimables.

Mais vous me dites dans cette même lettre, qu'il n'y a que deux ou trois majors, qu'ils remplissent actuellement les places des inspecteurs de brigade, et que parmi eux il y en a, qui pensent à quitter cet emploi. Je serai au desespoir, si cela arrive; j'ai cependant trop bonne opinion du zèle de ces Messrs., qui connaissent l'importance de leur office, pour croire qu'ils voudront abandonner cette besogne, qui quoiqu'elle est pénible, est si essentielle pour le bien de l'armée.

Vous m'obligerez, mon cher Walker, de m'envoyer dans votre première lettre les noms des inspecteurs des brigades, et quel rang chacun tient dans la ligne?

Vous me manquez bien essentiellement, mon cher Walker. Duponceau est malade; d'ailleurs vous savez, que mes idées quelquefois bonnes, ne sont pas toujours bonnes, quand on les traduit mot par mot. Il me faut un traducteur pour mes idées! en un mot il me faut un ami comme vous.

Je pense de venir au camp avec le Chevalier de la Luzerne peut-être dans quinze jours. Le temps n'est pas encore fixé. Comme il se peut, que je vous persuade, de m'accompagner alors à mon retour à Philadelphie, et que je me flatte, que vous ne me refuserez pas, je vous prie, de vous préparer en consequence.

Voilà, mon cher ami, une lettre sur ma table pour l'honorable Con-

grès, qui est cachetée depuis huit jours. Elle contient la démission de la place, dont l'Amérique m'a honoré.

Le mauvais état de mes propres finances m'oblige, de finir un jeu, que je ne peux plus soutenir. On m'a persuadé, de retenir cette lettre encore quelques jours, avec assurance, que le Congrès s'occupe des moyens, pour y remédier. Je ne sais ce qui arrivera; j'attendrai encore quelques jours, mais ma lettre une fois partie, j'engage ma parole d'honneur, que je ne la reprends plus.

Une lettre de Londres dans les gazettes de Paris me fait plus d'honneur, que je ne mérite. On y parle de l'ordre et de la discipline parfaite, que j'ai établis dans notre armée. Plût au ciel, qu'au lieu de parfait je pourrais me flatter que c'étoit passable. Votre nom est dans le même lettre ajoutant, que vous étiez un natif de Londres, qui m'assistait comme aide-de-camp. Il faut, que l'auteur est mieux informé de nos personnes, que de nos succès.

Mais revenons à mes affaires. Si on me met encore à la charrue pour cette campagne, m'abandonnez vous, mon ami? Je me flatte, que vous changerez votre opinion selon mon désir, en marchant avec moi main-en-main.

Je n'attends, qu'une occasion pour vous envoyer votre chapeau. Je vous prie, de me dire avec franchise ce que vous avez besoin. Aussitôt que je puis avoir le drap, je vous en enverrai pour une uniforme. Marquez moi, quel parement et doublure vous voulez. Traitez moi comme votre ami et votre commissionnaire.

J'ai reçu la lettre la plus bête de Mr. des Epiniers, il n'est pas parti pour la France. Il me demande mon avis, s'il doit revenir auprès de moi comme mon aide-de-camp, ou s'il doit faire le commerce pour son oncle. Vous pensez bien, que je lui ai conseillé le dernier.

Mes complimens à nos braves gens de la maison. Si Mde. Roberson a des commissions, je le ferai avec plaisir. Voyez aussi souvent, que vous pouvez, le Général Washington et communiquez moi ce qu'il vous dit. Je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur.

STEEBEN.

P. S.—Le gouvernement me demande, de procurer les ordonnances pour tous les officiers de l'armée. Major Scoll est allé en France avec la confédération. Les Messrs. du bureau de Guerre prétendent, que toutes les régulations sont envoyées à l'armée. Je vous prie, de m'envoyer une note exacte, combien nous avons reçu et distribué, et de vous informer après ceux, que Colonel Scammel a laissés à Windsor et ce qu'ils sont devenus.

Le bureau de Guerre n'a que 42 copies de reste. Dites moi, si cela est vrai, que notre armée a tant de désertion et la raison, d'où cela provient?

XV.

STEUBEN TO WALKER.

PHILADELPHIE, le 17 Mars, 1780.

Depuis votre lettre du 24 Février, je n'ai pas reçu de vos nouvelles. Rien n'étant décidé ici sur nos arrangements pour la campagne, et tout paraissant être arrêté par le mauvais état de nos finances, je n'ai rien à vous dire, qui pouvait vous intéresser.

Maintenant on assure, que le Congrès a trouvé la pierre philosophale—pour faire de l'or et de l'argent tant que nous pouvons manger—tant mieux, s'il était vrai !

J'espère, qu'à la fin mes vives représentations ont tant opéré, que dans deux ou trois jours on déterminera à la fin le système de la formation de l'armée pour la campagne prochaine.

Mainte projets ont été proposés, pour incorporer, réformer et ré-fondre toute l'armée. Avant-hier on m'a demandé mon opinion sur cet objet. Je l'ai donné en protestant solennellement contre une incorporation quelconque. Je propose le moyen le plus simple, qui est de laisser le nombre des régiments et des corps; de les égaliser, les augmenter autant que les circonstances le permettent; de mettre chaque régiment d'infanterie au nombre de 317 hommes, sans y comprendre les officiers commissionnés, ni les tambours et "*gîlers*;" de conserver la division d'un régiment en neuf compagnies; chaque compagnie de 35 soldats.

De mettre chaque régiment de Cavallerie au nombre de 204 Cavaliers montés; y compris les sous-officiers et trompettes, de conserver la formation en 3 Esq. et six Comps. chaque Regt.

Mon projet pour les Régts. additionels et les autres corps indépendants, est a peu près sur la même base. Je m'oppose directement à toute altération pour la campagne prochaine et j'explique les raisons, qui m'engagent à m'y opposer. Je n'ai pas le temps, de vous les détailler ici. Mais je suis sûr, que vous serez de mon avis, quand vous les scaurez.

Mais, mon ami! de tout ce que je me suis proposé de faire ici a Philadelphie, il n'y a pas la dixième partie achevée.

Le retard de la décision du Congrès a retardé mes opérations et quand même cette décision aurait été donnée plus tôt, je sens, que je ne pourrai rien achever sans votre assistance. Vous savez, que même dans mes propres affaires j'ai besoin de l'assistance de mon ami Walker. Je me flatte que vous ne persistez pas dans ce projet, qui m'a fait tant de peine et que nous ferons encore cette campagne ensemble. Pour la faire un peu plus agréablement, que la précédente, il faut un peu arranger notre menage. Vous savez combien je suis ignorant sur cet ob-

jet. J'ose donc vous prier, mon ami, de venir à mon secours aussi promptement, que vous pourrez. Faites vous avancer par Mr. Smith ou par qui vous voulez 500 dollars pour votre voyage. Je les rembourserai ici; et venez me joindre aussitôt que possible. Duponeau est toujours malade; son état m'inquiète infiniment. Le pauvre garçon m'assiste tant qu'il peut, mais c'est avec peine, que je lui donne de l'ouvrage.

Les mauvais chemins différeront encore quelque temps le départ du Chevalier de la Luzerne; peut-être restera-t-il jusqu'à ce que je vais au camp moi-même—il se rejouit, de vous voir ici.

Annoncez votre départ au général-en-chef, mais en cas qu'il veut vous charger de lettres, faites, qu'on vous expédie promptement.

Je vous attends ici dans le cours de la semaine prochaine. Je loge chez Me. Clark — Front street. Vous y trouverez une jeune veuve et une demoiselle charmante de New York. — Motif de plus, pour vous engager de venir le plus promptement.

Tachez, mon ami, de m'apporter une estimation aussi juste que possible du nombre des "Regulations" que le bureau de Guerre a fourni pour la grande armée. Le pauvre Major Scoll étant allé au paradis ne peut plus nous en rendre compte.

Je vous attends avec l'impatience de l'amant pour sa maîtresse, ou pour parler sans figure, avec tous les sentiments de vraie amitié, avec lesquels je suis toujours,

Mon cher ami,

Votre très humble et très

Obéissant serviteur,

STEBEN.

XVI.

STEBEN TO —.

WILLIAMSBURG, le 9 Septbr., 1751.

MON AMI,—J'ai reçu votre lettre du 13 Augt. de Philadelphie. Je vous suis bien obligé pour les preuves de votre attachement et pour les nouvelles, que vous me donnez. Je vous prie de continuer l'un et l'autre et soyez bien sûr de ma reconnaissance.

Je suis fâché, que vous n'avez pas trouvé Mr. Peters a Philadelphie —peut être l'avez vous rencontré au quartier général. Je voudrais savoir, s'il a reçu ma lettre, dans laquelle je lui ai envoyé ce morceau du journal, que vous savez. Tout étoit préparé pour mon départ pour le Sud, lorsqu'une attaque de la goutte m'obligea différer mon départ pour quelque jours. Le 3. je recevois une lettre du marquis, où il me mandoit, que la flotte françoise avec un corps de 4000 étoit dans la Baye, et qu'il seroit charmé de me voir chez lui. Ma goutte fut guérie

à l'instant ; j'écrivis au Général et le lendemain je partoais avec Colonel Walker pour l'armée, qui avançoit vers Williamsbourg.

Hier j'arrivois à cette place, où j'ai trouvé l'armée française campée avec la nôtre à une mille du collége. Nos lignes sont avancées à 4 milles de York, où l'ennemi se tient très serré, faisant des retranchements à York et Gloucester. Tous les Canons et Matelots sont à terre et les vaisseaux prêts à être brulés en cas de nécessité. Je ne doute pas, que Cornwallis ne se prépare pour une vigoureuse défense, mais les avantages sont à cette heure de notre côté. Il faut un miracle, pour qu'il s'échappe. S'il se sauve de ce pas, Cornwallis sera immortel dans sa patrie. S'il succombe, il sera criminel et peut-être jugé sévèrement. Voilà, mon ami, le sort d'un Général. La même action, le même manœuvre peut conduire un general à la gloire ou sur l'échafaud ! C'est du succès, que dépend le jugement ! On dit, que la flotte française ou du moins une partie d'elle est en poursuite de l'ennemi ; depuis plusieurs jours nous n'avons pas de nouvelles du Comte de Grasse. Six vaisseaux de ligne sont restés au Cap — les autres ont disparu. Les frégates sont à l'autre côté de Jamestown. Vous savez sans doute, que Lord Rawdon, pris dans son passage pour l'Angleterre, est en nos mains ?

Je n'ai pas encore vu le marquis ; il est malade et ne peut voir personne. Une fièvre violente l'a saisi tout d'un coup. J'espère de le voir aujourd'hui.

Mon ami North fut attaqué de la même manière en chemin. A peine ai-je pu l'amener ici dans une chaise. Il a la fièvre très forte.

Vous sentez bien, que tout est ici "in high spirits" quoique la milice ne se rassemble qu'avec sa négligence ordinaire.

Je bataille tous les jours contre la réception des aide-de-camp. Duval et quelques autres j'ai repoussé. Mais je ne pouvois pas me défendre de Peyton Randolph et de Moore, beau-frère du Colonel Walker. Ils sont mes aides volontiers pour cette expédition. Oh mon ami ! pour quoi n'êtes vous pas avec moi — mais comme nous attendons des troupes du Nord, peut-être vous en êtes ! Quelle joie aurai-je de vous revoir.

Ne sachant où vous adresser cette lettre, elle restera dans mon portefeuille et sera continuée avec les nouvelles, que nous aurons.

XVII.

WILLIAM DAVIES TO STEUBEN.

RICHMOND, September 9th, 1781.

I know not how to express to you my gratitude for the very obliging terms of favor and friendship you have used towards me. Your approbation I shall always be anxious to acquire, and however disap-

pointed your disinterested exertions may have been, for raising the line of this State into respect and consequence, I console myself with your assurance that the comfort and satisfaction of the troops of Virginia shall always be an object of your attention and regard. . . . With the warmest emotions of affectionate respect I bid you farewell, and beg you, my dear general, to accept of my most ardent wishes for your health and happiness, and a glorious reward for the very disinterested attachment you have shown my country, in an unremitted series of faithful services.

XVIII.

WILLIAM DAVIES TO STEUBEN.

RICHMOND, *October 6th, 1781.*

I am happy to hear you are still in Virginia, and sincerely congratulate you on the pleasing prospect before us. You had long expressed your opinion of the necessity of more attention and assistance towards us from the northward, and I doubt not that your representations in our favor had an influence in procuring the aid we have received. I hope to be able to arrange my business in such a manner as to admit of my visiting camp before the scene is closed, when I shall be happy in paying my respects to you.

XIX.

WILLIAM DAVIES TO STEUBEN.

WAR OFFICE, *December 27th, 1781.*

I am happy to hear of your safe arrival at Philadelphia, and promise myself the satisfaction of being recollected by you in your moments of leisure.

I am anxious to hear what impression the capture of Cornwallis will make upon the European powers, and particularly the Parliament of Britain. It is a calamity the British never expected, and must doubtless be felt with double poignancy after the high hopes they had entertained from the incursions and conquests, as they called them, of Lord Cornwallis.

I have understood the Congress propose to make another arrangement of the army. I should be very glad to know upon what principles it is to be made. I honestly confess the difficulties which officers, particularly of Virginia, are constantly entangled with, have very much moderated my zeal for a service I was once greatly attached to.

The troops at Cumberland old Court-house, both officers and sol-

diers, have refused to march till they get their pay. The situation of a brigadier officer or soldier is worse than that of a slave, and unless it is speedily altered there will be an end of the line altogether.

I must beg you to favor me with a line whenever your more important business will admit. It will afford me much satisfaction to find I am not forgotten, as I am, with unalterable attachment, etc.

XX.

STEUBEN TO COLONEL BARBER.

POMPTON, *April 5th, 1782.*

Nothing gives me more pain than to be obliged to censure where I wish to commend. I am obliged to complain to you of the manner in which the inspection and other rolls have been made out. My complaint is not official. I think I know the officers in the American army so well as to believe that it is sufficient for them to know that they have committed a fault; their wish will be to repair and avoid it in future.

The inspection returns of both regiments are wrong. In the first no mention is made of the colors. The return goes only on three hundred and ninety-seven to be armed, whereas it ought to be four hundred and three, including the sergeants and quarter-master sergeants; which make the number of arms, ammunition, etc., wanting, entirely wrong. In the camp, of equipage neither lanterns nor knapsacks are returned; neither are there any deficiencies noted. In the inspection returns of the second regiment the . . . is said to be eight captains, no surgeon's mate, sergeants, major, drum or fife major; no major to the regiment, thirty-six sergeants, seventeen drums, three hundred and seventy-eight rank and file. Colors for the regiment are not mentioned. There are several other mistakes in both rolls.

The muster rolls are in general very badly made out; very few but are wanting in some part or another. Some of them are so erroneous as not to be passed, among which are Captain Helmsreckle. In the column for musters, in one return Michael Daily is inserted, in the other two he is not. Abraham Roser is mustered in two rolls, but in the third he is called Shaver. James Wigans is not mustered, but no reason is given why he is not. In the rolls of Captain Peale's company the drums and fifes are not distinguished. Aaron Bayly is mustered in two, but not in the third roll.

XXI.

STEUBEN TO GENERAL WAYNE.

FISHKILL LANDING, May 24th, 1782.

The very polite and delicate manner in which you have considered my attentions to the honor of those truly brave men whom I had the honor to command in the trenches on the day alluded to, is so very flattering that I find myself at a loss of words to express my feelings on this occasion. I had too often borne witness of the gallant exertions of the troops under the command of General Wayne to perceive that a superiority of numbers was necessary to secure success, and so long as the armies of America continue to be commanded by officers of such distinguished merits her military glory will remain untarnished. I am very sorry, my dear general, to be under the necessity of giving disagreeable answers to your pertinent and important queries. From every appearance the enemy seem disposed to conduct the war in the old channel, except that their force is too inconsiderable to make any impression, and the situation of our public affairs is such as not to promise any decided exertions on our part. I hope the best, though I fear the worst. Yesterday the news of our independence by the States of Holland was announced at head-quarters, as contained in a paragraph of a British newspaper. This event, which happened on the 29th of March, has afforded us general satisfaction, which, together with the birth of a dauphin of France, will be a subject of an elegant entertainment in the army, and a *feu de joie*. General Carleton, who has lately arrived with a withered olive branch in his hand, proposed to send his aid to Congress on business of consequence, which was received with a disdain suited to the absurdity of the proposition. I have inclosed a paper containing an address to the people, in consequence of the reports holding up an idea of peace. I wish it may have the desired effect, though I have little reason for it from present appearances.

XXII.

Lieutenant Colonel J. Ternant's Report of the Muster and Inspection made of the Southern Army during the month of April, 1782.

What relates to the muster is so fully explained in the inclosed abstract as to make it unnecessary to say any thing further on the subject. I have to lament that the inspection could not be made with that accurate strictness the good of the service and the nature of the operation required.

But I am in hopes that the total deficiency of materials and vouchers

necessary to a proper investigation, the want of printed forms, and the peculiar circumstances of the army will sufficiently account for every imperfection. The inclosed returns, irregular as they are, will at least show the pressing wants of the troops in many respects, and the necessity of preparing the way to a future and more complete inspection. With that view I shall lay before you such a set of regulations, to be issued in general orders if approved of, as appear to me most conducive to the last object; in the meantime I shall beg leave to communicate a few remarks on the present state of the army.

Formation.—It is the best that could be adopted in the confused state of the several lines which were to compose this army; and we can only wish the present arrangement of the infantry to be permanent, and such recruits as may in future be sent by the several States, to be equally distributed to all the corps and companies as they actually stand, so as to complete them to their establishment.

Without a permanency of that sort, both in the appointments of the officers and the distribution of the men, the economical details of the service must be totally neglected, and a principal object of this department unavoidably missed. If the company of Virginia infantry under Lieutenant Smith is ultimately attached to the Second Partizan Legion, they ought to do duty as such in every respect, and not separately; if not, their incorporation into Lieutenant Colonel Posey's battalion might prove advantageous to the service.

Discipline.—With regard to tactics, discipline is as perfect as can be expected under the actual circumstances of the army. Lieutenant Colonel Posey's battalion, on the day of the review, went through several evolutions and manœuvres very much to the credit of the corps. There seems to be a total want of system in the legionary corps, each of them having a particular formation, and a different method of executing the several evolutions peculiar to their service. With regard to the interior and economical discipline, it is defective in a very material point; no regimental or company books are kept in any corps of the army. The necessity of attending immediately to that object is too obvious to need any further mention. I shall therefore lay before you the forms of the several books as they are kept in the northern army, that they may be introduced in the manner you may think proper to order.

Arms.—The muskets and bayonets in general are in good order and properly attended to in the infantry. But it was with great concern I found such a deficiency of them as to leave upwards of three hundred men unarmed on a field day—part of those are to be found in every company under the denominations of *camp color men*, *pioneers* and *barbers*, claiming, from custom, an exemption of bearing arms, highly injurious to the service, and no ways warranted by the regulations; others

as waiters enjoy the same privilege, contrary to the late adopted rules and general orders of the commander-in-chief. The artificers and matrosses of the artillery are also without arms, and although custom and the opinion of a distinguished character have sanctified the practice, I can not help thinking that the service would be benefited by those men having firelocks of one kind or other, besides the advantage of both attending to their police, the defense and safety of their stores, etc., etc. Upon all occasions the artificers would answer the purpose of a guard for the baggage of the army, and so lessen the number of drafts from the line.

The swords of the cavalry are but in a very indifferent order, one third being without scabbards, many broken or very much abused, and all far from being clean. The few pistols they have are so little attended to that many are unfit for any kind of use, and the rest want ammunition. I must except a troop of the Fourth regiment, under Captain Sill, whose arms, clothing and accouterments bespoke a steady attention to discipline. I found nowhere the traveling forge, armorers, tools, chests of spare arms and ammunition that every brigade or two battalions ought to have, conformable to the regulations, the want of which must occasion a variety of inconveniences too obvious to need any mention.

Accouterments.—The inspection returns will show a great deficiency of cartridge-boxes in the infantry, and almost a total one in the cavalry. That part of the equipment is so important and necessary to the preservation of ammunition, that an immediate supply must be looked upon as indispensable; those of the cavalry could even be spared to the infantry, if necessary, as the upper part of the holster-pipe can be so contrived as to contain three rounds, which is the most a horseman will want. Gun-worms, screw-drivers and turn-screws are wanting everywhere. The accouterments of the horse are still in a worse condition than their arms; all the saddles are incomplete and want repair, no collars or halters, and very few valises. The want of saddlers and farriers in the cavalry is much to be lamented, as most of the saddles and bridles, etc., are worn out and destroyed long before their usual duration; the granting those men an additional pay might be a just encouragement to those already in service, and a great inducement to others for enlisting.

Ammunition.—The deficiency of it in the infantry calls aloud for an immediate supply; the Pennsylvania and Maryland brigades are the best furnished, every man being complete to thirty rounds—but no regimental or brigade spare stock. The North Carolina brigade, the whole of the light infantry, and the infantry in Georgia, have not above twelve rounds per man, including the issued and spare ammunition; the cartridges through the whole army are mostly too small in the size of the bullet and the quantity of the powder, and some too large to fit

any bore. That strongly indicates the necessity of ascertaining, by the usual methods and experiments, the several bores, and the quantity of powder best calculated for each, so that measures and models may be made to direct the cartridge makers. The regulations with regard to the drawing the charges after field duty, collecting and returning the bad cartridges, are exceedingly neglected throughout the army. There is a deficiency of spare flints to one fifth of the muskets.

Clothing and Camp Equipage.—It is totally deficient with one half of the army, and far gone with the other half. If the troops were furnished with the proportion of needles and thread they have a right to, it might be the means of lengthening the duration of the several articles of clothing.

Horses.—Size rolls of them are totally deficient in the cavalry, but so necessary that no time ought to be lost in ordering them to be made out. Several horses returned as sick, absent with their riders, are too scattered to admit of any examination; a place convenient for that purpose ought to be fixed upon, where all the horses from the several corps could be collected, with a suitable number of farriers, and an officer to superintend the infirmary.

Hospitals.—The sick in general are as well attended to as the circumstances will permit. There is a total deficiency of the sacks allowed by the regulations, to the regimental and general hospitals.

Two soldiers of the Second Maryland regiment, in Captain McPherson's and Lieutenant Adam's companies, were suffered to go to the hospital with their arms and accouterments, contrary to the regulations.

Martley Leppet, Henry Cook, of First Maryland, and James Barrow, of Second Delaware, appear to be proper subjects to be transferred to the invalids corps.

XXII.

OTHO H. WILLIAMS TO STEUBEN.

CAMP NEWBURG, November 28th, 1782.

If I had known of your being in quarters in the vicinity of Philadelphia, I would certainly have done myself the honor of paying my respects to you, on my route to the northern army. The striking contrast I observe in what our troops now are and what they were when you first undertook the office of inspector general, evinces in a very conspicuous degree the great advantages of systematic discipline, and how much may be effected by the perseverance, attention and activity of an individual who is perfectly acquainted with the principles of his profession. How much our troops are indebted to you, sir, for that

military ability and appearance in which they now both so advantageously compare with the best disciplined troops in Europe, Congress, his Excellency General Washington, and other eminent characters, bear honorable testimony. The personal knowledge I have, as an officer of the American army, acquired from your general instructions, influences my gratitude to add my private thanks to the more important acknowledgments you have already and repeatedly received.

XXIII.

STEUBEN TO WALKER.

SCHUYLKILL, *December 27th, 1792.*

MON CHER WALKER,—Ce n'est que depuis quatre jours que Brigadier Williams m'a remis votre lettre du 3 Decembre. Vous savez combien je suis sensible à l'amitié ; jugez donc si les lettres qui me viennent de vous me doivent être chères. Si je vous avois su aussi près de moi, je vous aurais prévenu en venant vous voir. J'aurais satisfait un double désir, celui de présenter mes hommages à Mrs. Washington et de voir un ami que j'aime. Mais lorsque j'ai reçu votre avant dernière lettre, je croyais qu'il seroit trop tard pour arriver à Robertson's ferry. L'arrivée du Comte Rochambeau et des autres officiers français fait que je suis maintenant plus dissipé que je ne l'étais du commencement. Ces Messieurs viennent me voir et je suis souvent avec eux. Au reste depuis quinze jours mes affaires particulières m'ont presque toujours appelé en ville.

J'ai donné un mémoire au Congrès, dans lequel j'ai évacué tout ce que j'avois sur l'estomac depuis 1777 ; jugez si je dois me trouver soulagé. Ils ont nommé une committée de laquelle Hamilton est président. J'ai exposé ma situation "in plain English." Le rapport n'est pas encore fait. Pour de la paye je suis déjà assuré de recevoir autant que mes pauvres compagnons, c'est à dire peu ou rien. Pour les autres demandes, on emploiera à ce que je prévois des palliatifs pour me faire vivre une campagne de plus. Au reste, je dois avouer que je n'étais jamais traité avec plus de bonté depuis que je suis en Amérique. Le Congrès paraît vouloir me faire sa cour en parlant à toute occasion de notre armée avec une vénération sans égal. On ne lamente le mauvais état de nos finances que pour ne pouvoir satisfaire les justes demandes de nos genereux officiers. Si les compliments pouvoient nous faire vivre, mon cher, il n'y aurait pas une armée aussi riche que la notre.

C'est du moins quelque chose ; personne ne s'avise plus de dire "Let them go, we shall have another!"

Taisez vous au nom de Dieu sur mon bonnet de nuit et sur Gibral-

tar! Ah! les B . . . des Anglais! S'ils avoient des généraux et des ministres comme ils ont des officiers de marine, ils feraient la conquête du monde. Que je respecte ce Howe; voilà ce qui s'appelle un grand manœuvre! Elliot certainement a montré plus de vigueur que le fameux Lord Cornwallis—mais quand on connaît le roc qu'il a défendu, la chose n'est pas tant extraordinaire. On peut dire que les Dons ont bien dansé la folie d'Espagne.

Je vous aurais envoyé copie de mon mémoire au Congrès, mais le volume était trop grand. Il est de ma propre composition: mais mon ami le Chancelier Livingston a eu la complaisance de la corriger et d'effacer les traits où ma plume avait un peu trop appuyé. Je viens de cacheter un gros paquet pour Messieurs les ministres à Versailles, auxquels je parle aussi clair en français que j'ai parlé Anglois au Congrès. Mr. de la Luzerne et Mr. de Chattellux ont approuvé mon langage, ils m'en promettent du succès. Il est d'âre de se battre avec l'Amérique et la France, après qu'on a presque fait la paix avec les Anglois.

Cette chienne de correspondance ministérielle m'a coûté infiniment de peines. Vous savez que je suis sans assistance, même pour ma correspondance Anglaise. Que ferai-je mon ami, si je dois faire encore une campagne? Je ne crois pas que Popham a envie de me rejoindre; du moins je n'ai pas une ligne de lui. Où trouverai-je un Walker? mais je ne dois vous rendre trop vain. Mais sérieusement, où trouverai-je un homme qui peut conduire ma correspondance? Voyez un peu, si vous pouvez me proposer un bon sujet. Vous savez ce qu'il me faut. Je compte toujours sur mon North, vous savez cependant, que sa force ne consiste pas dans sa plume. Vous savez aussi, qu'il est aussi paresseux qu'il est aimable. Depuis quatre semaines je n'ai pas eu de ses nouvelles, écrivez lui et grondez le. Tâchez en même temps de le persuader de me joindre au plus tard à la fin de Mars.

Gibbs m'a dit que les officiers de l'armée étaient au point de m'écrire une lettre de reconnaissance. J'en aurais été infiniment flatté; dites moi la raison qui a empêché ce projet. Je vous souhaite une heureuse nouvelle année. N'oubliez pas mes respects au general et à Mrs. Washington. Adieu mon ami!

XXIV.

STEBEN TO CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

End of 1792.

Depuis votre ministère en Amérique Monsieur, vous m'avez témoigné tant de bontés qu'il ne me faut aucun autre encouragement pour réclamer votre protection dans un moment de détresse.

Je n'entrerais pas ici dans un narratif détaillé des services, que j'ai rendus dans ce pays, de tout les obstacles, que j'ai dû surmonter, du peu de moyens que j'avais—tout ces difficultés ne vous sont que trop connues—je ne m'étendrais non plus sur les changements de notre état militaire depuis que la discipline était confiée à mes soins ; la comparaison de ce qu'il étoit avec ce qu'il est aujourd'hui doit justifier mes opérations. L'approbation des officiers de votre armée et celle dont vous m'avez honoré vous même, m'a persuadé que mes peines n'ont pas été mal employées.

Mais Monsieur c'est avec une peine inexprimable que je dois vous dire, qu'il est absolument hors de mon pouvoir de soutenir plus longtemps la misère, à la quelle je me vois réellement exposé.

Je me vois sans ressource, sans crédit, sans appui, et l'idée qui me choque le plus, est celle que je me vois étranger dans un pays, où en justice je ne devrois plus l'être, et quelquefois dans mes chagrins, j'attribue à ce seul titre d'étranger le peu d'égards qu'on a pour ma condition et mes services.

Depuis cinq ans je ne suis pas plus payé que les officiers de notre armée en général, depuis cinq ans il ne se trouve pas une seule demande de moi dans les journeaux du Congrès, depuis cinq ans je n'ai reçu aucune faveur ni grace.

Si j'ai souffert pendant ce temps c'étoit toujours dans l'espérance qu'un heureux changement de nos affaires adouciroit mon sort. Mais c'est précisément depuis le changement le plus heureux que je me vois le plus négligé.

Le Secrétaire de la Guerre comença son ministère par rogner les émolumens qui m'étoient accordés en entrant dans le service ; il m'ôta un aide de camp, diminua le nombre des officiers dans mon département, etc.

Ce ministre, auquel je faisais tous les mois mes rapports de l'état de l'armée n'a pas daigné de me répondre une seule fois et quoique j'attribue son silence cela me décourage, à continuer une besogne où je devrois être soutenu par le Ministre de la Guerre.

C'est depuis ce temps que je dois me plaindre non seulement des négligences mais des mauvais procédés de nos ministres et finalement je me vois à présent réduit à manquer de tout.

La crainte de m'exposer à des refus malhonnêtes me retient de faire une demande quelconque.

Ma fortune épuisée, la cherté et plus que tout l'indifférence avec laquelle je me vois traité—m'engage à finir une carrière désagréable et ruineuse. Mais avant de faire une démarche, permettez moi, Monsieur, de réclamer votre avis, la confiance dans vos bontés me fera suivre votre direction sans m'en écarter d'aucune manière.

XXVI.

* STEUBEN TO CHEVALIER DE LA LUZERNE.

Five years have passed away, while with courage and perseverance I have pursued the object to make our army perfect, without requiring support of those from whom I had the right to hope for it. Now, however, is the time when I must know what is to be my lot. I must settle my affairs with Congress, and need not tell you what advantage would result to me from a recommendation of the Count De Vergennes, in which he would authorize you to make known to Congress and to the commander-in-chief that it was with the acquiescence of the court of France that I came over to this country. I entreat you, chevalier, to forward the inclosed letter on this subject to Count De Vergennes.

XXVII.

* STEUBEN TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

After nearly six years of labor and pains, will you allow me to ask for your protection? You know too well the state of affairs in the American army to make it necessary to describe in particular my own. A witness of the favors which the munificence of the king, your master, has generously bestowed upon the French officers who were in our army, I could not but regret that I had not been in the service of that generous prince; nevertheless, I served in the same cause, and, I may say, with the same zeal. But the United States could not grant me any gratuitous recompense. Yet it is time for Congress to decide my lot for the future, and I must now solicit your protection. A letter from you, authorizing Mr. De La Luzerne to interest himself for me, would obtain for me advantages which, as a stranger, I could not hope for. The report which will be made to you of the army by Messrs. De Chatelux, De Laval, De Ségur, Prince De Broglio, Count De Deuxponts and others, will prove to you that I have taken great pains to deserve your support. Encouraged by the approbation of your officers, I venture to flatter myself that I shall receive the favor I ask for

XXVIII.

* STEUBEN TO VERGENNES.

End of 1782.

I have for a long time wished to unite with the assurance of my respect for you a circumstantial report of my operations since my arrival

here. If it is important for the general good that you were well informed of our military condition, it is especially more so for me that the details be given you by an enlightened and impartial military man.

The departure of Mr. Le Chevalier De Chattelux affords me the opportunity so much desired. I have nothing to add to the report he will make to you, but the wish, that my task has been so conducted as to be honored by your approbation. With this, sir, I shall not regret the toils and obstacles I had to surmount in pursuit of my object.

The title of foreigner is nowhere so agreeable as in your country, and nowhere so disagreeable as among the English. Though Americans we were always a little English in this respect. I leave you to judge if it was easy to introduce a Prussian system of subordination into an army where a few days previously a captain had chosen his colonel, and a sergeant nominated his captain. To succeed in such an undertaking requires either vast authority or effective patronage or a great deal of money. Entirely destitute of these, I confess that success appeared very doubtful to me. In this lonely state much firmness was required to withstand the checks I was exposed to. But the more difficult the task the more we are animated to engage in it; the least success encourages us to persevere and finish the work once begun. This is my position at present. It depends on you, Mr. le comte, to make me confident of success. With a little support from you I am sure the task will be accomplished. It is for the general good that I claim your favor and protection.

XXIX.

* STEUBEN TO VERGENNES.

When I had the honor of presenting my respects to you at Versailles, I hoped to find more frequent opportunities of informing you of the success of my enterprise. It was, however, very important for me that the report of my operations should be sent you by a military man equally impartial and well informed. This opportunity is now afforded by the departure of Mr. Le Chevalier De Chattelux for France. He has seen the maneuvers of the American army, and although not the only French officer who has honored the execution of the system which I have established with his approbation, he is more particularly informed of the difficulties and obstacles which I have surmounted by the perseverance and firmness which I have employed. A stranger without recommendations, and often without resources, the execution of my plan was one of the greatest difficulties.

It gives me great satisfaction to address this letter to you, Mr. le

comte, at a time when, by the judgment of connoisseurs in French tactics, I am authorized to assure you that the Americans have at present an infantry very superior, in order and discipline, to that which England can oppose to it. After six years of hard work will you permit me to recall to your memory the conversation in your office? It is noted in the annexed memorial, at the end of which I have ventured to lay open to you my desires and my wishes. Believing that I have deserved your protection, from your way of thinking I anticipate success. The time seems to approach when your labors will be crowned by a peace glorious to France, and by the independence of America. You can not forget the instruments whose services you have made use of to attain this important object.

XXX.

STEUBEN TO VERGENNES.

From a Memorial addressed to the French Ministry in 1782.

Mr. De Steuben, satisfied that the French ministry is fully aware of the condition of the American army at the time of his arrival, flatters himself that after the report which the Count De Rochambeau and the Chevalier De Chattellux are going to make, a comparative view will secure him the approbation of the French court. The zeal and perseverance with which, for a period of nearly six years, he has surmounted every obstacle, the difficulty of conducting, his operations without any support, and almost without means, and lastly the system which he has established, and the success which has followed it, are the titles on which he presumes to rest his claims to the favor and munificence of His most Christian Majesty.

He binds himself to bring the work he has commenced to a termination. It is only when the war shall have ceased, and the independence of America shall have been recognized by England, that he wishes to finish his days in the dominions of His Majesty. He hopes to obtain from the United States of America an indemnity for the sacrifices he has made to enable him to enter into their service. This sum would nearly reinstate him in the same situation he was in previous to his leaving Europe. Who can he look to for the reward of such a hazardous enterprise, if it is not to the generosity of that prince who has rewarded the smallest services rendered in this revolution?

Encouraged by these examples of generosity, he presumes to take the liberty of asking for the favors mentioned in the following: That His Majesty will condescend, after this war, to grant him the same rank in his armies which he may then hold in the American service. As his age will hardly allow him to be actively employed, the rank

which he asks will not cause any jealousy in the army. That will be a title wished for by an old soldier which would confer great honor upon him, the sole object of his ambition.

That His Majesty will add to the pension which Mr. De Steuben hopes to obtain from Congress, such a sum as will yield him a life-interest of 20,000 livres per annum, to enable him to end his days at ease in the States of the king.

Mr. De Steuben is emboldened to beseech the Count De Vergennes to grant him his influence for obtaining the favor which he asks. It is worthy of the munificence of the king. It will be the reward of an old soldier who has sacrificed all to attain so interesting an object as the independence of America.

XXXI.

* STEUBEN TO THE PRINCE DE MONTBAREY.

1783.

Permit me to recall to your recollection an old soldier always mindful of the many kindnesses you have shown him in former days.

Five years have elapsed since you approved an enterprise, the success of which at that time, and indeed for a long time after, seemed to be very problematical. Although the work is not yet entirely finished, it is too advanced to doubt its completion any longer. Since I last had the honor of seeing you at Versailles I have not been idle. The five campaigns in America have afforded me greater experience than thirty-four years' service in Europe. How fortunate you are, generals in Europe! You get an army and means and have nothing to do but act. It is not so with us; Congress tells us: Look for your army, find the means, and manage as well as you can.

Le Chevalier De Chattellux will give you more perfect information on the matter than I can. I have requested him at the same time to give you the details of my proceedings. I should consider myself very fortunate should you deign to honor them with your approval. But prince, when Mr. De Chattellux tells you what I have done to merit your approbation, he will tell you also how much the non-receipt of any mark of it has pained me. M. Gérard, M. De La Luzerne, M. De Chattellux arrived one after the other, without the ministers at Versailles making any mention to them of an honest German who had the honor of being known to the Prince De Montbarey and other respectable persons. It has cost me much to be deprived of the comfort such an avowal would have afforded me. It is not as agreeable to be a foreigner in America as it is in France, particularly when so strange a doctrine is preached in a republic as obedience and subordination. But I do not want to pick

a quarrel with you; I flatter myself that having steered the ship without assistance, will entitle me somewhat to your esteem. Your military men have seen the maneuvers of the American army; my labors have been honored by their approval. What more can I require to make me vain?

XXXII.

VERGENNES TO STEUBEN.

VERSAILLES, *le 21 Juillet, 1783.*

J'ai reçu, Monsieur, la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 30 Septembre. J'ai toujours pris la plus grande part à vos succès, vous avez rendu des services essentiels aux Etats Unis, et je ne doute pas que vous n'en recueilliez tout le fruit que vous avez droit d'en attendre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être très sincèrement, Monsieur, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

DE VERGENNES.

XXXIII.

COUNT E. S. DE HERTZBERG, PRUSSIAN SECRETARY OF STATE, TO MR. DUMAS,
MINISTER-RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AT THE HAGUE.

BERLIN, *le 25 Février, 1783.*

MONSIEUR,—J'ai l'honneur de vous dire en réponse à votre lettre, qu'il faudrait beaucoup d'écritures pour vous envoyer un état détaillé de la paie et de la subsistance de l'armée Prussienne, et que je serais obligé de vous demander encore des éclaircissements sur ce qui fait le véritable but et objet de cette recherche. S'il est pour l'information des Etats Unis d'Amérique ils pouvoient y parvenir plus aisément puisqu'ils ont à leur service Mr. le Général de Steuben, qui a été autrefois au service Prussien, que le connaît au fond et qui est un officier fort intelligent.

Je suis, Monsieur, votre très, etc.

XXXIV.

* STEUBEN TO NORTH. (?)

Summer of 1783.

It is so difficult to correspond with one so lazy as you are, that I often throw down my pen when I have the most cheerful things to tell you. This disbandment of the army, for instance, was so thoroughly comic that you would laughed yourself sick had you seen it. I drew

the most amusing picture of it for your special entertainment, but all of a sudden I thought, "The lazy fellow does not deserve it," and I tore up the work. The good man whose portfolio was always for the army, Pandora's box, no sooner communicated his dispatches, than the sentiments concerning them were of the most diverse character. The most stupid were in ecstasies of admiration at his great policy; the most violent swore, and the most feeble shed tears. I leave you to judge to what class your old friend belonged. Well, yes, since you guess it, what is the use of denying it? I swore like an English sailor who has not been paid his wages. I could not conceal my surprise to the commander-in-chief, that the minister of war could become the bearer and the executor of such strange arrangements. One of the poor man's friends undertook to defend him, by assuring me that it was altogether against his inclination, but the finance minister compelled him to do all these things, and that he treated the good man in the most contemptuous manner. Enraged as I was, I could not refrain from laughing at this exculpation. The wicked, big Morris, to treat a good fellow in such a shameful manner! The next day I dined with the good man, at the house of our friend Pickering. The company was far from gay. I was as angry as the devil. The good man might have been very jolly, but these gloomy countenances afflicted him to that degree that he ate nothing but some pudding and cheese. After dinner he took me aside, and asked me if I could not lend him a little money. I told him politely that my finances were a miniature copy of those of the new empire. He sighed, and in order not to leave me in any doubt of his kind-heartedness, he said that he wanted a little money, in order to give three or four dollars to some officers of his acquaintance (probably from his country), to enable them to get home. What an excellent heart had this minister of war, and how wicked was Morris to send this excellent fellow without giving him a little money to show the generosity of his soul. He executed his commission, however; sent the vagabonds home, without giving them time to breathe. There was nothing said about settling accounts. "Go in peace," was the pass-word; and in three days they were so dispersed that they never will be found together again until the day of judgment. Is not this the day that all the preachers say that all accounts will be settled? Well, I shall hold myself in readiness for that day. But let us return to our glorious work. Numbers of these warriors are gone to New York; several are gone to the islands, and others to Ireland. As to these we are rid of them without paying a cent, and that is so much gained for our dear country.

Will you not be wicked enough to call me a sad dog, when you read of this disbandment? I know you. You are just the man to do so, and to accuse your best friend. It is not the first time that you

called me a sour-tempered fellow. Say whatever you please, I know that I am only too good-natured. The proof is that I am fond of you, notwithstanding your laziness and all your other faults. Say what you will, only let me get vent for my spleen. As you are in the habit of burning my letters, I willingly offer you this one for the same purpose. Let us then return to the stage. Every man played his part in the melancholy scene according to his character. As I could not trust my temper, I shut myself up in my rooms and pleaded illness. Each corps was disbanded by separate orders to the commander of each regiment, with the exception of the general order announcing the resolution of Congress. Each corps dispersed without leave-taking on either side. As Congress said nothing to either officers or soldiers, the commander-in-chief did not see fit to say any thing, although every one considered this an absolute dismissal. I was the only person who had to bear the sad farewells of the officers and soldiers. They came to visit me in my retreat, and nearly all of them, in heart-broken accents, began the conversation by asking me what I thought of the way in which they had been dismissed. Not venturing to say what I thought, I had nothing left to do but assure them of my friendship, and console them as well as I could. The New York regiments, which were a model of discipline and order for the entire army, were disbanded the same day. The officers did me the honor to present me an address, of which I inclose you a copy. As they only addressed their governor and myself, how do you think the proceeding will be regarded? However that may be, I feel infinitely flattered, and their kindly sentiments towards me will be the consolation of my old days. But, my friend, if Congress requires me to produce other certificates than those of the officers and soldiers—those same officers and soldiers from whom I have exacted a rigid performance of duty—if Congress requires certificates from my superiors to settle my recompense, they may save our dear country a very large expense.

XXXV.

* STEUBEN TO RICHARD PETERS.

End of 1788.

I have just received your letter of the 23d. This glorious peace has caused a great change in my way of thinking. You know, my dear friend, that I have often lamented, like Heraclitus, the follies of the human race. But I now laugh, like Democritus, particularly at our extravagance. A money, without gold or silver; military schools where they teach the Presbyterian catechism; arsenals filled with the Word of God; and even the hereditary sin of Congress, an empty purse, are

things to make the gloomiest pedagogue laugh. But what will the world say if this great independent empire, which has supported a war for eight years against Great Britain, can not support itself during one year of peace? O! Fathers of the Areopagus, spare the poor Americans this ridicule. Do not make money without metal, nor arsenals without arms. "Has not this old German baron plenty of reason to laugh at his own folly?" you will say, as a member of Congress. "Must he always amuse himself at the expense of his sovereigns?" Stop, member of Congress! I am a Baron of the Holy Roman Empire, consequently a sovereign myself. Quite as poor, but quite as proud as any American senator, I retain the privilege of laughing at your folly as I laugh at those of the sovereign pontiff or of kings. Will they believe in Europe, that after seven years of war this country is quite as thickly populated, if not more so, as it was when the war began; that at this moment the country is quite as widely cultivated, has as much merchandise and far more coin than it had before the war; that its commerce is more extended than ever, and its ports the markets of the world; that everybody has more of every thing than he needs; that among three millions of men, thirteen (certainly the most enlightened) have been chosen to govern this vast empire; and that this same vast empire has no more credit than the smallest village in the Canton of Grisons? O! Fathers of the Areopagus, suffer not the Grisons and the Grisettes to laugh at us! Go on, gentlemen; when Providence gives you wisdom, I shall lose the greatest object of my mirth.

"But, gentlemen laughers, what would you do if you were Congress, without money, without credit, without authority, and the people unwilling to pay taxes?" The case is certainly a difficult one. As a Prussian officer I shall reply—. But that won't do. I should resort to common sense. I should beg common sense to speak to the people in its own language (the most unintelligible to the people); to explain first the advantages that result from the independence obtained by peace; then the debt they have contracted to obtain these advantages; the necessity to pay these debts to maintain the national credit; the decline of a nation and of each individual inhabitant, when the national credit declines; the advantages of a solid confederation to secure the property of every citizen; and finally, I would beg common sense to show the people a bill, as simple as that of a butcher, of the general debt, the annual interest, the division of this interest among the inhabitants, and the sum required to pay it off and provide for the wants and the security of the empire, also divided among the people. The people, seeing that this sum will be very small (which it ought to be), will not hesitate to adopt the proposed measures.

I think that a pamphlet written by Common Sense on this subject

would produce a better effect than all the recommendations of Congress in prose and verse. "But if the people will not listen to Common Sense?" In that case, I should say to such a people, "Go to the devil with your independence."

Adieu, my dear friend.

XXXVI.

* STEUBEN TO KNOX.

BELISARIUS HALL ON THE SCHUYLKILL,
February 4th, 1784, in a long evening.

MY DEAR KNOX,—I hope that North has told you how deeply I regretted quitting the army without bidding you adieu at West Point. The presence of the Secretary of War delayed me three days longer than I expected. I intended to devote those three days to seeing you, my friend; to present my most respectful compliments to your lady; to take your orders for Philadelphia—perhaps for Europe. I wanted to ask you for letters and advice; but this minister—this man who deranges every thing without knowing how to arrange any thing—spoiled my favorite project of seeing my friend, the Governor of Eldorado, or of West Point—which is almost the same thing, except that the sheep are not rose color, and the young Lucas play with pebbles which are not exactly diamonds.

Here I am, my friend, in a country-house three miles distant from—Athens?—Rome?—no, 'tis Philadelphia. I regard with veneration the seat of our Areopagus, at a certain distance. As a connoisseur looks at and examines the pictures of Rubens or Van Dyck, he admires the boldness and magnificence of these *chefs d'œuvre* at a proper distance from them; and were he to approach one step nearer, he would see nothing but a mass of colors jumbled together, and stains, which, however, are necessary to produce the general effect;—so do I admire at a distance of three miles. But away with these comparisons. I am going to write myself out of the best of all republics. The fact is, that I am in the country because I have not the wherewithal to live in town; because I will not dine with anybody for the reason that I can not give anybody a dinner; because I do not pay visits to people who do not visit honest men; and because I do not wish to speak in society where I can not damn certain persons in high office and particularly "*the great disturbers.*"

Here are reasons enough, I think, for living in my barrel, like Diogenes, and for cursing the human race. In my execrations, I always except the general and the army, as an Italian sailor always excepts San Antonio of Padua, before he sends all the other saints to the

devil. How fortunate you are to belong to the army; otherwise you would be damned along with the rest of the crowd. God forgive me! Here is an entire page of large foolscap covered with nonsense. Why is it, I wonder, that I can never speak rationally with you? My personal position is serious enough. I am ruined, in the fullest sense of the word. The Prussian service cost me half my fortune; but it won me esteem and consideration in the Old World. The American service costs me the rest of my worldly possessions, and the ministers treat me worse than a vagrant in this New World. No, I can not and will not suffer any longer. I can not any longer depend on persons who are incapable of recognizing a man's merit and social condition. Let Congress deal with its ministers or cease to have any thing to do with me. This is my final determination. I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the art of war, an American army worthy of their approbation; an infantry such as England has never brought into the field; officers who understand their profession, and who would do honor to any army in Europe; and soldiers who are well drilled and obedient. I am satisfied with having saved the country, since the establishment of the inspector-generalship, at least \$600,000 in arms and accouterments alone. (You can decide if I am guilty of exaggeration in this regard.) I am satisfied with having won the esteem and confidence of the officers and soldiers; and I am satisfied with having done my duty honorably on all occasions that I was called upon to act. I regret, however, that political considerations deprived me of other opportunities of distinction; and I shall always regret that circumstances, perhaps, induced me to undertake the defense of a country where Cæsar and Hannibal would have lost their reputation, and where every farmer is a general, but where nobody wishes to be a soldier. I am sorry that I was obliged to solicit the command of a division at the siege of York, but I am glad that I obtained it, and proved that it was not the first siege at which I had served as an officer. In short, my friend, I am glad that I kept my word to form a regular and well-drilled army, in spite of the numberless obstacles that I met with. I had a hard task to overcome the prejudices—well or ill founded—against all foreigners. Without support, without credit, not knowing a word of the language, and what is more, without flattering anybody, I am sometimes astonished that I was able to succeed at all in my task. Nevertheless the work is accomplished. It only wants care and diligence to make it perfect. This is not so easily done as some people fancy. A year, a campaign of neglect, and you may bid farewell to order and discipline. The campaign of '81 demonstrated this thoroughly. I should be willing to place our battalions alongside of the French (I do not of course speak of their dress); but undress them, and any one who un-

derstands it will declare that they are troops which would do honor to any European army. Do not accuse me of gasconading. I refer to the judgment of French officers who, and not our minister of war, will make the report of our army in Europe.

"But what is the good of all this," a philosopher would say, "when you have nothing to eat? And this is exactly your case, Mr. Inspector General. If an honest Tory had not lent you yesterday fifty louis, you would be dinnerless to-day. If a good quakeress had not given you a bed, you would be lying on straw. You were five years in the country, and notwithstanding your brilliant services you have not received the honor of citizenship. You are called, in plain English, 'a stranger,' even sometimes 'an adventurer,' and you are treated accordingly." This same philosopher told me that he lately heard a member of Congress from — allude to my dissatisfaction in about the following terms: "What can he complain of? Has he not received his rations, and for the service which he may have done, he will receive his wages like our officers, and then let him go," etc., etc., etc.

Oh, Mr. Philosopher, you are a Tory. It is not possible that a member of Congress would use such language. You tell me this only to put me in a passion—to make me abandon the good cause. But I won't do so. I am a man of honor, and I will fulfill my engagements, notwithstanding the little slights of the ministers or the silly talk of a single member of Congress. We are in a republic, where, thank God! honors are not hereditary, as the title of baron is in Germany. This member will, perhaps, be sent about his business, as a disgrace to a respectable body, and the minister will perhaps be soon sent back to his old trade, and then every thing will go on well in our young republic.

This is the way I reason, and the devil himself can not persuade me to abandon the good cause. I watch from a distance the turn things are taking; but let what will happen, unless the great disturbers disturb me, I will not disturb myself. Hunger alone will oblige me to get leave and go to Europe, where at least "our great and good ally" will give me "the common rations," and then—and then—and then—nothing is certain except that after all one's follies, one can not avoid the last—that of dying. My friends in America, however, have an opportunity to commit another, namely, to erect a monument to my memory. The inscription will be found all ready on the tomb of the celebrated poet who died of hunger in England.

Enough of this raving, my dear Knox; but there is a good deal of truth in it. Have no news, except that my wagoner has just told me that a new president was elected yesterday—M. Boudinot of Jersey. He is a fine man, whom I love and esteem. God be praised that the world is not as bad as my cynic philosopher represents it.

Give my respects to Mrs. Knox. Always your sincere friend and servant,
STEUBEN.

XXXVII.

FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF ALBANY, PRESENTED TO STEUBEN.

ALBANY, *July 23d*, 1783.

SIR,—Engaged in a war, the event of which must inevitably involve the happiness or misery of millions and their posterity, America was much indebted to such of her virtuous sons who gallantly stepped forth to vindicate their country's injured rights, but more grateful sensations were excited toward those who, interested in our contest from a regard to the liberties of mankind, and impelled by a love of honor and ardent wish to contribute to the establishment of our independence, sacrificed their domestic ease and happiness to aid in repelling a cruel, hostile and tyrannic foe.

Among those, sir, whom America's just cause induced to rank among her defenders, she will always cherish with gratitude the remembrance of the man, who with unabating perseverance has labored to form her armies, and who has so materially contributed to render them respectable for discipline and regularity.

Impressed with these ideas, permit us as members of the Corporation of this city to congratulate you, sir, upon your arrival in it, and as a mark of the respect we entertain for you, sir, and the sense of the services you have rendered our country, to beg your acceptance of the freedom of our city, and to express our wish that the presence of our Mayor could have enabled us to address you as a Corporation; but as our charter authorizes any three of the aldermen to grant the freedom of the city, we indulge in the idea with pleasure of having the honor of considering you, sir, as one of our fellow-citizens.

Know all men by those presents, that we, Peter W. Yates, Cornelius Cuyler, John Jas. Beekman, Philip Van Rensselaer, Thomas Hun and Abraham Schuyler, Esqrs., aldermen of the city of Albany, being well assured of the great and distinguished services rendered to this country by the Honorable Major General Baron de Steuben, Inspector General of the American army, do admit him a freeman of the said city, hereby giving and granting unto him all the rights, liberties and privileges which an inhabitant and freeman of the said city has or is entitled to enjoy. In testimony whereof we have to these presents subscribed our names and caused the public seal of the said city to be

affixed, the 23d day of July in the 8th year of our independence and of the State of New York, and in the year of our Lord 1783.

PETER W. YATES.

JOHN JAS. BEECKMAN.

THOMAS HUN.

ABRAHAM SCHUYLER.

PHILIP VAN RENSSELAER.

CORNELIUS CUYLER.

XXXVIII.

STEUBEN'S ANSWER TO THE CITY OF ALBANY.

The measure in which you have been pleased to notice me demands my most respectful acknowledgment. I feel myself exceedingly flattered by the honor I receive in being ranked among the citizens of this ancient and respectable city, and will ever hold it in grateful remembrance.

Love of honor and a regard to the liberties of mankind led me to America; but the virtues of her brave sons have urged my stay, and induced me to the exertion of every talent I was possessed of in her service. I have been happy enough to see the completion of my wishes: America superior to all her enemies!

I should have been happy in paying my respects to the worshipful Mayor, but his absence unfortunately deprives me of that honor.

I beg the Recorder, Aldermen and Assistants of this respectable city will do justice to my sensibility on this occasion, and accept my sincere wishes for its prosperity and happiness. With the most profound respect, etc.

XXXIX.

FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PRESENTED TO STEUBEN.

NEW YORK, *October 11th, 1784.*

CITY OF NEW YORK, ss.

By James Duane, Esqr., Mayor, and the Recorder, Aldermen and Assistants of the City of New York in Common Council convened, To all people to whom these presents shall come or concern, Greeting: Whereas the Honorable Frederick William Baron de Steuben, Major General and Inspector General of the armies of the United States of America, among other individuals who have distinguished themselves in our happy Revolution, hath rendered important services, and this country is more especially indebted to his well-directed efforts for the introduction of that system into our military establishment on which the reputation and success of our arms so much depended; the battle of Monmouth soon after the commencement of his labors and every

subsequent event of the late war being memorable proofs of the utility of that system in the field; and the records of Congress bearing testimony in how great a degree it contributed to promote the interests of national economy; Now therefore know ye, that we, being mindful of the distinguished merit of the said Baron de Steuben, have received and admitted, and by those presents do receive and admit the said Baron de Steuben to be a freeman of the said city, within the limits of which he hath chosen his residence, to hold, exercise and enjoy all the privileges, advantages and immunities to the freedom of the said city incident and appertaining, as a public mark of the sense we entertain of his services, of our esteem for him personally, and of the interest we take in his happiness.—In testimony whereof we have caused the public seal of the said city to be hereunto affixed, and these presents to be inclosed in a golden box. Witness James Duane, Esquire, Mayor of the said city, this eleventh day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four, and of the independence of the State of New York the ninth.

JAMES DUANE.

By order of the Common Council.

ROBERT BENSON, Clerk.

(L. S.)

XL.

STEBEN TO PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA.

1755.

MONSIEUR,—Après une guerre de sept ans j'ai pour la seconde fois, et en apparence pour la dernière fois—déposé cette épée, dont je fis le premier usage sous les ordres de Votre Altesse Royale. Je me flatte, Monseigneur, que mes travaux militaires dans cette hémisphère ne m'ont pas rendu indigne de me vanter de la gloire d'avoir fait mon apprentissage sous un prince, qui ne fait pas moins l'admiration de l'Amérique que des autres parties du globe. Le succès de cette révolution m'a procuré plusieurs marques de distinction qui flattent l'ambition d'un soldat, mais l'assurance qu'on m'a donnée, que Votre Altesse Royale daigne encore se souvenir de moi, fait le comble de ma gloire. Aussi ne fallait-il pas moins pour m'encourager d'adresser à Votre Altesse Royale ce témoignage de mes profonds respects.

Le sieur Littelpage, Américain et Capitaine au service d'Espagne, aura l'honneur de présenter celle-ci à Votre Altesse Royale. Ce jeune officier s'est distingué dans la dernière guerre à Mahon et Gibraltar sous les ordres du Duc de Crillon et du Prince de Nassau. Son inclination pour ce métier excite en lui cette ambition louable de se faire connaître des grands capitaines d'Europe. Disposé à lui rendre les plus grands

services, j'ose supplier Votre Altesse Royale de l'honneur de sa haute protection. Il m'a donné sa parole de s'en rendre digne.

XLI.

* STEUBEN TO THE DUKE DE MONTMORENCY.

1755.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,—

The bearer of this letter, Mr. Littelpage, captain in the Spanish service, wishes me to give him letters to military men in France. To whom, sooner than to yourself, could I direct him? The distinction which he won at the capture of Minorca, under the Duke De Crillon, and at Gibraltar under the Prince of Nassau, entitle him to your kindness and protection. But while I claim your good offices for a young soldier, allow me, at the same time, to ask your kind consideration for the old soldier who has the honor to present him to you. The proofs that you gave me in America of your friendship, are too precious not to wish for their continuance. I have no longer any correspondents in your country. France has forgotten me. But you are too generous not to be an exception. I send you, inclosed, a little pamphlet containing a plan for the organization of a militia, which I am heartily anxious to see executed. Do me the favor to look over it and to let me know your opinion of it.

Your ministry at Versailles is in a great hurry to play the pacificator for all Europe; and why should they be prevented from cutting their throats when they desire to do so, as John Roastbeef says in "The Scotchman." But this convention of the Holy Roman Empire, the choice of a king of the Romans, and of a ninth elector, the juggling of the Elector Palatine, and other subjects of discussion will give your pacificators plenty to do; and before all this is settled I hope to receive an invitation from the Duke De Laval to take coffee with him in the trenches before—Fribourg, if you please. But do not mention this to the queen. Have you been at the review at Breslau? The old Frederick had a brilliant cortege. I await your reply with impatience. Your first letter will encourage me to keep up a correspondence, which I shall esteem a great honor.

XLII.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF LAFAYETTE TO GENERAL KNOX.

PARIS, *February 11, 1786.*

I have been very much pleased with my journey. I went to Cassel, Brunswick, Berlin, Prince Henry's country-seat, Potsdam, Silesia, Moravia, Vienna, Bohemia, Saxony, Potsdam again and Prince Henry's, Berlin, Magdeburg. I saw kings, emperors, generals, troops of every kind, and fields of battle. The Prussian troops are indeed most admi-

rable; their infantry is handsome, well exercised, and maneuvers in a line better than I had any idea of. I have seen twenty thousand men in one line at Breslau. There were also seventy-five squadrons of a hundred men each, of the best cavalry in the world; their horses are very indifferent, but habit and discipline give them a boldness and a rapidity which is surprising. In Silesia, at Potsdam and Magdeburg I have seen sham battles where I admired the instruction and the military routine by which in that army a fool can manage his corps in the line as well almost as if he was sensible; but the mode of recruiting is despotic. There is hardly any provision for old soldiers, and although I found much to admire, I had rather be the last farmer in America than the first general in Berlin. The imperial army is more substantial, more numerous, than that of Prussia; but not so well exercised by far, and is adopting the same principles for her recruits. Baron De Steuben was often mentioned to me, and while I had the opportunity to do justice to his services among us, I was happy to know he is esteemed in his own country as he deserves. His family made inquiries about him to me, and I felt a sincere pleasure in letting them know that he was well, and much respected in America.

XLIII.

* EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF PRINCE HENRY OF PRUSSIA TO STEUBEN.

BERLIN, *March 3, 1786.*

I recollect with great pleasure the time when you were with us, and was extremely happy to hear from you. I take great share in the military successes you have had among the Americans, and shall always be much pleased to hear that nothing disturbs the happy repose you are now enjoying and which you have so justly merited.

I seize with eagerness this opportunity to renew to you my assurances of the lively interest I take in whatever concerns you, and of the distinguished sentiments with which I ever shall be

Your most affectionate friend, HENRY.

XLIV.

* STEUBEN TO BARON VON DER GOLTZ.

1785.

MY DEAR BARON,—

Encouraged by the assurance I have received that you still remember an old friend who has always felt sincerely attached to you, I take advantage of Mr. Littelpage's (captain in the Spanish service) departure for Europe to repeat to you the sentiments of esteem and friendship which I feel towards you. I should long since have recalled myself to your recollection, but I always hoped to see you at Paris, and thus refrained from writing.

I am vain enough to believe that you have sometimes heard me spoken of, both favorably and the reverse, as is usually the case. I beg you to judge between the two extremes, and the caricature will not be so very extravagant or unlike. I am well aware that in the queen's apartments the American Revolution has but one young hero, but you know that women must always have a little Jesus to work miracles. Believe me, dear baron, that the task which I had to perform was not an easy one. My good republicans wanted every thing in the English style, our great and good allies every thing according to the French *mode*; and when I presented a plate of *sauerkraut* dressed in the Prussian style, they all wanted to throw it out of the window. Nevertheless, by the force of proving by "God damns" that my cookery was the best, I overcame the prejudices of the former; but the second liked me as little in the forests of America as they did on the plains of Rossbach. Do not, therefore, be astonished if I am not painted in very bright colors in Parisian circles. Our poor friend, Woedtke, found a grave in this country. Bile and French brandy finished him at Lake Champlain.

But enough of this Revolution. It is now nothing more than an old newspaper. Let us glance at what is actually going on in your hemisphere. It strikes me that you gentlemen of the diplomatic corps are preparing some work for the soldiers. Would that I were twenty years younger! But no matter. In my solitude the newspapers are a great source of amusement, and they are so insipid without a few battles. Will you have the kindness to give me some information of our old comrades, Schwerin, Götz, Möllendorff, the Tartar Goltz, Geusau and Natzmer—are they still living? What rank do they hold, in what regiments and in what garrisons are they stationed, so that I may know where to address them?

If you have any commissions to execute in this country, I flatter myself that you will intrust them to me. I shall prize any occasion to show you my sincere attachment.

I bespeak your kindness for the young officer who will hand you this letter. Although he has not served under me, he has shown such excellent testimony to his good conduct at the taking of Minorea and at the siege of Gibraltar, that I do not hesitate to recommend him to your attention.*

XLV.

* STEUBEN TO BARON DE GAUDY.

NEW YORK, 1787-'88.

SIR,—The same paper that contained the announcement of Frederick William's accession to the throne, also informed me that you were

* Baron von der Goltz was at the time Prussian Ambassador at Paris.

in your proper place. Sincere regret for my old master, the best wishes for his present majesty, and satisfaction at seeing your merits rewarded, were the sentiments that I experienced on receiving the news.

Permit me, sir, on this occasion to renew an acquaintance of which I am sorry to say a long lapse of time and distance have deprived me. You may have heard, perhaps, that I have thought proper to put in practice in another hemisphere the military knowledge which I acquired while I had the honor of serving with you under the same colors. My success has outstripped my most sanguine expectations. The difficulties which I had to encounter were innumerable. A foreigner, ignorant of the language of the country, without resources or help—without authority, I may say—I succeeded in forming an army capable of resisting Great Britain, and the result of this Revolution has crowned my enterprise. How happy I should be could I give you as satisfactory an account of our political affairs as I can of our military successes. But I can not. As this matter is not at all within my capacity, I shall content myself with the remark, that it is with real regret I see so soon tottering the edifice which I helped to build at so much labor and suffering. But I am forgetting that I am writing to a royalist, who will rejoice at the bad fortune of rebels.

Notwithstanding that I have laid aside the sword for the second and probably for the last time, I still amuse myself with the profession which for so many years was the object of my study. It is on this account that I beg you to give me a copy of the works which you have published on military matters, and thus increase my military library. Long since I have had your "*Elements of Tactics*" translated into English for the instruction of the officers; but M. de Holtzendorf's French translation does not do justice to the author, and he does not seem to have paid the least attention to the engraved plans. Will you have the goodness to send me a German copy, and I shall translate it more accurately for my American pupils.

You must not, however, believe that I have introduced the entire system of drill, evolutions, maneuvers, discipline, tactics and Prussian formation into our army. I should have been pelted had I attempted it, and should inevitably have failed.

My ordinance, which was translated in Paris, is a rhapsody that I hope has never reached you; but if you have seen it by chance, I beg you not to condemn it without considering my situation.

In the first place, the genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier, "Do this, and he doeth it;" but I am obliged to say, "This is the reason why you ought to do that," and then he does it.

Your army is the growth of a century, mine of a day. My officers

were as raw as my soldiers. This army was renewed almost after every campaign, and I considered myself too fortunate if I had my recruits four weeks before the commencement of active operations.

Judge, then, whether I could amuse myself much with the management of arms and parades. Contrary to my principles, I was forced to begin my task at the wrong end, and after executing great maneuvers with six or eight thousand men together, I have sent my generals and colonels to learn the manual exercise.

After what I have related above, you will admit that my task was not an easy one, and you will judge my ordinances indulgently. I should also tell you that besides infantry, cavalry, artillery and light troops, every thing belonged to my department, and my aids and assistants were all of my own creation.

In all the deviations from the Prussian ordinance that I was compelled to make, there is one that I never regretted. It is the formation of my battalions, which were numerically only half the strength of a Prussian battalion. The battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel or major. It was divided into two divisions; each division into two companies; the company into two platoons; the platoons into two sections; the section into two demi-sections; the demi-section into two squads; and the squad into two files. Two battalions formed a regiment, commanded by a colonel; two regiments a brigade, commanded by a brigadier general; two brigades a division, commanded by a major general. A battalion of light infantry, or rifles, two squadrons of dragoons, and two companies of artillery attached to this division, formed a legion. This simple formation was of infinite service to me, as well for my maneuvers as for the subdivision of detachments. You see that I did not adopt the five companies in a battalion, and that mine was always ready, each officer remaining with his company.

XLVI.

STEBDEN TO J. W. MULLIGAN.

PHILADELPHIA, *January 11, 1793.*

Your letter of the 7th was handed me yesterday by Mr. Hamilton. In vain, my dear child, should I undertake to express to you the sensations which this letter created in my heart. Neither have I the courage to attempt to arrest the tears you have so great reason to shed. For a heart as feeling as yours this was the severest of trials, and nothing but time can bring consolation under circumstances so afflicting.

Strength of mind is enfeebled by griefs of this nature; but, my friend, one ought not to suffer it to be entirely extinguished, for it is the duty of a sensible man to cherish the heavenly fire with which we are endowed by Providence.

Despite moral philosophy, I weep with you, and glory in the human weakness of mingling my tears with those of a friend I so tenderly love.

My dear Charles ought, ere this, to have received my answer to the touching letter he wrote me.

I repeat my entreaties, to hasten your journey to Philadelphia as soon as your strength permits. My heart and my arms are open to receive you. In the midst of the attention and fêtes which they have the goodness to give me, I enjoy not a moment's tranquillity until I hold you in my arms. Grant me this favor without delay, but divide your journey, that you may not be fatigued at the expense of your health.

O, if our friend could accompany you! Embrace him for me, with the same tender friendship I feel for you.

XLVII.

JOHN W. MULLIGAN TO BENJAMIN WALKER.

STEBBEN, November 29, 1794.

I am at length sufficiently composed to begin, O my dear sir, a sad tale. On Tuesday morning last, our friend, my father, was struck with a palsy which deprived his left side of motion. The evening before we parted at eleven; he was well, perfectly well. At four o'clock I was alarmed with the cry that he was dying, and when I entered his chamber he was in extreme agony and appeared to have suffered long. I sent for immediate assistance, and dispatched White for Major North. He was sensible and could speak, reached violently, asked for an emetic which I gave him—it operated well. I then put him to bed, from which I had taken him by his desire. He continued to speak at intervals till about six, and from thence was speechless. He remained apparently sensible during the greater part of Tuesday, notwithstanding he was often in convulsions. That night he was pretty quiet, though the fits sometimes returned. He did not show any signs of sense afterwards. Every measure which the situation afforded was pursued to relieve him until the arrival of the doctor on Thursday. He administered medicines which gave some relief, but it was not long. The stroke was too violent, and yesterday, at half past twelve o'clock, oh, my good God, my parent died! O, Colonel Walker, our friend, my all; I can write no more. Come if you can, I am lonely. Oh, good God, what solitude is in my bosom. Oh, if you were here to mingle your tears with mine, there would be some consolation for the distressed

JOHN W. MULLIGAN.

XLVIII.

STEBEN'S LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.

I, Frederick William Baron De Steuben, of the City and State of New York, do make this my last will and testament.

Sufficient reasons having determined me to exclude my relatives in Europe from any participation in my estate in America, and to adopt my friends and former aides-de-camp, Benjamin Walker and William North, as my children, and make them sole devisees of all my estate therein, except as hereinafterwards is otherwise disposed of. In consequence thereof I bequeath to the said Benjamin Walker the sum of three thousand dollars, and the gold-hilted sword given to me by Congress; to the said William North I bequeath my silver-hilted sword, and the gold box given me by the city of New York; to John W. Mulligan I bequeath the whole of my library, maps and charts, and the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars to complete it, and to each of my servants living with me at the time of my decease one year's wages, and besides this, to my valet-de-chambre, all my wearing apparel. I do hereby declare that those legacies to my servants are on the following conditions: that on my decease they do not permit any person to touch my body, nor even to change the shirt, in which I shall die, but that they wrap me up in my old military cloak and in twenty-four hours after my decease bury me in such a spot as I shall before my decease point out to them, and that they never acquaint any person with the place wherein I shall be buried. And lastly I do give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of my estate, real and personal, after the payment of my debts and the legacies aforesaid, to the said Benjamin Walker and William North, their heirs, executors and administrators, share and share alike, hereby appointing the said Benjamin Walker and William North executors of this my last will and testament, and revoking all former wills by me heretofore made.

New York, February 12, 1794.

STEBEN. (L. S.)

Signed, sealed, published and declared as the last will and testament, etc., in the presence of CHARLES WILLIAMSON, CHARLES ADAMS and W. H. ROBINSON.

XLIX.

EULOGY OF THE GERMAN SOCIETY.

From New York Journal and Patriotic Register, No. 2939, of Jan. 7, 1795.

When, in the dispensation of His Providence, it pleases the Almighty Ruler of the Universe to remove from this world persons who

have been eminently useful to mankind, it becomes the duty of the society to which they have belonged to bear to their virtue some honorable testimonial. In this sentiment, mankind in all ages and in every country have been agreed.

And whereas, we, the German Society in the city of New York, have lately received official intelligence of the death of our late respected countryman and president, Frederick William Baron De Steuben :

We, reflecting upon his kind and affectionate deportment as a citizen, as a member, and as president of our charitable institution, and considering the important services he rendered this our country, can not but view him as justly entitled to an affectionate place in the memory of every citizen, and of each member of our society.

We therefore conceive it our duty as members of this society, and as citizens of the American republic, to pay, on this mournful occasion, a tribute of respect to his memory : and though that heart which was once alive to every honorable feeling of our nature, is now " compressed into a clod of the valley," unconscious of this mark of our respect and regard, still this performance of our duty may not be without its use to society, while to the members of our society it may be an inducement to the practice of those gentle and amiable virtues, by which the deceased gained our affections and esteem. To our countrymen in general it may serve as a further incentive to the discharge of those duties they owe to their country ; for by this they will learn that the fame of virtuous deeds is as extensive as their utility, and that the names of those who have rendered distinguished services in the cause of freedom, descend to posterity, not only adorned with the wreath of public admiration, but even in societies, like ours, abstracted from all political concerns and devoted solely to the discharge of the duties of benevolence, their virtues are held in tender remembrance, and their memories are embalmed by the sight of unfeigned regret.

Be it, therefore, resolved, by the officers of the German Society, now convened on this mournful occasion, that the members thereof be requested to wear the usual mourning six weeks, in testimony of their respect for the public and private virtues of their late president, Frederick William Baron De Steuben ; and also, that the Rev. Dr. Gross be requested to deliver a funeral oration in the German language, in honor of our deceased president, on Sunday next, half past two o'clock, P. M., in the Reformed German Church in Nassau street.

DAVID GRIMM, V. P.

WILLIAM WILMERDING, SEC.

December 29, 1794.

L.

FROM AN INCOMPLETE MEMORIAL.

The respectable citizens who entered the lists with so much ardor, quitted their cabins with more regret to answer to the second call. Those who were in more easy circumstances emptied their purses to induce those who were poorer to take their places. The rotation of service soon became a speculation, and before the end of the second campaign there were very few rich enough to pay a substitute to serve in their stead. Associations were formed, and, by the force of money, children, invalids and vagrants were engaged to complete the number of the contingents. These men were engaged for such short terms that one recruit soon took the place of another, and the country became quickly destitute of money. They then began to pay in produce. Negroes, cattle, produce, even lands were given to recruits who were utterly useless to the army.

Congress and the commander-in-chief remonstrated. The evil had become incurable. The soldiers whose term had expired could not be kept on at any price; several withdrew in the middle, others at the end of the campaign. The enemy was always in full force, while the American army was almost insufficient to furnish the guards for our advanced posts. The new recruit generally arrived when the operations of the war were far advanced. He arrived in a wretched condition, destitute of every article of clothing, and utterly ignorant of a soldier's duty. Often a third of these new levies was totally unfit for service; another third soon went into hospital, and the remaining third was slightly trained during the time that the enemy employed in making his dispositions.

In the third campaign the government was compelled to reduce to a considerable extent the number of regiments, from inability to recruit them. If the fate of America could have been decided in one day by a general engagement, it is possible that the enthusiasm of our valorous citizens might have achieved a victory over an army as brave as it was well disciplined. But a war is seldom finished by one or two battles. It is necessary to keep the field, and the hope of regaining advantages on another occasion, tends to prolong the operations of the war.

The citizen who had braved death at Bunker Hill, could not resist the desire to see his family, and take charge of his household. The hero in the battle of to-day became a deserter to-morrow, perfectly confident that he was not guilty of any impropriety. "I have had my turn," he used to say; "I have fought bravely, let my neighbor do likewise. If five hundred thousand of my fellow citizens fire as many shots at the enemy as I have fired in the last battle, the enemy would

be soon annihilated, and my country would be free." The neighbor, animated by the same sentiments, puts on his arms, joins the army, fills the vacancy, and asks nothing better than to fight and distinguish himself. But a battle is not fought every day. He waits a week, two, three, perhaps a month. He begins to long to see his family, his cabin, his land which requires his presence to sow the crop or make his harvest. He fears to lose the produce of an entire year. His anxiety affects his health. There is nothing left for him but to go into hospital or go home. He returns to require some other neighbor to take his turn, and so on indefinitely. This rotation soon exhausts the village, but the war is not ended, and the enemy is getting ready for another campaign.

LI.

RICHARD PETERS TO STEUBEN.

BELMONT, *October 30, 1788.*

* * * * *

Having been in the War Office from its establishment to the dissolution of the Board of War (which happened after the great events of the war were passed through, and a short time before the peace), I can speak from an intimate knowledge of the effects your talents and industrious exertions produced.

And you will permit me to say that they operated like a charm upon every branch of the civil business of the department. Many obstacles were encountered by you, in the commencement of your operations, which I believe very few men would have overcome. But when your plans were understood and relished by the army, an economy was introduced which not only made the situation of those concerned in superintending the supplies easier and happier, but was the cause of such immense savings to the United States, as will bear no comparison with any compensation you can now expect.

It was scarcely possible for us, before your successful exertions introduced discipline and the police of the camp into our army, to keep pace with the waste and loss daily experienced.

But how happy was the change, the inspection returns and other documents will abundantly evince! I say not these things from any motive but that of justice to you, and from a desire to render to you a small but grateful tribute for the eminent and useful services my country has received at your hands. This I consider myself as bound to do, both as a citizen and one who profited not a little by your information, and the observations made on your conduct while I had the honor to fill a public station with which you were connected, and in which I had almost as much to learn as to practice.

FORMATION OF THE ARMY COMMANDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, FOR THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN (1779).

				To furnish		Remains		Total in the Line		Total Lt. Infantry	
				for Lt. Int.	Batt.	Batt.	Men.	Batt.	Men.	Batt.	Men.
VIRGINIA.	1st Briga. Woodford	2d Regt.	175	62	1	336		6	1758	1 1-2	246
		5th & 11th	223	98							
		8th	182	332	41	1	291				
		7th	150	245	21	1	224				
		3d & 4th			—124	—3					
	2d Briga. Mullenberg	6th	168	398	82	1	316				
		2d State,	230								
		Gists'	133	362	41	1	321				
		1st State	209								
		1st & 10th		270		1	270				
MARYLAND.	1st Briga. Smallwood	1st	290	41	1	219		8	1866	1	164
		5th	220		1	220					
		7th	240		1	240					
		3d	270		1	229					
				—123	—3						
	2d Briga. Gist	2d	280	41	1	298					
		6th	230		1	230					
		4th	220		1	249					
		Delaware	220		1	220					
				—82	—4						
PENNSYLVANIA.	1st Briga. Irvine	1st	210	389	41	1	339	5	1574	1 1-2	246
		7th	170			1	240				
		10th		241		1	229				
		2d	340		41	1	229				
					—82	—3					
	2d Briga. Johnson	3d	230	440	82	1	358				
		6th	180			1	338				
		9th	180	420	82	1	338				
		5th	240			1	338				
					—164	—2					
CONNECTICUT.	1st Briga. Huntington	4th	184	416	64	1	338	6	1909	2	328
		8th	232		59	1	384				
		6th		431		1	329				
		3d		567	41	1	329				
					—164	—3					
	2d Briga. Parsons	1st	289		41	1	251				
		5th	220	426	82	1	250				
		2d	206		41	1	257				
		7th		295	41	1	257				
					—164	—3					
MASSACHUSETTS.	1st Briga. Learned	2d	224		24	1	240	6	1373	1	164
		5th	203		30	1	233				
		4th	313		38	1	275				
					—92	—3					
					—3						
	2d Briga. Nixen	1st	277		32	1	245				
		7th	212		12	1	240				
		8th	248		15	1	220				
					—72	—3					
					—3						
N. CARO.	1st Brigade	9th	192	376	43	1	333				
		13th	184								
		10th	179	429	51	1	388				
		15th	269								
					—94	—2					
	2d	1st	338		37	1	291	35	9755	8	1312
			198		23	1	263				
					—70	—2					

N.B.—Each Batt. of Lt. Inftry. consists of 1 Field Offr., 4 Cpts., 8 Subs., 12 Sergts., & 164 R. & F.

RETURN OF THE NUMBER OF MEN ENLISTED DURING THE WAR, AND FOR SHORTER PERIODS
IN THE ARMY UNDER THE IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, DECEMBER, 1779.

BRIGADES.	Terms expire by the 1st of July,				During the War.	TOTAL.
	1780.	1781.	1782.	1783.		
1st Maryland	344	118	49	5	900	1416
2d Do.	307	122	15	7	1046	1497
1st Pennsylvania	7	1	3		1242	1253
2d Do.	10	5			1035	1050
New Jersey	191	13	11		1079	1297
New York	279	19	8	1	969	1267
1st Connecticut	717	81			878	1680
2d Do.	763	35	3		566	1267
Hand's	46				1023	1033
Stark's	476	327	1		406	1210
TOTAL	3194	721	97	13	9135	13070

GENERAL RETURN OF THE NUMBER OF MEN WHOSE TIMES OF ENLISTMENT EXPIRE BEFORE THE FIRST DAY OF JULY, 1780.						GENERAL RETURN OF THE NUM- BER OF MEN WHO HAVE BEEN SICK ABSENT, AND HAVE NOT BEEN HEARD OF IN SIX MONTHS.					
BRIGADES.	Regiments.	Sergeants.	Drums & Fife.	Rank & File.	Total of each Regt.	Regiments.	Sergeants.	Drums and Fife.	Rank and File.	Total of each Regt.	Total of each Brigade.
1st Maryland....	{ 1st 5th 7th 3d	{ 6 2 4 2 6 4 5	{ 85 45 37 43 38 47 30 35	{ 171		1st 5th 7th 3d		{ 7 7 2 2	{ 9		
2d Do.	{ 2d 6th 4th Delaware	{ 4 7	{ 15 15 24 28 38 45	{ 88		2d 6th 4th Delaware	1	{ 2 8 4 4	{ 7		
1st Pennsylvania	{ 1st 7th 10th 2d	{ 1 1 1	{ 3 4 1 2 1	{ 7		1st 7th 10th 2d		{ 1 1 3 3 4 4	{ 9		
2d Do.	{ 3d 6th 9th 5th	{ 2	{ 1 1 4 4 3 5 5 5	{ 15		3d 6th 9th 5th		{ 1 1 1 1	{ 2		
New Jersey.....	{ 1st 3d 4th 2d	{ 3 3 1 10 5 1	{ 6 9 22 26 88 103 3 4	{ 142		1st 3d 4th 2d		{ 4 4 2 2 5 5	{ 11		
New York.....	{ 2d 4th 5th 3d	{ 3 5 1 8 1	{ 6 9 10 10 18 24 25 29	{ 72		2d 4th 5th 3d		{ 3 3 5 5 2 2	{ 10		
Stark's	{ Webb's Jackson's 2d Rhode Is. Sherborn's	{ 12 8 14 12 5 3 13 10	{ 98 118 84 110 62 70 115 138	{ 436		Webb's Jackson's 2d Rhode Is. Sherborn's		{ 2 2 20 20	{ 22		
Hand's.....	{ 4th Penns. 11th Do. Hazen's Livingston	{ 1 2 1	{ 1 2 3 3 13 15 4 5	{ 25		4th Penns. 11th Do. Hazen's Livingston	3 1	{ 3 3 3 3 9 13	{ 19		
1st Connecticut..	{ 3d 4th 6th 5th	{ 17 8 10 3 6 6 12 7	{ 120 145 78 91 75 87 100 119	{ 442		3d 4th 6th 5th		{ 9 9 2 2 1 1 4 4	{ 16		
2d Do. ..	{ 1st 2d 5th 7th	{ 11 2 7 7 6 2 13 11	{ 115 128 75 89 74 82 146 170	{ 469		1st 2d 5th 7th					
TOTAL.....		197 95	1575	in all 1867			3 2 99	in all 104			

N. B.—The 2d Connecticut Brigade omitted making any Return of Men not heard of in Six Months.

LEGIONARY CORPS.

LEGIONARY CORPS.																										
	Colonels,	Lieut.-Colonels,	Majors,	Captains,	Lieutenants,	Cornets,	Pay-masters,	Adjutants and Qr.-masters,	Surgeons,	Riding-masters, Saddlers and Farriers,	Trumpet-major, Qr.-masters, and Sergeants,	Corporals, Buglers, and Dragoons,	Troop-horses,													
Lee's Partisan Legion.				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	35	128	7	52	8	231								
		1													193	1	13	2								
	Present, and on Field Duty.																									
1st Regt., Virginia.				12	12	12	12	12	1	1	5	1	65	95												
		1		4	4	4	4	1	1		2	1	66	96	1	4	1	411								
	Present, and on Field Duty.																	173								
3d Regt., Virginia.				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	6	14	14												
		1		1	1	1	1	1			4	0	6	65	10	6	1	25								
	Present, and on Field Duty.																	194								
Detachment from 4th Regt., Penns.				4	4	4	4	1					8	8	5	2	1	5								
		1		1	1	1	1				5		17	35	17	6	1	194								
	Present, and on Field Duty.																	46								
														31st Aug.	13th Sept.	24 Aug.	94	137	29	193	28	240	14	151	25	375

RECAPITULATION.

	Field (Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeons and Mates.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Trumpeters, Riflers and Drummers.	Privates of every denomination.	Troop-horses.
Present, fit for and on Field Duty,	19	98	86	11	960	126	1830	766
Sick, Present and in Hospital,	5	13	27	4	159	26	870	60
On Furlough and in Captivity,	8	18	34	1	27	2	37	8
On Staff, and Menial Duty,	42	2	20		23	124	321	4
EFFECTIVES,	31	71	157	16	569	153	3088	428

several of the officers returned in the Regimental Staff, are not attached to companies; but they, as well as those returned on Staff Duty, are all included in the columns of their rank in the Requisition. The column of Dates shows the day from which the terms of service are computed. The Master Rolls and Inspection Returns which are to accompany this Abstract will render any further remarks unnecessary here.

A true copy of the original.

D. TERNANT, Lt.-Col., 1 P.L., Insp. S. A.
Camp Ashley-hill, Sept. 23d, 1782.

Major-General the Baron STURZEN,
Insp. Gen'l of the Armies of the United States.

ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL, 1782.

[illegible][illegible]

	Colonels,	Lieutenant Colonels,	Majors,	Captains,	1st Lieutenants,	2d Lieutenants,	Corporals,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Sergeants,	Mates,	Sergeant-Majors,	Quartermaster-sergeants,	Riding-masters,	Trumpet-majora,	Sergents,	Corporals,	Trumpeters,	Buglers,	Drummers and Fifers,	Furriers,	Saddlers,	Ammunition,	Privates.
Connecticut... Van Heer.....	1	1	1	5	6	8	3	1	1	—	1	1	—	5	1	—	11	19	4	—	—	4	—	—	242
TOTAL....	—	—	—	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	3	8	—	—	—	—	—	28

ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF MAY, 1782.

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ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF JULY, 1782.

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ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY, 1753.

[illegible]

ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, 1783.

STATES AND CORPS.	Regiments, Colonels,	Lt. Cols. Commands, Lieutenant Colonels,	Majors,	Captains,	Lieutenants,	Ensigns,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Surgeons,	Mates,	Sergeant Majors, Quarter-master sergeants,	Drum-majors, File-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Drummers and Fifers,	Privates,
New Hampshire.....	1 2		1 2	6 4	4 4		1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	21 26	21 19	14 13	324 291
Massachusetts.....	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1	1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	5 4 6 4 3 1 1 1 1 1	8 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	32 25 22 30 34 34 32 40	25 31 28 26 22 24 24 28	13 17 18 16 17 19 18 15	442 423 426 422 426 434 430 424
Connecticut.....	1 2 3	1 1	1 1 1	6 5 2	4 3 2	3 2 2	1 1 1	1 1 1	1 1 1	1 1 1	1 1 1	1 1 1	1 1 1	42 53 40	35 31 24	20 22 27	377 411 407
New York.....	1 2		1 1	6 2	7 9	5 4	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	35 37	28 25	17 21	307 412
New Jersey.....	1 2		1 1	7 7	7 5	4 2	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	1 1	26 24	21 20	15 13	276 273
Maryland Detachment.			1	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10	15	7	196
Commr.-in-chief's Gd.					1								1	3		5	53
Invalids.....	1			3				1	1	1	1	1	1	13	13	8	164
Sappers and Miners...				1										5	2	1	55
TOTAL.....																	

ARTILLERY.	ARTILLERY.																					
	Colonels,	Lieutenant Colonels,	Majors,	Captains,	Capt. Lieutenants,	1st Lieutenants,	2d Lieutenants,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Surgeons,	Mates,	Sergeant-Majors,	Quarter-master sergeants,	Drum-majors,	Pay-masters,	File-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Bombardiers,	Gunners,	Drummers and Fifers,	Matrosses,
Massachusetts,...	1			4	8	8	5	1				1	1	1	1	1	47	36	22	21	18	305
New York,	1	1		4	4	4	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	20	15	4	16	14	200	
Artificers,				1	1	1								1		12						51
TOTAL,	1	1	1	9	12	13	15	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	2	79	51	26	37	32	536

**ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH, 1783.**

STATES AND CORPS.	Regiments, Colonels,	Lt. Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels,	Major, Captain,	Lieutenants,	Ensigns,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Surgeons,	Mates,	Sergeant Majors,	Quarter-master sergeants,	Trumpet-majors,	File-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Drummers and Fifers,	Privates,
New Hampshire.....	1	1	12	9	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	31	503
Do. Battalion.....	1		2	4	3	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	14	179	
Massachusetts...	1	1	1	7	10	3	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	38	25	18	459
	2	1	1	9	7	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	37	34	17	439
	3	1	1	9	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	34	33	19	449
	4	1	1	7	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	29	17	444
	5	1	1	8	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	41	28	16	448
	6	1	1	9	7	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	37	30	19	460
Rhode Island.....	1	1	1	4	9	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	27	22	15	224
Connecticut.....	1	1	1	8	7	5	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	48	38	21	404
	2	1	1	8	9	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	59	38	18	435
New York.....	1	1	1	9	9	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	40	26	17	396
New Jersey.....	2	1	1	7	7	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	42	27	19	419
Do. Battalion.....	1	1	1	4	4	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	20	15	8	183
Penn'a Detachment		1	2	2	2			1							10	7	2	100
Delaware do.....			1	2	2										2	2	3	63
Maryland do.....			1	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		14	15	7	208
Guards.....				2	2									1	5	4	5	50
Invalids.....	1			5	3			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	24	19	8	215
Sappers and Miners				3											5	4	1	55
TOTAL.....	10	7	11	23	147	158	75	19	19	20	18	15	20	20	95	61	343	7894

ARTILLERY.																					
	Colonels,	Lieutenant Colonels,	Major,	Captain,	1st Lieutenant,	2d Lieutenant,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Surgeons,	Mates,	Sergeant Majors,	Quarter-master sergeants,	Trumpet-majors,	File-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Bombardiers,	Gunnors,	Drummers and Fifers,	Musicians,
Massachusetts...	1	1	9	9	10	10	1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	45	37	22	21	18	336
New York.....	1	1	6	5	6	14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	24	22	12	17	13	221
Pennsylvania...		1	1	1	1	1										12	12	12			31
Mass. Artificers,			1	1	1	1								1		12	12	12			57
Penn. do.....			1	1	1											2					2
TOTAL.....	2	2	18	16	19	26	2	2	1	3		2	3	2	2	95	61	51	39	32	657

CAVALRY.																								
	Colonels,	Lieutenant Colonels,	Major,	Captain,	1st Lieutenant,	2d Lieutenant,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Surgeons,	Mates,	Sergeant Majors,	Quarter-master sergeants,	Riding-masters,	Trumpet-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Trumpeters,	Buglers,	Drummers and Fifers,	Furriers,	Clerks,	Volunteers,	Privates,
Sheldon's.....		1	5	10		1	1	1		1			4		1	18	3			3				234
Van Heer.....			1	2		1									5	4	3			1		1		40
TOTAL.....	1	6	12		1	1	1			1			4		10	22	6			4			1	274

**ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL, 1783.**

STATES AND CORPS.	Regiments.	Colonels.	Lt. Colo. Command.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quarter-master sergeants.	Drum-majors.	File-majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Privates.
New Hampshire....	1	1			2	9	7		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	42	32	20	494
Do. Battalion.....	1				2	4	4		1	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	20	15	5	172
Massachusetts...	1	1	1	1	1	6	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	25	18	453
	2	1	1	1	1	9	11	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	33	18	434
	3	1		1	3	6	8	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	34	33	20	451
	4	1	1	1	1	6	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	39	26	17	431
	5		1		1	6	9	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	43	29	17	441
	6	1	1	1	1	9	7	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	37	30	19	460
	7	1	1	1	1	6	8	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	25	18	449
	8	1			1	9	10	5	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	41	31	18	430
Rhode Island.....																					
Connecticut.....	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	4	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	46	25	21	386
	2	1	1	1	1	6	9	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	57	36	15	429
	3	1	1	1	1	6	8	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	49	33	23	421
New York.....	1	1	1	1	1	9	7	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	38	27	17	393
	2	1	1	1	1	6	8	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	40	27	19	421
New Jersey.....	1	1	1	1	1	6	5	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	45	35	23	445
Do. Battalion.....	1		1		1	4	4	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	29	13	8	178
Md. Detachment...					1	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		17	15	7	199
Guards						1	1										1	5	4	5	50
Invalids.....					1		3			1	1	1	1	1	1	1		24	19	8	215
Sappers and Miners						3												5	4	1	55
TOTAL.....		8	6	9	24	140	140	70	18	19	19	18	17	20	19	19	17	714	527	317	7407

ARTILLERY.	Colonels.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	1st Lieutenants.	2d Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant-Majors.	Quarter-master sergeants.	Drum-majors.	File-majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gamblers.	Drummers and Fifers.	Musicians.
Massachusetts....	1		1	2	8	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	48	37	22	21	12	339
New York.....	1	1	1	5	6	6	13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	23	22	14	15	12	218
Mass. Artillery,				1	1	1	1						1			12					58
TOTAL.....	1	1	2	15	15	17	24	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	83	59	29	36	30	615

CAVALRY.	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	1st Lieutenants.	2d Lieutenants.	Cornets.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant-Majors.	Quarter-master sergeants.	Riding-masters.	Trumpet-majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Trumpeters.	Bagpipers.	Drummers and Fifers.	Fardlers.	Clocks.	Volunteers.	Privates.
Sheldon's.....																									
Van Heer.....				1	2		1										3	4	3			1		1	40
TOTAL.....				1	2		1										3	4	3			1		1	40

ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1783.

[illegible]

FOR THE MONTHS OF OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1783.

STATES AND CORPS.																						
	Regiments,	Colonels,	Lt. Colonels,	Lieutenant Colonels,	Majors,	Captains,	Lieutenants,	Ensigns,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Surgeons,	Matns,	Sergeant-Majors,	Quarter-master sergeants,	Drum-majors,	File-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Drummers and Fifers,	Privates,	
1st Massachusetts.....	1	1	1	1	1	9	10	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	34	21	13	460	
2d ditto.....		1		1		2	9	9	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	35	25	13	444	
3d ditto.....		1		1		1	9	10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	26	25	11	480	
4th ditto.....		1		1		1	9	9	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	31	24	12	459	
New Hampshire.....						1	5	5		1	1	1		1	1	1	1	14	14	7	241	
Connecticut.....																						
Sappers and Miners.....						1	1											1			10	
TOTAL.....																						

ARTILLERY.																						
	Colonels,	Lieutenant Colonels,	Majors,	Captains,	Capt. Lieutenants,	1st Lieutenants,	2d Lieutenants,	Adjutants,	Quarter-masters,	Pay-masters,	Surgeons,	Matns,	Sergeant-Majors,	Quarter-master sergeants,	Drum-majors,	File-majors,	Sergeants,	Corporals,	Bombardiers,	Gunners,	Drummers and Fifers,	Privates,
Massachusetts, ..			1	4	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	7	5	1	7	139
New York,			1	2	4	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	7	5	1	7	61
Artificers,						1	6	1	1			1						6	2	2		2

**ABSTRACT OF THE MUSTERS OF THE NORTHERN ARMY,
FOR THE MONTHS OF JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH, AND APRIL, 1754.**

STATES AND CORPS.	Regiments.	Colonels.	Lt. Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quarter-master sergeants.	Drum-majors.	File-majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Privates.
Jackson's Regiment.....	1	1	1	1	9	9	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	39	24	17	421
Invalids.....					1													12	1		12
Field and Staff, and eight Companies of Jackson's Regiment, for May and June.....	1	1	1	1	8	8	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	36	19	16	354
Invalids.....					2											1		21	1		14
TOTAL.....																					

ARTILLERY																
For January, February, March, and April, com- manded by Major Baumann.																
	Colonels.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Capt. Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drummers and Fifers.	Artificers.
January, February, March, April.....	1	1	1	1	5	5	1	1			5	7	1	1	2	3
May and June.....	1	1	1	1	5	5	1	1			5	7	1	1	2	3
Lt. Jefferdt's Detachment for Jan. and Feb.						1	1				1	1				17
TOTAL.....																

FOR THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1754.

STATES AND CORPS.	Regiments.	Colonels.	Lt. Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Quarter-masters.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeant Majors.	Quarter-master sergeants.	Drum-majors.	File-majors.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Drummers and Fifers.	Privates.
Troops under Colonel Harmer.																					
Pennsylvania.....	1				3	3	1		1	1	1	1		1				7	7	4	172
Jersey.....					1	2	2					1						6	2		56
TOTAL INFANTRY....	1				4	5	3		1	1	1	2		1				13	7	6	258
Invalids for July, Aug., Sept. and Oct.....					2										1			2	1		18

ARTILLERY.																					
	Colonels.	Lieutenant Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Capt. Lieutenants.	Lieutenants.	Adjutants.	Pay-masters.	Surgeons.	Mates.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Drummers and Fifers.	Artificers.					
Harmer's for September.....					1		1				3	3	3	3	2	36					
Doughty for July, August, September, and October.....					1	1	1				5	5			2	43					

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